| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills (1968) 3 SCR 251 |
Used as contextual and procedural background regarding similar writ petitions against the levy. |
The judgment was referred to for succinctly stating facts and noting that the petitioner's judgment followed the Birla Mills judgment; it formed part of the factual/procedural matrix. |
| Government of Mysore v. J.V. Bhat & Others (decided 14-10-1974, reported 1975 1 S.C.C. 111) |
Authority for reading the requirement of audi alteram partem into statutes where silence exists and nothing prohibits hearing; emphasis on justice and fairness. |
The court relied on this decision to hold that the respondents had a duty to consider the petitioner's representation about excessive assessment and that an inquiry could be read into the statutory scheme. |
| King v. Electricity Commissioner (1924) 1 K.B. 171 |
Discussed in the context of historical development of the audi alteram partem principle. |
The decision was cited (via explanation in Government of Mysore) to show continuity of law on fairness requirements; used to support inference that a hearing is appropriate where statute is silent. |
| Cooper v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (14 C.B. (N.S.) 180) |
Early articulation of the general principle of giving a person an opportunity to answer before a decision affecting him is made. |
Referred to as part of the lineage of audi alteram partem authority; the court used related reasoning to infer a duty to inquire into the petitioner's representation. |
| Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P. Dube (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 549) |
Explains the scope of Article 226 jurisdiction where statutory appeal remedies exist — High Court normally refrains but may intervene for constitutional issues, jurisdictional error, serious procedural errors, or where taxing authority threatens recovery on erroneous interpretation. |
The court invoked these principles to justify entertaining the petition under Article 226 despite the availability of statutory appeals in appropriate circumstances. |
| New Delhi Holy Family Hospital Society v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (C.W. 1114/71) (decided 12-12-1973) |
Principle that availability of alternative remedy is a matter of discretion (not jurisdiction) and the High Court may decline jurisdiction in suitable cases; consideration of onerous conditions attached to appeals (e.g., deposit requirement). |
The decision was relied upon to show that the onerous condition of depositing disputed amounts under Section 170 may justify recourse to Article 226 without pursuing the statutory appeal. |
| Himatlal Hiralal Mehta v. State of M.P. & Ors. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 403) |
Authority referenced concerning recourse to Article 226 where statutory remedies are onerous or inadequate. |
Used to support the court's view that Article 226 may be invoked without exhausting statutory appeals in appropriate circumstances. |
| Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Judge Small Cause Courts (C.M. No. 161/72) (decided 31-10-1973) |
Decision of the court (cited by the judge) discussing limits on exercising Article 226 jurisdiction notwithstanding alternative remedies. |
Referred to for the proposition that limitations on jurisdiction are self-imposed and that interference under Article 226 may be proper in suitable cases. |
| Daryao v. State of U.P. & Others (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457) |
Considered the applicability of res judicata (including in writ proceedings) and discussed the doctrine's object (finality/minimising litigation) and limits. |
The court relied on Daryao's analysis to examine whether constructive res judicata barred the petition; it used Daryao's distinctions (e.g., speaking orders, finality) to reject the respondents' plea here. |
| Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621) |
Followed Daryao on res judicata principles in constitutional/writ contexts. |
Referenced in the court's review of res judicata authorities to frame limitations on applying res judicata to writ petitions. |
| Naresh v. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1) |
Authority on inappropriateness of applying res judicata to decisions affecting fundamental rights without careful consideration. |
Used in the court's discussion to show caution in applying res judicata principles to writ petitions involving constitutional rights. |
| Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335) |
Distinguished Daryao and considered limits of res judicata when prior dismissal did not address certain constitutional questions or when an order is not a 'speaking order'. |
Invoked to demonstrate that res judicata does not automatically bar subsequent writs where prior proceedings did not decide the relevant issues on merits. |
| Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. Government of Madras (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1196) |
Explained the effect of a dismissal in limine and whether that constitutes a bar by res judicata depending on whether a speaking order on merits was given. |
Used by the court to support the proposition that a summary dismissal may not create res judicata where no reasoned decision on the merits exists. |
| Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Others (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1013) |
Held that the principle of constructive res judicata is a special/artificial form and suggested it should not apply to writ petitions. |
Cited as authority resisting the blanket application of constructive res judicata to writ proceedings; court weighed it against contrary authorities. |
| Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1150) |
Applied constructive res judicata to prevent successive writs raising new grounds about the same assessment period; emphasised preventing piecemeal litigation. |
The court distinguished Devilal Modi on the facts and used it to explain limits of successive challenges for the same period; nevertheless, the court found Devilal does not control the present case's outcome. |
| Union of India v. Nanak Singh (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1370) |
Discussed extension of res judicata principles where an 'express decision' in prior writ could bar subsequent proceedings. |
Referred to in analysing whether prior express decisions could bar the petition; court treated the "express decision" principle as distinct from constructive res judicata. |
| Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer & Others (I.L.R. 20 Cal. 79) |
Explained that the test for "ought" (in the "might and ought" formulation of Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC) is cumulative and that a matter that would be inconsistent with or destructive of the previous title need not have been raised. |
Quoted to support the court's conclusion that the petitioner "ought" not to have been expected to raise excessive-assessment grounds in earlier constitutional challenges to the taxing power. |