AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957
  • rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949
  • Rule 12 of the Classification Control and Appeal Rules of 1957.
  • Rule 5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949
  • provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
  • Article 74 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1963
  • provisions contained in Article 311 of the Constitution,
  • provisions of clause (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)
  • SECTION 30 LIMITATION ACT
  • Article 309 of the Constitution ard the provisions
  • provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • Fundamental Rule 52 and Fundamental Rule 53
  • Central Public Works Department as Section
  • Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules
  • Rule 5 of Temporary Service Rules
  • Article 102 of the Limitation Act,
  • rule 12 of the Central Rules
  • provisions of Article 311 (2)
  • Rule 5 of the said Rules
  • Section Officers C P.W.D,
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • section 80 C.P.C
  • 33 rule 2 C.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957
  • rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949
  • Rule 12 of the Classification Control and Appeal Rules of 1957.
  • Rule 5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949
  • provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
  • Article 74 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1963
  • provisions contained in Article 311 of the Constitution,
  • provisions of clause (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)
  • SECTION 30 LIMITATION ACT
  • Article 309 of the Constitution ard the provisions
  • provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • Fundamental Rule 52 and Fundamental Rule 53
  • Central Public Works Department as Section
  • Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908
  • Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules
  • Rule 5 of Temporary Service Rules
  • Article 102 of the Limitation Act,
  • rule 12 of the Central Rules
  • provisions of Article 311 (2)
  • Rule 5 of the said Rules
  • Section Officers C P.W.D,
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • section 80 C.P.C
  • 33 rule 2 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: Paraksh Narian, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, suing in forma pauperis, sought a declaration that his termination by the respondent Government was wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional; he claimed a decree of Rs. 80,000 (Rs. 40,000 as salary, Rs. 40,000 as damages, and Rs. 4,000 for expenses in defending a criminal prosecution). The plaint states that the plaintiff was appointed as a Supervisor on 8 June 1934 by defendant No. 2 (Central Water and Power Commission), resigned on 11 October 1954, and joined the Central Public Works Department as Section Officer in August 1956.

On 6 October 1956 a report was allegedly lodged by Shri N.D. Tekchandani (then Executive Engineer, Central Water and Power Commission) with the police, leading to criminal proceedings against the plaintiff under sections 420/468/471 IPC. The plaintiff was suspended from April 12, 1957, and a termination notice dated September 10, 1957 (giving one month's notice) was issued, terminating service effective October 10, 1957. The plaintiff was acquitted by the criminal court on May 8, 1964; the certified copy of acquittal was obtained on August 18, 1964.

The plaintiff alleged mala fide prosecution, defamation, ruined service career, and sought quashing of the termination (contending it was in substance a dismissal violating Article 311 of the Constitution), reinstatement, arrears of salary, damages for malicious prosecution and expenses. A notice under section 80 CPC was served. The plaint and pleadings were amended several times (dates noted in the record). Written statements were filed by defendants; the plaintiff filed replication(s). Issues were settled on September 2, 1969. The plaintiff's suit was deemed filed (for limitation purposes) on August 17, 1965. The court heard evidence and arguments on limitation and merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the termination of the plaintiff's services was bad in law, including whether such termination amounted to "dismissal" within Article 311 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to salary and/or damages on account of alleged wrongful termination.
  4. Whether refusal to reinstate the plaintiff after his acquittal amounts to dismissal from service.
  5. Whether the suit for declaration and the claims for damages and/or salary are barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The order dated September 10, 1957 (terminating service effective October 10, 1957) was in reality a dismissal and therefore violative of Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • The termination was mala fide and passed with ulterior motives; the criminal prosecution was malicious and caused damages, defamation and financial loss.
  • No order of termination could be validly passed while he was under suspension and the criminal trial/investigation was pending.
  • Claims for salary, damages (including for malicious prosecution) and expenses incurred in defending the criminal case were asserted; a section 80 CPC notice had been served.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants 1–3 pleaded limitation; they denied the report was false or malicious and denied mala fide motives.
  • Contended the report was lodged with the Superintendent of Police, Parliament Street (not Hardinge Bridge); the termination was on September 10, 1957 (not October 10, 1957).
  • Defendants 4–6 contended the suit was not maintainable against them (they alleged they were not legal entities for the purpose of suit), that the suit was time-barred, and that the plaintiff being a temporary employee was validly terminated under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 after the requisite one month's notice.
  • On the merits, defendants admitted the two employments and that a report was lodged and that suspension and subsequent termination took place; they denied entitlement to salary, damages or expenses.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.B. Chakroberty v. The Union of India (AIR 1970 Assam & Nag 98) Where a temporary employee terminated under Rule 5(1) is described as "at present under suspension" but Article 311(2) provisions are not complied with, the termination is illegal because it casts a stigma affecting future employment. Used to support the proposition that describing the plaintiff as "under suspension" in the termination order casts a stigma and undermines reliance on Rule 5 as a simple termination.
Jagdish Mitter v. The Union of India (AIR 1964 S.C. 449) Finding an officer "undesirable to be retained" in an order purporting to be a simple discharge casts a stigma and violates Article 311(2); test is whether the order attaches stigma. Cited for the test whether an order casts aspersions or stigma such that Article 311(2) is attracted.
K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra (1971 1 SCC 790) Reversion/repatriation from temporary post may or may not amount to reduction in rank or punishment depending on substance and surrounding circumstances; substance over form approach. Applied to illustrate that substance must be examined to determine whether an administrative order is innocuous or punitive and thus attracts Article 311.
Union of India v. Gian Singh (1970 S.L.R. 563) Termination of a suspended government servant under Rule 5 while enquiry/trial is pending can amount to punishment attracting Article 311. Relied upon to support the proposition that termination under Rule 5 during pendency of investigation/trial indicates termination was not merely an administrative measure but punitive in nature.
R.C. Roy v. Union of India & Others (A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 186) Elaboration of circumstances when termination of a temporary government servant is punishment: (i) termination as part of administrative routine; (ii) dismissal as penalty; test is whether stigma vitiates the order and whether stigma is inseparable from the order. Adopted as a guiding rule to decide whether the impugned termination was punitive (attracting Article 311) or a harmless administrative termination.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36) and Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goel (1970 1 SCC 515) Supreme Court precedents on whether orders amount to punishment or innocuous administrative measures; part of the line of authorities considered when deciding stigma and Article 311 applicability. Referred to as part of the body of Supreme Court decisions forming the test adopted by the court in determining whether the impugned order cast a stigma.
V.P. Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1967 M.P. 231) Held that suspension suspends the employer-employee relationship and that during suspension termination by notice cannot be validly effected. Referred to by plaintiff; the court considered the authority but rejected its applicability to central government service, distinguishing private master-servant suspension from suspension under government service rules.
Hold Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers Union (AIR 1959 SC 1342) Authority invoked to support the view (in Gidroniya) regarding effects of suspension under an ordinary contract of service. Discussed and distinguished: the court held the rule in Hold Imperial could not be applied to government servants governed by Fundamental Rules and service regulations.
Union of India v. R. Akbar Shariff (A.I.R. 1961 Mad. 86) Case where dismissed employee reinstated after conviction overturned claimed salary for the intervening period; relates to consequences of reinstatement on salary claims. Found not to support the plaintiff's contention that limitation for challenging wrongful termination begins only after acquittal or refusal to reinstate.
State of Madras v. A.V. Anantharaman (A.I.R. 1963 Mad. 425) Decision concerning recovery of salary after reinstatement; discusses when pay accrues following set-aside of dismissal. Referred to in assessing when the cause of action for salary accrues; held not to support plaintiff's limitation argument.
Shri Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State of Mysore (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 8) Holds that wages accrue month by month; relevant when reconciling Fundamental Rules on pay with limitation for arrears of salary. Used to explain accrual of salary and to reconcile Supreme Court dicta with Fundamental Rules 52 and 53 in determining when salary claims arise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Suspension and authority: The plaintiff's suspension (order dated April 12, 1957) was authorized under rule 12 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 because a criminal case was under investigation/trial. The court accepted that suspension was justified on that ground.
  2. Nature of termination order: The termination order dated September 10, 1957 purported to be under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 (Exhibit P.16). However, the order explicitly described the plaintiff as an officer "under suspension" and was issued while the criminal investigation/trial was pending.
  3. Application of precedent and test for stigma: Applying the authorities (including Chakroberty, Jagdish Mitter, K.H. Phadnis, Union of India v. Gian Singh and R.C. Roy), the court applied the substantive test: whether the impugned order cast a stigma or attached aspersions such that it amounted to punishment (and thereby attracted Article 311(2)). The court concluded that where suspension continues and termination is effected while an enquiry/trial is pending and the order describes the officer as "under suspension", stigma is shown and the order is not a harmless termination simpliciter.
  4. Conclusion on Article 311: On the facts, the court held the termination order did cast a stigma and therefore violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The court noted this invalidity is not equivalent to being void for want of jurisdiction (i.e., not necessarily void ab initio), but the order was "bad in law" under Article 311(2).
  5. On the contention that suspension suspends master-servant relation (V.P. Gidroniya and Hold Imperial): the court distinguished private-contract suspension from government-service suspension. It held that in government service the employer-employee relationship continues during suspension (supported by Fundamental Rule 53 and the payment provisions). Hence, the contention that termination cannot be effected during suspension was rejected as a blanket rule.
  6. Malicious prosecution claim: The court examined the criminal court's judgment (Exhibit P.W.10/6) and noted acquittal occurred for lack of evidence but that the judgment contained no observation of malice or motivation. The plaintiff's trial testimony did not implicate Shri N.D. Tekchandani. Consequently, there was no evidence that defendant No.3 commenced prosecution maliciously. The court also held the claim was time-barred under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (one year from acquittal or termination of prosecution). The plaintiff's suit was deemed filed August 17, 1965, after the limitation expired.
  7. Limitation on challenge to termination: The court treated the cause of action to challenge the termination as accruing when the termination order was passed/implemented (September/October 1957). The Limitation Act (Article 58 in First Division of the Schedule) provides three years; consequently, the suit (filed in 1965) was barred by time. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that limitation should begin only after refusal to reinstate following acquittal; references (Union of India v. R. Akbar Shariff and State of Madras v. A.V. Anantharaman) did not support the plaintiff's position.
  8. Salary claim: The court explained that salary arrears become due only if the order of dismissal is set aside (Fundamental Rule 52 and related authorities). Since the order of dismissal/termination had not been set aside (and the challenge was time-barred), no claim for salary could succeed. The court referenced authorities (including Shri Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe) on accrual of wages and the interplay with Fundamental Rules.
  9. Overall result: Because the declaration and monetary claims were either barred by limitation or otherwise untenable on the evidence and law, the plaintiff's suit could not succeed despite the court's finding that the termination had been in breach of Article 311(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed and parties are left to bear their own costs.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The court held that the termination order (Exhibit P.16) did cast a stigma and was in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution; nonetheless, the plaintiff's civil suit challenging that order was barred by limitation and therefore the court did not quash the order or order reinstatement.
  • The claim for malicious prosecution was rejected for want of proof of malice and also held time-barred under Article 74 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • The claim for salary and expenses was denied because relief for arrears of salary arises only once an order of dismissal is set aside; because the termination challenge was time-barred and not set aside, no salary award followed.
  • No substantive relief (reinstatement, arrears or damages) was granted to the plaintiff; the suit was dismissed and parties ordered to bear their own costs.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to matters and findings as stated in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text of the judgment.

    Mohinder Singh Jagdev v. Secretary Ministry Of Irrigation & Power Government Of India

    Paraksh Narian, J.:— The plaintiff has filed a suit in forma pauperis claiming a declaration that the termination of his services with the respondent Government is wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional and so, the plaintiff continues to be in services and a decree for Rs. 80,000/- out of which the plaintiff claims Rs. 40,000/- by way of salary, Rs. 40,000/- by way of damages and Rs. 4,000/- by way of expenses allegedly incurred by the plaintiff to defend himself in a criminal prosecution alleged to have been commenced on a report of defendant No. 2.

    2. According to the plaint the plaintiff was appointed as a Supervisor on 8th Jun. 1934 by defendant No. 2, the Chairman, Central Water and Power Commission, New Delhi, which post he claims he held upto October 11, 1954 when he submitted his resignation. He joined the Central Public Works Department as Section Officer in August, 1956. Shri N.D Tek chandani, the then Executive Engineer, Central Water and Power Commission posted at Bhopal is claimed to have lodged a report on October 6, 1956 with the police Station, Hardinge Bridge (now Tilak Bridge), New Delhi, alleging that the Dlaintiff bad made certain misstatements about his educational qualifications and had allegedly produced forged certificates and on the basis thereof secured appointment as Supervisor in the Office of the Central Water and Power Commission, New Delhi. The Delhi Police is claimed to have registered a case under sections 420/468/471 I.P.C against the plaintiff. A challan was submitted against him on the basis of ths report after investigation by the Police. The plaintiff was suspended from service from the office of defendants 5 to 6 in the C.P W.D and his services were terminated on October 10, 1997. The plaintiff was acquitted by the Criminal Court on May 8, 1964. According to him a copy of the judgment was supplied to him on August 18, 1964. This prosecution which the plaintiff calls malicious is claimed to have been caused him great mental agony, worries and heavy financial losses besides defamation of his character and lowering of his position among people known to him. It is claimed that his service career was ruined. In March, 1965 the plaintiff claims he was able to get a job but had to lead a hand to mouth existence. The plaintiff claims that the order of Octorber 10th 1957 terminating his services was, in fact, an order of dismissal and so, is liable to be quashed as violative of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is also alleged that the order was mala fide and passed with ulterior motives. The plaintiff also asserts that the order of termination of service having been passed on the basis of the criminal case instituted against him whils he was under suspension was bad in law as no such order could be passed till the criminal trial was concluded. In consequence, the plaintiff claims that the order of termination be quashed and he be treated as being in service throughout. As already noticed the plaintiff further claims salary, damages for malicious prosecution which he calls defamatory and compensatory damages and expenses incurred by him while facing trial on the criminal charge. A notice under section 80 C:P.C is claimed to have been served on the defendants but as they did not admit the claim or give him any relief the plaintiff has filed the persent suit. The original application under order 33 rule 2 C.P.C was amended by a plaint dated August 13, 1965.October 7th, 965 and further amended by the petition of plaint dated March 13, 1P69. The application of the plaintiff allowing him to sue in forma pauperis was granted on August 12th 1968 and thereafter the suit was registered. Written statements were filed on behalf of the defendants. It may be mentioned that the defendants cited by the plaintiff are: The Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation & Power, Government of India, New Delhi, The Chairman, Central Water & Power Commission, Bikaner House, New Delhi, Shri N.D Tekchandani, the then Executive Engineer, C/o Investigation Division, C.W.P.G Bhopal, The Secretary, Ministry at Works & Housing, Government of India, New Delhi, The Chairman, Coordination Committee of Section Officers C P.W.D, New Delhi, and the Superintending Surveyor of Works (N), C.P.WD, Nagpur The plaintiff filed a replication to the written statement on behalf of the defendants but it is not clear to which written statement he is referring for there were two written statements, one on behalf of defendants I to j and the other on behalf of defendants 4 to 6.

    3. In the written statement of defendants 1 to 3 they raised the plea of limitation. It is mentioned that the report was lodged by defendant No. 3 not with Police Station Hardinge Bridge but with the Superintendent of Police, Parliament Street, New Delhi. It is denied that the report was either false or baseless or malicious. The ulterior motive alleged by the plaintiff is denied. It is stated that the plaintiff's services were terminated on September 10, 1957 and not on October 10, 1957. It is not disputed that the plaintiff was acquitted. All the other allegations were denied. In the written statement of defendants 4 to 6 it is contended that no suit was competent against the answering defendants except defendant No. 3 named in person as they were not legal entities, the suit was barred by time and that the plaintiff bing a temporary eployee and his services having been terminated under rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 after requisite notice of one month, there was no justiciable cause of action. On merits the factum of the two employments of the plaintiff was not disputed nor the lodging of the report with the Police. It was admitted that the plaintiff was suspended with effect from April 12, 1957 on receipt of a report from the Superintendent of Police, New Delhi about his having been proceeded against the connection with a criminal case. Later on while the trial was still pending bis services were terminated with effect from September 10, 1957 as already noticed above. It is denied that the plaintiff is entitled to any amount by way of salary, damages or expenses. Receipt of notice under section 80 C.P.C was not disputed

    4. In the replication the plaintiff reasserted his earlier stand. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were settled on September 2, 1969:—

    1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? O.P.D

    2. Whether the termination of the service of the plaintiff was wrongful and mala fide? O.P.P

    3. Whether the prosecution of the plaintiff was on false and malicious recorts? It so, what are the damages and losses sustained by the plaintiff? O.P.P

    4. Whether the impugned orders dated September 10, 1957 terminating the services of fhe plaintiff and that of December 3, 1964 refusing to reinstate the plaintiff after his acquittal amounts to dismissal? O.P.D

    5. To what arrears of salary and damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

    6. Relief.

    5. Before I proceed to deal with the issues it may be noted that the petition under Order 33 C.F.C was filed by the plaintiff on August 17, 196b. His services were terminated by a notice dated September 10, 1957 (Exhibit P. 16) giving him one month's notice of termination of service. In other words his services stood terminated on October 10, 1957. The plaintiff was placed under suspension by an order dated April 12, 1957 and he was acquitted by the criminal court on May 8, 1964. The certified copy of the order of acquittal is Exhibit P.W tO/6. An application for grant of this certified copy was moved on August 17, 1964 and the copy was prepared on August 18, 1964- I have given all these dates as arguments have been addressed on the question of limitation etc. for the claims made in this suit and for those cont entiods these dates may be relevant.

    6. Looking at the pleadings of the parties the issues settled, the points that arise for consideration are:

    1. Whether the termination of plaintiff's services was bad in law including the question as to whether such termination of service would amount to dismissal within the meaning of the term under Article 311 of the Constitution?

    2. Whether the plaintiff is entitied to damages for malicious prosecution?

    3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to salary and/or damages qua his claim of wrongfu termination of service?

    4. Whether refusal to reinstate after the plaintiff's acquittal amounts to dismissal from service? and

    5. Whether the suit for declaration and the claim for damages and/or salary is within limitation?

    7. Taking the first point regarding validity of the termination of service, it is common ground that the plaintiff was placed under suspension on April 12, 1957 by an order of that date, copy of which is Exhibit P. 17. Suspension of a Government servant could be ordered at tte relevant time under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 which came into force from February 28, 1957. According to rule 12 of the Central Rules the appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the President in that behalf could place a Government servant under suspension, inter alia, where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. It is not disputed that such a contingency did exist to warrant the order of suspension dated April 12, 1957 being passed with regard to the plaintiff. While the criminal trial or investigation was still pending the plaintiff's services were terminated by an order dated September 10, 1957 purported to have been passed under Rule 5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 which is Exhibit P. 16 on the record. On the face of the order it appears that it was passed under Rule 5 of the said Rules but the contention is that: (a) in reality this was an order of dismissal having been passed bcause of the criminal trial pending against the plaintiff; and (b) no such order could be passed while the plaintiff was under suspension by virtue of Rule 12 of the Classification Control and Appeal Rules of 1957. It is also urged that the very fact that it is mentioned in Exhibit P. 16 that service of Mohinder Singh Jagdev, Section Officer (under suspension) are being terminated casts a stigma on tie plaintiff and so, it was not a termina-tion of the services of a temporary Government servant which can be regarded as a termination simpliciter. Nothing has been brought on the record to show that the services of the plaintiff were terminated purely as an administrative measure. It is quite obvious his services were terminated because of the pendency of the criminal case against him.

    8. In support of the contention that describing the plaintiff as a Government servant under suspension amounts to a stigma on him and so, reliance on Rule 5 of Temporary Service Rules is of no avail, my attention was first invited to a bench decision of the Assam and Naga-land High Court in N.B Chakroberty v. The Union of India . AIR 1970 Assam & Nag. 98.. It was held that where a temporary employee whose services are terminated under Rule 5 (1) is described as ‘at present under suspension’ but before his termination provisions of Article 311 (2) are not complied with, the termination is illegal as the order leaves a stigma on the person concerned and any future employer may reasonably think that he must have been suspended in service on some serious allegations and may refuse employment to him on that ground alone. In Jagdish Mitter v. The Union of India . AIR 1964 S.C 449., the mention of Jagdish Mitter being found undesirable to be retained in government service in an order purporting to be a discharged simpliciter was held to cast a stigma on him and so, violative of the rule enunciated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It was observed that test in such cases must be: Does the order cast aspersions or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him?

    9. In K.H Phadnis v. State Of Maharashtra† . . 1971 1 SCC 790, the only question with which the court was concerned was whether ihe order of the Government of Bombay “repatriating” the appellant from temporary post of Controller of Food Grains Department, to his parent Department of Excise and prohibition amounted to a reduction in rank in violation of the provisions contained in Article 311 of the Constitution, The Government resolution sending Phadins to his parent department itself was innocuous but the events leading upto that resolution, the pendency of an investigation into the allegations against Phadnis when the resolution was passed, his protest at the so called repatriation, the unwillingness of the parent department to have him back and that though Phandis held a temporary post it was practically of quasi permanent character were all taken into account. It was then observed that the order of reversion simoliciter will not amount to a reduction in rank or a punishment and the Government has a right to revert a Government servant from his temporary post to the substantive post but as the matter has to be viewed as one of substance and all relevant matters are to be considered in ascertaining whether the impugned older is a genuine one of “accident of service” or whether it was one of. reversion amounting to a punishment. On the facts of the case it was held that the impuged repatriation amounted to a reduction in rank attracting Article 311 of the Constitution.

    10. In Union Of India… v. Gian Singh… . 1970 S.L.R 563., a bench of this court held that there was an abundant authority for the proposition that if a Government servant is suspended and his services are terminate without holding any enquiry against him, termination of service under Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules would amount to punishment so as to attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. In other words the rule laid down was that since suspension has to be either because of a pending departmental enquiry or pending trial or investigation a termination of service under Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules while such enquiry or investigation is still pending would really show that the termination of service was not on account of the exigencies or accident of service but for an ulterior motive.

    11. In R.C Roy… v. Union Of India & Others…S . A.I.R 1971 Delhi 186., a bench of this court ‘elaborated on the circumstances in which termination of service of a temporary Government servant can be regarded as punishment or otherwise. It was observed that services of a temporary Government servant can be terminated in two ways, viz. (i) on subjective assessment of his work as part of his service contract and in ordinary course of administrative routine, and (ii) dismissal or removal by way of penalty. It is only the latter action which attracts the operation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. A distinction was drawn between a preliminary enqniry into bad confidential reports and a formal enquiry. The test laid down was whether a stigma vitiates the order of termination and whether the stigma is contained in the order itself or is at least inseparable. The bench considered all the decisions of the Supreme Court starting from the decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union Of India . A.I.R 1958 S.C 36., upto the Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Balbir Saran Goel† . 1970 1 SCC 515. In my respectful opinion the rule laid down is a perfect guide to and out whether an impugned order amounts to inflicting a punishment or it is an innocuous order passed under the rules of service or the contract of service.

    12. Applying the above principles there can be no manner of doubt that the impugned order of termination of service, Exhibit P. 16, did cast a stigma on the plaintiff and is not an order of termination simpliciter under Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules. The Police Investigation/trial was still pending. The plaintiff had been placed under suspension because of the pendency of the Police investigation, the order itself describes the plaintiff to be an officer ‘under suspension “. I, therefore, hold that the said order was passed in violation of the provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and so, was bad in law That is not the same thing as an order being void ab initio as for instance an order being passed without jurisdiction.

    13. It was urged that when a person is under suspension his services could not be terminated till the suspension was revoked. Reliance in support of this contention was place on V.P Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh . A.I.R 1967 MP 231. It was held that when a Government servant is placed under suspension the relationship of employer and employee stands suspended for the time being and so, during the per od of suspension of a temporary Government servant there cannot be any termination of the Government servants service by a notice either by the Government servant or by the appointing authority. Support for enunciating this rule was found by the bench from the decision of the Supreme Court in Hold Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers Union . AIR 1959 SC 1342. In my opinion the rule laid down cannot be applied to Government servants. In the case of an ordinary contract of service between Master and servant a suspension of the employee amounts to a suspension of the contract of personal service or to a postponement of an actual performance of the contract. In other words the relationship of master and servant remains in abeyance for the period of suspension. A question that, however, arises is; Can an employee during this period go and seek employment elsewhere and whether the master can with hold wages due to the servant during this period? It will really depend upon the terms of the contract of service whether this can be done or not. As far as Government service is concerned the government seivant under suspension cannot seek employment elsewhere nor can the Government withhold payment of wages. Indeed, as is apparent from a reading of Exhibit P. 17 itself the subsistence allowance that the plaintiff was to draw is specified. It is also set out in Exhibit P. 17 that he will in addition to subsistence allowance also draw city com-persatory allowance and othe allowances. Obviously if that is to be done it cannot be said that no relationship of master and servant 1. existed between the plaintiff and the Government while he was under suspension.

    14. I was also referred to Union Of India… v. Gian Singh…, but this decision has nothing to do with the contention raised. My opinion, therefore, is that even during suspension the relationship of employer and employee continues to be in existence in the case of Government service, I am further fortified in taking this view by a reading of the Fundamental Rules which are applicable to Central Government employees. Fundamental Rule. 53 provides for the payments to which a Government servant under suspension would be entitled. A government servant is entitled to a salary by virtue of his terms of appointment read with such rules as may be framed under Article 309 of the Constitution ard the provisions of pay to be found in Chapter IV of Part 3 of the Fundamental Rules, Inasmuch as salary etc. can be claimed as of right by virtue of the rules under which the same are payable and the terms of appointment, similar payments contemplated by fundamental rule 53 can also be claimed as of right. Therefore there is absolutely no force in the contention that during suspension the contract of employment between the Government and the plaintiff was suspended and till the suspension was revoked his services could not be terminated The argument may be looked at from another point of view also There is no bar to services being terminated in accordance with law if a Government servant under suspension. For example, if a Government servant is placed under suspension but in the meantime circumstance for invoking the provisions of clause (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2) are brought to light, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that where a government servant under suspension becomes a security risk his services cannot be terminated without first revoking the order of suspension.

    15. I will first take up the plaintiff's claim for damages for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff's contention is that he was falsely implicated because of ulterior motives, as is apparent from the fact that he was honourably acquitted. The prosecution against the plaintiff failed on account of lack of evidence as is evident from a perusal of the certified copy of the judgment of the Magistrate, Exhibit P.W 10/6. There is no observation in the said judgment to warrant the suggestion that the prosecution was malicious or motivated. The allegation in the plaint is that it was defendant No. 3 who lodged a false complaint against the plaintiff. Defendant No. 3 is Shri N. D. Tekchandani. The plaintiff in his testimony as P.W 10 has not made any allegations against Shri Tekchandani. In this view of the matter it is held that there is nothing on record to come to the conclusion that the prosecution lodged against the plaintiff, which failed, was commenced by Shri Tekchandani maliciously or with ulterior motives. If that be so, merely because the plaintiff was ultimately acquitted he cannot claim damages for malicious prosecution. Apart from thj claim being untenable it must also be held to be barred by time. The limitation for filing a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is one year under Article 74 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1963 The time is to be computed from the date when the plaintiff is acquitted or prosecution is otherwise terminated. The plaintiff was acquitted on May 6, 1964. The suit may be deemed to have been filed on August 17, 1965. Even if the two months notice period provided by section 80 C.P.C is added the limitation for filing the suit expired on July 8, 1965. 1 am not impressed with the argument that the limitation has to be Computed from the date when the copy of the judgment of the criminal court was made available to the plaintiff, particularly when the application for such copy was moved after the expiry of the period of limitation. The claim of Rs. 4000/- for expenses allegedly incurred by the plaintiff in defending himself at a criminal trial is also-rejected. First of all, there is no proof of the actual amount spent. Secondly, this amount wou'd also be in the form of damages and the limitation for claiming the same would be governed by Article 74.

    16. Because the termination of plaintiff's services has been held to be violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution it can be urged that he is entitled to a declaration that the said order of termination is not binding on him and he still continues to be in service. It can also be urged that he is entitled to his claim for salary or damages lor this period when he has been kept out of service.

    17. The plaintiff's suit would be deemed to have been filed on August 17, 1965 while the orde of termination of service was passed on September 10, 1957, the service of the plaintiff being terminated from 9/10th October, 1957. The Limitation Act, 1963 cams into force from January 1, 1964 The cause of action for challenging the order of dismissal arose to the plaintiff in September or October. 1957. Article 58 in the First Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act of 1963 provides for limitation of three years. If this article applies then the suit would obviously be barred by time. Even if Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was attracted the suit would be barred by time notwithstanding the provisions of Section 30 of the Limitation Act of 963. It has, however, been urged that the limitation for the claim of declaration should be computed from the time when the plaintiff was refused reinstatement inspite of acquittal on May 8, 1964. After the plaintiff was acquitted he applied for reinstatement but was not reinstated as is evident from the office memo dated September 3, 1964, which is Exhibit P. 25. In support of the contention that it is refusal to reinstate which really amounts to dismissal and gives a ca'ise of action to the plaintiff to challenge the order of termination of service I was lirst referred to Union of India v. R. Akbar Shariff . A.I.R 1961 Mad. 86. This was a suit where a Government employee dismissed from service on being convicted by a criminal court was reinstated on the conviction being set aside in appeal. He then claimed salary for the intervening period. The rule laid down in this case does not support the contention that limitation for challenging wrongful termination of service will commence only after acquittal or that cause of action for claim that the termination of service was wrongful will accrue only after reinstatement is refused after acquittal. My attention was also invited to State of Madras v. A.V Anantharaman . A.I.R 1963 Mad. 425.. This was also a case for recovery of salary after reinstatement and is not relevant to the issue in hand. To my mind the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that it is refusal to reinstate which amounts to dismissal has n force. The plaintiff was placed under suspension because of a criminal investigation pending against him. His services were terminated purportedly under Rule 5 of the Temporary Service Rules. As criminal trial was pending aginst him, possibly he was considered undesirable for being retained in Government service. The suit for declaration challenging the termination of service as wrongful has nothing to do with the suspension order. The cause of action for challenging the order of dismissal as being wrongful arose when that order was passed or implemented. Subsequent events did not give any more force to the conditions that prevailed at the time when his services were terminated. That the plaintiff was acqitted may suggest that i.e was not at fault and so, should not have been proceeded against in a criminal court but the reason for termination of service was not his conviction as in the Madras case. So, the ground available to the plaintiff now is the same as was available to him when the order of termination was passed. Rightly or wronly an order of termination of service has been passed and though the order has been held to be violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution it does not mean that the order is void ab initio. Right or wrong, the order subsists and unless it is quashed it will have full effect. To have it quashed the plaintiff should have come to court within the period of Imitation and it is no defence to say that he was busy in prosecuting his criminal case and could not come to court earlier. I, therefore, hold that the suit for declaration is barred by time.

    18. I now come to the question of the claim for salary. The plaintiff could claim salary only if he was in service. If he was not in service he could not claim any salary. It has been contended that the plaintiff could not ask for salary till he was reinstated by virtue of of fundamental rule 52 and it is only after his dismissal is set aside that salary would become due to. him. Inasmuch as the order of termination of service or dismissal cannot be set aside no relief regarding salary can also be given.

    19. In Union Of India… v. Gian Singh…, bench of this court held that the cause of action for claiming full pay and allowances would arise only when the wages become due and that is from the time when the order of suspension stood revoked. The same view was taken in State of Madras v. A.N Anantharaman. It was observed that clai.Ti by a public servant, whose dismissal has been set aside, for arrears of his pay falls within Article 102 of the Limitation Act, and the right to recover arears of salary accrues only after the order of dismissal is set aside either in the departmental appeal or a civii court. It was observed by reason of fundamental rule 52 in case of such an employee the right to salary ceases the moment an order for dismissal or removal is made and it is not open to the employee to recover the salary without having the order of dismissal set aside. fundamental rule 52 contemplates no distinction between irregular and improper order which has been set aside by departmental authority and one declared to be invalid by civil courts. So, the crux of the matter is whether the order of dismissal can be or is set aside. In Shri Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State Of Mysore . A.I.R 1962 S.C 8., it has been clearly held that wages accrue due month by month. Reconciling, therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court in this case with Fundamental Rule 52 and Fundamental Rule 53 it has to be held that if the ordei of dismissal is set aside then wages or salary due to a plaintiff for a period not exceeding three years from the date of the institution of the suit can also be granted. The plaintiff in the present case would have been entitled to a similar relief if the order of dismissal could be set aside. I have already held the suit to have that order set aside is barred by time. Therefore, the order'of dismissal not having been set aside, no claim for salary can be allowed.

    20. The result is that the plaintiff's suit is dismissed but in the circumstance of the case parties are lef to bear their own costs.

    21. Suit dismissed.

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