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  • provisions of Section 397, 398 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 399 COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882
  • Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Sections 397 or 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Sections 397 & 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
  • Section 153-C of the Companies Act, 1913.
  • Article 181 of the Limitation Act.
  • SECTION 483 COMPANIES ACT
  • sub-section (3) of Section 399
  • sub-section (1) of Section 397
  • FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT 1855
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 397, 398 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 399 COMPANIES ACT 1956
  • Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882
  • Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Sections 397 or 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Sections 397 & 398 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
  • Section 153-C of the Companies Act, 1913.
  • Article 181 of the Limitation Act.
  • SECTION 483 COMPANIES ACT
  • sub-section (3) of Section 399
  • sub-section (1) of Section 397
  • FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT 1855
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The late Shri Krishan Talwar instituted proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, concerning M/s. Jawahar Singh Bikram Singh (Private) Ltd. The petition was initially filed before the Companies Tribunal, New Delhi, with Shrimati Sharda Talwar (the petitioner’s wife), Darshan Singh Pheruman, and Jaswant Singh as consenting persons. Darshan Singh Pheruman and Shrimati Sharda Talwar were joined as proforma respondents. The petition was transferred to the High Court on 29th October, 1966. Shri Krishan Talwar died on 22nd February, 1972, during the pendency of the proceedings. An earlier order in 1968 had accepted that the petitioners and consenting parties held the requisite shareholding, making the petition maintainable under Section 399.

After the petitioner’s death, Shrimati Sharda Talwar applied to be transposed as petitioner. The company opposed this, but the Single Judge allowed the transposition on 24th November, 1972. The company appealed this order under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 abated upon the death of the original petitioner, Shri Krishan Talwar.
  2. Whether Shrimati Sharda Talwar could be transposed as petitioner and continue the proceedings after the death of the original petitioner.
  3. Whether the transposed petitioner must independently fulfill the requirements of Section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956, including obtaining consent of one-tenth of the shareholders.

Arguments of the Parties

Company's Arguments

  • The petition abated with the death of Shri Krishan Talwar and could not be revived by transposition of Shrimati Sharda Talwar.
  • Only the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner could continue the proceedings.
  • Shrimati Sharda Talwar did not have the requisite consent from one-tenth of the shareholders as required under Section 399, rendering the petition incompetent.
  • The transposition order effectively circumvents the statutory requirements of Section 399, making it ineffective.

Shrimati Sharda Talwar's Arguments

  • The petition was originally filed for the benefit of all consenting shareholders, who are constructively petitioners even if not formally named as such.
  • The maintainability of the petition must be assessed based on the facts at the time of institution, not at a subsequent date.
  • She was constructively a petitioner originally and thus entitled to continue the proceedings after the death of the original petitioner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. I. A. Nageshwara Rao, A.I.R 1956 S.C. 213 Validity of a petition must be judged on facts at the time of presentation; subsequent changes do not affect maintainability. Applied to hold that the petition remain maintainable despite the death of the original petitioner and transposition of a constructive petitioner.
Ponniathakathoot Parameshwarem Munpa and others v. Moothedath Mallseri Illah Narayanan Namboodri and another, A.I.R 1917 Madras 389 Representative suits do not abate on death of a plaintiff; court has power to add parties. Supported the principle that proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 are representative and do not abate on death of original petitioner.
Krishnaswami Iyer v. Seethalakshmi Ammal and others, A.I.R 1919 Madras 479 Next reversioner can continue suit after death of original plaintiff; governed by Limitation Act Article 181. Used to illustrate that representative suits permit continuation by other persons interested despite death of original plaintiff.
Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram and others, A.I.R 1921 Privy Council 123 Representative suits do not abate on death of plaintiff who obtained permission to file suit. Reinforced principle of non-abatement of representative suits applicable by analogy to the present case.
State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Parwati Devi, A.I.R 1966 Rajasthan 210 Suit under Fatal Accidents Act (1855) does not abate on death of representative plaintiff. Illustrated the principle that suits brought for benefit of a class do not abate due to death of a representative plaintiff.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the provisions of Sections 397, 398, and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956, noting that the right to apply lies with members holding one-tenth of the issued share capital or with the consent of such members. The original petitioner, Shri Krishan Talwar, had instituted the petition on behalf of himself and consenting members who together held the requisite shareholding. The Court found that these consenting members are constructively petitioners, even if not formally named as such.

Since the petition was representative in nature, the Court referred to principles governing representative suits under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It observed that such suits do not abate due to the death of a plaintiff, and other persons represented by the deceased plaintiff are entitled to continue the proceedings. This analogy was accepted as applicable to proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act.

The Court further held that it is not necessary for the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner to be parties, as long as the members constructively before the Court continue the proceedings. The Court rejected the company's contention that the transposed petitioner must independently satisfy the requirements of Section 399. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., the Court held that the maintainability of the petition must be judged on the facts at the time of institution, and a change in circumstances after filing does not render the petition non-maintainable.

Therefore, Shrimati Sharda Talwar, as a constructive petitioner, was entitled to continue the proceedings, and the transposition order was valid.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED the appeal filed by the company against the order permitting transposition of Shrimati Sharda Talwar as petitioner.

The direct effect of this decision is that proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 do not abate upon the death of the original petitioner if the petition was instituted on behalf of consenting members who are constructively petitioners. The transposition of a constructive petitioner does not require fresh fulfillment of the shareholding or consent requirements under Section 399. No new precedent beyond the immediate parties was established, and costs were left to be borne by the parties themselves.

    Jawahar Singh Bikram Singh (P) Ltd. v. Sharda Talwar W/O Late Kishan Talwar

    D.K Kapur, J.:— The late Shri Krishan Talwar had instituted proceedings under Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, in respect of M/s. Jawahar Singh Bikram Singh (Private) Ltd. In those proceedings, which were filed before the Companies Tribunal, New Delhi, Shrimati Sharda Talwar the petitioner's wife as well as Darshan Singh Pheruman and Jaswant Singh were shown as persons consenting to the petition. Of these, Darshan Singh Pheruman and Shrimati Sharda Talwar had been joined as proforma respondents. The petition was transferred to this High Court from the Companies Tribunal on 29th October, 1966. During the pendency of the proceedings, Shri Kishan Talwar, petitioner died on 22nd February, 1972. It may be mentioned that the original petitioner, Shri Kishan Talwar together with the consenting parties already mentioned, were stated to hold more than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company. There was an order passed by S. K. Kapur J. on 26th November, 1968 accepting that these persons held the requisite share holdings and thus, the requirements of Section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 were complied with and the petition was maintainable.

    After the death of the petitioner, his widow Shrimati Sharda Talwar who was shown as a proforma respondent applied to be transposed as a petitioner. No application was made by the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner to be joined as parties. Although Shrimati Sharda Talwar was one of these legal representatives, there is no dispute that there are other legal representatives who are not on record. The application for transposition was contested by the company, but Rangarajan J. passed the order under appeal on 24th November, 1972, rejecting the opposition and permitting the applicant, Shrimati Sharda Talwar to be transposed as petitioner in the proceedings. Against that decision the company has appealed under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956.

    It is contended on behalf of the company that the petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act had abated by the death of the petitioner, Shri Kishan Talwar and proceedings could not be revived by transposing Shrimati Sharda Talwar. It is submitted that only the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner could have continued the proceedings. It is further submitted that Shrimati Sharda Talwar did not obtain the consent of one-tenth of the shareholders of the company or holders of one-tenth of the share capital of the company. It is, therefore, submitted that Shrimati Sharda Talwar could not have herself brought a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 on the date on which she was transposed. Consequently, it is submitted that the transposition order in effect allows Shrimati Sharda Talwar to avoid the effect of Section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956, in as much as she does not fulfil its requirements, the petition has become incompetent and the transposition is ineffective. Thus, on these contentions we have to decide whether the petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 abated at the death of the original petitioner and, secondly, whether the order of transposition could be passed in relation to these proceedings. In respect of these contentions, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant, i.e, Shrimati Sharda Talwar that the petition was originally brought for the benefit of all the consenting shareholders and, therefore, all of them were constructively petitioners even though some of them were mentioned as respondents and one of them was not shown as a party at all. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge rightly decided that the maintainability of the petition has to be determined on the facts substituting at the time the petition was instituted and not at a subsequent date. For this purpose, the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajahmundry Electric Supplycorporation Ltd. v. 1. A. Nageshwara Rao, A.I.R 1956 S. C. 213, (1) which was also relied upon in the judgement under appeal has been referred to.

    The matter before us has certain peculiar difficulties. Firstly, the question is whether a petition like the present abates on the death of the petitioner and if it does not, who are the persons who are competent to prosecute the same after the death of the original petitioner. One of the questions which has to be determined is whether the consenting shareholders are constructively petitioners competent to continue the petition on the death of the original petitioner.

    It is first necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 397, 398 and 399 of the Companies Act, 1956. It is provided in sub-section (1) of Section 397 that any member or members may apply to the Court for an order under this Section if they have a right to apply ‘in virtue of Section 399’. A similar provisions is to be found in Section 398. Now turning to Section 399, it is provided by sub-section (1) that the following members have a right to make, an application:—

    ”(a) in the case of a company having a share capital, not less than one hundred members of the company or not less than one-tenth of the total number of its members, whichever is less, or any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company, provided that the applicant or applicants have paid all calls and other sums due on their shares;
    (b) in the case of a company not having a share capital, not less than one-fifth of the total number of its members.”

    Thus, the holders of one-tenth of the issued share capital of a company have the right to make an application. It is not necessary that all these members should be petitioners because it is provided in sub-section (3) of Section 399 as follows:—

    “Where any members of a company are entitled to make an application in virtue of sub-section (1), any one or more of them having obtained the consent in writing of the rest, may make the application on behalf and for the benefit of all of them.”

    Thus, even a single member of a company, can make an application even if he does not hold one-tenth of the share capital if he obtains the consent in writing of other members who together with the applicant hold one-tenth of the share-capital. The application, however, is to be made on behalf of and for the benefit of all these members. On the facts of the present case, when the deceased petitioner applied under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act, he did so, not only for himself, but also on behalf of and for the benefit of all the members who had given written consent. It is this part of the Section which is relied upon by the applicant, Shrimati Sharda Talwar for the purpose of continuing the petition.

    There are no reported cases which have been brought to our notice concerning the abatement of applications under Sections 397 or 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, and we had to turn to the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to representative suits for the purpose of ascertaining the law applicable to the present case. It has been held in a number of cases, that representative suits do not abate if the plaintiffs happen to die. For example, in Ponniathakathoot Parameshwarem Munpa and others v. Moothedath Mallseri Illah Narayanan Namboodri and another, A.I.R 1917 Madras 389 (2), when a plaintiff died it was held that the Court had ample power to add other worshippers (the suit being under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure) as parties under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the suit did not abate. In Krishnaswami Iyer v. Seethalakshmi Ammal and others, A.I.R 1919, Madras 479, (3) a reversioner had instituted a suit to challenge an alienation made by a widow. On his death the next reversioner was permitted to continue the suit. The order of abatement passed in the suit was treated as a nullity and it was held that the next reversioner could continue the proceedings and an application in this behalf was governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. These cases are representative of a large body of case-law governing cases brought under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure as representative suits. Although the actual plaintiffs before the Court may be very few in number, they in fact represent a much larger body of persons. On the death of one or more of the parties before the Court other persons who are not on record are permitted to continue the proceedings. This procedure is permissible on account of the fact that even originally the suit had been brought on their behalf and not for the individual benefit of the actual plaintiff. The same position should on principle be applicable to proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, because here also the proceedings are instituted not only for the individual benefit of the actual petitioner but also for and for the benefit, of the consenting members of the company. Thus, on a Party of reasoning the contention of Shrimati Sharda Talwar that she was in actual fact a petitioner in the original petition, although shown as a proforma respondent has to be accepted. It is not necessary to deal with other cases in which it has been held that proceedings in representative suits do not abate on the death of the plaintiff, but reference may be made to Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram and others, A.I.R 1921, Privy Council 123, (4) where it was held under Section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 that if a person who had obtained permission to file a representative suit died during the pendency of the suit, other members of the public were entitled to continue the suit. This principle was extended by the Rajasthan High Court to a suit under the Fatal Accidents Act (1855) in State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Parwati Devi, A.I.R 1966, Rajasthan 210. (5)

    In that case, suit for damages was brought by a widow for compensation. Section 1-A of the Act provided that such suits ‘shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused. . . ’ It was held that such a suit did not abate as it was for the benefit of others who were not on record. A number of judgements were referred to of the type that have already been referred to, where it had been held that representative suits do not abate. It was held by the Court:—

    “The principle, which seems to us to have been uniformally accepted in these decisions, is that a suit like this is not brought by or against a person in his personal capacity but is brought by or against him as a representative of a class of persons and even if the representative or representatives who has or have so brought the suit, or against whom a suit is so brought, happens to die, then the other person or persons whom the deceased represented would still be interested in the litigation in the very nature of things and cannot but be held constructively to be parties to the suit, and in this type of case the question of abatement cannot properly arise.”

    There does not seem to be any reason why this reasoning should not be equally applicable to the proceedings before the Court under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956. It must, therefore, be held that Shrimati Sharda Talwar was constructively a petitioner, to the original petition and she was therefore, entitled to continue the proceedings as a petitioner. It equally follows that when proceedings have been brought under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, it is not necessary that the ordinary legal representatives should be brought on record. The normal legal representatives are the heirs of the estate of the deceased. However, for the purpose of petitions under sections 397 & 398 of the companies act, 1956, it is only necessary that members who are already constructively before the Court should continue the proceedings. This will not of course debar the legal representatives from themselves wanting to continue the proceedings as heirs of. The deceased petitioner provided they also fulfil the requirements of being members of the company.

    It is now necessary to deal with the alternative case of the company, which is that the transposed petitioner should also fulfil the requirements of Section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 and must also get the consent of the requisite members of the company as provided by Section 399. This contention cannot be accepted firstly on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajahmundry Electric Supplycorporation Ltd. v. 1. A. Nageshwara Rao, A. I. R. 1956, S. C. 213. (6) In that case the petition originally brought had the necessary consent as required by Section 153-C of the Companies Act, 1913. During the course of the petition, the consent was withdrawn but it was held by the Supreme Court that the validity of a petition must be judged on the facts as they were at the time of its presentation. This authority is fully applicable to the situation in the present case and the petition cannot be held to be non-maintainable merely because the petitioner has died and one of the constructive petitioners has been transposed. Secondly, the transposed petitioner was always constructively a petitioner and, therefore, it is not necessary for her to satisfy the same conditions as would be necessary if a new petition were to be filed. The contention on behalf of the company that the transposed party must also satisfy the same conditions as the original petitioner does not seem to be justified on any principle. If she was constructively a petitioner initially, then she continues to be a petitioner and on the application of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, a change in the situation vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956 will not make the petition non-maintainable. It would, therefore, follow that the decision of the Single Judge has to be affirmed and this appeal has to be dismissed. As the question involved in this appeal appears to have arisen for the first time, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Jawahar Singh Bikram Singh (P) Ltd. v. Sharda Talwar W/O Late Kishan Talwar
    (Feb 13, 1973)