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  • Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules 1960 on 2nd August 1960. Rule 1 (ii)
  • Railway Services (Revision of Pay) Rules 1947.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules 1960 on 2nd August 1960. Rule 1 (ii)
  • Railway Services (Revision of Pay) Rules 1947.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (T.P.S. Chawla, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

In or about 1959, a number of persons (including the appellant) were appointed as surveyors under the All India Soil and Land Use Survey Scheme ("the Scheme"). The appellant's appointment was on 2 November 1959 and the initial pay scale for these surveyors was Rs. 60–150. On 3 February 1960 the surveyors represented that surveyors in other central organisations received a higher scale (Rs. 100–185 then) and requested parity because their qualifications and duties were similar.

The Second Pay Commission's recommendations were given effect by the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1960 (promulgated 2 August 1960) with retrospective effect from 1 July 1959. After an October 1960 amendment, surveyors in the Scheme received Rs. 110–200 while surveyors in other organisations received Rs. 150–240, reflecting differences in pre-existing scales. The surveyors continued representations and, by order dated 15 June 1966, the President sanctioned Rs. 150–240 for surveyors in the Scheme effective 1 July 1966.

The appellant sought retrospective effect for that sanction from 1 July 1959. Subsequent representations to that end were rejected by the President (letter dated 22 August 1967). The appellant then filed a petition in this Court seeking certiorari and mandamus to make the revision retrospective to 1 July 1959. A learned Single Judge dismissed the petition and the appellant appealed to the court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the revision of the appellant's pay scale (sanctioned 15 June 1966) ought to be made retrospective to 1 July 1959 (the date from which revised pay scales applied generally under the Revised Pay Rules 1960).
  2. Whether denial of retrospective effect constituted unconstitutional discrimination in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (i.e., whether the appellant was entitled to equal pay from the earlier date because his qualifications, duties and responsibilities were the same or similar to those of surveyors in other organisations).
  3. Whether the doctrine "equal work must receive equal pay" is enforceable under Article 14 or Article 16 in the circumstances of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The surveyors in the Scheme (including the appellant) had qualifications, duties and responsibilities the same or similar to surveyors in other Government organisations; therefore they should have been given the same pay scale from the beginning.
  • The order of 15 June 1966 recognizing the higher scale left a residual discrimination because it was made effective from 1 July 1966 rather than from 1 July 1959 (the date applicable to other surveyors).
  • The chronological discrimination violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  • At argument, the appellant indicated a willingness to accept retrospective operation from 3 October 1961 (the date when the respondents say formal qualifications for scheme surveyors were notified and became similar to other surveyors).

Respondents' Statements / Arguments

  • Until 3 October 1961 there were no formally notified qualifications for surveyor posts in the Scheme; recruitment earlier had been on the basis of a certificate in Overseers Course or training in surveying, which were materially different and inferior to the qualifications required for surveyors in other organisations.
  • On 3 October 1961 a notification prescribed qualifications for surveyors in the Scheme similar to those in other organisations, which was a reason for granting equal pay from 1 July 1966.
  • There was no legal right (other than the constitutional claim) for retrospective application of the 1966 revision; the 1966 revision was executive munificence and not a legally enforceable right.
  • Earlier representations seeking retrospective effect were considered and rejected by the President (letter dated 22 August 1967).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1139 Rejection of the proposition that Article 14 requires "equal pay for equal work" as an abstract doctrine. Relied on to dismiss the appellant's contention that Article 14 mandates equal pay simply because work is equal.
State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 913 Reiteration that Article 14 does not require the abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work; also cited for principle on classes of employees. Used to support the view that equality need not extend between separate, independent classes of employees.
Unikat Sankunni Menon v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 81 Equality does not require identical emoluments for persons appointed to the same post from different sources or by different methods of recruitment; Articles 14 and 16 do not impose such a rule. Applied to reject the appellant's argument that all persons appointed to the same post were entitled to identical pay irrespective of recruitment source.
All India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association, Delhi and others v. General Manager, Central Railway and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 384 Equality of opportunity in employment applies within the same class of employees, not between separate and independent classes; the State employs many departments and classes. Used to demonstrate that the appellant's claim of equality across different classes of surveyors was not mandated by Articles 14 and 16.
Sham Sunder v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 212 Reinforcement of the principle that equality is to be considered within the same class and not across separate classes. Reiterated as authority that the appellant's cross-class equality claim is not warranted.
Union of India and another v. Shanti Swarup (1969) 2 L.I.C. 1265 Where members of the same service/class are treated differently (without reason), Article 14 may be violated; example of Railway Number Takers where a division suffered exclusion. Distinguished by the court: in Shanti Swarup the aggrieved persons belonged to the same class; here the appellant belonged to a separate class (surveyors in the Scheme) and no intra-class discrimination was shown.
D. Murthumjayam and others v. The Union of India (1969) 1 An. W.R. 333 Example of a "glaring anomaly" within related cadres where a superior cadre received less pay and suffered prejudice in promotion—used to show circumstances where discrimination is unconstitutional. Distinguished: the appellant did not establish a comparable anomaly or intra-class prejudice of the kind present in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reviewing the factual chronology and then tested the appellant's legal contentions against settled constitutional principles and precedent.

  1. Chronology and factual distinctions: The court noted that (a) the Revised Pay Rules 1960 were given retrospective effect from 1 July 1959; (b) after implementation the Scheme's surveyors were placed on Rs. 110–200 while other surveyors rose to Rs. 150–240; and (c) after further representations the President sanctioned Rs. 150–240 for Scheme surveyors effective 1 July 1966. The respondents' affidavit established that formal qualifications for scheme surveyors identical to other surveyors were not prescribed until 3 October 1961.
  2. On the legal contention that Article 14/16 required retrospective equalisation: the court identified two core premises implicit in the appellant's claim — (a) that equal work must receive equal pay and (b) that the appellant's class was the same as surveyors in other organisations. The court rejected both premises.
  3. Rejection of "equal pay for equal work" as a constitutional mandate: relying on Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi and subsequent decisions (including State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh and Unikat Sankunni Menon), the court held that Article 14 does not embody an absolute doctrine that equal work must always receive equal pay; such a doctrine would negate permissible variations like incremental scales based on length of service.
  4. Distinction of classes: relying on All India Station Masters' Association and related authorities, the court emphasized that Articles 14 and 16 secure equality within the same class of employees, not equality between separate and independent classes. The court found the appellant's grievance to be a cross-class complaint (surveyors in the Scheme versus surveyors elsewhere), and not a claim of inequality within the same class.
  5. Distinguishing authority relied on by the appellant: the court explained that precedents cited by the appellant (notably Shanti Swarup and D. Murthumjayam) involved discrimination within the same service/class or "glaring anomaly" affecting promotion and pay within related cadres. Those facts differ materially from the present case, where the appellant failed to show intra-class discrimination or anomaly of the sort that would invalidate executive action under Article 14.
  6. Executive munificence versus legal right: the court accepted that the 15 June 1966 revision was not the result of a legally enforceable entitlement but of executive discretion (munificence). Because the appellant had no legal right to the retrospective revision other than the constitutional claim already rejected, retrospective relief could not be compelled.
  7. Practical concession: the respondents' position that identical qualifications were only prescribed from 3 October 1961 was not disputed by appellant's counsel, who said the appellant would accept retrospective effect from that date; nevertheless the court did not order retrospective effect even from that date for the reasons above.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court agreed with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge and refused to grant retrospective operation of the 15 June 1966 pay sanction to the appellant.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence for the appellant is that the sanctioned revision to Rs. 150–240 remains effective from 1 July 1966 (as ordered), and the appellant is not entitled to retrospective pay from 1 July 1959.
  • The court did not establish a new constitutional principle; it applied existing Supreme Court authority to reject the proposition that Articles 14 and 16 require cross-class equalisation of pay or a universal "equal pay for equal work" rule.
  • Because the revision was treated as executive generosity rather than a legal entitlement, the appellant cannot claim retrospective legal rights arising from that munificence.
  • The parties were ordered to bear their own costs, and no change in general pay jurisprudence was announced beyond reliance on the cited precedents.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

    Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union Of India

    T.P.S Chawla, J.:— In or about 1959 a number of persons were appointed as surveyors in the All India Soil and Land Use Survey Scheme, under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, which we will call ‘the Scheme’. The appellant was one such, and was appointed on 2nd November 1959. The scale of pay of these surveyors was Rs. 60 — 150. On 3rd February 1960, they sent a representation to the concerned authority requesting that as surveyors in other organisations of the Government of India were given a pay scale of Rs. 100 — 185 they ought to receive the same, as their qualifications and duties were similar to those of the other surveyors. The higher scale was apparently paid to surveyors in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Geological Survey of India, Indian Bureau of Mines, Atomic Energy Commission, Ministry of Steel, Mines and Fuel and the Exploratory Tubewells Organisation. By a letter dated 30th June 1960, surveyors in the Scheme were informed that the scales of pay of Central Government Employees were under revision by the Second Pay Commission, and no further action could be taken until the revised scales of pay were announced by the Government.

    The President gave effect to the recommendations of the Second Pay Commission by promulgating the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules 1960 on 2nd August 1960. Rule 1 (ii) gave retrospective effect to the revised scales of pay, specified in the schedule to the Rules, as from 1st July 1959. Certain amendments were made in the schedule by a notification published on 26th October 1960. As a result of the Revised Pay Rules, as amended, the scale of pay of surveyors employed in the Scheme was raised to Rs. 110 — 200, whereas that of surveyors in the other organisations was raised to Rs. 150 — 240. This difference existed because their respective previous scales were different. It seems, that in implementing the report of the Second Pay Commission, surveyors in the Scheme were treated on par with draftsmen and tracers, and not surveyors. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that their pay scale was raised by the Rules, the grievance of surveyors in the Scheme that they were not treated on par with surveyors in other governmental organisations survived.
    So, they continued to make representations, over a number of years, seeking redress. Their perseverance ultimately bore fruit. By a letter dated 15th June 1966 they were informed that the President had sanctioned the scale of Rs. 150 — 240 for them, to take effect from 1st July 1966, thus bringing them on par with other surveyors. But, they were still not entirely content. Having got thus far, they claimed that this revision in their scale of pay ought to have been made retrospective to take effect from 1st July 1959. To this end, a number of further representations, followed which were ultimately rejected by the President; and by a letter dated 22nd August 1967, surveyors in the Scheme were informed accordingly. The appellant then filed a petition in this court seeking appropriate orders, in the nature of certiorari and mandamus, as would secure that the revision in his scale of pay made by the order of 15th June 1966 would have retrospective effect from 1st July 1959. A learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed that petition, and the appellant has appealed.
    The case of the appellant is simple. He contends, that the qualifications, duties and responsibilities of surveyors in the Scheme were at all times the same or similar to those or surveyors in the other governmental organisations, and so their pay scales ought to have been the same from the beginning. The quality, he maintains, was recognised by the order of 15th June 1966, but it left a residue of discrimination because the revised pay scale of Rs. 150 — 240 was made effective for surveyors in the Scheme from 1st July 1966 and not 1st July 1959, the date from which surveyors in the other organisations were given that scale. This chronological discrimination, he urges, violates his rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
    From the affidavit filed by the respondents, it transpires that until 3rd October 1961 no qualifications were formally notified for the post of surveyor in the Scheme. The respondents say, that before that date recruitment to such posts was made on the basis of a “certificate in Overseers Course or Training in Surveying”. Undoubtedly, the qualifications required for the post of surveyor in the other organisations were much more. Consequently before 3rd October 1961, the qualifications were not the same. On that date a notification was issued prescribing the qualifications for the post of surveyor in the Scheme. These, the respondents admit, were similar to those for the post of surveyor in the other organisations. That is one of the reasons, they say, why in 1966 surveyors in the Scheme were given the same pay scale as the other surveyors. Counsel for the appellant was unable to controvert that, before 3rd October 1961, the qualifications for a surveyor in the Scheme were not the same as those for a surveyor in the other organisations. We were told, in the course of the argument, that the appellant would be satisfied if the revised scale was made operative from 3rd October 1961, after which date the qualifications were the same.
    Implicit in the argument for the appellant are two premises: (a) that equal work must receive equal pay and (b) that surveyors in the Scheme belonged to the same class as the surveyors in the other organisations and were entitled to equal treatment. Neither of them is tenable. The suggestion that Article 14 of the Constitution requires that equal work must receive equal pay was given shot shrift in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India, A.I.R 1962 S.C 1139, (1) and the Supreme Court said:
    “If this contention had any validity, there could be no incremental scales of pay fixed dependent on the duration of an officer's service. The abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work has nothing to do with Article 14.”
    This view was reiterated in The State Of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R 1963 S.C 913. (2) An absolute illustration of the rejection of this doctrine is found in Unikat Sankunni Menon v. State Of Rajasthan, A.I.R 1968 S.C 81. (3) In that case, under the relevant rules, persons appointed as Deputy Secretaries from one service were allowed Special pay, whilst those appointed to the same post from another service were not. Rejecting the plea of discrimination, the Supreme Court said:
    “It is entirely wrong to think that every one, appointed to the same post, is entitled to claim that he must be paid identical emoluments as any other person appointed to the same post, disregarding the method of recruitment, or the source from which the Officer is drawn for appointment to that post. No. such equality is required either by Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution.”
    As regards the second premise, it is important to note that the appellant does not suggest that there has been any discrimination between him and other surveyors in the Scheme inter se. The discrimination of which he complains is between the class of surveyors in the Scheme, to which he belongs, and the classes of surveyors in the other organisations. It is now well settled that as between the members of such separate and independent classes there need not be equality, as Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution do not require the same. In All India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association, Delhi and others v. General Manager, Central Railway and others, A.I.R 1960 S.C 384, (4) the Supreme Court explained, that, for its activities the State has many departments, and men are employed in each such department in many different classes. Each such class is to be considered a separate and independent entity. The Court then said:
    “Does the concept of equal opportunity in matters of employment apply, however, to variations in provisions as between members of different classes of employees under the State ? In our opinion, the answer must be in the negative.”
    and, further:
    “There is, in our opinion, no escape from the conclusion that equality of opportunity in matters of promotion, must mean equality as between members of the same class of employees, and not equality between members of separate, independent classes.”
    The same principles were repeated in The State Of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R 1963 S.C 913 (5) and Sham Sunder v. Union of India and others, A.I.R 1969 S.C 212. (6) These cases show that the equality which the appellant claims is not warranted by law.
    Cases on which counsel for the appellant relied are clearly distinguishable. In Union of India and another v. Shanti Swarup (1969) 2 L.I.C 1265, (7) the scale of pay of Number Takers employed by the Railways was increased by the Railway Services (Revision of Pay) Rules 1947. All Number Takers were given the benefit of the increase, except only (for no apparent reason) those employed in Delhi Division. A Division Bench of this Court held that Article 14 of the Constitution was violated. There, the aggrieved Number Takers of Delhi Division belonged to the same service, and, therefore, the same class as the others, and so were entitled to equality. In D. Murthumjayam and others v. The Union of India represented by the Secretary, Railway Ministry, New Delhi and others (1969) 1 An. W.R 333 (8) there was a glaring anomaly. A scheme called “The New Deal” worked in such a curious way that Station Masters, forming a superior cadre, received less pay than persons with equal length of service in the inferior cadre of commercial clerks; and it also prejudiced their opportunities for promotion. Nothing of that kind is established by the appellant.
    Since the premises on which it is founded are unsound, the appellants contention as to unconstitutional discrimination cannot be sustained. Bereft of this ground, the case of the appellant becomes legally rather awkward. It was not disputed by counsel for the appellant that, aside from violation of Constitutional provisions, the appellant had no legal right to obtain a revision of his scale of pay. Although there were presumably good other reasons for making a revision by the order of 15th June 1966, there was no legal compulsion to do so. That, in law, was mere executive munificence. The appellant now demands the munificence be made retrospective. He claims it as of right. We do not think that legal rights can be made to sprout from what was originally only munificence. Possibly, to meet this difficulty the appellant moved an application (C.M 737 of 1970) for leave to urge that the entry in the Schedule to the Revised Pay Rules 1960 fixing his scale of pay was also violative of the Constitution. When it was realised that even if that point were to succeed, the appellant would be worse off than he is at present, the plea was abandoned.
    We agree with the conclusions of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the appeal. In the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
    Appeal dismissed
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    Comments

    Binoy Kumar Mukerjee v. Union Of India
    (Oct 27, 1972)