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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Om Parkash, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 were employees of plaintiff No. 3 (a limited company incorporated and functioning in London) and were sent to India by plaintiff No. 3 to assist and supervise installation of machinery at Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. They stayed at the Cecil Hotel (owned by defendant No. 1). On 18 July 1957 plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 hired a taxi (owned by defendant No. 1 and driven by defendant No. 2) insured against third party risks by defendant No. 3. While travelling beyond Bhargava Lane, a truck driven by defendant No. 5 stuck the taxi; the truck then knocked down a cyclist and hit a tree. The truck was owned by defendant No. 4 and insured with defendant No. 6.

As a result of the accident plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 allegedly sustained serious injuries, incurred medical expenses and could not complete the work; plaintiff No. 3 sent two other experts to complete the job and claimed consequential expenses. Specific claimed amounts were pleaded for each plaintiff in the plaint.

The defendants contested the suit and raised a preliminary objection that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to try the suit was barred by the Motor Vehicles Act. The lower court framed a preliminary issue whether it had no jurisdiction in view of section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, held that plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2's claims were barred by that section, and returned the plaint. Plaintiffs appealed the order returning the plaint.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, a Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain claims for compensation arising out of a motor accident where a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for the relevant area was constituted after the accident but before institution of the Civil suit.
  2. Whether a Claims Tribunal constituted after the date of the accident can entertain claims in respect of accidents that occurred before its constitution, particularly where the sixty-day limitation period (under section 110-A as quoted) may have expired before constitution of the Tribunal.
  3. Whether, where some plaintiffs' claims are barred by section 110-F but another plaintiff's claim is not, a joint plaint must be split (or may be tried in part) or whether the plaint should be returned in entirety if no prayer for splitting is made.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The Claims Tribunal for the Union Territory of Delhi was constituted on 25 October 1957 and, they contended, could entertain only claims which related to accidents occurring after that date; the accident in question occurred on 18 July 1957 and thus was not within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
  • The right to sue for compensation vested in the plaintiffs on 18 July 1957, and a subsequent constitution of the Claims Tribunal could not take away that vested right to proceed in the Civil Court.
  • The sixty-day period prescribed for applying to the Claims Tribunal had already expired by the time the Tribunal was constituted, and therefore plaintiffs could not be expected to apply to the Claims Tribunal after constitution.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit was expressly barred by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (specifically section 110-F) once a Claims Tribunal was constituted for the area.
  • Implied in the contest was the position that the statutory scheme transferred the forum for adjudication of claims arising from motor accidents to the Claims Tribunal, notwithstanding that the accident pre-dated the constitution of the Tribunal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Palani Ammal v. The Safe Service Ltd., 1966 A.L.J. 19 Held that a Claims Tribunal constituted under section 110-F has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain claims even in respect of accidents that occurred before its constitution provided the remedy under civil law was alive and not barred by limitation at the time of constitution. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that claims for the 18 July 1957 accident were triable exclusively by the Claims Tribunal constituted on 25 October 1957 (since no suit had been instituted in the Civil Court before constitution).
Unique Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kartar Singh, 1964 66 P. L. R. 1083 (Punjab High Court) Takes the view that where the accident occurred before constitution of the Claims Tribunal but no suit was filed in the Civil Court before constitution, after constitution the claims are exclusively entertainable by the Claims Tribunal and not by a Civil Court. The court cited this decision as further support for the proposition that the Claims Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims once constituted.
Kumari Sushma Mehta v. Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd., A. I. R. 1064 M.P. 133 This authority supports the contrary contention (i.e., that a claim in respect of an accident occurring before constitution of the Claims Tribunal can be tried by a Civil Court). The court explicitly disagreed with this view and stated it was unable to agree with the Madhya Pradesh decision, explaining reasons why tribunal jurisdiction is exclusive after constitution.
Chauahry Gursaran v. Akhouri Parmeshwari Charan, A. I. R. 1927 Patna 203 Decision under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (a different statutory regime). The court held this case inapplicable to the present facts because it arose under a different statute and not under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by reference to statutory text, dates and established principles about jurisdiction and procedural change. It noted the following determinative points drawn from the opinion:

  1. General principle: Civil Courts have jurisdiction over civil suits except where their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred; exclusion of jurisdiction must be explicit or clearly implied. (The court cited the well-settled position as provided in section 8, Civil Procedure Code, as described in the opinion.)
  2. Statutory bar: Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act expressly provides that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for an area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by that Claims Tribunal.
  3. Chronology and application: The accident occurred on 18 July 1957; the Claims Tribunal for the Union Territory of Delhi was constituted on 25 October 1957; the plaint in the Civil Court was filed on 17 July 1958 (i.e., after constitution of the Tribunal). Because no suit or other proceeding in respect of this claim had been instituted in a Civil Court before the Tribunal's constitution, section 110-F barred the Civil Court from entertaining the plaintiffs' claims which were triable by the Claims Tribunal.
  4. Vesting of right vs. forum/procedure: The court accepted that the right to claim compensation vested on the date of the accident and cannot be taken away retrospectively by statute save by express provision. However, it distinguished a vested substantive right from the procedural forum for enforcing it: "No person has a vested right in procedure" and a change in procedure (i.e., transfer of forum to the Claims Tribunal) operates retrospectively. Thus, constitution of the Claims Tribunal changed the forum for enforcement even as to accidents that had already occurred.
  5. Limitation argument: The plaintiffs' point that the sixty-day limitation period had expired by the time the Tribunal was constituted was addressed by the court by observing that the Claims Tribunal has the statutory jurisdiction to condone delay for sufficient cause (reference to section 110-A(3) as quoted in the opinion).
  6. Precedential support: The court relied on Palani Ammal v. The Safe Service Ltd. and the Punjab High Court decision in Unique Motor & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kartar Singh to support the exclusive jurisdiction of a Claims Tribunal over accidents occurring before its constitution provided no Civil suit had been instituted before constitution. It rejected the contrary view expressed in the Madhya Pradesh decision (Kumari Sushma Mehta) as not persuasive in the present case. A separate earlier decision under a different statute (Chauahry Gursaran) was held inapplicable.
  7. Joint claim issue: The court found that while plaintiff No. 3's claim was not barred by section 110-F, the three plaintiffs had made a joint claim and there was no application either below or before the appellate court to split the joint claim so as to proceed with only plaintiff No. 3's claim. On this procedural footing the lower court's order returning the plaint in its entirety was upheld.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Holding (core ruling):

  • The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 because a Claims Tribunal for the Union Territory of Delhi had been constituted before the plaintiffs instituted the Civil suit; such claims were exclusively triable by the Claims Tribunal under section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • Although plaintiff No. 3's claim was not hit by section 110-F, the plaint was a joint claim by three plaintiffs and there was no prayer to split the claims; consequently the lower court was correct in ordering the return of the plaint in its entirety.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs (the order of the lower court returning the plaint was upheld).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaint was returned and the appeal against that order failed; plaintiffs seeking compensation for bodily injury in the described accident are to proceed, if at all, before the Claims Tribunal constituted for the area (subject to that Tribunal's power to condone delay where applicable).
  • Precedential effect: The court applied and followed earlier decisions holding that a Claims Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over claims for accidents occurring before its constitution provided no civil suit had been instituted prior to constitution. The opinion expressly disagreed with an authority that took a contrary view. The decision does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond the application of the cited authorities and the statutory scheme described in the opinion.

This summary is confined strictly to matters contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond the text of the judgment.

    Thomas Tornley v. Hotz Hotels Limited

    Om Parkash, J.:— This appeal, by the plaintiff, is directed against an order returning the plaint, filed in the suit, for the recovery of damages, for presentation to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The suit was based on the following allegations:— The plaintiffs No. 1 and 2, the employees of plaintiff No. 3 a limited Company, incorporated and functioning in London, were sent to India, by plaintiff No. 3, for assisting and supervising the installation of certain machinery in the mills of M/s Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., Delhi. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 & 2 had stayed in the Cecil Hotel, Delhi, owned by defendant No. 1 Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 had hired a taxi on the 18th July, 1957 owned by defendant No. 1 and driven by defendant No. 2. The taxi was insured against Third party Risks by defendant, No. 3. The taxi was hired for carrying plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 to the premises of the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. from the Cecil Hotel, As the taxi bad travelled a little beyond Bhargava Lane, a truck driven by defendant No. 5 had stuck against the taxi. The truck then swung to the left, knocked down a cyclist and then banged against a tree felling it down. Defendant No. 5 was driving the truck rashly and negligently. The truck was owned by the defendant No. 4 and was insured against Third party Risks with defendant No. 6. As a result of the accident, plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 had sustained serious injuries and had to undergo medical treatment for a considerable time. They had incurred expenses in connection with the medical treatment. They had also suffered shock and pain. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 were not fit for completing the work for which they had been sent to India. Plaintiff No. 3 had, therefore, to send two other experts for completing the job. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 claimed special and general damages to the extent of Rs. 24,098/66 paise and Rs. 8929/33 paise respectively, plaintiff No. 3 claimed damages to the extent of Rs. 4,666/67 paise as expenses incurred in connection with the sending of two other experts.

    2. The suit of the plaintiffs was contested on behalf of the defendants Besides controverting the various allegations, made in the plaint; the defendants had taken up the preliminary objection that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit was expressly barred by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

    3. The Court framed a preliminary issue whether the Court had no iunsdiction to take cognizance of the suit in view of the provisions of section 110 F of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Court held that the claim of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 was barred under the provisions of that section and that through the claim of plaintiff No. 3 was not so barred, yet as there was no prayer for splitting the claims, claim of plaintiff No. 3 could not be tried and the plaint as a whole was to be returned. On the basis of this finding, the Court ordered the return of the plant to the plaintiffs.

    4. Aggrieved by the order of the Court, the plaintiffs hare come up in appeal.

    5. For appreciating the points, convassed in the appeal, it will be useful to note the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred as the Act) and certain other facts bearing on those points. sub section (1) of Section 110 of the. Act reads:—

    “A State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be socified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles.

    6. Section 10-A of the Act is—

    “(1) An application of compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub section (1) of Section 110 may be made.

    (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

    (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by the legal representatives of the deceased; or

    (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be,

    (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed.

    (3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within sixty days of the occurence of the accident:

    Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application alter the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”

    7. Section 110-F of the Act lays down that—

    “Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon the claims Tribunal for that area, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claims for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court.’

    8. The material facts bearing on the point of jurisdiction are that the accident was alleged to have taken place on the 18th July. 1957, the Claims Tribunal was constituted for the Union Toritory of Delhi on the 25th October, 1957, and the suit for the recovery of damages was filed by the plaintiffs on the 17th July, 1958.

    9. It is well-settled that as provided in section 8 Civil Procedure Code, Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of Civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. It is, further, well-settled that the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred and that such exclusion must be either explicitly expressed or clearly implied. In the present ease, section 110-F of the Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain any question relating to any claims Tribunal for that area The claim of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 was for compensation in respect of of a motor accident wherein the plaintiffs has sustained bodily injuries The claim was triable by the Claims Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the-Civil Court was barred under section 110-F of the Act to entertain the claims of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. The contention, on behalf of the plaintiffs, was that the claims Tribunal for the Union Territory of Delhi was constituted on the 25th October, 1957 and that it could entertain only those claims which related to accident occuring after the 25th October, 1957. The accident, in the present case had occurred on the 18th July, 1957, the Claims Tribunal could not. there-fore, entertain the claims of the plaintiffs and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit for recovery of damages was not barred under section 110-F of the Act. The argument, on behalf of the plaintiffs, was that the right to sue for compensation vested in the plaintiffs on the 18th July, 1957 and that the subsequent constitution of the claims Tribunal could not take away that vested right. It was, also, submitted that the period of limitation of 60 days, for applying to the Claims Tribunal, had already expired, so far as the plaintiffs were concerned when the claims Tribunal was constituted and that, obviously, the plaintiffs could not apply to the Claims Tribunal after the period of limitation.

    10. The right to sue for the recovery of compensation for injuries sustained in an accident is, no doubt, avsted light and cannot be taken sway retrospectively except by an express statutory provision. But the matter of enforcing that right in a Civil Court or in any other forum is only a matter of procedure. No person has a vested right in procedure and the change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and is not only prospective. The constitution of the Claims Tribunal did not take away the right of the plaintiffs to claim compensation. It simply changed the forum for enforcing that right from the Civil Court to the Claims Tribunal. After the Constitution of the Claims Tribunal, claim for compensation for injuries sustained in a motor accident could only be filed before the Claims Tribunal, even if the accident had occured j before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. Of course, if the claim had already been instituted in a Civil Court, before the constitution of the claims Tribunal, the Civil Court will continue to have jurisdiction to dispose of the claim. In the instance case, the suit was instituted in Civil Court after the constitution of the Claims Tribunal The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit was barred under section 110-F of the Act. So far as the contention of plaintiffs that the period of sixty days for filing the claim before the claims Tribunal had already expired when the claims Tribunal was constituted, is concerned, it is sufficient to point out that the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone delay for sufficient cause.

    11. The question whether claim for compensation, in connection with the injuries, sustained in a motor accident, which had occured before the constitution of the claims ‘Tribunal, is exclusively triable by the Claims Tribunal, was considered in Palani Ammal v. The Safe Service Ltd. . 1966 A.L.J, 19, and it was held that such a claim is triable only by the claims Tribunal and that the Civil Court has not jurisdiction to entertain such claim. It was observed;—

    “The claims Tribunal constituted under section 110-F (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain claims even in respect of acidents that occured before its constitution provided the remedy under the Civil law is alive and not barred by limitation, at he time of the constitution of the Tribunal.”

    12. It was further observed:—

    “Therefore, the intention of the Legislature must have been that the bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court enacted in S. 110-F must only be in regard to matters in respect of which claim had not been entertained by the civil Court before the constitution of the Tribunal-The terms of that section which provide that no civil Court shall entertain any question therefore mean that it cannot, after the: constitution of the Tribunal under the Act. take cognizance of a suit or other proceeding in respect of such claims. If before the constitution of the Tribunal the Civil Court had entertained a suit or proceeding respecting such claim, there is nothing in the Motor Vehicles Act to take away its jurisdiction………..

    But, in the present case, no suit or other proceeding has been filed in any Civil Court in respect of the claims for damages for the accidents in question before the constitution of the Tribunal These accidents which gave rise to the causes of action in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased in the two cases took place before the constitution of the Tribunal. If those persons had so minded, they could certainly have instituted suits for damages in the ordinary Court of the land before the constitution of the Tribunal.”

    13. The Punjab High Court has, also, in Unique Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kartar Singh . 1964 66 P. L. R. 1083 taken the view that where the accident had taken place before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal but no suit was filed in the Civil Court, then, after the constitution of the Claims Tribunal, the claim was exclusively entertainable by the claims Tribunal and not by a Civil Court.

    14. Reliance was placed, on behalf of the plaintiffs, on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Kumari Sushma Mehta v. Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. . A. I. R. 1064 M.P 133.. This authority supports the contention of the plaintiffs that a claim in respect of an accident occurred before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal can be tried by a Civil Court. With respect, I am unable to agree with the view expressed in the above authority. I have already given reasons for holding that a claim in respect of an accident occured before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal, is exclusively triable by that Tribunal after its constitution. I am in respectful-agreement with the view expressed in Madras and Punjab cases.

    15. Another case, relied upon by the plaintiffs, was Chauahry Gursaran v. Akhouri Parmeshwari Charan . A. I. R. 1927 Patna 203.. This case was under the Chota nagpur tenancy act and was not under the Motor Vehicles Act. The case has no application to the facts of the present case.

    16. From the above discussion, it follows that the lower Court was light in holding that the claims for comnensation of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 was exclusively triable by the claims Tribunal and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for the recovery of compensation. The claim of plaintiff No. 3 was not hit by the provisions of section 110 F of the Act. But the three plaintiffs had made a joint claim. There was no prayer, either before the lower Court or before this court, to split up the joint claim and try the claim of plaintiff No. 1, only. In the circumstances, the lower Court was right in ordering the return of the plaint.

    17. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    18. Appeal dismissed.

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    Thomas Tornley v. Hotz Hotels Limited
    (Sep 15, 1967)