17.....
"We are not able to accept this contention. In our opinion, what was affected by the change of policy were merely the chances of promotion of the Air Vice-Marshals in the Navigation Stream. As far as the posts of Air Marshals open to the Air Vice-Marshals in the said stream were concerned, their right or eligibility to be considered for promotion still remained and hence, there was no change in their conditions of service."
18. ......
"These are matters regarding which judges and the lawyers of courts can hardly be expected to have much knowledge by reasons of their training and experience. In the present case there is no question of arbitrary departure from the policy duly adopted because before the decision not to promote respondent 1 was taken, the policy had already been changed. The question is, therefore, whether this change can be said to be arbitrary or mala fide. As we have already pointed out, we are not in a position to hold that this change of policy was not warranted by the circumstances prevailing........"
27.2.Further, the Supreme Court in Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 575 has held in paragraph 31 which is as follows:
31. No employee has a right to promotion but he has only the right to be considered for promotion according to rules. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service and are defeasible.
28.The Supreme Court once again in Union of India v. N.Y. Apte reported in (1998) 6 SCC 741 held in paragraph 8 as follows:
8. Further, what all has been done in the Rules is only to include such persons in the field of consideration and give an opportunity to them to be considered for promotion. ..... It is too well settled that chance of promotion is not a right, nor a condition of service.
29.The Supreme Court in one of its earlier decision while dealing with the service conditions of Government servants held that even promotion will come within the ambit of Article 16 of the Constitution, vide its decision in S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India reported in (1967) 2 SCR 703 = AIR 1967 SC 1427. In that decision, the Supreme Court had also suggested that to avoid the controversy between two sources of recruitment to posts had suggested adoption of a roster system prescribing quota for the different sources. The following passages found in paragraphs 9 and 15 can be usefully reproduced below:
9.
"The relevant law on the subject is well-settled. Under Article 16 of the Constitution, there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State or to promotion from one office to a higher office thereunder. Article 16 of the Constitution is only an incident of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 thereof. It gives effect to the doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion. It follows that there can be reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of appointment or promotion. The concept of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the promotees are drawn from the same source. If the preferential treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the differences between the said two sources, and the said differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to which recruitment is made, the said recruitment can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification...."
......
15. We should also like to suggest to the Government that for future years the roster system should be adopted by framing an appropriate rule for working out the quota between the direct recruits and the promotees and that a roster should be maintained indicating the order in which appointments are made by direct recruitment and by promotion in accordance with the percentages fixed under the statutory rule for each method of recruitment.
In the present case, the Special Rules not only provides a quota but also rotation by which appointments will have to be effected by the respondents.
30.The Supreme Court in Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in (2008) 2 SCC 161 has held that in the absence of any allegation of mala fide or arbitrariness, a rule cannot be challenged. Further, it was also stated that in such matters there is no promissory estoppal involved. It is therefore necessary to refer to the following passages found in paragraphs 47, 58 and 60 from the judgment which are as follows:
47. It is, therefore, evident that whereas the selectee as such has no legal right, the superior court in exercise of its judicial review would not ordinarily direct issuance of any writ in absence of any pleading and proof of mala fide or arbitrariness on its part. Each case, therefore, must be considered on its own merit.
.....
58. Application of doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel must also be considered from the aforementioned viewpoint. A legitimate expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It is distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is based on a right. [See Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan19 and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.20] It is grounded in the rule of law as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty in the Governments dealings with the public. We have no doubt that the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates both in procedural and substantive matters.
..........
60. We also fail to see any reason as to why the doctrine of promissory estoppel will apply in the instant case.
In view of the above, the contention that there was a recommendation from the Director and hence the rule must be struck down cannot be accepted.
31.The Supreme Court in Prasad Kurien v. K.J. Augustin reportde in (2008) 3 SCC 529 in more or less in similar circumstances dealt with the case of a rule framed by the Kerala Government. In that case, there was a general rule framed by the Government for all services as to how the vacancies are to be filled up. It was held that the general rule which was made subsequently will apply to all services covered by Special Rules. The Government has specifically stated that the term vacancy will mean only the cadre strength. It is therefore necessary to refer to the following passages found in paragraphs 24, 27 and 28 which are as follows:
24. By virtue of this amendment which has been brought out under the Rules of 1958 it clearly transpires that this Note (3) was not framed under the exercise of power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. In fact, learned Senior Counsel gave us an impression during the course of argument that this Note (3) has been framed in exercise of power under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution but that impression is now removed after perusing the notification which has been issued under the Act of 1968. Had that not been the position, then perhaps the argument of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would have survived but after going through the notification it becomes absolutely clear that Note (3) which was inserted in the Rules of 1958 in 1992 was subsequent to the Rules of 1974 and this notification is of 1992 i.e. subsequent in point of time and this having been issued under the Act of 1968, therefore, the Rules of 1958 which have already been deemed to have been made under the Act of 1968 and the amendment which has been brought out by appending Note (3) is also under the Act of 1968. As such, the argument of learned Senior Counsel cannot now survive. The Rules of 1958 are of general nature which clearly stipulates that cadre strength has to be taken into consideration for maintaining the ratio in the Special Rules, meaning thereby that these Rules which have come into being at subsequent point of time under the Act of 1968, will hold the field and these Rules are not repugnant to the Rules of 1974. The Rules of 1974 only laid down that every fourth substantive vacancy shall be filled or reserved to be filled by direct recruitment and now on reading of this Note (3) along with the Rules of 1974 harmoniously then it comes to, at the time of determination of fourth substantive vacancy one has to maintain the ratio or percentage of the cadre strength of the posts to which the recruitment is made and not to the existing vacancies at that time. If we construe the whole thing in this light and read the Service Rules in a harmonious manner, then the desired result can be achieved.
......
27. This Court in S. Prakash1 referring to various Acts on the subject with relation to this service has observed as follows: (SCC pp.633-34, para 14)
14. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that if the intention of the rule-making authority was to establish a rule of universal application to all the services in the State of Kerala for which the Special Rules are made, then the Special Rules will give way to the General Rules enacted for that purpose. This has to be found out from the language used in the rules which may be express or by implication. If the language is clear and unqualified, the subsequent General Rules would prevail despite repugnancy. If the intention of the rule-making authority is to sweep away all the Special Rules and to establish a uniform pattern for computation of the ratio or percentage of direct recruits and by transfer, in such a case, the Special Rules will give way. On the basis of the aforesaid settled principles, let us interpret Rule 5 as well as Note (3) and the method of recruitment prescribed under the Special Rules. Rule 5 quoted above provides the method of recruitment to any service, class or category where the method of recruitment is neither solely by direct recruitment nor by transfer but is both by direct recruitment and by transfer. It is made specifically applicable to the Special Rules. Clause (a) provides that the proportion or order will be applicable only to substantive vacancies in permanent cadre; Clause (b) provides that direct recruitment shall be only against substantive vacancy in permanent cadre; and recruitment to all other vacancies shall be made by transfer. Notes (1) and (2) provide that all permanent vacancies and temporary vacancies except those of short duration shall be treated as substantive vacancies. Note (3) specifically provides that whenever a ratio or percentage is fixed (in the Special Rules) for different methods of recruitment to a post, the number of vacancies to be filled up by candidates from each method is to be decided by applying a fixed ratio or percentage to the cadre strength of the post to which the recruitment is made and not to the vacancies existing at that time. Therefore, the entire Rule 5 deals with the Special Rules which provide for filling up of the vacancies to any service, class or category by direct recruitment and by transfer. The language of Note (3) is crystal clear and is for removal of any ambiguity by using positive and negative terms. It applies to all the Special Rules whenever a ratio or percentage is prescribed in the rules. It also emphatically states that it has to be computed on the cadre strength of the post to which the recruitment is to be made and not on the basis of the vacancies existing at that time. (emphasis in original)
28. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish the decision in S. Prakash1 and submitted that in fact this case related to the recruitment to the post of Sales Tax Officer in the Income Tax and Sales Tax Departments and there a provision was that proportion of 20% of successive substantive vacancies shall be filled or reserved to be filled by direct recruitment and the remaining shall be filled or reserved to be filled by transfer of Assistant Sales Tax Officers. The attempt on the part of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to distinguish this case is futile. The percentage may vary. Here it is 25%, there it may be 20% of the successive vacancies. But the principle which has been laid down by this Court in S. Prakash1 clearly governs this case also as we have already dealt with in detail that the principle, generaliabus specialia derogant will not be applicable in the present case but what is applicable is generalia specialibus non derogant which means general things do not derogate from special things. In this case, the General Rules which have come at the later point of time and which govern all service rules and not derogant to the Special Rules will prevail and not the Special Rules. In fact both could be read harmoniously as the intention of both the Rules, if read together is that the ratio of 75%:25% is to be maintained in the whole of the cadre and was accordingly reflected in the subsequent amendment which was brought about in the Rules of 1958 in purported exercise of the power under the Act of 1958 (sic 1968). Therefore, this General Rule which is not repugnant with the Rules of 1974 will prevail and the ratio of 75% promotion and 25% direct recruits is to be maintained on the basis of the cadre strength.
32.But, in the present case, the Government has consciously after taking note of Rule 6 of the General rules amended the Special rules by the impugned amendment and had stated that the vacancies will include both permanent and temporary. When once the intention of the State is to override the General rule and frame a Special rule, as was done in the present case the Special Rule will prevail over the earlier General rule. The contention that in other services of the Government there is no such rule, will not help the case of the petitioner. Each service is a Constituted service and has its own peculiarities. Therefore, when once the Government takes a policy decision to provide ratio by taking into account the total cadre strength of the department as well as deputation vacancies, such a stand cannot be found fault with only because the members of the petitioner Association are likely to get reduced number of promotions/appointments. Such claims are not based upon rights flowing from Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
33.In the light of the above, all the petitions must fail and accordingly, all the writ petitions will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. The interim orders granted by the Tribunal shall stand vacated.
vvk
To
1.The Secretary,
State of Tamil Nadu,
Planning & Development Department,
Chennai-600 009.
2.Director,
Directorate of Economics and Statistics,
D.M.S. Compound,
Chennai-600 006.
3.The Secretary,
Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission,
Chennai 600 002