94/2004, 95 of 2004 & 565 of 2004
M/s.Beema Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd.,
Chennai ... Respondent in T.C.No.229/2004
M/s.Thompson Consumer Electronics,
44, 1st Main Road,
Gandhi Nagar,
Adyar, Chennai-20 ... Respondent in T.C.No.2203/2006
T.C.(A)No.163 of 2003 is against the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'A' Bench, dated
28.2.2003 in ITA No.468/(Mds)/95.
T.C.(A)No.1 of 2004 is against the order of the Income-
tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'A' Bench, dated 7.7.2003 in
ITA No.874/Mds/1996.
T.C.(A)No.94 of 2004 and 95 of 2004 are against the
common order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras
'C' Bench, dated 28.4.2003 respectively in ITA Nos.276 and
1244/Mds/95.
T.C.(A)No.229 of 2004 is against the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'D' Bench, dated
30.9.2003 in ITA No.1285/Mds/2001.
T.C.(A) No.565 of 2004 is against the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'B' Bench, dated
10.02.2004, in ITA No.1091/Mds/97.
T.C.(A)No.2203 of 2006 is against the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'B' Bench, dated
31.10.2005 in ITA No.1317/Mds/2001.
)
All these appeals are clubbed together, for
passing a common order, considering the identity of the
issues raised therein.
2. The common question that arises for
consideration is, whether the Tribunal was right in holding
that the warranty provision is an allowable deduction ? and,
whether the Tribunal was right in holding that a provision
made in respect of future claims that may not rise at all is
a deductible expenditure in the current year ?
3. In T.C.No.94 of 2005, apart from the warranty
charges, there is yet another question relating to the
disallowance under Section 40 A (2) (b) (iv) of the Income
Tax Act, regarding payment of corporate service charges paid
to a closely connected company.
4. The facts in all these appeals centre on the
question of warranty charges. Taking T.C.No.163 of 2003 for
consideration of facts, it may be seen that the assessee
made a provision as regards warranty charges payable under
the terms of sale. It is stated that such a provision is
made in the accounts to mete out the future requirements
arising on account of the warranty clause in the sale
agreement. It is admitted by the assessee that the warranty
provision made as against the liability had not crystalised
against the assessee. Consequently, holding the provisions
as unascertained liability, the assessing authority rejected
the plea of the assessee. The Assessing Officer followed
the orders passed earlier, in respect of similar claims.
Aggrieved of the same, the assessee preferred an appeal
before the first appellate authority, who followed the
earlier orders of the Tribunal and allowed the claim.
Aggrieved of this, the Assessing Officer further went on
appeal, following the orders passed earlier under similar
circumstances. Hence, these appeals.
5. It is a matter of fact that in all these cases,
the claims are not made on the basis of any particular data
available for earlier years.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the revenue
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shree
Sajjan Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1985) 156
ITR 585, and makes a particular reference to the distinction
between 'provision' and 'reserve', dealt with by the Apex
Court and to the extract from the decision reported in Vazir
Sultan Tobacco Co.Ltd. v. CIT [1981] 132 ITR 559 (SC), which
may be usefully extracted hereunder :
"The distinction between a provision
and a reserve is in commercial
accountancy fairly well known. Provisions
made against anticipated losses and
contingencies are charges against profits
and, therefore, to be taken into account
against gross receipts in the P.&
L.account and the balance sheet. On the
other hand, reserves are appropriations
of profits, the assets by which they are
represented being retained to form part
of the capital employed in the business.
Provisions are usually shown in the
balance sheet by way of deductions from
the assets in respect of which they are
made whereas general reserves and reserve
funds are shown as part of the
proprietor's interest."
7. Based on the said decision, the learned Standing
Counsel submits that when there was no obligation cast as on
the date of sale except for an agreement and in the absence
any comparison to make a provision for an uncrystallised or
uncertain liability, the assessee was not entitled to the
benefit, as granted by the Tribunal. He also placed
reliance on the decisions in Indian Smelting and Refining
Co.Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, [2001] 248 ITR 4 and
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Dynavision Ltd., [2004] 265
ITR 289 and makes a reference to page 297, to impress on the
fact that the contingency liability, by its very nature,
cannot have a provision for purposes of deduction. He also
made a specific reference to the decision in Bharat Earth Movers v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Karnataka., [2000] 245 ITR 428, and submitted that the
same is distinguishable on facts and in the absence of
certainty of a liability and certainty of an event to incur
that liability, a provision cannot go for deduction. The
learned counsel further submitted that the assessees in
these cases have not submitted any proof as regards previous
pattern of expenditure, to maintain a provision. In this
connection, he placed reliance on Commissioner of Inland
Revenue v. Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd., [1996] 222
ITR 671 at 701; Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Vinitec
Corporation Pvt. Ltd., [2005] 278 ITR 337 (Delhi) and
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Indian Transformers Ltd.,
[2004) 270 ITR 259.
8. Per contra, Mr.Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel
for the assessees, submits that a committed liability is an
accrued liability and, hence, even though the exact
quantification is postponed to a future date, yet a
provision in terms of the agreement undertaken has to be
considered for deduction. In short, he submits that the
determination of exactness of the liability on a future date
does not make a liability as on the date of agreement a
contingency liability. In this connection, he placed
reliance on Section 37 (1) and drew support from [2001] 248
ITR 4 and [2000] 245 ITR 428. In the above circumstances,
the learned counsel for the assessees prays that the order
of the Tribunal be upheld.
9. We agree with the submission made by the
learned counsel for the revenue, that considering the nature
of the liability, which is yet to crystalise but loaded with
uncertainty of the event to cause a liability, there is no
justification to accept the plea of the assessees to uphold
the order of the Tribunal.
10. The reliance placed on the decision of the
Supreme Court in (1985) 156 ITR 585 needs to be noted
herein. It relates to a provision for future use for payment
of gratuity to the employees on retirement or on termination
of their services. The Apex Court held that the liability
to pay gratuity becomes an accrued liability of an assessee,
when the employees retire or when their services are
terminated and, until then, the right to receive gratuity is
a contingent right and the liability to pay gratuity
continues to be a contingent liability qua the employer.
Taking note of the nature of liability, the Supreme Court
also made a reference to the decision in Metal Box Company Of India Ltd. v. Workmen, [1969] 73 ITR 53, and held that
it was permissible for an assessee, if he so chooses, to
provide in his profit and loss account for the estimated
liability under a gratuity scheme, by ascertaining the
present value on accrued basis and claiming it as an
ascertained liability, to be deducted in the computation of
profits profits and gains of the previous year. Referring
to the provisions of section 40 A (7) in that case, the
Supreme Court held that the requirements for gratuity to be
deductible under the Act must be fulfilled under Section 40
A (7). It may be noted that though it relates to a gratuity
payment, the fact remains, that, to qualify for a deduction,
there must be a liability and it is a certainty. Although
the quantification, as such might be postponed to a future
date, as long as the event is of certainty, the claim for
deduction, as such, cannot be denied. However, where the
liability itself is not held out with certainty, which may
happen or may not happen, such liabilities, contingent in
character, cannot be the subject matter of deduction, even
under the mercantile system of accounting. The eligibility
or otherwise for deduction hence depends on the certainty of
the event, namely, the liability to occur even under the
terms of sale agreement. Hence, with such uncertainty, the
writ large on the occurring of an event, there is no
justification to extend the benefit of deduction on the
provision on a contingent liability. The decision reported
in [2001] 248 ITR 4 relied on by the assessee is
distinguishable to the effect that the provision made for
liability on the basis of show cause notice, which the
assessee did not admit as a liability, was not deductible;
that was only a contingent liability and, hence, could not
constitute as an expenditure for the purpose of income tax.
[2004] 265 ITR 289 is the decision of this Court, on the
question of the character of a liability as the contingent
liability. Referring to the decision in [1985] 156 ITR 585
(SC), this Court held that
the basic requirement is that
the amount sought to be excluded should be an expenditure
and the expenditure, which is deductible for income tax
purposes, is one which is towards a liability actually
existing at the time, but the putting aside of money, which
may become expenditure on the happening of an event is not
an expenditure.
11. The Revenue as well as the assessees placed
reliance on [2000] 245 ITR 428. This relates to a claim on
leave encashment. The assessee, in that case, created a
fund making provision for meeting its liability, arising on
account of accumulated earned/vacation leave. A certain sum
was set apart in a separate account as provision for
encashment of accrued leave. Assessee made a claim for
deduction. The High Court reversed the view of the Tribunal
that provision for accrued leave salary was a contingent
liability that was not a permissible deduction. Reversing
the said view, the Apex Court held that the provision made
by the assessee therein for meeting its liability was under
the leave encashment scheme proportionate with the
entitlement earned by the employees of the company, subject
to a ceiling on accumulation as applicable on relevant date.
Consequently, the Apex Court held that the liability was not
a contingent liability.
12. A perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court
shows that what should be certain is the incurring of the
liability. Even though the actual quantification may not be
possible, it should also be capable of being estimated with
reasonable certainty. If these requirements are satisfied,
the liability is not a contingent one. The liability is in
praesenti, though it will be discharged at a future date.
It makes no difference to the point of time when the
liability shall have to be discharged.
13. The Supreme Court decision referred to above
lays down the law on the question of deductibility of a
provision on contingent liability and that the deduction to
be allowable thereon must be that liability existing with
certainty to be called an accrued liability. Hence, where
there was no difficulty in ascertaining the existence of a
liability, mere existence of difficulty in actual
quantification does not convert the accrued liability to
that of a conditional one, to look upon to the happening of
an event. The settled principles, hence, emphasis on the
existence of element of certainty rather than on the
quantification of the liability.
14. A perusal of the facts in these cases makes it
clear that what has been projected in these cases is that
under the terms of the agreement of sale, there is a
warranty provision. The accounts of the assessee made a
provision for warranty at a percentage on the turnover.
15. Learned counsel for the assessee could not
deny the fact that considering the uncertainty of a
liability, deduction could still be a possibility under the
law declared by the supreme Court.
16. In none of these cases, the assessee could lay
its hand on the actual incurring of a liability under the
warranty clause on the basis of fixing a percentage on the
turnover. In the absence of any details, accepting the
claim of percentage on the turnover could not be sustained.
17. As to the reliance placed on the decision in
[1996] 222 ITR 697, as rightly submitted by the learned
Standing Counsel for the Revenue, the said decision was
prompted by the statistical data available that in respect
of 63% of the vehicles sold by the tax payer, they were
returned to the dealers for some kind of work to be done
under the warranty clause. The Privy Council held that the
tax payer could reasonably make an accurate forecast, based
on the previous experience, as to what would be the total
cost of remedial work for all the vehicles sold in a given
year. Taking note of the commercial practice, the Privy
Council granted the relief in the assessee's appeal.
18. With no such details in the appeals at any
stage of the proceedings, we do not find any justification
to grant 1.5 per cent on the total turnover, as provision
for the warranty clauses.
19. Learned counsel for the assessee placed
reliance on [2005] 278 ITR 337 (Delhi), a decision of the
Delhi High Court, and [2004] 270 ITR 259, a decision of the
Kerala High Court.
20. A perusal of the above two decisions shows
that the claims in those cases were based on the data of the
previous years, which enabled the assessee to estimate its
liability under the warranty clause.
21. In the decision reported in [2005] 278 ITR 337
(Delhi), the Delhi High Court noted that the assessee had
given figures for five years of warranty liability provided
vis-a-vis the expenditure incurred, so also, in the decision
reported in [2004] 270 ITR 259.
22. We do not think that the decisions of the
Delhi High Court and the Kerala High Court lend support to
the cause of action. In the absence of any such details, an
adhoc provision on a percentage of the turnover disentitles
the assessee to the relief.
23. Learned counsel for the assessees reiterated
the fact that under the terms of sale, warranty clause is a
committed liability and, as such, the claim is not
reasonable as to the particular percentage in the total
turnover.
24. We do not agree with the above said submission
of the learned counsel that they could be granted some ad
hoc percentage. Considering the fact that the liability, as
such, being a contingent one and not a certainty, we fail to
understand the reasoning of the Tribunal in accepting the
case of the assessee on the strength of decisions, which
certainly are based on definite data. Under the
circumstances, the decision of the Tribunal deserves to be
reversed.
25. As regards the question relating to the
charges paid under additional service charges arising in the
case of T.C.Nos.94 and 95 of 2004, we find that the
Tribunal granted the relief , without adverting to the facts
which required the additional expenditure. It is stated
that under the terms of the agreement, with increased sales,
amount was paid as a corporate service charge to the holding
company. The assessing authority allowed the claim in
earlier years based on this. However, in respect of the
assessment year 1991-92, the assessee claimed that payment
at 2% required a revision commensurate with the increase in
turnover. The Assessing Officer, however, rejected the
claim, as excessive and unreasonable, having regard to the
nature of services rendered by the holding company. The
assessee explained the increase in the payment of
commission, on account of the increase in the turnover.
Hence, a sum of Rs.25.00 lakhs extra was paid to the holding
company. The first appellate authority, confirming the
order of the assessing authority, held that the
disallowance of Rs.15.00 lakhs was reasonable and hence
allowance of Rs.10.00 lakhs was upheld. The Commissioner
also held that the assessee had not produced any data
regarding the services rendered extra, justifying the huge
payment.
26. On appeal, the Tribunal held that the assessee
had produced the necessary calculation sheet; that the
assessee had spent less amount towards the charges,
consequent to the fact that where it had no branches, it
took the services of the holding company to get its
business. The Tribunal held that there was nothing to show
that the calculation given by the assessee was found to be
false. Consequently, it was not open to the revenue to
reject the contention in an ad hoc manner.
27. The learned Standing Counsel referred to the
decisions in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Shatrunjay
Diamonds, [2003] 261 ITR 258 and V.S.T.Motors Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, [2003] 260 ITR 440, wherein it
was held that in the absence of necessary details to support
the claim, disallowance was justified and, hence, prayed for
restoring the order of the Assessing Officer.
28. Per contra, learned counsel for the assessees,
however, submitted that there is no denial of the fact that
the holding company had rendered additional services. He
submitted that the authorities must look at the commercial
exigencies, which require the payment to the fixed extent.
Learned counsel also submitted that considering the various
aspects of the claim, the Tribunal had rightly concluded the
issue in favour of the assessee.
29. A perusal of the order of the Tribunal shows
that the Tribunal has mainly accepted the plea of the
assessee that the expenditure was warranted by commercial
exigencies and the assessee would have spent more if it were
to maintain branches, instead of taking services of a
holding company.
30. We feel, in the absence of any details in the
order as to the services rendered, in order to result in a
better business, the matter be remitted to the assessing
authority for fresh consideration on issue of granting
relief to enable the assessee to furnish the details as to
the additional services rendered, to justify the payment
over and above 2% services charges on the sales effected.
Consequently, the first question in T.C.Nos.94 and 95 of
2004, namely, whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was
right in holding that the disallowances made under Section
40 A (2) (b) (iv) of the Income Tax Act in respect of
corporate service charges paid to a closely connected
company were not justified, stands remanded to the assessing
authority to re-do the assessment in this regard.
31. As regards T.C.No.2203 of 2006, learned
counsel appearing for the assessee submitted that the
calculation of the liability was made on scientific basis
with reference to the past experience. Consequently, the
decision of the Privy Council as well as the decision of the
Apex Court will have a bearing on the issue.
32. A perusal of the assessment order shows that
the assessee company paid on an average Rs.150/- per set to
T.D.Electronics. The liability to pay arose as and when
sales were effected. The assessing authority noted that in
the case of five year warranty, the entire expenditure spent
was dependent on the liability occurring. Since the
obligation was purely contingent and not actual, their claim
was not sustainable. The Tribunal followed the earlier
year's order in the assessee's case as well as that of the
Privy Council in [1996] 222 ITR 697.
33. It may be noted that the assessee was
providing warrantee for the repair for a period of one year,
when they were paying Rs.150/- per set to another company,
by name, T.D.Electronics Service Company. That apart, there
was another five year warranty and the expenditure on this
account was estimated at Rs.68.00 lakhs and this expenditure
was to be incurred only when there arose a liability, to be
borne. The facts herein are no different from that of the
earlier cases.
34. Under the circumstances, we do not find any
justification to accept the plea of the assessee that the
proviso merited a deduction. In the light of the view that
we have taken, which is supported by the decision of the
Supreme Court, the appeals preferred by the Revenue, on the
question of warranty charges as a contingent liability, are
allowed, holding that the same as not deductible. No costs.
dixit
To
The Commissioner of Income Tax,
Chennai.