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  • Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963;(ii) Respondents 1
  • clause (a) or clause (aa) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 40
  • Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred
  • Rule 4 (i) (ii) of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963
  • Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963
  • Sections 40 (1) (b) and 41 (5)-satisfaction of Government
  • clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of sub-section (1). Section 41
  • Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules
  • Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • sub-section (1) of that Section (Section 40),
  • Section 39, the provisions of Sections 6
  • clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40,
  • Section 4 (1), declaration under Section 6
  • Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.
  • Sec. 39 of Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 11-vide (1) M/s Star
  • Section 5-A, sub-section (2)
  • Indian Companies Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Rule 3 of the Rules
  • Rule 4 of the Rules
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963;(ii) Respondents 1
  • clause (a) or clause (aa) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 40
  • Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred
  • Rule 4 (i) (ii) of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963
  • Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963
  • Sections 40 (1) (b) and 41 (5)-satisfaction of Government
  • clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of sub-section (1). Section 41
  • Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules
  • Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  • sub-section (1) of that Section (Section 40),
  • Section 39, the provisions of Sections 6
  • clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40,
  • Section 4 (1), declaration under Section 6
  • Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.
  • Sec. 39 of Land Acquisition Act.
  • Section 11-vide (1) M/s Star
  • Section 5-A, sub-section (2)
  • Indian Companies Act
  • LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • Rule 3 of the Rules
  • Rule 4 of the Rules
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions were filed by the same petitioner challenging land acquisition proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2. In W.P. No. 13247/2001 the petitioner sought to quash: (a) the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 3.11.1999; (b) the declaration dated 18.9.2000; and (c) Award No. 1/2000 dated 30.12.2000, in so far as 2.79.5 hectares of his land in Veerapuram village were concerned, and prayed for restoration of that land to him.

In W.P. No. 13248/2001 the petitioner challenged the Section 4(1) notification relating to 1.55.0 hectares of his land in Thenmelpakkam village.

The petitioner stated he purchased a total of 4.34.5 hectares in 1996 and had leased the lands to Blossoms Bio-tech Limited to operate a greenhouse farm, claiming substantial investments and loans. He alleged the lands were being acquired for a private company (Mahindra Industrial Park Limited/third respondent), that Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act applied, and that statutory requirements (including Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 and Sections 41 and 42 of the Act) were not complied with.

Respondents 1 and 2 (State) filed counter-affidavits stating the Government had given administrative sanction by G.O.Ms No. 630 dated 24.9.1998 to acquire a large area for an industrial park promoted by Mahindra Industrial Park Ltd.; that the Section 4(1) notification was published and Section 5-A enquiry notices served; that objections were forwarded to the requisitioning body and considered; that declaration under Section 6 was published and an award was passed with compensation deposited. The State asserted full compliance with Part VII and the Companies Rules.

The third respondent (requisitioning company) also filed counter-affidavits asserting compliance and emphasising the project's scale and the delay being caused by non-possession of the petitioner's land.

The matter was heard with counsel for the petitioner, the Advocate General for respondents 1 and 2, and senior counsel for the third respondent. The court ultimately dismissed the writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification under Section 4(1), the declaration under Section 6 and Award No.1/2000 are liable to be quashed in relation to the petitioner's lands.
  2. Whether Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (specifically Rules 3, 4 and 5) were complied with before acquiring land for a private company.
  3. Whether the inquiry mandated by Rule 4 of the Companies Rules must necessarily precede issuance of the Section 4(1) notification (i.e., the temporal/mandatory effect of Rule 4).
  4. Whether the Section 5-A enquiry was properly conducted and whether the petitioner’s objections were validly considered.
  5. Whether the writ petitions are barred by delay and laches given the time between the award and filing of the petitions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The acquisition proceedings were illegal because the State and requisitioning body failed to follow Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.
  • Rule 4 of the Companies Rules (Rule 4(i) & (ii)) had not been followed; the prior consent, execution of agreement and publication requirements envisaged by Sections 39, 41 and 42 were not complied with.
  • The acquisition was effectively for a private company and thus Part VII applied strictly; there were defects in the Section 5-A enquiry process.
  • The petitioner described his investment and proposed commercial operations (orchids, tube roses, bananas) and asserted the acquisition would kill the purpose of his enterprise.

Respondents 1 & 2 (State) – Counter-Arguments

  • The Government gave administrative sanction (G.O.Ms No. 630 dated 24.9.98) to acquire land for an Industrial Park promoted by Mahindra Industrial Park Ltd.; Part VII and Companies Rules were complied with.
  • Notification under Section 4(1) was published in the Gazette and newspapers; notices for Section 5-A enquiry were served; the petitioner's objections were forwarded to the requisitioning body and considered; a Section 5-A enquiry took place on a date when no one appeared.
  • Declaration under Section 6 was published and an award was passed; compensation was deposited and partial possession taken; respondents asserted no merit in the petitioner's claims of procedural non-compliance.

Third Respondent (Requisitioning Body) – Counter-Arguments

  • They asserted full compliance with mandatory provisions and highlighted the public and developmental object of the industrial park.
  • Emphasised extensive private purchases (about 1,125 acres out of 1,398 acres) and that delay in taking possession of the petitioner's land was hindering project completion.
  • Argued that the petitioner failed to file objections within time and did not appear for the Section 5-A enquiry, and therefore cannot now challenge the adequacy of that enquiry.
  • Argued that the writ petitions were filed belatedly (after award) and are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai, AIR 1975 SC 629 Petitioner's reliance: that an enquiry under Rule 4 when not lawfully held makes subsequent notification illegal. The court recorded the petitioner's reliance but did not accept Chaturbhai as dispositive; instead it examined whether Rule 4 must always precede Section 4 in light of other binding authorities.
H.M.T House Building Co-op. Society v. Syed Khader, AIR 1995 SC 2244 Principle that prior approval by the Government of certain housing schemes is a condition precedent (relied on by petitioner). Cited by petitioner; court noted the reliance but assessed compliance with Part VII and Rules on the facts rather than automatically striking down notifications.
H.M.T House Building Co-op. Society v. M. Venkataswamappa, AIR 1995 SC 2253 Similar to the above: prior approval as condition precedent for certain acquisitions. Referenced by petitioner; court considered this line but held factual compliance with Part VII and Rules made petitioner's challenge unsustainable.
General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Wahab Uddin, AIR 1981 SC 866 Rule 4 of the Companies Rules is mandatory and unless directions in Rule 4 are complied with, notification under Section 6 will be invalid; compliance of Rule 4 precedes notification under Section 4 and Section 6 (as held on the facts of that case). The petitioner relied on this decision; the court acknowledged it but contrasted it with a later three-Judge Bench decision (Fomento) that qualified the necessity of Rule 4 preceding Section 4 in all cases.
R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 764 Consideration of Sections 40(1)(b) and 41(5) — Government satisfaction and the Court's jurisdiction to enquire into such satisfaction. Cited by petitioner; the court noted the principle that governmental satisfaction is reviewable only within limits and used it in assessing whether judicial re-examination of the Government's satisfaction was appropriate in this case.
M/s Fomento R. & H. Ltd. v. Gustavo Ranato da Cruz Pinto, AIR 1985 SC 736 Three-Judge Bench: it is not necessary that Rule 4 enquiry must in all cases precede issuance of Section 4(1) notification; Section 4 requires only that it appear to the Government that land is needed; Rule 4 may be complied with later in an appropriate case. The court accepted and relied on this authority to hold that Rule 4 need not invariably precede issuance of Section 4(1) notification and therefore petitioner's contention that Rule 4 was mandatory prior to Section 4 was not decisive against the State on the facts.
Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1998 (4) SCC 387 Pleading principle: vague allegations of non-compliance are insufficient; particulars must be pleaded to challenge statutory non-compliance. The court relied on this decision to reject sketchy and unparticularised allegations by the petitioner that statutory requirements were not complied with; the State's records were held to justify dismissal of vague claims.
M/s Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others, 1996 (11) SCC 698 Authority cited for the proposition that writ petitions challenging acquisition long after award may be dismissed on ground of laches/delay. Used by respondents and considered by the court in evaluating whether the petitions were barred by delay; the court treated this as part of established Supreme Court guidance on laches.
Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam C.S Division, U.P v. S.N. Juyal, AIR 1997 SC 2180 Supports the principle that delay/laches can bar belated challenges to acquisition proceedings. Relied on by respondents; court considered it when addressing the laches argument and the timing of the petitions relative to the award.
Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671 Also cited for the principle that belated challenges to acquisition may be dismissed for laches. Referenced by respondents; the court considered this line of authority in assessing whether the petitions should be dismissed due to delay.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a fact-specific and law-driven analysis focusing on compliance with Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and the Companies Rules, the adequacy of the Section 5-A enquiry, and the effect of delay.

  1. Scope of Part VII and the Companies Rules: The court summarized the statutory scheme — Sections 39, 40, 41, 42 and 44-B — observing that Part VII governs acquisition for companies and prescribes prior consent, enquiry and agreement obligations. The court reviewed Rule 3 (constitution of Land Acquisition Committee), Rule 4 (matters to be satisfied before acquisition) and Rule 5 (matters to be provided in the agreement).
  2. On the Rule 4 timing question: The court analysed conflicting authorities. While the petitioner relied on cases emphasising Rule 4's mandatory nature, the court placed decisive weight on the three-Judge Bench decision in M/s Fomento which held that Rule 4 need not in all cases precede Section 4(1) notification. The court concluded that Rule 4 is not invariably a pre-condition to issuance of Section 4(1) notification and that Section 4 requires only that it "appear" to the government that the land is needed.
  3. Evaluation of pleadings and evidence: Applying Larsen & Toubro, the court observed that the petitioner's allegations of non-compliance were sketchy and lacked particulars. The State had filed detailed counter-affidavits describing administrative sanction, publications, forwarding of objections to the requisitioning body, publication of declaration, execution and publication of agreement, award and deposit of compensation.
  4. On Section 5-A enquiry: The court examined the record of notices and the chronology. It found that the petitioner's objection was submitted after the statutory 30-day period; that notices for the enquiry were issued; that an extension was sought and granted; that the petitioner subsequently did not appear for the enquiry fixed on 27.4.2000; and that the Collector rejected the objections after consideration. The court concluded the Section 5-A process was conducted in conformity with the Act.
  5. Government satisfaction and public purpose: The court considered the Government's factual materials as to the industrial park project, its identification of sites, the Government's objective of promoting large-scale employment and industrial development, and the involvement of TIDCO and promoters. Relying on precedent about limits to judicial re-examination of government satisfaction, the court found no fault with the Government's conclusion that the park would be useful to the public.
  6. Private negotiations and extent of private purchase: The court recorded that the third respondent had acquired a large part of the required land by private negotiation (about 1,125 acres) and had bought a portion from the petitioner by negotiation; this contrasted with the small residual area that required acquisition.
  7. Laches/delay: The court considered authorities holding that belated challenges to acquisition may be dismissed. While the court noted the laches argument pressed by respondents, its principal conclusions on compliance and the petitioner's conduct formed the basis for dismissal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were dismissed. No costs were awarded; consequential writ miscellaneous petitions (WPMPs and WVMPs) were closed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner's challenges to the Section 4(1) notification, the declaration under Section 6 and the award in relation to his lands were rejected, and the acquisition proceedings, as to the lands in issue, stand upheld subject to the statutory compensation and deposit already made.
  • Procedure and precedent: The court reaffirmed that Rule 4 of the Companies Rules need not, in all circumstances, precede the issuance of a Section 4(1) notification (following the three-Judge Bench in Fomento). The opinion emphasises that vague or sketchy allegations of non-compliance without particulars will not succeed (following Larsen & Toubro).
  • Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to set new law beyond application of existing precedents and the statutory scheme. The court expressly found no fault in the Government’s satisfaction that the industrial park would be useful to the public and relied on the State's factual record. The judgment does not announce any novel principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of the case.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and contains no information beyond what appears in that text.

    S. Harshavardhan v. State Of T.N.

    1. The petitioner challenges the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents 1 and 2 on various grounds. In W.P No. 13247/2001, the petitioner seeks to quash Notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 3.11.1999 and Declaration dated 18.9.2000 as well as Award No. 1/2000 dated 30.12.2000 in so far as his land to an extent of 2.79.5 Hectares in Veerapuram village, Chingleput Taluk, Kancheepuram District and prays for quashing of the entire acquisition proceedings and restore the said extent of land to him.

    2. The very same petitioner in W.P No. 13248 of 2001 challenges Notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of his land in 88, Thenmelpakkam village of an extent of 1.55.0 Hectares.

    3. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder:- According to him, he purchased 4.34.5 hectares extent of land in Veerapuram and Thenmelpakkam villages, Chingleput Taluk in the year 1996 on a sale consideration of Rs. 70 lakhs. Of this land, 2.79.5 hectares are the subject-matter of W.P No. 13247/2001 and 1.55.0 hectares are the subject-matter in W.P No. 13248/2001. He had leased out the lands under acquisition to Blossoms Bio-tech Limited, Chennai-18 for 99 years and he is the Managing Director of the said company. They set up a Green House Farm to an extent of 7 acres for growing Orchids Tube Roses and Bananas for export purposes. They had spent a total sum of Rs. 55 lakhs. The company has invested more than Rs. 6 crores in the total unit and started exporting flowers on trial basis. The petitioner had borrowed a sum of Rs. 1.25 crores from Central Bank of India, Coimbatore. The land is proposed to be acquired by a company called Mahindra Industrial Park Limited/third respondent herein. The funds for acquisition are not from public funds but from the company funds. Hence Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act alone applies. The previous consent and execution of agreement with Government of Tamil Nadu has not been complied with. There has been no publication of agreement violating Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Acquisition Act. The land is being acquired for private company, developed and resold killing the main purpose of Government acquisition for real estate purposes. The objections of the petitioner were not referred to the requisitioning body. Further, this being company acquisition under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, no steps were taken for private negotiations between the parties. The entire land acquisition proceedings is illegal inasmuch as Rule 4 (i) (ii) of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 has not been followed.

    4. On behalf of respondents 1 and 2, Special Secretary to Government, Industries Department, Chennai-9 has filed a separate identical counter affidavit in both the writ petitions, disputing various averments made by the petitioner. It is stated that the Government in G.O.Ms No. 630 Industries (M.I.E.1) Department dated 24.9.98 has given administrative sanction to acquire 827.47.0 hectare of lands in 220, Veerapuram and 7 other villages in Chengalpattu Taluk with all amenities to establish an Industrial Park by name and style of Mahindra Industrial Park Ltd. As per requisition received from the requisitioning body, namely, Mahindra Industrial Park Ltd., necessary proposals for publication of 4 (1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act were sent to the Government in respect of the lands measuring to an extent of 6.39.5 Hectares (which are dealt with in Block-II) of 220, Veerapuram village, in which the petitioner's land of 2.79.5 hectares are included. The said proposal was approved by the Government and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 3.11.99 and also published in two Tamil dailies on 24.10.99 and 25.10.99 and the same were published in the village on 9.11.99 Notice for enquiry under Section 5-A was duly served on the land owners and as requested by the petitioner, the enquiry was adjourned to enable him to attend the same. The objection petition received from the petitioner was referred to the requisitioning body,i.e,Mahindra Industrial Park Limited, for remarks. The remarks from the requisitioning body were received on 11.4.2000 Consequent on the objection petition received from the petitioner, 5-A enquiry was posted to 27.4.2000 On that day, nobody appeared for enquiry. Hence the objections raised by the petitioner were duly considered and rejected. After exclusion of certain lands as requested by the requisitioning body, declaration under 6 was published in the Gazette dated 18.9.2000 and in two Tamil dailies on 22.9.2000 The same was also published in the village (Veerapuram) on 16.10.2000 As the requisitioning body have further purchased through private negotiation an extent of 0.64.0 hectares, they were withdrawn by requisitioning body as per letter dated 28.9.2000, out of 3.50.0 hectares published in Declaration under section 6 of the Act. After notice, award has been passed on 1.3.2001 and a sum of Rs. 18,04,375/- has been paid towards compensation for the above lands inclusive of structure on land and the above amount is kept in revenue deposit at the Sub-Treasury, Chengalpattu. The possession of the lands measuring 0.06.5 hectares were taken on 23.3.2001 In respect of lands measuring 2.79.5 hectares stands registered in the name of the petitioner, possession was not taken, as there were orchid flowers on the acquired lands. Since the respondents complied with all mandatory provisions of the Act and Rules, there is no merit in the claim made by the petitioner. Similar averments have been made by the very same first respondent in W.P No. 13248/2001.

    5. The third respondent has also filed separate identical counter affidavit highlighting the compliance of mandatory provisions and the object of the industrial park. They also highlighted that they are invested more than 200 crores in the project and 95 per cent of the development work has been completed. The delay in taking possession of this piece of land which is the subject-matter of the writ petitions is causing delay in completing the project.

    6. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr. K. Sridhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. N.R Chandran, learned Advocate General for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel for third respondent.

    7. Mr. K. Sridhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions:

    (i) Since the acquisition is for a company, the respondents 1 and 2 have not strictly followed the provisions, particularly Part VII of the Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963;

    (ii) Respondents 1 and 2 failed to conduct enquiry in terms of section 5-A of the Act.

    On the other hand, learned Advocate General, after placing the entire records relating to the impugned acquisition proceedings, contended that they complied with all the provisions under Part VII of the Act as well as Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. He also contended that petitioner was given ample opportunity in the 5-A enquiry proceedings and absolutely there is no flaw in Section 5-A enquiry. Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the requisitioning body-third respondent, contended that since the petitioner did not file his objection within the prescribed time and failed to appear for 5-A enquiry, he cannot be allowed to contend that the said enquiry was not duly conducted. He also contended that respondents 1 and 2 as well as the requisitioning body, after fully complying with the provisions of Part VII of the Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, passed an award for a portion of the land. He also contended that the third respondent purchased 1,125 acres out of 1,398 acres of land by way of private negotiations and out of 10.72 hectares, they purchased 1.88 hectares from the petitioner by way of negotiations. In any event, inasmuch as the writ petitions were filed after a long gap after passing award, they are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

    8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

    9. Though Mr. K. Sridhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed certain factual materials regarding the petitioner's proposed business, namely, Orchids Tube Roses and Bananas for export purposes and contended that more lands are required including the land under acquisition for the said purpose, I am of the view that it is unnecessary to consider these aspects. It is true that at the request of the third respondent, which is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act and on the basis of the industrial policies and programmes for 1996, 1997 of the Government of Tamil Nadu entered into by Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited (TIDCO) (an Undertaking of Government of Tamil Nadu) and M/s Mahindra Realty and Infrastructure Developers Limited for establishing an Automobile Ancillary Park in Chennai to cater to the new Industrial Units which will come up near Chennai as suppliers of Ancillary and components to Mahindra Ford Car Project/new Automobile projects and steps have been taken to identify suitable sites for the project preparing a project report etc. Thereafter, the company has been promoted pursuant to G.O 2 (D) No. 88 dated 11.6.97 It is further seen that the Government of Tamil Nadu with the object of achieving greater economic development of the State, to provide large-scale employment to the masses and to sustained industrial development felt the necessity for establishment of a modern industrial park with necessary infrastructure facilities like broad approach road sewage and drainage system, ware- houses, Telecommunication facilities, power stations, hospitals, rest places, commercial centres etc., with adequate greenery for balancing the Eco system. Considering the fact that a number of Multinational companies like Ford, Hyundai Motor Corporation etc., have set up huge automobile units for the manufacture of different kinds of motor vehicles in and around Chennai and considering the favourable atmosphere for further establishment of auto ancillary Units by attracting foreign investment world over, the Government of Tamil Nadu with the co-operation of the promoters of the third respondent company conceived the idea to establish an industrial park of international standard in an area about 1398.23 acres on the east of National Highway 45 (NH 45) near Chengalpattu, Kancheepuram District. The lands situated at Veerapuram, Paranur, Thenmelpakkam, Rajakulipettai, Hanumanthai, Kunnavakkam, Anjur villages and in Survey No. 405 in Chettipunniyam village within Chengalpattu taluk in Kancheepuram District were identified taking in to the various factors. It is further seen that the location of the proposed park is off the National Highway 45 from Chennai to Dindugal. According to the respondents, this road is well developed and is suitable for carrying heavy traffic meant for industries. This road is one of the main arterial roads entering the city of Chennai and it connects the Anna International and Kamaraj Domestic Airports as well as the seaport in the city. The site has excellent ground water potential as determined by the Anna University using satellite technology. The site selected is therefore ideally suited for establishing an industrial park. The third respondent company was asked to take steps to acquire the lands by private negotiation. The particulars furnished by the first respondent as well as the third respondent show that the third respondent purchased roughly 1125 acres out of 1398 acres by way of private negotiation. As a matter of fact, they purchased 1.88 hectares by way of private negotiation from the petitioner.

    10. Now I shall consider whether respondents 1 and 2 have complied with the mandatory provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. Part VII of the Act is meant for acquisition of land for companies. As per Section 39, the provisions of Sections 6 to 16 and 18 to 37 shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company under Part VII without the previous consent of the appropriate Government and without execution of an agreement by the company. Section 40 speaks about previous enquiry. In terms of sub-section (1) of that Section (Section 40), such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate Government be satisfied, either on the report of the Collector under Section 5-A, sub-section (2) or by an enquiry held as provided in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of sub-section (1). Section 41 refers to Agreement with the appropriate Government. If the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), or on the report of the officer making an inquiry under Section 40 that the proposed acquisition is for any of the purposes referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 40 it shall require the company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government. It is also clear that the Government has to satisfy regarding the cost of acquisition, the transfer of land to the company and the terms on which the land shall be held by the company. As per Section 42, every such agreement shall, as soon as may be after its execution, be published in the Official Gazette and shall thereupon have the same effect as if it had formed part of the Act. As per Section 44-B of the Act, no land shall be acquired under this part, except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, for a private company which is not a Government company.

    11. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 55 of the Act, the central Government has framed the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) for the guidance of the State Government and the Officer of the Central Government and of the State Governments. Rule 3 of the Rules speaks about land acquisition committee. For the purpose of advising the appropriate Government in relation to acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, the appropriate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a committee to be called the Land Acquisition Committee. The Committee consists of the Secretaries to the Government of the Departments of Revenue, Agriculture and Industries or such other offices of each of the said Departments as the Government may appoint. It shall be duty of the committee to advise the appropriate Government on all matters relating to or arising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, on which it is consulted and to tender its advise within one month from the date on which it is consulted. Rule 4 prescribes certain matters to be satisfied by the appropriate Government before initiating acquisition proceedings. The matters to be provided in the agreement under section 41 are dealt with in Rule 5. Though Mr. K. Sridhar has contended that sections 39, 40, 41, 44-B of the Act and Rules, 3, 4 and 5 were not complied with, learned Advocate General by placing the relevant records, highlighted that all the provisions referred to above have been complied with. He also brought to my notice the details furnished by the Special Secretary to Government, Industries Department in his counter affidavit filed in the above writ petitions.

    12. Mr. K. Sridhar by drawing my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai, AIR 1975 SC 629, contended that the enquiry contemplated under Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 had not been held lawfully and, therefore, the subsequent notification was illegal. He also relied on another decision in H.M.T House Building Co-op. Society v. Syed Khader, AIR 1995 SC 2244, and in H.M.T House Building Co-op. Society v. M. Venkataswamappa, AIR 1995 SC 2253, wherein it was held that prior approval by the Government of housing scheme presented by society is a condition precedent. In General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., v. Wahab Uddin, AIR 1981 S.C 866, it was held that Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules is mandatory and unless the directions enjoined by Rule 4 are complied with, the notification under Section 6 will be invalid. They also held that consideration of Rule 4 also shows that its compliance precedes the notification under Section 4 as well as compliance of Section 6 of the Act. In that case on facts the Supreme Court has held that notification under Section 6 was invalid for non-compliance of Rule 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also very much relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in R.L Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 764. In this decision, Their Lordships have considered Sections 40 (1) (b) and 41 (5)-satisfaction of Government and jurisdiction of Court to enquire into. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has very much pressed into service the above referred decisions, it is clear that if the Government wants to acquire a land for company, undoubtedly they have to satisfy and comply with the provisions contained in Sections 39,40,41 and 44 (b) of the Act as well as Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Rules. I have already referred to the action taken by the Government and the particulars furnished in the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent regarding compliance of all the above provisions. Learned Advocate General, by relying on a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court, namely, M/s Fomento R. & H. Ltd. v. Gustavo Ranato da Cruz Pinto, AIR 1985 SC 736, contended that it is not necessary that enquiry under Rule 4 must in all cases precede issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. After referring to the relevant provisions for acquisition of land by companies, Their Lordships have held as follows:- (para 9, 10, 11 and 15)

    “9. A conspectus of the provisions of the Act as well as the Rules indicate that there are two purposes of acquisition of land one being for the public purpose and the other for the purpose of a Company, the appropriate government has to satisfy itself that such acquisition is needed and would be useful also for public need. Rule 4 of the Rules provides for satisfaction of the appropriate government with regard to various matters before acquisition.

    10. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court were of the view that the enquiry under Rule 4 was necessary for the initiation of the acquisition proceedings to be satisfied that acquisition was necessary for the Company.

    11. We are unable to accept this conclusion for the following reasons:

    (i) To complete the acquisition proceedings, notification under Sec. 6 of the Act is required. Section 6 of the Act enjoins that the government has to be satisfied that the land is needed for public purpose or for a Company and after declaration is made the acquisition is complete after the award is made and possession of the land is taken when the land vests under Sec. 16 in the government free from encumbrances. Section 4 does not require as such this satisfaction of the government. The government might initiate acquisition proceedings “if it appears” to the government that land is needed either for public purpose or for a Company. That might appear to the government by enquiry aliunde or on a petition or application made by any Company. Whether the need is proper or genuine that can be found by the government subsequently after notice under Sec. 4 of the Act. An enquiry under Sec. 4 might be made before issuance of the notification under section 4 of the Act but it is not a sine qua non for the issuance of the notification under section 4 to have an enquiry under R.4 of the Rules. The scheme and the language of the Act and the Rules do not indicate that. As noted before, Section 4 does not require government to be satisfied, it is sufficient if it appears to the government that land is needed either for public purpose or for a Company. It may so appear to the government either by independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the government or even from an application by the company concerned.

    15. Reading the Act and the Rules and keeping in view the scheme of the Act, it is apparent, in our opinion, that before the issuance of Section 4 notification, there is no requirement as such of compliance with the procedure contemplated by Rule 4 of the Rules. We are therefore unable to subscribe to the view that enquiry by Rule 4 must precede the issuance of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. Furthermore as indicated before certain matters which are required to be done under Rule 4 cannot be done because the officer or the person authorised by him would have no authority unless notification under Section 4 is issued.”

    It is clear from the above decision that it is not necessary that enquiry under Rule 4 must in all cases precede the issuance of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act, and in an appropriate case if it is possible, enquiry under Rule 4 may be held before issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. However, it is not mandatory requirement that it must precede the issuance of notification under Section 4. It is also clear that Section 4 does not require Government to be satisfied, it is sufficient if it appears to the government that land is needed either for public purpose or for a company. It is also clear that the Government can get information either by independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the Government or even from an application by the company concerned.

    13. Learned Advocate General has also very much relied on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd., v. State of Gujarat, 1998 (4) SCC 387. By relying on the said decision, he contended that in the absence of specific pleading, namely, details as to non-compliance of the statutory requirements, the vague allegations made cannot be considered. In that decision, Their Lordships have held: (para 10)

    “10???It is not enough to allege that a particular rule or any provision has not been complied with. It is a requirement of good pleading to give details, i.e, particulars as to why it is alleged that there is non-compliance with a statutory requirement. Ordinarily no notice can be taken on such an allegation which is devoid of any particular. No issue can be raised on a plea the foundation of which is lacking. Even where rule nisi is issued, it is not always for the department to justify its action when the court finds that a plea has been advanced without any substance, though ordinarily the department may have to place its full cards before the court??.”

    As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, the State has more than justified its stand that there has been compliance with Rule 4, and the averments regarding non-compliance with Rule 4 were sketchy and without any particulars whatsoever. In this regard, it is relevant to note the categorical assertion made by the first respondent in his counter affidavit regarding compliance of the provisions of the Act and the Companies Rules. Paragraph 19 is relevant which runs as follows:-

    “19??Totally about 1400 acres of land were identified for setting up of this Industrial park by the third respondent herein and out of that a maximum extent of lands were purchased by private negotiations with the owners. As the other landowners were not willing to part with the lands private negotiation was not possible. The first respondent was approached for acquiring the lands under the Land Acquisition Act. The funds for the acquisition have been paid by the Company. Part VII of the said Act applies to this case and the provisions envisages in part VII of the Act have been fully complied with. It is incorrect to state that the provisions in part VII of the Act have been violated, I submit that as seen from G.O.Ms 630 dated: 24.9.1998 and G.O.Ms No. 631 dated: 24.9.98, the prior consent of the State Government was obtained for acquiring the lands, as provided for under Sec. 39 of Land Acquisition Act. The prior consent of the State Government has been given based on the relevant reports and consideration as contemplated under Section 40 of the Act. It is also submitted that the third respondent has entered into an agreement with the Government on 23.8.2000, as provided for under section 41 of the Act. The agreement dated: 23.8.2000 entered into by the third respondent with the State Government, was approved in G.O.Ms No. 323 Industries (M.I.D.1) Department dated: 15.9.2000 and it was published in the Tamil Nadu Govt. Gazette Dt. 15.9.2000 in G.O.Ms 323 Industries (MID-1) Department. Thus all the requirements contemplated in part VII of the Land Acquisition Act are fully complied with. If the landowners had chosen to convey their lands through their power of Attorney no one can find fault with the same. The land is not being acquired for real estate purpose as claimed by the petitioner. As said above the third respondent company has been promoted at the instance of the Government of Tamil Nadu with the object of promoting an Industrial Park and Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation is a co-promoter of the third respondent company. The object of the acquisition is that number of Multi National Companies like Ford, Hyundai Motor Corporation etc., have set up huge automobile units for the manufacture of different kinds of Motor Vehicles in and around Chennai and considering the favourable atmosphere for further establishment of auto ancillary units by attracting foreign investment world over, the Government of Tamil Nadu with the co-operation of the promoters of the 3rd respondent company conceived the idea to establish an Industrial Park of International Standard on the east of National Highway 45 (NH 45) near Chengalpattu, Kancheepuram District. The area was identified and the 3rd respondent company was asked to take steps to acquire lands situated at Veerpapuram, Paranur, Thenmelpakkam, Rajakulipettai, Hanumanthai, Kunnavakkam, Anjur villages and in Survey No. 405 in Chettipunniyam village within Chengalpattu Taluk in Kancheepuram District by private negotiations. The contiguous lands needed for the Project are chosen without any displacement of residents of villages and without affecting the environment and taking into account the proximity to the city and National Highway with a possibility to develop a straight wider approach road and rail connectivity.”

    In the light of what is stated above and in view of the legal position coupled with the factual details, I reject the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and hold that respondents 1 and 2 have fully complied with and followed Sections 39, 40, 41, 44(b) of the Act and Rules 3,4 and 5 of the Rules.

    14. Regarding the other contention that enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was not conducted in accordance with law, here again the records as well as the particulars furnished by the first respondent clearly show that first of all the objection submitted by the petitioner is beyond the prescribed period. In other words, the petitioner did not submit his objection within 30 days from the date of publication of 4 (1) notification as contemplated in Section 5-A (1) of the Act. Accordingly, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the objections were not referred to the requisitioning body. The details furnished would show that notice dated 12.11.99 was sent to the petitioner for 5-A enquiry posted to 16.12.99 However, the petitioner did not respond to the same. The Manager of Blossom Biotech Limited sent a letter dated 13.1.2000 on behalf of the petitioner, requesting time for four weeks for filing objections and the time was granted. Then, the petitioner has sent his objections dated 25.2.2000 to the second respondent. The second respondent forwarded the said objections to the requisitioning body and the latter submitted its remarks dated 10.4.2000 on the objections to the second respondent on 11.4.2000 Thereafter, the second respondent had sent a notice to the petitioner for 5-A enquiry, fixing the enquiry on 27.4.2000 Neither the petitioner nor his representative appeared for the 5-A enquiry on 27.4.2000 and hence the 5-A enquiry was concluded. The second respondent has passed orders on the 5-A enquiry on 26.5.2000 rejecting the objections of the petitioner after duly considering the case. The above factual details would go to show that all the requirements of the Act have been strictly followed and the contentions of the petitioner are totally incorrect and liable to be rejected.

    15. Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the third respondent, has contended that apart from the fact that respondents 1 and 2 have complied with the provisions of the Act and Rules, both the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, since the petitioner has filed the above writ petitions only on 17.7.2001, whereas the award was passed on 30.12.2000 The Supreme Court in more than one case has held that writ petition challenging acquisition proceedings long after passing of the award and vesting of the land in State is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. They further held that the person who approaches the court belatedly will be told that laches close the gates of the Court for him to question the legality of the notification under Section 4 (1), declaration under Section 6 and the award of the Collector under Section 11-vide (1) M/s Star Wire (India) Ltd., v. The State of Haryana and others, 1996 (11) SCC 698: JT 1996 (9) S.C 429; (2) Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam C.S Division, U.P v. S.N Juyal, AIR 1997 S.C 2180; and (3) Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 S.C 671.

    16. As already referred to by me, the land was acquired to establish an Industrial Park by name and style of Mahindra Industrial Park Limited. The Government was satisfied within the meaning of Section 40 (1) (b) of the Act, that it was a work which would prove useful to the public. They also placed the relevant records. Further, the details furnished in the counter affidavit of the first respondent show that they complied with the provisions of the Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. In such circumstances, as observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1962 S.C 764 (cited supra), it is no part of the duty of this Court to sit in judgment over the merits of Government's satisfaction. As a matter of fact, it is my duty to point out that I find no fault with the Government for having been satisfied that the proposed Industrial Park would be useful to the public. I am also satisfied that the third respondent company has been promoted on the initiative of the Government of Tamil Nadu with the object of promoting an Industrial Park and the Industrial development arm of the Government, namely, TIDCO is a co-promoter of the third respondent company. The object of the acquisition is that number of Multi National Companies like Ford, Hyundai Motor Corporation etc., have set up huge automobile units for the manufacture of different kinds of Motor Vehicles in and around Chennai and considering the favourable atmosphere for further establishment of auto ancillary units by attracting foreign investment world over the Government of Tamil Nadu with the co-operation of the promoters of the third respondent company conceived the idea to establish an Industrial Park of International Standard on the east of National Highway 45 near Chengalpattu, Kancheepuram District. Further, the third respondent has also filed a separate counter affidavit denying allegations made against them.

    17. In the light of what is stated above, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions; accordingly they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the WPMPs., and WVMPs., are closed.

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    S. Harshavardhan v. State Of T.N.
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