Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of amounts due on two promissory notes dated 3.2.1998 (Ex.A1) and 15.7.1998 (Ex.A2). The plaintiff's case was that the defendant borrowed Rs. 3,500 on 3.2.1998 and Rs. 5,000 on 15.7.1998, executed promissory notes promising to repay those sums with 12% interest per annum, and thereafter failed to pay despite a notice dated 23.7.1999 and a reply from the defendant dated 5.8.1999.

The defendant denied borrowing those sums and, in his written statement, claimed he had signed blank printed promissory note forms in relation to a chit liability of Rs. 1,750 and that the plaintiff (with the help of others) filled up those blank promissory notes to fabricate Ex.A1 and Ex.A2. The trial court framed issues, found that Ex.A2 was materially altered, concluded that both promissory notes were not validly executed, and dismissed the suit.

The plaintiff appealed to the District Court (A.S No. 170 of 1997). The District Judge held that the defendant had not pleaded material alteration and that, in the absence of such pleading, the trial court's finding of material alteration was not proper. The District Judge also held the defendant failed to prove that the promissory notes were originally blank forms filled up by the plaintiff, and therefore allowed the first appeal. The defendant then preferred the present Second Appeal.

The appeal was initially taken up at the admission stage (notice of motion ordered); trial court records were later obtained and the Second Appeal was taken up for enquiry.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the learned District Judge correct in decreeing the suit on the ground that the question of material alteration has not been pleaded by the defendant when the court has power to look into material alterations, if any, to decide the issue without the pleadings of either party?
  2. Are not the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge vitiated for not considering the evidence of both sides as the first appellate is the last court on facts?
  3. When the defendant/appellant admitted his signature under promissory notes (Exs.A1 and A2), can the defendant shift the burden of proving the promissory notes to the plaintiff?
  4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of statutory estoppel under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?
  5. Whether the evidence adduced without pleadings is admissible in law?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The trial court dismissed the suit not solely on the ground of material alteration in Ex.A2 but on the broader ground that Exs.A1 and A2 were not validly executed by the defendant.
  • Even if material alteration was not pleaded, the trial court can consider material alterations found during trial to decide the matter.
  • The defendant never borrowed the amounts claimed. He had signed blank printed promissory notes in relation to a chit transaction (liability Rs.1,750) and the plaintiff filled up those blank promissory notes later to fabricate the suit documents.
  • In Ex.A1, the consideration amount was allegedly changed from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 4,000 (deletion and substitution), which would be a material alteration rendering the instrument void; reliance placed on Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The District Judge erred in not allowing the trial court to act upon its finding of material alteration.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • There is no material alteration in the promissory notes and the defendant did not plead material alteration in his written statement.
  • The trial court erred in holding the promissory notes to be materially altered without such a pleading; the first appellate court correctly set aside that finding.
  • The defendant admitted his signatures on the promissory notes; the burden is therefore on him to prove that the signature was obtained on blank promissory notes and that the notes were fabricated.
  • Even if the notes were signed as blanks, Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act makes the person who signs a blank stamped instrument prima facie liable to a holder in due course; the holder may complete the instrument and recover up to the amount indicated by the stamp.
  • Corrections in numeric figures in Ex.A2 did not change the amount stated in words; Section 18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies (words prevail over figures).
  • Relied on case law (including Chidambaram v. P.T. Ponnusamy and Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal) to support that the onus to disprove consideration or to prove fabrication rests on the defendant once signatures are admitted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chidambaram v. P.T. Ponnusamy (cited variously) Support for the proposition that a holder in due course who obtains a blank or incomplete stamped instrument may complete it and negotiate it; consequence of admission of signature shifting burden. The court cited this authority as supportive of the view that, once the defendant admitted his signature and the plaintiff is a holder in due course, the defendant cannot escape liability merely by asserting the plaintiff filled blanks; it bolstered the conclusion that the defendant remained liable.
Bharat Barrel And Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal (AIR 1999 S.C. 1008) Illustration that evidence led by a defendant to displace a presumption (existence of consideration) may be rejected and that absence of proof prevents shifting of onus. The respondent relied upon this decision to argue that the defendant failed to disprove the consideration and thus the onus could not shift; the court considered it in relation to the burden of proof and presumption favouring the plaintiff.
Kishanlal v. Jograj Bantia (100 L.W. 981) Principle under Section 18, Negotiable Instruments Act — where words and figures differ, the amount in words prevails. The court applied Section 18 (as endorsed by this authority) to find there was no discrepancy between words and figures in Ex.A2; therefore the defendant could not derive benefit from alleged numeric corrections.
Samikannu Naicker v. Sigamani (2000 (2) CTC 140) Consideration of consequences when a defendant admits signature but claims blanks were filled by others; application of Section 20 re: inchoate stamped instruments and holder in due course rights. The court relied on its prior reasoning in that case to support the conclusion that the plaintiff, being a holder in due course, was entitled to fill blanks and recover amounts not exceeding the stamp value; it reinforced the present holding that the defendant was liable.
P. Talamalai Chetty v. Rathinasamy (1997 (1) L.W. 843) Authority supporting the proposition that a holder in due course may complete an incomplete instrument and enforce it against the signer. Used as supporting precedent along with Chidambaram and Samikannu Naicker to justify the application of Section 20 and the conclusion that the defendant could not avoid liability after admitting his signature.
K. Gopalan Nair v. V. Kamalammal (1981 1 M.L.J. 40 = 94 L.W. 130) Principle that appellate authorities should not act on evidence in the absence of allegations or pleadings supporting such evidence. The court invoked this authority to support the proposition that evidence meant to establish material alteration is inadmissible if the plea of alteration was not raised in the written statement; this formed a basis for rejecting the trial court's reliance on such evidence.
Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand and another (AIR 1968 S.C. 1083) Ordinary rule: evidence should be led only on matters properly pleaded; parties should not be taken by surprise by evidence on issues not raised by pleadings. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that the trial court erred in admitting and acting upon evidence of material alteration when no such plea had been taken in the written statement; this supported confirmation of the lower appellate court's view.
Sakharibai Hasanali Makani & others v. Girish Kumar Rupchand Gadia & others (1997 ACJ 95) Illustration by the Bombay High Court that evidence in the absence of a pleaded case may be inadmissible and that pleadings form the structure for admissible evidence in a civil suit. The court cited this decision to emphasize that evidence tendered without supporting pleadings is inadmissible; it strengthened the reasoning that the trial court's finding on material alteration was unsustainable without a pleading.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the pleadings, the evidence, the trial court's findings, and the appellate court's conclusions. The analysis proceeded in the following steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Document verification: The court personally examined Ex.A1 and Ex.A2. It observed no deletion, addition or overwriting in Ex.A1. In Ex.A2 the numeric figure was corrected (numericals), but the amount in words was not deleted or altered. The court therefore found no material discrepancy between words and figures in Ex.A2.
  2. Application of Section 18, Negotiable Instruments Act: Because the amount in words and figures did not differ, Section 18 (which gives primacy to words where figures and words differ) did not benefit the defendant; the amount shown was to be accepted.
  3. Admissibility of evidence in absence of pleadings: The court reviewed authorities, including K. Gopalan Nair, Mrs. Om Prabha Jain, and the Bombay High Court decision (Sakharibai), and reiterated the principle that evidence should ordinarily be given only on matters properly pleaded. It held that where a party does not plead material alteration, evidence on that ground is inadmissible and the trial court erred in acting upon such evidence.
  4. Burden of proof and presumption under Negotiable Instruments law and Evidence Act: The court recited Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act on burden of proof and noted that the defendant had admitted his signature on the promissory notes. Once signature is admitted, the defendant bears the burden to prove material alteration or fabrication. The court also relied on the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the plaintiff.
  5. Application of Section 20, Negotiable Instruments Act: The court applied Section 20 (inchoate stamped instruments), which provides that a person who signs and delivers a blank or incomplete stamped instrument gives prima facie authority to a holder in due course to complete it and that such signer is liable to a holder in due course. The court held that, even if the plaintiff completed blanks, once the plaintiff is a holder in due course the defendant cannot escape liability; the holder may recover any amount specified not exceeding the stamp value.
  6. Weighing precedents and submissions: The court considered the parties' authorities (including Chidambaram, Samikannu Naicker, P. Talamalai Chetty, and Bharat Barrel) and concluded that the lower appellate court correctly set aside the trial court's dismissal because the trial court had relied on evidence of material alteration that was not supported by pleadings. At the same time, the court found that the plaintiff, as holder in due course and given the admitted signatures, was entitled to protection under Section 20 and relevant presumptions.
  7. Final legal synthesis: Drawing upon Sections 118 and 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and principles of burden of proof under the Evidence Act, the court concluded that the plaintiff qualified as a holder in due course and that the defendant failed to discharge the burden of proving material alteration or fabrication. Accordingly the defendant remained liable to pay the amounts shown in the promissory notes.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court (District Court) are confirmed, and this Second Appeal is dismissed at the admission stage. No costs. The connected CMP is also dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The defendant is held liable to pay the amounts shown in the promissory notes (Exs.A1 and A2) as the court found the plaintiff to be a holder in due course and the defendant failed to prove material alteration or fabrication.
  • The trial court's dismissal of the suit on the basis of material alteration (without supporting pleadings) was held to be unsustainable; the lower appellate court's allowance of the plaintiff's appeal is affirmed.
  • The appeal is dismissed at the admission stage, no costs awarded, and the connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.

Broader legal implication: The court applied existing statutory provisions (Sections 18, 20, 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Sections 101–102 of the Evidence Act) and cited settled authorities to resolve the dispute. The opinion confirms and applies established principles regarding inchoate stamped instruments, the effect of an admission of signature, the burden of proof, and the inadmissibility of evidence on issues not pleaded. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond these applications.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion; no information beyond that text has been added.

    K. Mani v. Elumalai

    The defendant is the appellant. The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of the amount due on promissory notes dated 3.2.1998 and 15.7.1998

    2. The plaintiff's case is that on 3.2.1998, the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 3500/= promising to repay the same together with 12% interest per annum and executed the first promissory note. The defendant also borrowed another sum of Rs. 5000/= on 15.7.1998 and executed the second promissory note, promising to repay the same together with 12% interest per annum. The defendant has not paid any amount towards these promissory notes and to the notice dated 23.7.1999, the defendant sent a reply on 5.8.1999 As the defendant has not paid the amount, the plaintiff laid the suit.

    3. The defendant in his written statement had stated that he never borrowed any amount on 3.2.1998 or on 15.7.1998 The defendant was conducting a chit and in respect of the same, the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1750/= only, for which, the plaintiff obtained the signature of the defendant in the blank printed promissory notes and filled up the same with the help of his men. The second promissory note dated 15.7.1998 was also filled up by the plaintiff in the same manner. The defendant did not borrow any amount from the plaintiff.

    4. On the said pleadings, the trial court framed the necessary issues and answered that the second promissory note Ex.A2 was materially altered and came to the conclusion that both the promissory notes were not executed by the defendant and the promissory notes were not true and valid, and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S No. 170 of 1997 before the District Court, Tiruvannamalai and the learned District Judge found that the defendant has not raised any plea with regard to material alteration and in the absence of the necessary pleading, the trial court's finding that the suit promissory notes were materially altered and thereby dismissed the suit is not proper. The lower appellate court further held that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff obtained Exs.A1 and A2 Promissory Notes in the blank printed promissory notes and allowed the appeal. As against the same, the defendant has preferred this appeal.

    5. The appeal came up for admission and notice of motion alone was ordered. Thereafter, it was felt that trial court's records are necessary and they were sent for. After the receipt of the Trial court records, Second Appeal was taken up for enquiry.

    6. The learned advocate for the defendant/appellant has submitted that the findings of the learned District Judge that the trial court dismissed the suit only on the ground of ‘material alteration’ in Ex.A2 is not correct. But on the other hand, the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that Exs.A1 and A2 were not validly executed. It is submitted, even if there is no pleading as to material alteration of the documents, during the trial of the suit, if the court finds that there is any material alteration of the documents, that can be taken into account in deciding the issue even in the absence of such a pleading.

    7. The appellant has raised two substantial questions of Law in this Second Appeal, which are,

    (i) Is the learned District Judge correct in decreeing the suit on the ground that the question of material alteration has not been pleaded by the defendant when the court has power to look into the material alterations if any to decide the issue without the pleadings of either party?

    ii) Are not the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge vitiated for not considering the evidence of both sides as the first appellate being the last court on facts?

    8. The learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff has submitted that there is no material alteration at all in the suit promissory notes and the defendant also has not pleaded so in the written statement. That in the absence of the pleadings, the trial court erred in holding that the suit promissory notes were materially altered and the first appellate court has correctly held that the said finding of the trial court was not based upon the pleadings in the written statement and therefore it is not sustainable, and allowed the appeal.

    9. It is further argued that the defendant having admitted his signature in the suit promissory notes, the burden is upon him to prove that the signature of the defendant was obtained in the blank printed promissory notes. Even if it is true, that would not amount to material alterations and the defendant has given prima facie authority to the holder (plaintiff) to make or complete the instrument and make it negotiable and that therefore the dismissal of the suit by the trial court is not proper. The learned counsel argued in support of the findings rendered by the lower appellate court.

    10. Though the defendant raised only two substantial questions of law, after hearing the learned advocates for the respective parties. I feel that the following further substantial questions of law would arise for consideration of this Court:

    (i) When the defendant/appellant admitted his signature under promissory notes (Exs.A1 and A2), can the defendant shift the burden of proving the promissory notes to the plaintiff?

    (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of statutory estoppel under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?

    (iii) Whether the evidence adduced without pleadings is admissible in law?

    11. The learned advocate for the defendant/appellant has submitted that the defendant has not borrowed any amount from the plaintiff. But however, the defendant had signed in the printed stamped promissory notes for the amount due in respect of some chit transactions and the suit promissory notes were fabricated by the plaintiff with the help of those unfilled promissory notes and therefore the defendant is not at all liable to pay the suit claim.

    12. The learned advocate for the defendant/appellant has further submitted that in Ex.A1, the consideration amount was written as Rs. 5000/= and subsequently it was deleted and it was written as Rs. 4000/= and it would amount to material alteration and it would make the instrument as void and also relied upon Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. These things are taken note of by the trial court and dismissed the suit. But however, the lower appellate court has taken a different view and the same is not proper.

    13. On the contrary, the learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff would submit that the defendant having admitted his signature in the suit promissory notes Exs.A1 and A2, the burden shifts upon the defendant to prove that the suit promissory notes were fabricated with his signature. He has relied upon the case of Chidambaram v. P.T Ponnusamy (1997 (1) L.W 843 to substantiate his submission.

    14. The respondent/plaintiff has also submitted that under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, wherein it is stated that “where one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in India, and either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, shall be liable to pay the amount to any holder in due course for such amount.”

    15. The learned advocate for the respondent/plaintiff further relied upon the case of Bharat Barrel And Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal (AIR 1999 S.C 1008 = 1999 3 L.W 237), wherein it was held,

    “The evidence led by the defendant in that regard was not accepted by any of the Judges dealing with the case as noticed herein earlier. In the absence of disproving the existence of the consideration, the onus of proof of the legal presumption in favour of the plaintiff could not be shifted.”

    16. The respondent/plaintiff further submitted that there is no material alteration at all in the promissory notes, especially in Ex.A2, the amount shown in the numericals alone is corrected but the amount written in words are shown properly. If that be so, under Section 18 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, if the amount undertaken or ordered to be paid is stated differently in figures and in words, the amount stated in words shall be the amount undertaken or ordered to be paid. He relied upon the case of Kishanlal v. Jograj Bantia (100 L.W 981), for the above said preposition. It is further argued that there is no material alteration at all as contended by the defendant. Only when the defendant proves that there is any material alterations of the negotiable instrument, then only it will render the same void and in the absence of the same, the defendant is not entitled to make the instrument as void.

    17. The respondent/plaintiff's case is that the defendant borrowed the amount under the promissory notes Exs.A1 and A2, but the same is being denied by the defendant. But however, the defendant admits his signatures but would deny the consideration thereon. Further case of the defendant, is that he has signed in the blank stamped printed promissory notes and the same were utilised by the plaintiff to file the suit. I had an occasion to consider a similar case in the case of Samikannu Naicker v. Sigamani (2000 (2) CTC 140), wherein I have considered about the legal consequences that would flow from the admission made by the defendant, that the signature in the suit promissory note is, his signature, but the rest were filled up by somebody else. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was relied upon, which reads as follows:

    “Inchoate Stamped instruments: Where one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in the States, and either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, he thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, upon it a negotiable instrument, for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. The person so signing shall be liable upon such instrument, in the capacity in which he signed the same to any holder in due course shall recover from the person delivering the instrument anything in excess of the amount intended by him to be paid thereunder.”

    18. In the said case after considering those aspects, I came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is the “holder in due course” and the same was not in dispute. As such, the plaintiff is entitled to fill up the blanks and to negotiate the instrument. The only limitation is that ‘the holder in due course’ can recover any amount specified thereunder and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. In fact, the said view of mine is supported by the view already taken by this Court in the case of Chidambaram v. P.T Ponnusamy (1995 (2) L.W 719 and P. Talamalai Chetty v. Rathinasamy (1997 (1) L.W 843. That apart, a passage from the commentaries on the Negotiable Instruments Act by Bashyanm and Adiga's Eighth Edition, page 201, was also relied upon, wherein it is stated that “the instrument may be wholly blank or incomplete in any particular, in either case, the holder has the authority to make or complete the instrument as a negotiable one.” After analysing all the aspects of the case, here also I have to hold that even assuming that the contents of the promissory note were filled up by the plaintiff, when once it is proved that he is the holder in due course, the defendant cannot extricate from the liability and therefore, I hold that the defendant is liable to pay the amount as shown in the promissory notes.

    19. With regard to certain alterations in the suit promissory notes, it is submitted that the said alterations are material alterations and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the amount. The said argument of the Appellant was countered by the learned Advocate for the respondent-plaintiff that in the absence of pleadings to that effect, the evidence let in is inadmissible and cannot be considered. But once again it is submitted on behalf of the defendant that the trial court accepted the material alterations found in Ex.A.2 and dismissed the suit. But the lower appellate court declined to accept the said case of the defendant on the ground that in the absence of pleadings the evidence let in by he defendant cannot be accepted and set aside the findings of the Trial Court. For the purposes of my satisfaction, I have also verified Exs.A1 and A2 and there is no deletion or addition or overwriting in Ex.A1 But in Ex.A2, the amount in words was written and it was deleted and written as Rs. 5000/=. But however, 1 do not find any alterations, deletions in words. As such, there is no difference at all in between the amount written in the letter and in the words. Even otherwise, under Section 18 of The Negotiable Instruments Act if the amount undertaken or ordered to be paid is stated differently in figures and in words, the amount stated in words, shall be the amount undertaken or ordered to be paid. Even the benefit of that section is not available to the defendant, as there is no difference of the amount in the words and in the figures and therefore, the amount shown is to be accepted.

    20. With regard to certain corrections in the promissory note, the learned advocate for the defendant/appellant submitted that though there is no plea about the corrections/material alteration in the written statement there is material alteration in Ex.A2 and the same was pointed out before the trial court and it was accepted, but the same was not accepted by the lower appellate court. It is of the view that in the absence of any pleadings in the written statement, the findings of the trial court that the suit promissory notes were materially altered, is a wrong finding. In the case of K. Gopalan Nair v. V. Kamalammal (1981 1 M.L.J 40 = 94 L.W 130), it was observed as follows:

    “I am firmly of the opinion that the learned Appellate Authority should not have looked into this piece of evidence of P.W.1 in the absence of any allegation that the non-residential building is required for any textile business of the respondent's husband.”

    21. The Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand and another (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1083) has held that “the ordinary rule of law is that evidence is to be given only on a plea properly raised and not in contradiction of the plea.” Here, the defendant not having raised the plea of material alteration in the written statement, it is not open to develop his case during letting in evidence. In fact, viz-a-viz namely, when there is a plea and there is no evidence to support the said pleadings, the pleadings cannot also be admitted. This is a view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Sakharibai Hasanali Makani and others v. Girish Kumar Rupchand Gadia and others (1997 ACJ 95). That case arises out of a claim in a motor accident, wherein the claimant had stated that the deceased was earning about Rs. 3500/= to Rs. 3600/- per month and on an average he was contributing Rs. 2000/= per month for the household expenses. The witness was not cross examined and the claim was not disputed. But however, it was found that initially the claimant had claimed that the deceased was earning Rs. 1500/= to Rs. 1600/= per month and it was only by subsequent amendment that the claim was made that the deceased was earning Rs. 3500/= or more. The Court held that

    “we do not find any merit in the contention that the amendment should not have been granted. The contents of the application are not the evidence and substantive evidence is only deposition of the witness entering into the witness-box. However, in a civil suit, the pleadings, namely the plaint and the written statement formed the basic structure over which the case is built by filing documents and let in oral evidence. The pleadings of the statement of facts, where the parties are expected to state all the facts and material facts and so that the other party can either accept or deny. That in the absence of pleadings, if any evidence is let in, the other party would be taken unaware of and in the said situation only, the courts have held that any amount of evidence in the absence of a plea not being raised is inadmissible”.

    In this case also, the defendant had not chosen to plead that the suit promissory notes are materially altered, but however, he had let in evidence and the trial court accepted the case of the defendant and dismissed the suit. But however the lower appellate court took a correct view that the findings of the trial court without pleadings, is not proper and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. I am in complete agreement with the findings of the lower appellate court that the dismissal of suit by the trial court is not proper. As such any amount of evidence in the absence of a plea not being raised is inadmissible.

    22. The lower appellate court has also drawn the presumption available under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the plaintiff. Section 101 of the Evidence Act states that “whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.” When a person is bound to provide the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

    23. Section 102 of the Evidence Act speaks about ‘on whom burden of proof lies’ as follows:

    “The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

    Illustration (b) states as “A sues B for money due on a bond.

    The execution of the bond is admitted, but B says that is was obtained by fraud, which A denies.

    If no evidence were given on either side, A would succeed, as the bond not disputed and the fraud is not proved.”

    In our case also, the defendant having admitted the signature in the suit promissory notes would state that the rest of the contents in the suit promissory notes were filled up subsequently by the plaintiff in his absence. To such a contention, Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is the answer, which empowers the holder in due course to fill up the blanks and to negotiate the instrument. As such, the signatures of the defendant in the promissory notes is admitted and the burden shifts upon the defendant that there is a material alteration in the promissory notes and that he has not borrowed the amount shown in the suit promissory notes, which the defendant has not proved in this case. Drawing presumption available under Section 118 and Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, I hold that the plaintiff is a holder in due course of the promissory notes and the defendant is liable to pay the said amount. All the questions raised in this Appeal are answered accordingly.

    24. For all the reasons stated above, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is hereby confirmed and this appeal is dismissed in the admission stage itself. No costs. Consequently, connected CMP is also dismissed.

    VCJ/VCS

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    K. Mani v. Elumalai
    (Apr 17, 2002)