The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. Karpagavinayagam, J.:— On 1.10.1991 at about 9.45 a.m, the deceased Chitra was riding on her bicycle along with one Selvamani seated on the carrier of the bicycle towards north on the western side of the Trichy-Namakkal Road near Bharathipuram. At that point of time, Ambassador car bearing registration No. TDO 1269, proceeding from south in a rash and negligent manner, dashed against the bicycle. As a result of the impact, Chitra died and Selvamani sustained serious injuries.

2. Pappu, the mother of the deceased Chitra along with her two minor sons, the brothers of the deceased filed a claim petition seeking a consolidated sum of Rs. 1,00,000 towards compensation in M.C.O.P No. 18 of 1992. Rajendran alias Murugesan, the husband of the deceased Chitra also filed a petition in M.C.O.P No. 218 of 1992 claiming a compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 for the death of his wife in the accident.

3. Selvamani, the injured filed application in M.C.O.P No. 923 of 1993 seeking for the compensation of Rs. 75,000 for the injury sustained by her in the accident.

4. All the three applications were taken up together and a common enquiry was conducted.

5. Thirunavukkarasu, the owner of the vehicle, the respondent No. 1 in the petition was set ex parte as he was called absent. The respondent No. 2 is United India Insurance Co. Ltd. with which the Ambassador car was insured.

6. On behalf of all these claimants, P.Ws 1 to 4 were examined and Exhs. A-1 to A-4 were marked. On the side of the insurance company, no evidence was let in.

7. The Tribunal, after analysis of the evidence let in by the parties, concluded that the husband alone would be entitled to compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 for the death of the deceased Chitra and awarded Rs. 5,000 to Selvamani for the injury sustained by her and dismissed the claim petition filed by the mother and minor brothers of the deceased holding that they are not the legal representatives of the deceased.

8. Challenging the impugned order, the mother and minor brothers of the deceased have filed this appeal before this court contending that the finding of the Tribunal that the appellants are not the legal repre sentatives, is not valid in law.

9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the appellants alone would be entitled to compensation as the dependants and legal representatives of the deceased, since the deceased though got married to one Rajendran earlier, was driven out of the house by her husband and at the time of the accident, she was living with her mother and minor brothers and she used to do coolie work and maintain the appellants with her earnings.

10. On the other hand, in support of the finding of the Tribunal, the learned counsel appearing for the insurance company, the respondent No. 2 herein, would submit that the parties are governed by the Hindu Succession Act and under section 15 of the Act, the estate of the female Hindu died intestate devolves firstly upon the husband being the class I [Sic. category (a)] heir and the mother belonging to class III [Sic. category (c)] would succeed only if there is no heir in class I [Sic. category (a)] and that, therefore, the mother cannot lay any claim to the estate of the deceased, so long as the husband, the class I [Sic. category (a)] heir is alive.

11. In the light of the rival contentions, the question involved in this case is, whether the mother of a married woman who was killed in a motor vehicle accident, can claim compensation in a proceeding instituted before the Tribunal, when the class I [Sic. category (a)] heir and legal representative, namely, the husband of the deceased is alive?

12. Before launching discussion on this question, let us now recapitulate the facts of this case.

13. In the enquiry, four witnesses were examined. PW 1 Pappu is the mother of the deceased daughter, PW 2 Rajendran is the husband of the deceased, PW 3 Selvamani, the injured eyewitness who was seated on the carrier of the bicycle at the time of accident and PW 4, Thiruma Gounder, the local villager and relative of PW 1. Exh. A-1 is the F.I.R, which was given to the police by PW 3 Selvamani, Exh. A-2 is the post-mortem report, Exh. A-3 is the judgment of criminal court convicting the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident and Exh. A-4 is the wound certificate issued to PW 3 Selvamani.

14. According to PW 1, the mother of the deceased, Chitra, the deceased got married to Rajendran, PW 2 and she was living with him only for three months and out of the dowry torture she was deserted and ultimately, she came back to her mother's place and was working as an agricultural coolie earning about Rs. 30 per day and handing over the same to the mother for the maintenance of the family consisting of mother, deceased daughter and two minor sons. She would further state that though her husband was alive, he was not living with her and as such, they were depending upon the income of the deceased.

15. According to PW 2 Rajendran, the husband of the deceased, another claimant, she was not driven out from his house as alleged by the mother of the deceased and at the time of the accident, she was living with him and as such, as a legal representative of the deceased, he would be entitled to the compensation. PW 3, the injured eyewitness speaks about the occurrence. PW 4 Thiruma Gounder would state that subsequent to the death of Chitra, PW 2 Rajendran got remarried to one Chellammal and he was living with her.

16. At the time of filing of the claim petition, PW 1 mentioned in the petition that the husband of the deceased was making arrangements to marry someone else. In the claim petition filed by the mother, the said Rajendran was made as a party by impleading as respondent No. 3.

17. The records would show that the claim petition dated 18.11.1991 was filed before the Claims Tribunal on 6.12.1991 in M.C.O.P No. 18 of 1992. On the other hand, the husband Rajendran filed a claim petition in M.C.O.P No. 218 of 1992 on 20.2.1992 In the said petition, the mother and brothers were not made as parties.

18. PW 4 would state that subsequent to the filing of the application the husband of the deceased got married to one Chellammal and that they were living as husband and wife in Pudur village. In the cross-examination, he would admit that he would not be able to tell the details about the date and year in which the said second marriage was held.

19. But, when PW 2 Rajendran was examined, a suggestion was put by the counsel appearing for the mother of the deceased that the said Rajendran got remarried to Chellammal on 11.2.1993 at Thottiyam and the same was denied by him.

20. On the basis of these details, the Tribunal concluded that the second marriage was not proved and as such, the husband alone would be entitled to compensation as legal heir and legal representative as class I [Sic. category (a)] heir of the Act.

21. It shall be noticed that the evidence of PW 1 and the details given in the claim petition would clearly show that at the time of the accident, the victim Chitra was living with her mother and minor brothers and by earning income through agricul tural work she maintained the said family.

22. This is obvious by the fact that immediately after the death of the deceased, the mother of the deceased filed the claim petition dated 18.11.91 before the Tribunal. This was numbered as M.C.O.P No. 18 of 1992. Even in this claim petition she mentioned that the deceased was deserted out of the cruelty and torture meted out to her by her husband and, therefore, she came and lived with the mother and two minor brothers.

23. It is also to be noted, as said earlier, that the husband Rajendran was made as a party in the said claim petition. On the other hand, the husband of the deceased Rajendran filed the claim petition only on 20.2.1992 and the same got numbered as M.C.O.P No. 218 of 1992. He claimed compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 as consolidated amount, on the ground that he lost his young wife and had lost marital happiness and other services of the deceased as a wife. In this petition, the mother of the deceased was not made as a party.

24. Thus it is clear that the second application was filed and got numbered only after he came to know that the mother and minor brothers of the deceased claimed compensation for the death of the deceased by making the husband as one of the respondents.

25. Under those circumstances, it shall be concluded that at the time of the accident, the deceased wife was not living with him and she was living with her mother and maintaining her mother's family by doing coolie work.

26. A perusal of the deposition of PW 1 and the claim petition would clearly show that the mother and minor brothers claimed compensation as dependants. On the contrary, the husband would not state that he was depending upon the income of the deceased, but he simply claimed compensation on the ground of loss of marital happiness.

27. In such a situation, it is clear that dependency of the mother and the minor brothers only on the income of the deceased, who was living with them, has been sufficiently established by the materials available on record.

28. However, it cannot be contended that the husband ceased to be a legal repre sentative of the deceased merely because the wife was not living with her husband at the time of accident.

29. An attempt has been made by the claimant PW 1 by exam ining PW 4 that during the pendency of the enquiry of the claim petition, PW 2 Rajen dran got remarried to one Chellammal. But, as correctly pointed out by the Tri bunal, the evidence of PW 4, in the ab sence of clear details of the date and time of the alleged second marriage, would not be sufficient to hold that the deceased's husband Rajendran got remarried and consequently, he Ceased to be the legal heir of the deceased.

30. Under these circumstances, in my view, both the claimants, namely, mother and brothers are dependants and legal representatives and the husband is the legal heir and legal representative of the deceased.

31. In the context of the above factual situation, let us now go into the question as quoted earlier.

32. The counsel for the parties have cited various authorities of this court, the other High Courts and the Apex Court on this aspect. Those are the following:

(1) Abdulkadar Ebrahim v. Kashinath Moreshwar Chandani, 1968 ACJ 78 (Bombay);

(2) Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, 1977 ACJ 253 (Gujarat);

(3) Mahendra Singh…(); v. Smt. Krishna Devi…()., 1979 ACJ 299 (Allahabad);

(4) Union Coop Insurance Society v. Bhartiben, AIR 1979 Gujarat 121;

(5) Bhai Shamsher Singh v. Punjab State, 1985 ACJ 360 (P & H);

(6) Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC);

(7) S. Nookaratnam v. United India Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd., 1988 ACJ 315 (AP);

(8) Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Ammani Ammal, 1989 ACJ 847 (Madras);

(9) Cheriyakutty Mammi v. Ummerkutty, 1996 ACJ 402 (Kerala);

(10) Anandavally Amma v. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn., 1997 ACJ 1044 (Kerala); and

(11) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kasiammal, 1997 (III) CTC 346.

33. When a similar question arose earlier, this court in Ammani Animal's case, 1989 ACJ 847 (Madras), held that mother also is a legal representative of the daughter, who got already married and she would be entitled to compensation. This decision was based upon the ratio decidendi given by the Apex Court in Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC).

34. The principles laid down relating to the question of competency of filing claim petition have been elaborately expounded in the decisions cited above.

35. As far as the present case is concerned, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would apply, since occurrence in the instant case took place on 1.10.91 Therefore, it would be appropriate to extract section 166(1):

“166. Application for compensation.— (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made—

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.”

36. It is clause (c) which deals with the claim application by legal representatives as the other clauses do not relate to any legal representatives. However, an appli cation falling within the ambit of clause (c) relates to the estate of the deceased victim in a motor accident who died either due to the injuries sustained in the accident or otherwise.

37. The expression ‘legal representative’ has not been defined in the Act. However, the meaning of the legal representative as given in the Black's Law Dictionary is given below:

“Legal representative: The term in its broadest sense means one who stands in place of, and represents the interest of another. A person who oversees the legal affairs of another. Examples include the executor or administrator of an estate and a court appointed guardian of a minor or incompetent person.

Term ‘legal representative’, which is almost always held to be synonymous with the term ‘personal representative’, means, in accident cases, member of family entitled to benefits under wrongful death statute.”

38. The Tribunal, in the instant case, decided the award on the basis of the ques tion who is the legal heir. The term ‘legal heirs’ is given in the same dictionary as follows:

“Legal heirs: As used in will, term means descendent's next of kin. Persons entitled under laws of descent and distribution. Person to whom law would give descendent's property if descendent died intestate.”

39. It is significant to note that the term ‘legal heir’ is not used in the section con cerned in the Act, namely, section 166. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal repre sentatives of the deceased.

40. In the words of the Supreme Court as laid down in Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), a legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.

41. As a matter of fact, section 168 of the Act provides that Tribunal is authorised to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom the compensation shall be paid. Therefore, the Tribunal is not invariably called upon to decide who is the legal heir.

42. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it has to be decided whether the claimant would be the legal representative of the deceased. Every legal representative who suffers on account of death of a person due to motor vehicle accident should have remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided in section 166. It is true that the Act does not specify as to who is to be treated as legal representative for the purpose of section 166 of the Act.

43. In this connection, it would be appropriate to refer the observations of the Supreme Court in para 12 of Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai's case, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC):

“We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of Torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed under section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. We should remember that in an Indian family, brothers, sisters and brothers' children and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent upon the breadwinner of the family and if the breadwinner is killed on account of a motor vehicle accident, there is no justification to deny them compensation relying upon the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 which as we have already held has been substantially modified by the provisions contained in the Act in relation to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents. We express our approval of the decision in Megjibhai Khimji Vira v. Chaturbhai Taljabhai, 1977 ACJ 253 (Gujarat) and hold that the brother of a person who dies in a motor vehicle accident is entitled to maintain a petition under section 110-A of the Act if he is a legal representative of the deceased.”

44. The Supreme Court has also added that the expression ‘legal representative’ contained in section 166 of the Act should be given a wider meaning and should not be confined to the spouse, parent and children of the deceased.

45. Applying the above principles in the present case, the mother of the deceased cannot be denied of her right of claiming compensation merely because she is class III [sic category (c)] heir. In these accident claim cases, the Tribunal cannot reject the claim petition as the class I [sic category (a)] heir is available.

46. The point to be considered in this case is, whether the claimants are the dependants or legal representatives of the deceased.

47. In that fact situation, if we examine the materials available on record, as discussed above, it is clear that both the husband, the legal heir and legal representative and the mother along with her minor sons, who are dependants and legal representatives would be entitled to compensation.

48. In the present case, Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,00,000 to the husband alone. In the light of the above conclusion, this award shall be liable to be modified.

49. Since the claim of the husband is on the ground of loss of marital happiness, out of Rs. 1,00,000 awarded, he would be entitled to Rs. 40,000. The balance amount of Rs. 60,000 would be awarded to the mother and two minor brothers, as the dependants and legal representatives. Out of this sum, the mother would be entitled to Rs. 40,000 and other two minor sons would be entitled to Rs. 10,000 each.

50. The claimants, namely, husband and mother and brothers of the deceased would be entitled to the said sums along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of petition till the date of realisation. In other respects, the order of the Tribunal is sustained.

51. With these observations, the appeal is allowed. No costs.

52. Appeal allowed.