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  • Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules (hereinafter called as the Rules).
  • Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules
  • Rule 39 of the Rules
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  • Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules (hereinafter called as the Rules).
  • Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules
  • Rule 39 of the Rules
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kanakaraj, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (same person in writ petitions Nos. 374–376 and 379 of 1996) was an ex-lessee of a 78.78 acre site in Thiruneermalai Village for quarrying blue metal; his earlier lease expired on 1-8-1987 and a renewal application was rejected. Leases were subsequently granted to others (including one M. Arumugham) and later expired. The appellant applied again (initially on 20-5-1994, and after validation of the applicable rule again on 14-9-1995 and paid fees). Without calling for tenders, the Government granted leases on 12-12-1995 to three persons (each referred to as the fourth respondent in the respective petitions) for identical 25-acre extents under Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules. The Government rejected the appellant's application on 29-12-1995. The appellant filed the writ petitions on 9-1-1996; interim relief was granted but ultimately a learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions on 12-9-1996. These writ appeals challenge that dismissal and seek quashing of the Government orders granting leases to the fourth respondents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division Bench decision in W.A. Nos. 1026, 1089 and 1090 of 1995 (S. Baskaran) — holding that exclusion of an application from consideration while granting a lease to another applicant is improper — applied to these writ appeals.
  2. Whether the Government's grants under Rule 39 were vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record because they failed to record or consider public interest and the interest of mineral development as required by the Supreme Court in Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu.
  3. Whether the appellant had sufficient interest (locus) to challenge the grants or whether his antecedents/associations precluded relief at his instance.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Vijay Narayan)

  • The Government, when exercising powers under Rule 39, should have considered all applications available on the date of grant and selected on the basis of merits — reliance placed on a Division Bench judgment in W.A. Nos. 1026, 1089 and 1090 of 1995 (S. Baskaran).
  • The grants to the fourth respondents did not comply with the Supreme Court's observations in Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu — specifically, the Government failed to consider or record satisfaction that the grant was in public interest and in the interest of mineral development; thus the orders are vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record.

Fourth Respondents' / State's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. N.R. Chandran and the Government Pleader)

  • The Division Bench authority (S. Baskaran) does not apply because the appellant's applications were not available or ripe for disposal on the date when the fourth respondents' applications were considered by the Government.
  • Reading the Government order as a whole shows there were no infirmities; the Government took into account relevant considerations before granting the leases.
  • At the appellant's instance, the grants should not be set aside — suggestion that the appellant was part of a syndicate (with M. Arumugham and one Regina Bai) interested in preventing grants to competent persons.
  • The Government (and Government Pleader) also contended that the fourth respondents were educated unemployed youth, which — it was argued — indicated consideration of public interest in granting the leases (this reasoning appears in pleadings/counter affidavit rather than in the impugned orders themselves).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1994 SC 2233 The power of relaxation under Rule 39 must be exercised for 'mineral development' and 'in public interest', with reasons recorded; exercise cannot be arbitrary or capricious and must satisfy reasonableness. The court applied this authority to scrutinize the impugned Government orders and found defects: the orders contained no reference to public interest or mineral development and merely reproduced general findings of a committee without applying the Rule 39 parameters.
S. Baskaran v. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu (W.A. Nos. 1026, 1089 & 1090 of 1995), Division Bench judgment dated 8-11-1995 Where multiple applications are processed together but one applicant's file alone is forwarded and grant made without considering the others, exclusion of other applications is improper and opposed to fair play and justice (mandamus may be available). The court examined factual timelines and distinguished that precedent: the appellant's applications were not ripe when the fourth respondents' applications were considered, so that ratio did not apply to the present facts.
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851 An order must be sustained on the reasons given in the order itself and not on reasons offered later in affidavits or pleadings. The court relied on this principle to reject reliance on the Deputy Secretary's counter-affidavit (or subsequent explanations) that purported to supply reasons (e.g., the grantees being educated unemployed youth), because those reasons did not appear in the impugned orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, strictly following the material shown on the files and the authorities cited:

  1. Chronology and file perusal: The court examined the complete files and established a precise chronology. The fourth respondents filed applications on 9-3-1995 (forwarded to the Collector on 3-4-1995). The Collector's remarks regarding those applications were forwarded on 24-9-1995. The appellant's application was received in the Government office on 25-9-1995 (his Chalan dated 14-8-1995 was forwarded for Collector's remarks on 26-10-1995), and the Collector's remarks regarding the appellant were despatched on 8-12-1995 and reached the Government on 6-12-1995 (with endorsement of dispatch on 8-12-1995).
  2. Content of the high level committee report: The high level committee had inspected the area on 22-2-1995 and produced a general report noting (i) the quarry was far from residential area, (ii) no local objection, (iii) approach roads available, and (iv) illicit quarrying in part of the hillock. The report did not assess or recommend in relation to any specific applicant.
  3. Application of the Division Bench precedent (S. Baskaran): The court compared factual matrices. In S. Baskaran the Division Bench found applications were processed together but one applicant's file alone was forwarded, resulting in exclusion. Here the court found a substantial time gap (about five months) between the applications and that the records showed the respective applications were ripe for Government consideration on different, widely separated dates. Therefore the ratio in S. Baskaran did not apply; the first contention failed.
  4. Application of Premium Granites: The court held that Premium Granites required that Rule 39 grants be exercised for mineral development and public interest with recorded reasons and not arbitrarily. The impugned Government orders were scrutinised against those parameters and found defective for several stated reasons (see next paragraph).
  5. Specific defects identified in the impugned orders: (i) no reference in the orders to public interest or mineral development; (ii) Government misapprehension that the high level committee had recommended the specific quarry leases — whereas the committee report was a general inspection not made with reference to any applicant; (iii) Government merely reproduced general observations of the committee and did not consider whether or how the lease to the three respondents served public interest or mineral development. Thus the orders lacked the required reasoning within the parameters articulated by the Supreme Court.
  6. Rejection of post-hoc explanations: The court rejected reliance on explanations contained only in the counter-affidavit (e.g., that grantees were educated unemployed youth) because an order must stand or fall on the reasons contained within it — citing Mohinder Singh Gill — and such subsequent reasons cannot validate an order deficient on its face.
  7. Locus and antecedents: The court considered the contention that the appellant was part of a syndicate and thus not entitled to relief. The court declined to investigate antecedents for the purpose of denying relief. It held that where an illegal order is shown, the court is duty-bound to set it aside, and the appellant had sufficient interest because he had applied for the same site.
  8. Result of analysis: Because the learned single Judge had not considered the validity of the impugned Government orders in the light of Premium Granites, the single Judge's order could not stand. The impugned Government orders were vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record and therefore required quashing.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's core rulings were:

  • The writ appeals are allowed.
  • The order of the learned single Judge is set aside.
  • The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned Government orders granting leases to the fourth respondents are quashed.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Government's grants (orders dated 12-12-1995 granting leases to the three fourth respondents) are quashed; the appellant's challenge succeeds and the single Judge's dismissal is overturned.
  • Legal principle reinforced: The decision enforces the Supreme Court's requirement (stated in Premium Granites) that the power under Rule 39 must be exercised within the parameters of mineral development and public interest and that reasons to that effect must appear in the order — grants lacking such reasoning may be quashed as vitiated by want of recorded satisfaction on these grounds.
  • Limitations on reliance on post-hoc explanations: The Court reaffirmed that reasons given after the event (e.g., in counter-affidavits) cannot be used to sustain an order which is deficient on its face, consistent with Mohinder Singh Gill.
  • Scope regarding precedents: The court distinguished the Division Bench decision in S. Baskaran on factual grounds (timing/ripe dates); that precedent was held inapplicable here because the appellant's application was not before the Government when the fourth respondents' applications were decided.

Final line from the opinion: "Petitions allowed."

    K. Arunachalam And Others v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Kanakaraj, J.:— The appellant in all the writ appeals is one and the same and he had filed writ petition Nos. 374 to 376 and 379 of 1996 against the grant of leases for quarrying blue metal in favour of the fourth respondent in each of the eases. The writ petitions were dismissed by a common order of a learned single Judge of this Court, dated 12-9-1996.

    2. The case of the appellant as disclosed in the affidavits filed by him before the learned single Judge is as follows: He is an ex-lessee of an extent of 78.78 acres of land in Thiruneermalai Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpat MGR District for quarrying blue metal. The period of lease ended on 1-8-1987. He applied for renewal and the same was rejected and the lease was granted to one M. Arumugham. The lease in favour of M. Arumugham also expired and the petitioner again applied for the grant of lease on 20-5-1994. By a letter, dated 22-8-1994. the appellant was informed that as per the then existing Rules, the Collector would publish a notice, calling for tenders and the lease would be granted only on the basis of the highest offer. After the validation of Rule 39 by the Supreme Court of India the appellant again applied on 14-9-1995 and paid the requisite lees. Without calling for any tenders, the lease was granted to the fourth respondents by an order dated 12-12-1995. The contention of the appellant is that the said grant is illegal and liable to be quashed by this Court. In all the writ petitions, the grant was made to the fourth respondent in each case for identical extents of 25 acres of land under Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules (hereinafter called as the Rules). The learned single Judge found that the Government had made the grants based on the findings of a high level committee and that there was nothing illegal about the grant. Having granted the lease in favour of the three persons named as fourth respondent in each writ petition the Government found that there was no occasion for the grant of any further lease in the area and therefore rejected the application of the appellant on 29-12-1995. The grievance of the appellant that his application should have been considered along with the applications of the fourth respondent in each case, was rejected by the learned single Judge on the ground that the applications of the grantees were disposed of even before the receipt of the application of the appellant with the remarks of the Collector. In the affidavite filed by the appellant, the grants in favour of the three respondents had been challenged on the ground that the Government cannot make a grant, according to its own whims and fancies, but should be satisfied that the grant is in public interest and in the interest of mineral development. Before us, Mr. Vijay Narayan has projected the case of the appellant in a two fold manner. The first contention is that while exercising powers under Rule 39 of the Rules, the Government should have considered all the applications available on the date of grant and should have made a selection on the basis of merits. In this connection, reliance was placed on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in writ appeal Nos. 1026, 1089 and 1090 of 1995 S. Baskaran v. The Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu, dated 8-11-1995. The second argument of learned counsel for the appellant is that in any event, the grant in favour of the fourth respondent in the writ petition, in each case, was not in accordance with the observations of the Supreme Court in Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1994 SC 2233. The argument is that the Government never considered the public interest or the interest of the mineral development before making the grant. In fact, a perusal of the orders of the Government would, according to learned counsel show that the Government had proceeded on an incorrect basis and the orders are vitiated by errors of law, apparent on the face of the record.

    3. Mr. N.R Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting fourth respondent argues that the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A Nos. 1026, 1089 and 1090 of 1995, dated 8-11-1995 will not at all apply because the facts in these cases would disclose that the application of the appellant was not at all available and ripe for disposal, on the date, when the applications of the fourth respondent in each case were disposed of. Secondly, he argues that if the order of the Government is read as a whole, it would follow that there are no infirmities and the Government had taken into account all the relevant considerations before granting the lease in favour of the respective fourth respondents. He would also attempt to argue that in any event at the instance of the appellant, the grants cannot be set aside.

    4. On the first question there was considerable controversy regarding the dates of the application and the dates when the Collector forwarded his remarks along with the report of the high level committee. We had therefore called for the entire files and we have also perused the same and we will indicate the correct dates, with reference to the files themselves. The fourth respondent in all the three cases had filed their applications under Rule 39 of the Rules, on 9-3-1995. The same were forwarded to the Collector on 3-4-1995, seeking the remarks of the Collector. The remarks of the Collector were sent on 24-9-1995 under proceedings RC No. 730/95, Q4. All the applicants had sought for a lease for five years in respect of the entire extent of 78.78 acres in Survey No. 234/2, Thiruneermalai Village. The Collector says that the high level committee had already examined the area and had submitted a report. Beyond this, the Collector has not made any special remarks. The report of the high level committee which is available in the file shows that the committee had made an inspection on 22-2-1995. The report makes a reference to the lease of one M. Arumugham which had expired on 19-6-1994 and the fact that under the Rules, there was no provision for renewal of the lease and therefore, the area was available for the grant of a fresh lease. The other aspects of the report indicates that (i) the quarry sought for, is far away from the residential area (ii) there was no local objection for the grant of lease; (iii) there are approach roads for reaching the quarry sites and (iv) illicit quarrying was being done in the hillock which extends to an area of 66 acres. The report is of no avail to all the three persons being the fourth respondent in each case because it was not made with reference to any application.

    5. Coming to the appellant, his application was not dated, but received in the Government's office on 25-9-1995 and he had paid the fees under Chalan dated 14-8-1995, which was forwarded to the Collector for remarks on 26-10-1995. The remarks of the Collector were sent to the Government through the Commissioner of Geology and Mining on 6-12-1995. There is an endorsement that the remarks were despatched by the Collector on 8-12-1995. In the remarks, the Collector only says that the appellant had applied for the grant of lease in respect of an extent of 6 acres out of a total extent of 77.77 acres. He also refers to the fact that the high level committee had already examined the area and the report was available with the Government along with the remarks of the Collector, dated 24-9-1995 relating to the fourth respondent in each case. It was under those circumstance that the grant was made in favour of the fourth respondent in each case on 12-12-1995 and the application of the appellant was rejected on 29-12-1995. The writ petitions were filed on 9-1-1996 and interim stay was obtained. Ultimately, the writ petitions were dismissed on 12-9-1996.

    6. We will now take up the first point as to whether the judgment of the division Bench in writ appeal Nos. 1026 of 1995 etc. dated 8-11-1995 would apply to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Division Bench the undisputed facts were as follows:

    “… … … … … … Upto a certain stage, all the applications were processed together by the Collector as well as the Director of Geology and Mining. However, while submitted the applications to the State Government, the application of the second respondent alone was forwarded and the applications of the writ petitioner and others were forwarded to the State Government later on after the mining lease was granted in favour of the second respondent………”

    7. In these circumstances, the Division Bench held as follows:

    “………… For the present, it is sufficient to mention that a mandamus was available on the date when the order was passed by the State Government considering the application of the second respondent separately and thereafter taking up of the applications of the writ petitioner and two others. Hence we are of the view that exclusion of the application of the writ petitioner from consideration, when the application of the second respondent was considered was neither proper nor legal and was opposed to the principles of fair play and justice………”

    8. If we now recapitulate the facts of the present case, we can see that the fourth respondent in each case had filed their applications on 9-3-1995 and they were received by the Government on 3-4-1995. The appellant's applications reached the Government on 25-9-1995. There is a clear time gap of about five months between the two applications. In both the cases, it took nearly a month for the Government's letter to reach the Collector. The remarks of the Collector were forwarded to the Government, in the case of the fourth respondent on 24-9-1995. In the case of the appellant, the Collector's remarks were despatched only on 8-12-1995. In other words, the respective applications were ripe for consideration by the Government on two different dates, which are far apart. The Government had passed the order in the case of the fourth respondent in each case on 12-12-1995 and in the case of the appellant on 29-12-1995. On 12-12-1995 when the Government passed the order in favour of the fourth respondent in each case, it cannot be said that the Government was aware of the applications of the appellant, in this view of the matter the ratio of the Division Bench judgment in W.A No. 1026 of 1995 etc., dated 8-11-1995 would not at all apply to the facts of the present case. The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant fails.

    9. Even so, Mr. Vijay Narayan, argues that the impugned orders in favour of the fourth respondent in each of the writ petitions are liable to be quashed on the ground that they are vitiated by errors of law apparent on the face of the record and totally contrary to the dictum of the Apex Court in Premium Granites's case (1994) 2 SCC 691 : AIR 1994 SC 2233. The said case of the Supreme Court arose out of a judgment of this Court holding that Rule 39 of the Rules is not unconstitutional and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court, reversing the judgment of this Court observed as follows (at page 2248 (of AIR):

    “The power of relaxation under Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules is to be exercised for ‘mineral development’ and ‘in public interest’ after recording reasons for such exercise of power. In our view, it has been rightly contended by the learned counsel in support of the validity of Rule 39, that the exercise of power under the said Rule 39 cannot be made arbitrarily, capriciously and on subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority but the same is to be exercised within the parameters of mineral development and in public interest which as aforesaid are not vague and indefinite concepts. Such exercise of power must satisfy the reasonableness of State action before a Court of law if any challenge of improper action in exercise of the said power under Rule 39 in a given case is made………”

    10. Therefore, the impugned orders of the Government have to be scrutinised with reference to the above observations of the Apex Court. If we now turn to the impugned orders which are identical in nature, the following defects are (sic):

    (i) there is no reference at all to public interest and/or the interest of the mineral development before the Government decided to grant the lease in favour of the three respondents; (ii) the Government was under a misapprehension that the high level committee had recommended the quarry lease implication of the fourth respondent in each case for quarrying blue metal. This is because the inspection and the report was made by the high level committee did not have in mind any particular applicant. It was a general report regarding the area in question and the availability of the area for quarrying purpose. The Government in the impugned orders had merely repealed the general findings of the high level committee regarding the area being available for the purpose of quarrying blue metal; (iii) beyond re-producing the general observations of the high level committee with reference to the area, the Government did not consider whether and how the mining lease would be in public interest and in the interest of mineral development to grant lease to the three respondents. The specific directions of the Supreme Court that the power must be exercised within the parameters of mineral development and public interest, which according to the Apex Court are not vague and indefinite concepts. There can be no grant of a mining lease by the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules without being satisfied that it would be in public interest and/or in the interest of mineral development.

    11. There was an argument by learned counsel for the fourth respondent as well as the learned Government Pleader that the fourth respondent in each case were found to be educated unemployed youth and therefore, the Government had in fact considered the public interest. We cannot accept this argument because even this reasoning was not given in the impugned orders, but only in the counter affidavit of the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the writ petitions filed by the appellant. It is well known that an order has to be sustained on the reasons given in the order and not on the basis of the subsequent reasons given in the counter affidavit See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851 we are therefore or the clear opinion that the impugned orders are vitiated by errors of law appearant on the face of the record and they are accordingly liable to be quash.

    12. Mr. N.R Chandran, learned Senior Counsel made an attempt to argue that in any event, the orders cannot be quashed at the instance of the appellant. According to Mr. N.R Chandran, the appellant is none other than a member of the Syndicate comprising of himself, one M. Arumugham and one Regina Bai, all of whom where interested in preventing the grant in favour of the competent persons like the 4th respondent. We are of the opinion that it is go into the antecedents of the appellant or his previous conduct in all these proceedings. So long as an illegal order regarding the grant of a quarry lease is brought to our notice, we are duty bound to set aside the same. In this particular case, the appellant has sufficient interest in the invalidity of the grant because he himself had applied for the grant of the very same site for quarry lease.

    13. In this view of the matter the contention of Mr. N.R Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the fourth respondents in all these appeals is rejected.

    14. The order of the learned single Judge, in our opinion, cannot be approved or affirmed because the learned single Judge has not considered the question of validity of the impugned orders in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Premium Granite's case (cites above). For all the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. The order of the learned single Judge, is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the writ appeals are allowed. The orders of the learned single Judge in the writ petitions are set aside. The writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed. However there will be no order is as to costs.

    15. Petitions allowed.

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    K. Arunachalam And Others v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others
    (Feb 25, 1997)