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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, i.e, Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922
  • provisions of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act
  • Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act
  • SECTION 105 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921.
  • sub-section (2). These provisions
  • City Tenants Protection Act
  • sub-section (6) of section 1
  • 1973. Section 2(1)
  • Rent Control Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, i.e, Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922
  • provisions of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act
  • Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act
  • SECTION 105 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921.
  • sub-section (2). These provisions
  • City Tenants Protection Act
  • sub-section (6) of section 1
  • 1973. Section 2(1)
  • Rent Control Act,
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal in O.S. No. 290 of 1986 (Panruti)

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondents filed Original Suit No. 290 of 1986 in the District Munsif's Court, Panruti, seeking recovery of property on the allegation that the appellant (defendant in the suit) was occupying the land as a tenant, had defaulted in paying rent, and that tenancy had been terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The respondents claimed entitlement to possession.

In his written statement the defendant did not challenge the respondents' title; instead he asserted that he took the land on lease, erected a non-residential building, and thereby sought the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. Within the statutory period the defendant filed an application under Section 9 of that Act to purchase the property. The trial court dismissed the Section 9 application on the ground that the Act did not apply to non-residential buildings and, since no other defence remained, decreed the suit for possession.

The defendant appealed to the Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore (A.S. No. 81 of 1988), which dismissed the appeal for the same reason. He then preferred a Second Appeal raising three substantial questions of law. After filing the Second Appeal the defendant also moved in a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before the District Court seeking condonation of delay with respect to an appeal against the dismissal of his Section 9 application; that condonation petition was dismissed for want of sufficient cause and a Civil Revision Petition was filed against that dismissal. The Second Appeal and the Revision Petition were directed to be posted together and were heard jointly.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act (Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922) does not apply to non-residential buildings in Nellikuppam as held by the courts below in view of G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Revenue, dated 31-5-1975?
  2. Whether the present suit, in the absence of a notice under Section 11, is maintainable?
  3. Whether the appellant is not entitled to compensation under Section 3?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant asserted he had taken the land on lease and put up a non-residential building and therefore claimed entitlement to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, including filing an application under Section 9 to purchase the property.
  • He pointed to an Extension Notification (G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Revenue, dated 31-5-1975), published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette (25-6-1975), which—he maintained—extended the Act's provisions to non-residential buildings in municipal towns; the notification was brought to the respondents' attention.
  • He relied on the principle (and on Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code and Supreme Court authority) that dismissal of an interlocutory application (such as under Section 9) in the trial court does not preclude challenging that interlocutory order in an appeal against the final decree; therefore the Section 9 application should be deemed pending during the pendency of the appeal/Second Appeal.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the Extension Notification (G.O. Ms. No. 1285) had not been placed before the Legislature as required by law and therefore had no force; they argued it was not valid to confer rights under the Act.
  • They further observed that in subsequent editions of a publication the Notification was not published and inferred from that omission that the Notification was not in force.
  • Regarding remedy, respondents argued that because the application under Section 9 had been dismissed and became final, the appellant had lost the right to purchase the property and could at most claim compensation for improvements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. Govindasamy v. Bhoopalan and others, 1977-II M.L.J. 206 Holds that a notification issued under section 2(1)(i) (specifying that "building" includes residential or non-residential building) is not required to be placed before the Legislature pursuant to subsection (6) of section 1; therefore such a notification is valid without being laid before the Legislature. The Court treated this decision as binding and relied on its reasoning to conclude that G.O. Ms. No. 1285 (dated 31-5-1975) validating extension to non-residential buildings is valid and need not have been placed before the Legislature; this undermined the lower courts' basis for holding the Act inapplicable to non-residential buildings.
Thailammal & others v. Janardhan Raju & others, (1992) 1 S.C.J. 126 Establishes that an application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act is interlocutory in the suit for ejectment and that any interlocutory order can be challenged in the appellate proceedings against the final decree by virtue of Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code; it is not necessary to prefer an independent appeal against the interlocutory order. The Court applied this authority to hold that the dismissal of the Section 9 application by the trial court did not conclusively foreclose the appellant's right to claim purchase under Section 9 once an appeal/Second Appeal was filed; the Section 9 application must be deemed pending during the appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis arising from the lower courts' findings.

First, addressing the lower courts' conclusion that the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act did not apply to non-residential buildings (and thus the Section 9 application was not maintainable), the court found that this conclusion rested not on evidence but on incorrect assumptions. The court observed that G.O. Ms. No. 1285, Revenue, dated 31-5-1975, was an extension Notification published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 25-6-1975, which extended the Act so as to include non-residential buildings in municipal towns. When respondents argued the Notification had to be placed before the Legislature and therefore lacked force, the court relied on the binding decision in R. Govindasamy v. Bhoopalan, which explained that the statutory requirement for laying notifications before the Legislature (sub-section (6) of section 1) applies only to notifications issued under sub-sections (2) or (4) of section 1, and not to notifications such as those under section 2(1)(i). Consequently, the Notification need not have been laid before the Legislature to be effective, and the court rejected the respondents' contention that the Notification was invalid.

Second, on the procedural consequence of the dismissal of the Section 9 application at trial, the court analyzed whether that dismissal precluded the appellant from seeking purchase under Section 9. The court held that an application under Section 9 is interlocutory in nature and that Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code permits a party to challenge interlocutory orders in an appeal against the final decree. The court relied on the Supreme Court authority in Thailammal to conclude that dismissal of the interlocutory Section 9 application in the trial court does not conclusively bar the remedy—once an appeal (or Second Appeal) is filed against the main decree, the Section 9 application must be deemed pending for all purposes. Thus, the conclusiveness of the trial court's dismissal of the Section 9 application is lost on filing of the Second Appeal.

Because both lower courts had relied solely on the (incorrect) assumption that the Act did not apply to non-residential buildings, they had not considered the substantive entitlement of the appellant under Section 9. Having set aside that foundational assumption by applying the binding precedent on the effect of the Notification, the court held that the matter could not be finally decided without remitting it to the trial court for fresh consideration of the appellant's statutory claims.

As to the separate Civil Revision Petition seeking condonation of delay in appealing against the dismissal of the Section 9 application, the court reasoned that an independent appeal was not necessary given the availability of challenge in the appeal against the final decree; therefore the dismissal of the belated appeal (on grounds of delay) did not prejudice the appellant, and the Revision was unnecessary.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Second Appeal allowed; the judgments of the courts below are set aside; Original Suit No. 290 of 1986 is restored to file; and the trial court is directed to re-determine whether the appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, including any rights under Section 9, in accordance with law.

The court also dismissed C.R.P. No. 426 of 1991 as unnecessary. There was no order as to costs in the Second Appeal; the Civil Revision Petition (seeking condonation) was held unnecessary and dismissed without costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The trial court must reconsider the appellant's claim under the City Tenants Protection Act (including the Section 9 application) in light of the valid Extension Notification and the accepted principle that interlocutory orders can be challenged in the appeal against the final decree. The correctness of the lower courts' finding that the Act did not apply to non-residential buildings is set aside and remitted for fresh determination.
  • Procedural consequence: Dismissal of an interlocutory Section 9 application by a trial court is not necessarily final once an appeal/Second Appeal is filed; such interlocutory relief is to be treated as pending for purposes of appellate review.
  • Precedential note: The decision relies on existing binding authorities to resolve the legal questions; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents. The immediate effect is to restore the appeal rights of the appellant and remit the matter for reconsideration rather than to create a novel rule of law.

Directions: Parties were directed to appear before the trial court on 28-6-1996. (No order as to costs in the Second Appeal; C.R.P. No. 426/1991 dismissed as unnecessary.)

    Mohammed Haneef v. Haleel Basha And Another

    Defendant in O.S No. 290 of 1986, on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Panruti, is the appellant.

    2. Respondents filed the above suit for recovery of property, on the allegation that the appellant is in possession of the property as a tenant and that he has defaulted in paying the rent. It is further contended that the tenancy has been terminated by issuing a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, the respondents are entitled to get possession from the defendant.

    3. In his written statement defendant did not challenge the title of the property. But his contention was that he has taken the land on lease and has put up a non-residential building and, therefore, lie is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. Within the statutory period, he also filed an application under Section 9 of the Act to purchase the property. Evidence was taken on the application filed by the defendant wherein it was held that since for non-residential building, the Act will have no application, the same was dismissed. Since there was no other defence, the suit was also decreed. Against the judgment, the defendant preferred A.S No. 81 of 1988, on the file of Principal Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. The Appeal was also dismissed for the same reasoning. The Second Appeal is preferred against the concurrent finding, on the following substantial questions of law:—

    “1) Whether the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, i.e, Tamil Nadu Act III of 1922 does not apply to non-residential buildings in Nellikuppam as held by the Court below in view of G.O Ms. No. 1285, Revenue, dated 31-5-1975?

    2) Whether the present suit in the absence of a Notice under Section 11 is maintainable?

    3) Whether the appellant is not entitled to compensation under Section 3?”

    4. After the Second Appeal was filed, defendant preferred a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before the District Court, with an application to condone delay against the dismissal of his application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act The lower appellate court dismissed the delay condone petition on the ground that no sufficient cause has been made out. The Civil Revision Petition is filed against the dismissal of Section 5 petition, refusing to condone the delay.

    5. When the Civil Revision Petition came for arguments, learned Judge directed the Second Appeal also to be posted along with the Revision Petition. That is how both these matters have come together for arguments.

    6. Both the courts below have held that the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act on the ground that in respect of a non-residential building, the Act has no application. It is not on the basis of any evidence, but on the basis of certain assumptions, which have been shown to be patently incorrect. The extension Notification is dated 31-5-1975, extending the provisions of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act to non-residential buildings in all Municipal towns in the State. The said Notification is published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Part II Section dated 25-6-1975 at pages 302 and 303.

    7. When this was brought to the notice of the respondents, they contended that the same was not placed before the Legislature and, therefore, the Notification has no force. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that in the subsequent editions of the book, this Notification was not published and hence his inference that the said notification is not in force has to be accepted.

    8. I cannot accept the said contention in view of the binding decision in respect of the very same Notification reported in 1977-II M.L.J 206 (R. Govindasamy v. Bhoopalan and others). In paragraph 2 of the said judgment, at page 208, a learned judge of this Court has considered a similar question and has held that the Notification need not be placed before the Legislature and, therefore, it is valid. For the sake of convenience, it is better to incorporate the very same reasoning of the learned judge, which reads thus:

    “The respondents have filed counter affidavits both in the petition under S. 9 and in the petition to excuse the delay, filed in this Court. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the notification in G.O Ms. No. 1285, Revenue, dated 31st May, 1975 had not been shown to have been placed before the Legislature as required in section 1(6) of the Act and unless the said notification was placed before the Legislature, it will not be of any effect and will not confer any right on the petitioner to invoke the provisions of section 9 of the Act. Under sub-section (6) of section 1, every notification issued under sub-section (2) or sub-section (4) of that section shall be laid before the Legislature, if it is sitting, as soon as may be after the issue of the notification, and if it is not sitting within seven days of its re-assembly, and the State Government shall seek the approval of the Legislature to the notification by a resolution moved within a period of fifteen days beginning with the day on which the notification is so laid before it. As seen from this provision, this requirement relating to the placing before the Legislature is required only with reference to the notifications issued under sub-section (2) or sub-section (4). The Act, as originally enacted was made applicable by the Legislature to the City of Madras. But sub-section (2) enabled the State Government by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette to extend the Act to any other municipal town. Sub-section (4) authorised the Government by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette to cancel any notification issued under sub-section (2). These provisions show that only when the Act is extended or a notification under sub-section (2) is cancelled, it had to be placed before the Legislature. The Act was extended to the municipal town of Vellore by notification dated 8th January, 1973 which was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 31st January, 1973. Section 2(1) defined ‘building’ as meaning a building used for residential or non-residential purposes in the City of Madras and for residential purposes only, in any other area. Thus when the Act was extended to the Municipal town of Vellore, it applied only for residential buildings, But Section 2 (1)(i) also empowered the Government by notification to make the definition of ‘building’ as including residential or non-residential building even in cases of any other municipal town. In exercise of the power under the said G.O Ms. No. 1285, Revenue, dated 31st May, 1975, the Government specified the municipal town of Vellore as a municipal town for the purposes of section 2 (1)(i) from the date of publication of the notification in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. This notification under section 2 (1)(i) is not required to be placed on the table of the Legislature. The learned counsel for the respondents is, therefore, not well-founded in his contention that the notification had not taken effect in this case. It should not be assumed that even in the case of a notification under section 1(2) that the notification will take effect only after it is laid before the Legislature. In fact, that question does not arise for consideration as I have said that sub-section (6) of section 1 is not applicable to notification issued under section 2(1)(i).”

    9. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that since Section 9 Application has been dismissed and that has become final, the appellant cannot purchase the property, and at the most, he can be given only the right to get the value of improvements. According to him, once the Application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act is dismissed, the right to purchase the property is also lost.

    10. The said reasoning also cannot be accepted. The application under Section 9 of the said Act is filed only in a pending suit. The only condition is that the application should be filed within the statutory time fixed by the Statute. If such an application is filed, evidence is taken and it will be decided whether the person who wanted the benefit under that Section is entitled to purchase the property. But, when an application is filed in a suit, naturally, it can only be an interlocutory application therein. The dismissal of the interlocutory application in a suit will not bar the remedy. Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code enables a party to challenge the finding on an interlocutory application when he files an appeal against the decree. The said legal position is now settled by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1992) 1 S.C.J 126 (Thailammal & others v. Janardhan Raju and others). That is also a case where in an eviction petition under the Rent Control Act, the defendant filed an application under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. That Application was dismissed, from which he did not file an Appeal. But, ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the application under Section 9 of the said Act and its conclusiveness will not affect the right of the party in challenging that finding or the final decision in the Rent Control Petition. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, their Lordships have held thus:—

    “So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is concerned, we are of the opinion that according to Section 9 it is open to a defendant to file an application there under in the suit for ejectment filed by the landlord against him. Such an application would be in the nature of an interlocutory application in the suit. In such a situation, it follows that once an appeal is filed by the defendant against the decree of the trial court, he is entitled to challenge the correctness of any interlocutory order passed in the suit, in such appeal, by virtue of Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is not necessary in such a case that he should prefer an independent appeal against the order dismissing an interlocutory application, even if it is appealable. This principle is of equal application herein even though the interlocutory application is one under Section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, it must be held that in the Appeal/Second Appeal against the decree of the trail court, it was open to the defendants to challenge the correctness of the order dismissing their application under Section 9. The High Court was, therefore not right in holding that the said application having been dismissed by trial court and no fresh application having been filed, it must be held that there was no application under Section 9. The application filed by the defendants in the trial court must be deemed to be pending during the pendency of the Appeal/Second Appeal….”

    11. In view of the binding decision, it has to be held that the conclusiveness is also lost once the Second Appeal is filed against the main decree. The application under Section 9 must be deemed to have been pending for all purposes.

    12. The courts below have not decided the case of the appellant whether he is entitled to the benefits of Section 9 and purchase the property. It dismissed the application only on the ground that the Act has no application to non-residential buildings. Once that finding is set aside, the entire matter will have to go back to the trial court for re-determination of the issues.

    13. In so far as the Revision is concerned, in view of the reasoning given by me, an appeal to the lower appellate court itself was not necessary. Only by way of abundant caution, the appellant filed ah appeal before the lower appellate court, of course, belatedly. Even without an appeal, he can challenge the correctness of the finding rendered by the courts below on the application under Section 9. Since I hold that no appeal was necessary, the dismissal of the same on the ground of delay will not affect the right of the appellant. The Revision against that order is also, therefore, unnecessary.

    14. In the result, I set aside the judgments of the courts below and allow the Second Appeal. Original Suit No. 290 of 1986, on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Panruti, is restored to file, and the trial court is directed to consider the case of the appellant, namely, whether he is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in the Second Appeal. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 28-6-1996. C.R.P No. 426 of 1991 is dismissed as unnecessary, however, without any order as to costs.

    KA/RR/VCS

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    Mohammed Haneef v. Haleel Basha And Another
    (Apr 19, 1996)