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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Section 2(c) read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, filed to punish the respondent for allegedly abusing the process of court by misrepresentation and suppression of the fact that writ petitions had been filed in the High Court concerning the same subject-matter as a suit before the City Civil Court.

Procedural history and key factual events recited in the opinion:

  • On 24.3.1994 the petitioner filed two writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 5339 and 5340 of 1994) in this Court seeking writs in the nature of mandamus related to award/forbearance of award of a contract for item No. 2 in tender notices dated 28.10.1993 (opened 25.11.1993). The writ petitions were admitted and notice was ordered on the W.M.Ps filed for interim orders.
  • On 28.3.1994 the respondent filed O.S. No. 2364 of 1994 in the II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, seeking permanent and interim injunctions and other reliefs in relation to the same tender item, and obtained an order of interim injunction in that suit.
  • The interim injunction granted in the City Civil Court was vacated by the VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, by order dated 6.5.1994 in appeals (C.M.A. Nos. 46 and 47 of 1994).
  • Subsequently, learned counsel for the writ petitioners filed a letter dated 25.5.1994 stating that the writ petitions may be dismissed as withdrawn; the writ petitions were accordingly dismissed as withdrawn on 25.5.1994.
  • The contempt petition alleges that the respondent suppressed the existence and status (notice on W.M.Ps) of the writ petitions when seeking and obtaining the interim injunction in the civil suit, and thereby abused the City Civil Court's process.
  • On notice being issued in the contempt application, the respondent appeared and filed a counter-affidavit, and later an additional counter-affidavit tendering an unconditional apology and explaining the background of filings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent's non-disclosure (suppression) of the fact that writ petitions with interim applications were pending before this Court, while obtaining interim injunction in the City Civil Court, amounted to wilful abuse of the process of court and therefore criminal contempt under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
  2. If the respondent is guilty of criminal contempt, what punishment is appropriate having regard to the facts and circumstances?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Allegations / Case in the Contempt Application

  • The respondent abused the process of the City Civil Court by suppressing that he had filed writ petitions and W.M.Ps before this Court seeking the same relief; those writ petitions had been admitted and only notice was ordered on the W.M.Ps.
  • By not disclosing that this Court had taken cognizance and had only ordered notice on the interim applications, the respondent obtained an interim injunction from the City Civil Court that likely would not have been granted if the City Civil Court had known of the prior High Court proceedings.
  • This suppression and misrepresentation amounted to abuse of process and contempt of court.

Respondent's Arguments (from counter-affidavits)

  • Denial of deliberate abuse: the respondent asserted he did not deliberately non-mention or suppress the writ petitions filed by him nor did he play fraud on the Court.
  • Ignorance and lack of legal sophistication: he stated he was a layman, a contractor with about 20 years' experience, and ignorant of legal consequences.
  • Explanatory narrative and apology: the respondent said a draft prepared by an advocate in Kerala was given to his counsel, that he was advised the matter should be dealt with by a civil court and instructed withdrawal of the writ petition and then proceeded to file the civil suit through a different counsel; he tendered an unconditional apology and sought pardon and exoneration from contempt proceedings.
  • In the counter-affidavit he also stated that he had not disobeyed any orders of the High Court and that the contempt application was not maintainable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Naraindar v. Govt. of M.P., AIR 1974 M.P. 1252 That a deliberate and wilful wrong or misleading statement made by a party to obtain a favourable order prejudices the due course of judicial proceedings and may amount to contempt; but it must be established satisfactorily that such a deliberate wrong statement was made and that a favourable order resulted. The court relied on this principle to hold that wilful suppression of material facts in the instant case was equivalent to making a wrong statement and that an interim order was obtained as a consequence—supporting a finding of criminal contempt.
Advocate General of Bihar v. K.P. Khair Industries, AIR 1980 S.C. 944 That abuse of the process of the court which is calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceedings or the orderly administration of justice is contempt; distinguishing between minor abuses (remediable by procedural devices) and serious abuses that attack the administration of justice and therefore warrant punishment as contempt. The court applied the ratio to affirm that the respondent's conduct, which abused the judicial process and affected public interest in the administration of justice, fell within the category of contempt punishable under the Act.
Offutt v. U.S., (1954) 348 U.S. 11 (per Frankfurter J.) Quoted for the broader proposition that the court's power to commit for contempt is entrusted not merely to protect the court's dignity but to vindicate the public interest in the due administration of justice. Quoted within the Advocate General of Bihar decision excerpt relied upon by the court to support the public-interest rationale for punishing serious abuses of process.
Jennison v. Baker, (1912) 1 All E.R. 997 Quoted for the proposition (via an extract) indicating courts should not sit by while defiance of law goes unpunished and those seeking protection lose hope; supports public interest in administration of justice. Referenced in the excerpt from Advocate General of Bihar relied upon by the court to underline the necessity of protecting the public interest in the administration of justice when punishing serious abuses.
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9 (4th Edn.), paragraph 38 (as cited) Explains abuse of process generally: forging/altering court documents and deliberate suppression or false facts are punishable contempts; minor abuses may be dealt with procedurally, but serious misuse extending beyond the parties may be punished as contempt. The court used this doctrinal exposition (quoted in the Advocate General of Bihar decision) to frame the boundary between procedural remedies and criminal contempt, concluding the respondent's conduct warranted contempt proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based on the material in the counter-affidavits and the record:

  1. Assessment of the apology: The court examined the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent and found it not bona fide on the facts and circumstances. The court emphasised that the respondent was not an illiterate or inexperienced person; rather he claimed over 20 years' experience as a contractor and regular dealings with large organisations.
  2. Evaluation of the respondent's narrative: The respondent claimed that a draft writ petition prepared by an advocate in Kerala had been used, that he had instructed the first advocate to withdraw the writ petition on the same day after being advised the civil court should handle the matter, and that he handed the same draft to a new counsel who filed the civil suit. The court noted the absence of an affidavit from the advocate who filed and then allegedly withdrew the writ petitions to confirm these instructions.
  3. Inference of wilful suppression: From the combination of (a) the respondent's experience, (b) the transfer of draft pleadings between advocates, (c) the lack of corroboration of the asserted withdrawal instructions, and (d) the timing (writs admitted and notice on W.M.Ps, followed by filing and obtaining interim injunction in civil court), the court concluded that the suppression of material facts in the civil suit was wilful and with the objective of obtaining an interim order.
  4. Application of legal principles: The court applied the principle in Naraindar v. Govt. of M.P. that deliberate misleading statements to obtain a favourable order can amount to contempt, and the Supreme Court's ratio in Advocate General of Bihar v. K.P. Khair Industries distinguishing minor abuses from serious abuse of process affecting the public interest. The court also relied on the quoted doctrinal material (Offutt, Jennison, Halsbury's) to underscore that some abuses must be punished as contempt to vindicate the public interest in the administration of justice.
  5. Conclusion on guilt: Given the proved and undisputed facts, the court held that the suppression was deliberate and amounted to abusing the court's process to procure an interim order; therefore, the respondent was guilty of criminal contempt under Section 12 of the Act.
  6. Determination of punishment: Noting that criminal contempt is punishable with simple imprisonment, the court nonetheless considered mitigating factors (respondent's trade, the effect of imprisonment on his profession, and his tendered apology). Although the apology was held not to be bona fide, the court imposed a monetary penalty instead of immediate imprisonment: a fine of Rs. 2,000 to be paid within four weeks (with default leading to two weeks' simple imprisonment).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The respondent was held guilty of criminal contempt for wilful suppression of material facts and abusing the process of the court; the court imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees Two thousand) to be paid within four weeks, with default to undergo simple imprisonment of two weeks.

Direct implications and orders:

  • The respondent must pay the fine of Rs. 2,000 within the period fixed by the court; otherwise he shall undergo two weeks' simple imprisonment.
  • The authorities concerned were directed to take appropriate steps in the event of non-payment of the fine.
  • The contempt application was ordered accordingly and no costs were awarded; the time for payment of the fine was extended until 16th June, 1995 (as recorded).

Broader implications: The opinion applies established authorities on abuse of process and contempt as quoted and relied upon in the text. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new precedent; it applies existing precedent to the facts to determine guilt and punishment, with the direct effect limited to the respondent's fine or default imprisonment.

    Seetharami Reddy v. Joseph Vilangadhan

    This is an application filed under Section 2(C) read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’) to punish the respondent for absuing the process of the Court by misrepresentation and suppression of the fact of filing the writ petitions in the High Court in the suit filed before the City Civil Court Judge, in respect of the very same subject matter.

    2. On the notice being issued, the respondent had put in appearance through a counsel and filed a counter affidavit Therefore, the matter was heard at great length and came to be adjourned to today for further hearing. Today, the respondent has filed an additional counter-affidavit stating the background in which the suit came to be filed before the City Civil Court, and further, tendering an unconditional apology.

    3. Few facts of the case, which are not in dispute, are as follows:

    The petitioner filed two writ petitions (W.P Nos. 5339 and 5340 of 1994) before this Court on 24.3.1994 In W.P No. 5339 of 1994, the petitioner sought for issue of a Writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the Chief Engineer (Constn.), Headquarters Officer, Works Construction Branch, Southern Railway, Egmore, Madras-600008, to award the contract in respect of item No. 2 of the tender notice No. 35.CE/CN/93 dated 28.10.93, opened on 25.11.1993, in favour of the petitioner, whose tender was the lowest and duly complied with the conditions of the tenders in W.P No. 5340 of 1994, he sought for issue of a Writ in the nature of Mandamus, directing the very same Chief Engineer to forbear from awarding to, implementing, entering into contract with or having the work executed through, the 2nd respondent, viz., Seetharama Reddy (petitioner herein) in respect of item No. 2 of the tender Notice No. 36.CE/CN/93 dated 28.10.1993, opened on 25.11.1993 The Writ Petitions were filed on the basis that the tender submitted by the respondent had been wrongly rejected. These writ petitions came up before a learned single Judge of this Court on 25.3.1994 and the same were admitted and notice was ordered on the W.M.Ps filed for interim orders. The High Court and the Subordinate Courts were closed on 26th and 27th March, 1994, being Saturday and Sunday. On 28th March, 1994, the respondent filed O.S No. 2364 of 1994 before the II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, for the relief of permanent injunction, restraining the defendants, viz., The Chief Engineer and Seetharama Reddy, from in any way executing the works being the item No. 2 of the Tender Notice of the Chief Engineer No. 35.CE/CN/93 dated 28.10.93, opened on 25.11.1993 either by awarding in favour of the 2nd defendant or by entering into contract by and between the 1st and 2nd defendants, or by accepting or by implementing the same by the 2nd defendant, or otherwise, a mandatory injunction directing the cancellation of the contract awarded in favour of the 2nd defendant, a mandatory injunction directing the 1st defendant to award the contract of the works being item No. 2 of the tender notice of the 1st defendant No. 36.CE/CN/93 dated 28.10.1993, opened on 25.11.1993 in favour of the plaintiff and costs of the suit. He also filed an application in the suit for the relief of interim injunction and obtained an order of interim injunction, restraining the defendant in the suit from in any way executing the works being item No. 2 of the tender notice No. 35.CE/CN/93 dated 28.10.1993 opened on 25.11.1993 either by awarding in favour of the 2nd defendant or by entering into contract by and between the 1st and 2nd defendants or by accepting or by implementing the same by the 2nd defendant. Subsequent, in the appeals preferred by the defendants in the suit being C.M.A Nos. 46, and 47 of 1994, the VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, by the order dated 6.5.1994 vacated the order of temporary injunction. Subsequently, Learned counsel, who appeared for the writ petitioners, filed a letter dated 25.5.1994 stating that the writ petitions may be dismissed as withdrawn. Accordingly, the writ petitions were dismissed as withdrawn on 25.5.1994

    3.A. The complaint against the respondent in this contempt application is that he has abused the process of the City Civil Court by suppressing the material fact that he had tiled the writ petitions for the very same relief and also sought for interim orders in the writ petitions, though the writ petitions were admitted and only notice was ordered in the W.M.Ps filed for interim orders; that he filed the aforesaid civil suit as though he had not approached this Court in petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and thereby obtained interim injunction in the suit; that if only the respondent had disclosed the fact of filing the writ petitions and W.M.Ps and that this Court had only ordered notice in the W.M.Ps in all probability, the learned II Assistant City Civil Judge, would not have passed an order of temporary injunction in the suit, that too in a case where it pertained to contract.

    4. In the counter-affidavit dated 16.11.1994 filed by the respondent, he has tried to justify his action, by contending as follows:

    “I have not committed any abuse of process of Court of deliberately non-mentioning the writ petitions filed by me and its withdrawal in the suit. I have not deliberately suppressed the facts and I have not played fraud on the Court and I have not mislead the Hon'ble Court. I have not disobeyed any orders of this Hon'ble Court and as such this contempt application is not maintainable. As the petitioner sought to punish me for disobeying the order dated 25.3.1994 made in W.M.P Nos. 8396 and 8397 of 1994 passed by His Lordship Mr. Justice Kanakaraj is only to notice to the respondent therein on 25.3.1994 I have not committed any contempt of Court, I am a layman and I am innocent and ignorant of legal process. In any event I tender my unconditional apology before this Hon'ble Court if this Hon'ble court feels that I had committed any contempt of Court”. In the additional counter-affidavit filed today, he has submitted as follows:— “I most humbly and respectfully tender my unconditional apology for the incidents. I am a Registered Contractor with the Railway Deportment and I have been engaging in contract work for more than 20 years. I am also doing regular contract work for Indian Oil Corporation. Since the Railway did not accept my tender, the advocate at Kerala gave ma a draft to instruct my advocate to prepare the writ petition. Accordingly, I gave the original draft based on which the writ petition was filed. Though the writ petition was admitted by His Lordship Justice Kanakaraj, His Lordship felt that the matter has to be dealt with by Civil Court, I instructed my advocate to withdraw the writ petition on the same day and immediately approached a different counsel and I gave him the copy of the same draft which I handed over to the earlier counsel. The very same wordings and narrations of the facts in both the Writ Petition as well as the suit would show my innocence that I have not suppressed any facts. Since my wife, was very ill at Cochin I had to leave to Cochin. I did not inform the counsel regarding the filing of the writ petition. I humbly submit that I am a man of well reputation and I am a well known contractor having 20 years experience in the business line and since I am ignorant of the legal consequence, I have committed the abovesaid act. I had no intention of committing any abusive process of law and I once again tender my unconditional apology before this Hon'ble Court as I never intentionally did anything. I once again tender my unconditional apology and I may be pardoned for my act and I may be exonerated from the contempt proceedings”.

    Thus the respondent, as on today, does not dispute his act of approaching the civil court without disclosing and suppressing the fact of filing of the writ petition before this Court and the notice being ordered on the interim prayer made, in the W.M.Ps filed in the Writ Petitions. However, he has tendered an unconditional apology after stating several facts.

    5. On the very facts stated in the counter affidavit and in the additional counter - affidavit, it is not possible to accept the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent as there is no bonafide in it. He is not an illiterate person or a person not knowing the proceeding of the Court He claims that he has been in the field for over 20 years and he has been doing contract work with Indian Railways and also with Indian Oil Corporation. He states that he had brought draft of the writ petition prepared by an Advocate in Kerala and after filing the writ petitions, as no interim order was granted, he gave the said draft to another advocate for filing a civil suit with instructions to the advocate, who had filed the writ petitions, to withdraw the writ petitions. There is no affidavit of the learned counsel, who filed the writ petitions, to the effect that he had been instructed by the petitioner to withdraw the writ petitions as he was going to file a suit When the copies of affidavits and the writ miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions were given to the learned counsel who filed the suit, it is not possible to believe the petitioner that he did not inform the counsel regarding the filing of the writ petitions. This only shows that wilfully and deliberately, with an avowed object of obtaining interim orders from the Civil Court the true and material facts of filing of the writ petitions and not granting of interim orders in the W.M.Ps were suppressed and were omitted to be mentioned in the suit The suppression was wilful and was with the purpose of obtaining an interim order from the Civil Court. It is not possible to avoid this inference from the proved and undisputed facts. As far as the legal position is concerned, it is very much clear. In Naraindar v. Govt. of M.P (AIR 1974 M.P 1252), it has been specifically held that, “if a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and wilfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due course of judicial proceeding and thus amount to contempt of Court But, it must be established satisfactorily that any deliberate and wrong statement was made and there was a favourable order in consequence of the statement.” As we have already pointed out this is a case in which wilful suppression of actual and material facts would amount to making a wrong statement and thereby misleading the Court with a view to obtain an interim order. In the instant case, the interim order in the suit was obtained by suppressing the true and material facts, therfore we are of the view that the respondent has wilfully abused the process of the Court with a view to obtain an advantage in his favour by obtaining an interim order and therfore, he is guilty of criminal contempt, liable to be punished under Sec. 12 of the Act This case also fails within the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Advocate General of Bihar v. KP Khair Industries (AIR 1980 S.C 944). The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:—

    “While we are conscious that every obuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of Court - abuse of the process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of a Judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice we must say - is a Contempt of Court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the Court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as u contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless Justice is so administered, there is the period of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice, and so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court, against insult or injury as the expression Contempt of Court” may seem to suggest but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. “It is a mode of vindicating the majestry of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage”. Per Frank Further. J. in Offutt v. U.S (1954) 348 US 11.

    “The law should not be seen to sit by simply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope”. Per Judge, Curtain-Raleigh quoted in Jennison v. Baker (1912) 1 A11 E.R 997 at p. 1006. in Halsbuty's Laws of England, (4th Edn., Vol. 9., paragraph 38), there is a brief discussion of when abuses of the process of the Court may be a punishable contempt It is said:

    “38. Abuse of process in general. The Court has power to punish as contempt any misuse of the Court's process. That the forging or altering of Court documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable as serious contempts. Similarly, deceiving the Court or the court's officers by deliberately suppressing a tact or giving false facts, may be a punishable contempt.

    Certain acts of a lesser nature may also constitute an abuse of process as, for instance, initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting in bonafides, or which are frivolous, vexatious, or alternative powers to prevent an abuse of its process by striking our or staying proceedings or by prohibiting the taking further proceedings without leave. Where the Court, by exercising its statutory powers, its powers, under rules of court, or its inherent jurisdiction, can give an adequate remedy, it will not in general punish the abuse as a contempt of court. On the other hand, where an irregularity or misuse of process amounts to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond the parties to the action, it may be punished as a contempt”.

    (emphasis supplied).

    6. We have already pointed out that unconditional apology, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be held to be a bonafide one and as such it cannot at all be accepted. Accordingly, we hold that the respondent is quilty of contempt of Court falling in the cateorgory of criminal contempt.

    7. The next question for consideration is as to the quantum of punishment. For the act of criminal contempt committed by the respondent, he is liable to be punished with simple imprisonment However, taking into consideration of the fact that the respondent is a contract and the punishment of imprisonment is likely to result in black-listing him, thereby affecting his very profession itself and also taking into consideration of the fact that he has realised that he has committed criminal contempt and seriousness of the ofference and offered an unconditional apology, which we have held, in the facts and cirumstances of the case cannot be accepted, we only impose the penality of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two thousand) which shall be paid by the respondent within four weeks from today. In the event the respondent fails to pay the fine into this Court within the aforesaid period, he shall undergo simple imprisonment of two weeks. The authorities concerned shall take appropriate steps in the event the respondent fails to pay the fine as imposed.

    7.A. The contempt application is ordered accordingly. No costs. Time for payments of fine is extended till 16th June, 1995.

    KA/RR/VCS

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    Seetharami Reddy v. Joseph Vilangadhan
    (Mar 29, 1995)