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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

One Arumugham Chettiar, a daily-wage earner, purchased a lottery ticket for Rs. 2. He thereafter agreed, in a written agreement, to share 25% of any prize with O.K. Ramaswamy Chettiar because he required 50 paise for his next meal. The ticket won a prize of Rs. 17,85,000 (net). Both individuals offered their respective shares for tax purposes, but the Income-tax Officer assessed the entire prize as income of an association of persons (AOP). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside that assessment, finding that the two persons had come together through an accidental union and did not form an association. The Department appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal and confirmed that the prize should be assessed in the hands of the individuals. The Department referred the following question to this Court under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961: whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the lottery winnings should be assessed individually and not as an association of persons.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the lottery winnings of Rs. 17,85,000 (net) should be assessed in the hands of the members individually on their respective shares, or whether they should be assessed as one unit in the status of an "association of persons"?

Arguments of the Parties

Department's Arguments

  • The written agreement to share the prize establishes that the two individuals formed an association of persons for the purpose of producing income.
  • By entering into the agreement the parties agreed to have a share in the ticket and in the income produced by it; even a single shared activity to produce income is sufficient to constitute an AOP.
  • Winnings from lotteries are now taxable as income, so the arrangement relates to producing taxable income.
  • Reliance was placed on various decisions (cited in the opinion) to support the proposition that such agreements can create an AOP.

Assessee's Arguments

  • There was no association of persons because the ticket-holder never agreed to share the right in the ticket; he only agreed to pay 25% of any prize after the ticket had been purchased.
  • There was no common intention or ongoing venture between the two persons to produce income; the agreement was a single contract and no other joint activity existed.
  • Winning a lottery cannot be equated with "producing" income in the sense contemplated for formation of an AOP.
  • Cited authorities that support assessment of the incomes individually or that distinguish ownership/co-ownership from an AOP were relied upon.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
G. Murugesan & Brothers v. CIT, [1973] 88 ITR 432 (Supreme Court) Accepted that "association of persons" is not a term of art; reiterated the crucial test that an association involves two or more persons joining in a common purpose or common action with the object of producing income, profits or gains; there is no universal formula and the conclusion depends on facts and circumstances. The Court treated this authority as laying down the crucial test to determine whether an AOP exists and accepted its principles as applicable to the present factual inquiry.
CIT v. Indira Balkrishna, [1960] 39 ITR 546 (Supreme Court) Defined "associate" as to join in a common purpose or action; an association for taxation must have as its object the production of income, profits or gains. The Court relied on this definition to assess whether the facts showed a common purpose to produce income; it was cited as authoritative on the legal meaning of "association of persons".
In re B.N. Elias, [1935] 3 ITR 408 (Cal) Tested the meaning of "association of persons" and stated that an association must be one in which persons join in common purpose or action to produce income; illustrated that a combination formed for promotion of a joint enterprise could be an association. Used as part of the line of authority establishing the test for AOP; the Court treated it as supportive of the principle that factual combination and joint enterprise are relevant to the question.
CIT v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937] 5 ITR 584 (Bom) Held that an association is one the object of which is to produce income; supported the view that joining in a common purpose/action is essential. Accepted as one of the earlier decisions forming the test for determining an AOP; relied upon for the general principle.
In re Dwarkanath Harishchandra Pitale, [1937] 5 ITR 716 (Bom) Similar principle as above: association requires joining in common purpose/action to produce income. Included among the authorities the Court referred to as correctly laying down the crucial test for AOP under section 3 of the Income-tax Act.
CIT v. Smt. Saraswati Bai, [1982] 137 ITR 656 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) On facts where three ladies jointly purchased land and later sold it, the Tribunal's positive finding that they did not constitute an AOP and the transaction was not an adventure in nature of trade was supported by evidence. The Court observed this decision but held it not applicable to the present facts because that case involved co-ownership (interest in land) and different factual circumstances.
CIT v. Har Parshad, [1989] 178 ITR 591 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) Held there was no material to show that four persons formed an association with the object of producing income when they had purchased land and later sold it; appeared to be joint ownership rather than an association to earn profits. The Court noted this decision but considered it inapplicable to the present case on its facts (joint ownership over years versus a single post-purchase contract).
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Shiv Sagar Estates (AOP), [1993] 201 ITR 953 (Bombay High Court) Held that co-owners (who had interest in immovable property) could not be assessed as an AOP for income from the property; co-ownership distinguished from an association of persons. The Court treated this authority as factually distinguishable and therefore not helpful to the Department in the present case.
CIT v. Friends Enterprises, [1988] 171 ITR 269 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Where five persons agreed beforehand to contribute money and engage in organized betting activity to earn income, they were assessable as an association of persons because they had come together in an organised course of activity to earn income. The Court considered this decision relied on by the Department but distinguished it: in Friends Enterprises there was a prior agreement to invest and enter into a joint organized activity; in the present case the agreement came after purchase and did not create a common venture to purchase the ticket for producing income.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step-by-step, relying only on the facts and authorities set out in the opinion:

  1. Fact-finding: The Court accepted the factual matrix as established: Arumugham individually purchased the ticket out of his own money, then — after purchase — obtained 50 paise from Ramaswamy and entered a written agreement promising to pay 25% of any prize. The ticket subsequently won Rs. 17,85,000.
  2. Framing the legal test: The Court reiterated the settled test from Supreme Court and earlier authorities that an "association of persons" involves two or more persons joining in a common purpose or common action where the object is to produce income, profits or gains; there is no single formula and the determination depends on the facts of each case.
  3. Comparison with precedents: The Court examined prior decisions cited by both sides:
    • Decisions involving co-ownership (e.g., Saraswati Bai, Har Parshad, Shiv Sagar Estates) were distinguished because those cases concerned persons who had an interest in the property before the sale (i.e., co-owners), whereas in the present case the second person never had a right in the ticket.
    • Friends Enterprises (where five persons agreed beforehand to contribute for betting) was distinguished because there the parties entered into an organized venture before engaging in the income-producing activity; the present facts show no prior joint venture to purchase the ticket or to produce income.
  4. Application of the test to facts: The Court emphasized that the agreement in the present case was post-purchase and limited to a promise by the ticket-holder to pay 25% of any prize to Ramaswamy in return for 50 paise. The second person obtained no right over the ticket and there was no consensus ad idem to purchase the ticket as a joint venture for producing income. The agreement merely gave Ramaswamy a contractual claim to a portion of any prize, not an ownership or co-venturing interest.
  5. Conclusion from analysis: Because the essential ingredients for treating the two persons as an association of persons were lacking — no common purpose to produce income, no pre-existing joint agreement to enter into the venture, no right in the ticket for Ramaswamy — the Tribunal's conclusion that there was no association of persons was upheld.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative and against the Department: it held that there is no association of persons between Arumugham Chettiar and O.K. Ramaswamy Chettiar, and the lottery winnings should be assessed individually in the hands of the members on their respective shares.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Department's contention that the entire prize should be assessed as income of an AOP was rejected; the assessment must be made on an individual basis according to each person's share as offered.
  • Distinguishing precedent: The Court distinguished authorities relied on by the Department (notably Friends Enterprises and various co-ownership cases) on their facts; the ruling turns on the absence of a prior joint venture or ownership interest and on the fact that the agreement here was a post-purchase contractual sharing of proceeds.
  • No broader precedent announced: The Court applied established tests from earlier authorities and explicitly noted the fact-specific nature of the inquiry; the opinion does not purport to lay down any new universal rule beyond the accepted tests and factual application in this case.
  • Costs and fees: There was no order as to costs; counsel fee awarded was Rs. 1,000 (one thousand only), as recorded in the opinion.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. O.K Arumugham Chettiar And Another

    Thanikkachalam, J.:— At the instance of the Department, the Tribunal referred the following question for the opinion of this court under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

    “1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the lottery winnings of Rs. 17,85,000 (net) should not be assessed in the hands of the members as one unit in the status of ‘association of persons’ but should be assessed individually in the hands of the members on their respective shares?”

    2. One Sri Arumugham Chettiar is said to be a daily wage earner of Rs. 3 per day in a cycle shop. He purchased a lottery ticket for Rs. 2 and agreed to share 25 per cent, of the prize with one Sri O.K Ramaswamy Chettiar as he was in need of 50 paise for his next meal. This agreement was reduced to writing. The ticket earned a prize of Rs. 17,85,000. Both these persons offered the respective shares for tax purposes. The Income-tax Officer was of the view that the entire assessment should be made as a single assessment on an association of persons. Accordingly, the assessment was made in the status of association of persons. On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that they came together through an accidental union and there was no conscious and stable relationship expected of an association. Accordingly, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner set aside the assessment made in the status of association of persons. As against this order, the Department filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the Departmental appeal holding that the mere agreement to share the prize money for a consideration being a single activity for the purposes of sharing a chance prize would hardly constitute an association of persons. The Tribunal pointed out that the scheme of the Act is to tax individuals and not to club the incomes of different persons except under conditions prescribed under section 64 of the Act. According to the Tribunal in order that an association or body of individuals is assessed there should be such a separate entity in existence. These two persons had not combined for other purposes and at other times nor did they have any other common relationship. There was, therefore, no basis for treating both of them together as a common assessable entity. It was also found that the case for aggregation or otherwise did not depend upon the validity or otherwise of the agreement. Accordingly, the Tribunal confirmed the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Learned senior standing counsel for the Department submitted that the agreement between these two individuals would go to show that there was an association of persons for the purpose of producing income. By entering into the abovesaid agreement both the individuals agreed to have a share in the ticket as well as in the income produced by the ticket. According to learned senior standing counsel even one activity of joining into a common action for the purpose of producing income would be sufficient to form an association of persons. Learned standing counsel further pointed out that the contention put forward by the assessee that the winning of the lottery has not produced any income to the joint venture of association of persons is untenable because winnings from lottery are now only made taxable as income. In order to support these contentions, learned standing counsel for the Department relied upon various decisions about which we will consider at a later stage.

    3. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the assessee while supporting the order passed by the Tribunal submitted that there is no association of persons as alleged by the Department between the said two individuals in the present case. The holder of the ticket never agreed to share the right in the ticket. What was agreed by the holder of the ticket was to part with 25 per cent, of the prize money if the ticket wins a prize. Therefore, the second person has no right in the ticket and there is no common intention between the two persons for entering into a venture for producing the income. For these reasons, it was submitted that there is no association of persons as stated by the Department. Learned counsel further contended that in the present case apart from the abovesaid single contract there is no other activity of joining into common action in between the abovesaid two individuals. Again it was submitted that winning of a lottery cannot be equated to produce the income. Learned counsel appearing for the assessee also relied upon certain decisions in order to support his contentions.

    4. We have heard the rival submissions. The fact remains that one Arumugham Chettiar who was working in a cycle shop on daily wages of Rs. 2 purchased a lottery ticket for Rs. 2. He agreed to share 25 per cent, of the prize money with one O.K Ramaswamy Chettiar as he was in need of 50 paise for the next meal. The agreement was reduced into writing. The ticket earned a prize of Rs. 17,85,000. According to the Department, both the individuals formed an association of persons for producing this lottery winning income. Hence, the winning of the lottery is to be assessed in the status of association of persons. In the case of G. Murugesan & Brothers v. Cit, Madras, [1973] 88 ITR 432, the Supreme Court has held as under (page 436):

    “The expression ‘association of persons’ is not a term of art. That expression has come up for consideration before this court in more than one case. In CIT v. Indira Balkrishna, [1960] 39 ITR 546, this court, after referring to the various judgments, observed thus:

    ‘It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re B.N Elias, [1935] 3 ITR 408 (Cal); CIT v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937] 5 ITR 584 (Bom) and In re Dwarkanath Harishchandra Pitale, [1937] 5 ITR 716 (Bom). In In re B.N Elias, [1935] 3 ITR 408 (Cal), Derbyshire C.J rightly pointed out that the word “associate” means, according to the Oxford Dictionary, “to join in common purpose, or to join in an action”. Therefore, an association of persons must be one in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income, profits or gains. This was the view expressed by Beaumont C.J in CIT v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937] 5 ITR 584 (Bom) at page 589 and also in In re Dwarkanath Harishchandra Pitale, [1937] 5 ITR 716 (Bom). In In re B.N Elias, [1935] 3 ITR 408 (Cal), Costello J. put the test in more forceful language. He said: “It may well be that the intention of the Legislature was to hit a combination of individuals who were engaged together in some joint enterprise but did not in law constitute partnerships…. When we find…. that there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise…. then I think no difficulty arises whatever in the way of saying that…. these persons did constitute an association….”

    We think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay down the crucial test for determining what is an “association of persons” within the meaning of section 3 of the Income-tax Act, and they have been accepted and followed in a number of later decisions of different High Courts to all of which it is unnecessary to call attention. It is, however, necessary to add some words of caution here. There is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them and of what nature, are necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an association of persons within the meaning of section 3; it must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or not’.

    5. So also the Supreme Court had another occasion to consider the meaning of the word “association of persons” in the case of CIT v. Indira Balkrishna, [1960] 39 ITR 546, wherein it was held that “the word ‘associate’ means to ‘join in a common purpose, or to join in an action’. Therefore, ‘association of persons’ as used in section 3 of the Income-tax Act, means an association in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income, profits or gains”.

    6. A similar question came up for consideration before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Saraswati Bai, [1982] 137 ITR 656. According to the facts arising in this case a piece of land was purchased by three ladies jointly and subsequently resold. Profit on the sale of land was included in the individual returns of the ladies as capital gains and assessed as such. Subsequently, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice of reassessment on the ground that the assessees constituted an association of persons and the transaction amounted to an adventure in the nature of trade. While considering these facts, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that “there was evidence on which the Tribunal had arrived at a positive finding on fact that the assessee did not constitute an association of persons and that transaction did not amount to an adventure in the nature of trade”.

    7. According to the facts arising in the abovesaid case, the ladies who purchased the land were having interest in the said land before they resold it. Therefore, they are considered to be co-owners and not an association of persons. Hence, this decision on the facts arising in that case would not be applicable for making any decision in the present case.

    8. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT v. Har Parshad, [1989] 178 ITR 591. According to the facts arising in that case, N, T, H and P purchased two pieces of land in 1951. During the financial year ending March 31, 1960, and in the assessment year 1960-61 under consideration the land was sold by the aforesaid persons after dividing it into 12 plots. The Income-tax Officer started proceedings with a view to tax the income from the sale of the land and issued a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to the aforesaid four persons jointly treating their status as an association of persons. However, the Tribunal held that the assessment under section 143(3) was not valid as there was no service of notice and that no association of persons had been formed. On a reference, the High Court held that (headnote):

    “There was no material to show that the four persons in question, while purchasing the land, formed themselves into an association with the object of producing income. It appeared to be a joint venture of owning property. The land was purchased in May, 1951, and it was sold after more than eight years. The mere fact that it was sold after dividing it into plots did not mean that at the time of its purchase, the purpose or object was to earn profits. No association of persons had been formed by the four persons in the impugned transaction of purchase and sale of land.”

    9. Therefore, on the facts, this decision would also render no assistance to the assessees to say that there is no association of persons in the present case. Reliance was also placed upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Shiv Sagar Estates (Aop).), [1993] 201 ITR 953. According to the facts arising in that case 65 persons of three prosperous families together purchased properties, from the legal heirs of the Maharaja of Gwalior to whom it belonged as per the registered document dated November 4, 1963. Each of the families contributed equally to the consideration of Rs. 65,00,000 paid for the transfer. The entire property was divided into eight plots. Since there was disagreement between the seller of the lands and the purchasers, the 65 co-owners became the direct lessors, since the lands were let out to Kiran Constructions. The rent received by them was said to be assessed in the status of association of persons. The Bombay High Court held that since they are co-owners they cannot be assessed in the status of association of persons, since they are already having interest over the immovable property. Therefore, on the facts this decision would also be not helpful for the purpose of making a decision in the present case. Learned senior standing counsel heavily relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Friends Enterprises, [1988] 171 ITR 269. According to the facts arising in that case a return was filed by the assessee in the status of a registered firm for the assessment year 1973-74 showing an income of over Rs. 1 lakh on total winnings. It was claimed that a partnership had been formed consisting of five persons. The five persons had agreed to contribute equal sums of Rs. 200 each. The amount would be invested in placing bets, investing in jackpots, etc., in the horse racing season. The Income-tax Officer assessed the entity as an association of persons but the Tribunal held that betting and racing could not be treated as an income-producing activity and the assessment in the status of an association of persons could not be sustained. On a reference, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that “the income from betting was taxable as income from other sources under section 56. In the instant case, the five persons had come together and engaged themselves in an organised course of activity to earn income from betting. They were assessable in the status of an association of persons”

    10. Thus, according to the facts arising in that case, even prior to entering into the venture five persons entered into an agreement to invest money for producing income. But according to the facts arising in the present case, there was no agreement between the said two individuals prior to the purchase of the lottery ticket to form an entity for the purpose of producing income by purchasing the lottery ticket. The facts arising in the present case would go to show that Arumugham Chettiar purchased the lottery ticket out of his own money. After the purchase of the ticket he required a second person, viz., O.K Ramaswamy Chettiar, to part with a sum of 50 paise for the purpose of obtaining his next meal and promised to pay back 25 per cent, of the lottery winning if the ticket got a prize. Therefore, both these persons did not enter into a contract prior to the purchase of the ticket for the purpose of entering into a venture to purchase the lottery ticket for producing the income. The contract is between Arumugham Chettiar and Ramaswamy Chettiar. Arumugham Chettiar obtained 50 paise from Ramaswamy Chettiar and agreed to pay 25 per cent, of the prize money if the ticket in his hand gets a prize. Therefore, there is no consensus ad idem between these two persons to purchase the ticket for the purpose of producing the income. This agreement would go to show that O.K Ramaswamy Chettiar can look to Arumugham Chettiar to get 25 per cent, of the prize money if Arumugham Chettiar's ticket successfully wins a prize. Therefore, Ramaswamy Chettiar can claim no right over the ticket. Hence, the ingredients for considering both of them forming an association of persons are lacking in the present case. Therefore, the decision cited by learned senior standing counsel for the Department, viz., CIT v. Friends Enterprises, [1988] 171 ITR 269 (AP), would not be applicable to the facts of the case. Even though the income by way of lottery winnings is an income assessable under section 2(24)(ix) of the Income-tax Act, for all these reasons stated above, we hold that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that there is no association of persons between Arumugham Chettiar and Ramaswamy Chettiar and hence they cannot be assessed in the status of association of persons. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000 (one thousand only).

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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. O.K Arumugham Chettiar And Another
    (Jun 5, 1995)