AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927), or in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951),
  • sub-S.(4)(a) of S. 64 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951)
  • S. 64(4) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951)
  • provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II
  • Constitution of India on 26th January, 1950 the Hindu Religious Endowments Act
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II
  • Ordinance 1 of 1965 and Amendment Act 16 of 1965
  • S. 118(2)(a) of Madras H.R and C.E Act 22 of 1959
  • Code of Civil Procedure or the Civil Rules
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927,
  • Code of Civil Procedure or Civil Rules
  • (7) of S. 75-B of Madras Act 22 of 1959
  • PAYMENT OF BONUS AMENDMENT ACT
  • S. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 32 of the Payment of Bonus Act,
  • Act, 1959 (Madras Act 52 of 1959).
  • (3) of S. 64 of Act XIX of 1951
  • Amendment Act 16 of 1965
  • 1960. S. 72(7) of this Act
  • Madras Act IX of 1937
  • S. 75-B of he Act
  • Rule 3 of O. 22.
  • sub-rule (2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927), or in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951),
  • sub-S.(4)(a) of S. 64 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951)
  • S. 64(4) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951)
  • provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II
  • Constitution of India on 26th January, 1950 the Hindu Religious Endowments Act
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II
  • Ordinance 1 of 1965 and Amendment Act 16 of 1965
  • S. 118(2)(a) of Madras H.R and C.E Act 22 of 1959
  • Code of Civil Procedure or the Civil Rules
  • Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927,
  • Code of Civil Procedure or Civil Rules
  • (7) of S. 75-B of Madras Act 22 of 1959
  • PAYMENT OF BONUS AMENDMENT ACT
  • S. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 32 of the Payment of Bonus Act,
  • Act, 1959 (Madras Act 52 of 1959).
  • (3) of S. 64 of Act XIX of 1951
  • Amendment Act 16 of 1965
  • 1960. S. 72(7) of this Act
  • Madras Act IX of 1937
  • S. 75-B of he Act
  • Rule 3 of O. 22.
  • sub-rule (2)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Thangamuni, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns Sri Thiyagarajaswami Temple, Tiruvarur and a set of specific endowments (Kattalais) attached to it. The temple relies on multiple Kattalais for funding and performance of daily, weekly, monthly and annual services. Thirteen Kattalais are identified, with four being prominent (Ulthurai, Abhisheka, Annadhana and Rajan). Trusteeship of some Kattalais is hereditary in heads of certain Mutts (for example, Rajan Kattalai in the Head of Dharmapuram Mutt; Abhisheka and Annadhana in the Head of Velakurichi Mutt).

Historically the temple and Kattalais were at various times under royal, Government and trustee control. In 1937 the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act and subsequent administrative action resulted in a Government Notification (No. 638 dated 25.5.1937) placing the temple and its Kattalais under Chapter VI-A and an Executive Officer was appointed. A later Government Order (G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956) renewed that Notification. The renewal was challenged in writ proceedings and the Supreme Court ultimately quashed G.O. No. 3069 (decision reported as 1965 (2) M.L.J 167).

Following the Supreme Court decision, the State promulgated an Ordinance (Madras Ordinance 1 of 1965) and enacted amendments (Act XVI of 1965) inserting sections (notably S.75-A, 75-B and 75-C) into the H.R. & C.E. Act to validate prior Notifications and provide a mechanism for continuance and challenge. Under those provisions the Government and Commissioner issued further orders (including G.O No. 2347 dated 13.7.1966 and a show-cause call of trustees) that led to three suits (O.S. Nos. 11, 12 and 15 of 1968) by hereditary trustees seeking cancellation of the validating orders and continuations.

At trial, the Subordinate Judge found the original G.O. 3069 invalid under the Supreme Court decision but concluded that the Amendment Act 16 of 1965 kept it in force; he dismissed the suits on merits, finding a necessity for a central coordinating authority (Executive Officer). The present appeals challenge that dismissal and raise (a) validity of S.75-A, (b) validity of G.O. 2347 under S.75-B, (c) whether notifications should be cancelled on merits, and (d) procedural questions about maintainability of appeals after the original plaintiff's death and amendment of cause titles.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S.75-A of the Act is valid in so far as it validates/affects the Notification in G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956?
  2. Whether the Notification in G.O No. 2347 dated 13.7.1966 passed under S.75-B of the Act is valid?
  3. If the Notifications are valid, whether they are liable to be cancelled on the merits of the underlying factual allegations (mismanagement, diversion of funds, etc.)?
  4. Whether appeals A.S. Nos. 647 and 648 of 1983 are maintainable in view of the death of the original plaintiff during pendency and whether the cause title may be amended to substitute the successor trustee?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • S.75-A and the Ordinance/Act amendments were enacted to nullify the Supreme Court's decision in 1965 (2) M.L.J 167 and are therefore an impermissible attempt to override the judicial order; the Legislature cannot validly enact provisions that nullify an inter partes judicial decision.
  • The validating provisions (S.75-A) did not cure the defect identified by the Supreme Court (failure to afford hearing / breach of natural justice) and therefore are colourable legislation intended solely to circumvent the Court's judgment.
  • S.75-B seeks to continue a Notification that was already quashed (i.e., non est), and the State cannot continue or revive what does not exist after judicial nullification.
  • The appointments and actions of the Executive Officer have prejudicially affected the Kattalai (e.g., diversion of funds, improper permanent leases of trust properties) and the continuation of the Notifications would destroy the independence of the hereditary trusteeship and wreck the trust.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The temple has no independent income and depends on Kattalais; chronic mismanagement by separate Kattalai trustees and lack of coordination among them harmed temple worship and services.
  • Government action (Notification and Executive Officer) was necessary to secure proper administration, coordination and efficient performance of services.
  • The Ordinance and subsequent Act were necessitated by doubts created by the Supreme Court judgment about the validity of past actions and were intended to validate and secure continued administration of multiple religious institutions and their trusts.
  • The existence of administrative necessity and evidence of mismanagement justified the trial Court's decision to dismiss the suits on merits (i.e., a central agency is imperative for co-ordination).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Somasundara Mudaliar (I.L.R. 17 Mad. 199) Characterisation of the Kattalais: whether they are distinct endowments or classifications of income sources. The Court relied on the statement to describe the particular nature of the temple's Kattalais (that they may form classification of income rather than separate endowments).
Gnana Sambanda v. Vaithilinga Mudaliar (18 L.W. 247) Modification of a scheme so as to maintain individuality of Kattalais while providing machinery for management. Referred to as historical precedent where a scheme was modified to protect individuality of Kattalais and yet secure proper management.
S.D.G. Pandara Sannadhi v. State of Madras (1962 (2) M.L.J. 67) Division Bench: principles of natural justice require opportunity to be heard before renewal under S.64(4); practical view taken due to short remaining life of the Notification. Referenced to recount earlier High Court proceedings where natural justice breach was recognized though writ was dismissed on pragmatic grounds.
S.D.G. Pandara Sannadhi v. State of Madras (1965 (2) M.L.J. 167) (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court quashed G.O. No. 3069 (4.8.1956) holding renewal was invalid because affected parties were not given opportunity to be heard; a court must be able to quash such an order. This decision is central: the Supreme Court's quashing is the touchstone that the State later tried to counteract via Ordinance and S.75-A; the Court analyzes whether legislature could validate so as to render that judgment ineffective.
I.N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2250) Distinction between legislative and judicial acts; validating legislation can render judicial decisions ineffective by enacting law that removes the basis of the decision, provided it alters the law within legislative field. Cited by appellants to show that legislature may cure defects by appropriate validating law, but the Court examined whether S.75-A actually cured the judicially identified defect (it did not, per Court's view).
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1978 (2) S.C.R. 347) Principle that legislature may alter law to render judicial decision ineffective by changing the basis of that decision. Quoted as authority reinforcing the principle that validating Acts can affect the basis of judicial decisions when properly enacted; used to frame limits of permissible legislative action.
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (AIR 1992 S.C. 522) Legislature cannot nullify an individual inter partes judicial decision; altering general law is permissible but setting aside a particular decision affecting particular parties is not. Relied on to support the proposition that S.75-A (which single out and validate particular earlier Notification) amounted to impermissibly nullifying an individual judicial decision.
Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 803) It can be unfair and invalid for legislation to undo a settlement or a judicially backed settlement by special exclusion that trenches upon judicial power; validating legislation must not impermissibly affect inter partes rights. Used to support the argument that legislative measures cannot be used to take away rights which have passed into judgments without proper general legislative basis.
P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1987 S.C. 663) Rule of law demands that exercise of power be conditioned by law and subject to judicial review; judicial review protects limits of executive/legislative action. Citied to underline that overriding a court's decision by state action undermines rule of law; Court invoked this principle in assessing S.75-A.
Khetramohan v. Moni Beheri (AIR 1962 Orissa 128) Procedural consequences of failing to substitute legal representatives after death; potential abatement where substitution not carried into record. Respondents relied on it to argue appeals were invalid; the Court considered it but distinguished the present trustee succession facts and did not accept automatic abatement here.
Thirumalai v. Arunachalla (AIR 1926 Madras 540) Trustees are not "legal representatives" under the CPC; succession of trustees is treated as devolution of interest and new trustees can be added under O.22, R.10. Applied by the Court to conclude succession of a trustee during pendency is devolution of interest and does not automatically abate proceedings; supports allowing substitution.
Viswanathaswami Devasthanam v. Koodalinga (AIR 1928 Madras 246) When trustees change, proceedings do not necessarily become void; devolution of interest permits new trustees to be brought on record under O.22, R.10. Relied on heavily; Court held it governs present controversy and supports substitution of successor trustee and maintainability of appeals despite death of original trustee.
Sri Pushpagiri Mutt v. Ramalinga Sastri (1979 (1) M.L.J. 54) Courts should permit proper representation and allow substitution of the proper representative on record in the lis; descriptive errors in cause-title can be remedied. Used to demonstrate the Court's power and inclination to permit amendment of cause-title to bring in the proper representative/trustee.
Gopala Krishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao (49 M.L.J. 590 Full Bench) Court's power under S.153 CPC to permit amendment of cause-title where appeal is presented against a person who was dead at the date of presentation; discretion to excuse delay for presentation. Referred to in support of the proposition that cause-title amendments and substitutions are within the Court's powers and such amendments can be directed in discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its reasoning around the four questions identified. Its principal analytical steps were:

  1. Analysis of the legislative response to the Supreme Court's quashing of G.O. No. 3069 (4.8.1956): The Court examined the Ordinance and Amending Act provisions (notably S.75-A) and the declared purpose in the explanatory memorandum, observing that the evident legislative purpose was to validate and continue Notifications that the Supreme Court had invalidated for lack of compliance with natural justice.
  2. On the validity of S.75-A: The Court evaluated whether the statute merely changed the general law or impermissibly nullified an individual judicial decision. Citing authorities (Cauvery Tribunal, P. Sambamurthy, Madan Mohan Pathak), the Court held that while legislatures can change law generally and thereby remove the basis of judicial decisions, they cannot validly set aside an individual inter partes judicial decision in a manner that exercises the judicial power of the State. Since S.75-A effectively commanded continuance of a specific Notification (G.O. No. 3069) despite the Supreme Court judgment and without curing the precise defect identified (lack of opportunity to show cause), the Court concluded S.75-A could not stand so far as that Notification was concerned.
  3. On the validity of S.75-B and G.O No. 2347: The Court reasoned that continuation under S.75-B presupposes the existence of a Notification to continue. Where a Notification had been judicially quashed and thus was non est, a statute or order purporting to continue it would be invalid. The Court found substance in appellants' contention that G.O. No. 2347 (13.7.1966), issued under S.75-B, was not valid because it attempted to continue a Notification that the Supreme Court had already quashed.
  4. On merits (whether notifications should be cancelled for mismanagement): The Court noted that the trial judge had evidence of mismanagement but also found that the Executive Officer had been able to regulate services. The appellate Court considered the validity issues dispositive and observed that because it struck down the validating provisions as applied, it was unnecessary to decide the merits relating to actions of the Executive Officer.
  5. On maintainability and substitution after death of original plaintiff: The Court analyzed procedural provisions (Order 22, Rules 3 and 10) and precedent. It distinguished legal representatives (which trigger abatement rules) from devolution of interest on succession of trustees. Relying on Thirumalai, Viswanathaswami and other authorities, the Court held that succession to trusteeship during pendency is a devolution of interest and does not automatically abate proceedings; accordingly, substitution of the successor hereditary trustee and consequential amendment of the cause-title were permissible and required.
  6. Disposition of interlocutory applications: The Court allowed the petitions to amend/ substitute the successor trustee cause-title (C.M.P. Nos. 13481 and 13483 of 1993) but dismissed as unnecessary an application to admit a special audit report as additional documents (C.M.P. No. 13482 of 1993) because the Court did not need to go into merits after deciding the validity issue.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • S.75-A of the Act is invalid insofar as it seeks to validate and continue G.O. No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956 (the Renewal of Notification No. 638) — the section cannot be used to override the Supreme Court's judicial order in that manner.
  • G.O. No. 2347 dated 13.7.1966 (issued under S.75-B to continue Notification No. 638) is not valid insofar as it attempts to continue a Notification that had been quashed by the Supreme Court.
  • The appeals (A.S. Nos. 647 and 648 of 1983) are allowed; the judgment and decrees of the trial Court are set aside; the suits are decreed as prayed for.
  • Procedural relief: C.M.P. Nos. 13481 and 13483 of 1993 (to amend cause-title and substitute the present hereditary trustee) are allowed; C.M.P. No. 13482 of 1993 (to admit a special audit report) is dismissed as unnecessary.

Implications and Consequences:

- Direct effect on the parties: The trial Court judgments dismissing the suits are set aside and the plaintiffs' suits are decreed as prayed for; the successor hereditary trustee may be substituted on record and the appellants' procedural applications for substitution are granted. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout, and no cost is ordered for the interlocutory petitions as specified by the Court.

- Broader legal implications: The Court held that legislation that has the clear purpose and practical effect of nullifying a judicial decision applicable to specific parties, without curing the defects identified by the judiciary and in a manner that targets individual judicial orders, cannot stand where it amounts to exercising judicial power. The opinion emphasizes limits to validating statutes and the need for legislative measures, if any, to operate within constitutional bounds and to respect the separation of judicial and legislative functions. The Court did not purport to create a new general rule beyond these principles but applied existing authorities to the facts of these Notifications.

Final disposition as recorded by the Court: appeals allowed; trial Court decrees set aside; suits decreed as prayed for; C.M.P. Nos. 13481 & 13483 allowed; C.M.P. No. 13482 dismissed.

    Sri-La-Sri Kailai Subramania Desiga Gnanasambanda Pandarasannadhi v. State Of Madras

    JUDGMENT

    Thangamuni, J.

    Sri Thiyagarajaswami Temple of Tiruvarur is a very ancient one in Southern India. In the temple, pooja or worship has to be done almost throughout the day. There are the daily services, the extraordinary services prescribed for a particular week and a particular month and the celebration of the annual festivals. The daily services are 6 in number spread over the day from morning to midnight. There are forms and rituals to be observed with regard to the several services of the day, the weekly, the monthly and extraordinary services and celebration of festivals. The peculiar feature of the temple is that apart from an allowance called the Mohini allowance,’ there is no other property which can now be said to be devoted for its general purpose. There are however, a number of specific endowments or Kattalais relating to the various services in the temple, its festivals and for conducting several charities in glorification of the pagoda of Sri Thiyagarajaswami. The main object of the several Kattalais seems to be to keep the services and the festivals going and to have everything tidy and orderly within the precincts of the temple and to enable the various duties within the temple to be performed regularly and punctually. Each Kattalai has its own trustee and separate properties are endowed in connection with each Kattalai. There are thirteen of such kattalais. The most important of them are four viz., Ulthurai Kattalai, Abhisheka, kattalai, Annadhana Kattalai and Rajan Kattalai. It is not known when and by whom properties have been endowed for these Kattalais. It is claimed that the endowments were made by the Native Rulers who reigned Thanjavur before the advent of British Rule. The management of each of these Kattalais is vested in a certain Trustee or Trustees hereditarily. The trusteeship of Rajan Kattalai vests in the Head of the Dharmapuram Mutt who is the appellant in A.S Nos. 647 and 648 of 1993 herein. The trusteeship of the Abhisheka Kattalai and Annadhana Kattalai is vested in the Head of the Velukurichi Mutt in Tirunelveli District, the present appellant in A.S No. 176 of 1984 before us. With regard to the services connected with Rajan Kattalai, the Head of Dharmapuram Mutt generally functions through a deputy known as, Kattalai Thambiran.

    2. Though technically speaking the temple has no income of its own and has to depend for all its services on the proper performance of the trusts connected with the Kattalais, still for all practical purposes the Ulthurai Kattalai represents the temple proper, its object being the internal management of the temple. Mohini allowance is the only source of income for this Kattalai. The other Kattalais contribute their share of services of things in the various stages of the daily worship and in the various festivals of the temple. The extent of their liability is determined by usage and is ascertained from the dhittarn prepared by each Kattalai, in connection with the daily worship and festivals. Admittedly the several Kattalais came into existence at different times and have been managed separately for a long time, probably for centuries. Certain copper plate grants by which some of the lands of the Rajan Kattalai were endowed are available. The trustees of some Kattalais have added to the originally endowed lands by further purchases, out of the savings from their income.

    3. It was not possible to trace the history of the temple beyond the year 1800. It was probably then under the control of the Raja of Thanjavur. From 1800 to 1847 the temple seems to have been under the control of the Government, the properties having been managed by the Government itself. In the year 1817 Kattalai administration was taken over by the British Government along with administration of all temples. In 1847, when the Government withdrew themselves from the management of religious institutions of the Hindus, the institution, including the several Kattalais, seems to have been handed over to the Kattalaidars or managers of the respective Kattalais, muchilikas as or agreements having been taken from every one of them describing the terms under which they were to hold the trust properties and utilise the income from those properties. During the time of the Government management the officers of the Government seem to have superintended the affairs of all the then Kattalais. The accounts of the different Kattalais were submitted to the Collector every year and in each of these accounts of Panchayatdars who were evidently then appointed by the Government, signed in token of their exercise of supervision over the affairs of the Kattalais. After the withdrawal of the Government, the Kattalaidars in pursuance of terms of the muchilikas executed by them, managed these Kattalais managed these Kattalais for the common benefit of the main temple of Sri Thiyagarajaswami.

    4. Ordinarily speaking a Kattalai is a special or specific endowment for certain specific services or religious charity to be performed. The property endowed for the performance of the Kattalai vests in the deity itself. The position of a Kattalai trustee therefore would be nothing more than of a manager of a Hindu Religious Endowment. But Kattalais which are attached to Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple at Tiruvarur are, however, of a slightly different variety. In the words of Muttuswsmiy Aiyer, J. in Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Somasundara Mudaliar (I.L.R 17 Mad. 199) relating to this very temple, it is a distinct endowment under a separate trustee to which specific items of expenditure are assigned as legitimate charges to be paid therefrom. The eminent Judge was of the view that the Kattalais merely formed a classification of the sources of income rather than separate endowments designed for specific services.

    5. Whatever may be the origin and nature of these kattalais, there can be no doubt that all the Kattalais are integrally connected with the worship in the temple and a co-ordination of the duties by the various trustees would be absolutely necessary for the maintenance of proper worship in the temple. In course of time however emphasis appears to have been laid on the individuality of the Kattalais. This led to unseemly fights between trustees of the various Kattalias. There was gross mismanagement of the affairs of the temple and some scheme for the co-ordination of the various Kattalais and for some control over the various Kattalais in so far as it may ensure the harmonious, working of the Kattalais, wherever they have to cooperate, was felt necessary. As early as 1910 a suit was filed under S. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for settlement of a scheme to manage the affairs of the temple in the Sub Court at Thanjavur. A scheme was settled and there was an appeal to this Court from that decree in Gnana Sambanda v. Vaithilinga Mudaliar (18 L.W 247). There the Division Bench pointed out that the history of the temple from 1870 to 1882 showed that the Kattalais were independent institutions and that the trustee of one such Kattalai was not subordinate to another, namely, the ulthurai trustee. In that view that scheme of the lower Court was modified in such a manner as would have the effect of maintaining the individuality of the several Kattalais, without interfering with the essential character of the independent trusts while at the same time securing a machinery for the proper management of the temples.

    6. In the meantime the Madras Legislature passed the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927, with a view to provide for the proper administration and governance of certain Hindu religious endowments. The Act provided for the supervision of the Hindu Religious endowments through a statutory body known as the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. Provisions were made for the control of religious endowments as well as specific endowments in relation to temples. It divided the temples into excepted and non-excepted temples. It also provided for the framing of a scheme for the management of the temples.

    7. This Act was amended by Madras Act IX of 1937 by introducing a new chapter, namely Chapter VI-A. That provided that notwithstanding that a temple or specific endowment attached to a temple was governed by a scheme previously framed by the Board or settled by a Court, the Board-if it were satisfied that the temple or endowment was being mismanaged and that in the interests of the administration of the temple or endowment, it was necessary to take proceedings under this chapter-might “notify” the temple or endowment. And on the publication of such Notification the administration of the temple or endowment would go under the control of the Board notwithstanding the scheme which might have been framed already. On taking management of a notified temple or endowment the Board was authorised to appoint an Executive Officer and define his duties. In consequence, such Executive Officer would virtually displace the trustee and would function under the control of the Endowment Board. The result of the Notification in substance would be that the previously existing scheme would be suspended and the management would vest in the Board. Shortly after the passing of Act IX of 1937 proceedings were initiated by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board for the purpose of notifying Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple of Tiruvarur and the Kattalais attached thereto. The trustees of the various Kattalais opposed this step but their objections proved fruitless. By Notification No. 638, dated 25th May, 1937, the Government declared that Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple at Tiruvarur and the specific endowments attached thereto would be subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Act. An Executive Officer was appointed by the Board on 12th July, 1937, for the temple as well as for the specific endowments attached thereto. On 30th July, 1937, the Board defined the powers of the Executive Officer and directed him to take charge and be in possession of the properties of the temple and the various Kattalais attached thereto and subject to the provisions made in its order, the Executive Officer was authorised to exercise all powers and perform all duties of a trustee of a non-excepted temple. This left the trustees of the various Kattalais with very little powers. Beyond a right to be consulted and to offer suggestions for modification of budgets and to receive honours and perquisites no other powers were given to them.

    8. The Pandarasannadhi of Dharmapuram Mutt, the appellant in A.S Nos. 647 and 648 of 1983 herein, instituted C.S No. 20 of 1938 on the file of this Court for a declaration that the Notification by the Government of the Rajan Kattalai as coming under the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Act and the consequent orders of the Board appointing the Executive Officer and defining his powers were illegal, for setting aside those orders and for restraining the Executive Officer from taking possession of the Kattalai properties. The suit did not, however, proceed to trial as the parties thereto entered into a compromise. Briefly stated, as a result of the compromise, the Notification was maintained: but the possession of the Kattalai properties was restored to the Kattalai Trustee who was to manage the same by a staff under his control: he was to keep accounts, etc. There was provision therein for the auditing of the accounts and the preparation of the budget was entrusted to the Kattalaidar. Leases of trust lands were to be by public auction and the Kattalaidars was responsible for the collection of the income. The income realised should be remitted to the Executive Officer. The expenses in connection with the staff employed by the Kattalaidar were to be paid by the Executive Officer, who alone was entitled to have the services performed in the temple. There was provision for the maintenance of accounts by the trustee as well as by the Executive Officer.

    9. After the advent of the Constitution of India on 26th January, 1950 the Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1927 was repealed and in its place Act XIX of 1951 was substituted. The Chapter relating to Notification of temples and endowments was numbered as Chapter VI, S. 64 of this Act provided for the Notification of the temple or a religious institution and sub-S. (4) laid down that every Notification published under this Section shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of its publication; but Government may at any tune on an application made to them cancel the Notification. The Notification No. 638, dated 25th May, 1937, as modified by the compromise decree subsisted till 30th September, 1951, the date of coming into force of Act XIX of 1951. On that dale the Notification would by reason of S. 103(c) in its original form enure for a period of five years from 30th September, 1951, that is still 30th September, 1956. By that time the amendment introduced by Act IX of 1956 had come into force. By virtue or that amendment the Government have a right to renew the Notification and this is what they did in regard to Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple and the endowments attached thereto. By G.O No. 3069, (Revenue) dated 4th August, 1956, the government issued the following order:—

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-S.(4)(a) of S. 64 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951) the Governor of Madras hereby directs that Notification No. 638, dated 25th May, 1937, relating to Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple, Tiruvarur, Nagapattinam taluk, Thianjavur district published at page 305 of Part I-A of the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 1st June, 1937, be continued for a period of five years from the 30th September, 1956.”

    10. The validity of this G.O No. 3069 (Revenue) dated 4th August, 1956, was challenged in W.P No. 295 of 1958 (S.D.G Pandara Sannadhi v. State of Madras (1962 (2) M.L.J 67). It was argued on behalf of the present appellants in that case that the trusteeship of Rajan Kattalai being hereditary in the Head of Dharmapuram Mutt, is a right of property under Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, and since S. 64 of the Act empowers the Government to take away that right of property in an arbitrary and capricious manner, that provision is constitutionally invalid. The second ground which was urged by the appellant was that the Notification was issued without giving an opportunity to the appellant to show cause why the earlier Notification should not be extended, and that made the Notification invalid. The Division Bench rejected the first contention. In regard to the second contention it held that the proceedings authorised to be taken under S. 64(4) are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and so before making an order, the appellant should have been given an opportunity to be heard, for that was the requirement of natural justice. However, since the Division Bench thought that the impugned order could last only till 30th September, 1961, a short period after the delivery of the judgment on 11th August, 1961, it would serve no purpose to issue a writ quashing the said order on the ground that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with before passing it. Accordingly, it dismissed the writ petition.

    11. The Division Bench while holding that the renewal of the 1937 Notification was done without any regard to principles of natural justice, it expressed; “The Government will then have to consider whether the Notification now subsisting should be renewed or not. We have no reason to think that the Government will, after this judgment, proceed to direct a renewal of the Notification without being satisfied as to its necessity or without giving facilities to the petitioner to show cause why it should not be renewed. However, the Commissioner, H.R and C.E issued directions to the Executive Officer of Sri Thiyagarajaswami Devasthanam in his R.C No. 12718/58.A4 dated 29.9.1961 that the Notification already issued shall be deemed to be in force even after the said period of five years by virtue of S. 118(2)(a) of Madras H.R and C.E Act 22 of 1959 and therefore the Executive Officer appointed in consequence of the above Notification shall continue to administer the institution and their properties as they have been doing so far.

    12. In the meanwhile, Dharmapuram Mutt preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court in S.D.G Pandara Sannadhi v. State of Madras (1965 (2) M.L.J 167) against the dismissal of W.P No. 295 of 1958. The Supreme Court pointed out that in assuming that the impugned order would come to an end on 30th September, 1961, the High Court appears to have ignored the fact that before it delivered its judgment, a new Act had come into force (Madras Act XXII of 1959). This Act came into operation on 1st January, 1960. S. 72(7) of this Act provides that any Notification published under sub-S. (1) or sub-S. (3) of S. 64 of Act XIX of 1951 before the commencement of this Act shall be as valid as if such Notification had been published under this Act. This provision has again been subsequently amended by Act XL of 1961, and the amended provision is retrospectively brought into operation from 1st January, 1960. And as a result of the subsequent Act which had already come into force on the date when the High Court delivered its judgment, it is obvious that the impugned Notification would not automatically come to an end on 30th September, 1961. And the said Notification would continue in operation without the appellant getting an opportunity to show cause why it should not continue to be in operation. The main reason which weighed with the High Court in not issuing a writ in favour of the appellant that the impugned Notification would remain in operation for a very short period after it delivered its judgment, is found to be erroneous. Held that the High Court should have granted the prayer made by the appellant for the issue of an appropriate writ cancelling the impugned Notification. Though the impugned Notification has been issued in 1956 for five years, its life gets statutorily extended, and the only way in which the appellant would be able to show cause why the said Notification should not be extended in respect of his Kattalai is to quash the said Notification. Ultimately, the Supreme Court quashed the impugned Notification G.O No. 3069, (Revenue) dated 4th August, 1956.

    13. After the Supreme Court quashed the Notification aforesaid on 10.2.1965, Madras Ordinance 1 of 1965 was promulgated by the Governor of Madras on 16.7.1965 Subsequently Act XVI of 1965 was passed on the lines of the above Ordinance. Thereunder S. 75 of H.R & C.E Act was amended by introducing Ss. 75(a), 75(b) and 75(c) of the Act. The relevant parts of these provisions run as under:—

    “75-A. Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court and notwithstanding anything contained in the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927), or in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951), or in this Act, but subject to the provisions of S. 75-C, all Notifications issued under Chapter VI-A of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927) and in force immediately before the 30th September 1956 and which have not been subsequently cancelled by the Government, shall continue, and shall be deemed always to have continued, in force upto and inclusive of the 16th July 1965 and for a period of one year thereafter; and accordingly all acts, proceedings or things done or taken under the said Acts or this Act by the Government or by any officer of the Government or by any other authority in pursuance of the said Notifications shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be, and to have always been, done or taken in accordance with law.

    75-B(1) - Where after the expiry of a period of six months from the 16th July 1965, the Commissioner is satisfied that in the interests of the administration of any religious institution governed by any of the Notifications referred to in S. 75-A it is necessary to continue the Notification (hereinafter in this Section referred to, as the said Notification) beyond the date of the expiry of the period of one year from the 16th July 1965, he may, by notice, published in the prescribed manner, call upon the trustee and all other persons having interest to show cause why the said Notification should not be so continued.

    (2) Such notice shall state the reasons for the action proposed, and specify a reasonable time, not being less than one month from the date of the issue of such notice, for showing such cause.

    (3) The trustee or any person having interest may thereupon prefer any objection he may wish to make against the action proposed.

    (4) Such objection shall be in writing and shall reach the Commissioner before the expiry of the time specified in the notice aforesaid, or within such further time as may be granted by the Commissioner.

    (5) Where no such objection has been received within the time so specified or granted, the Government may, on receipt of a report from the Commissioner to that effect by Notification declare that the said Notification shall continue in force beyond the dale of the expiry of the period of one year from the 16th July, 1965.

    (6) Where any such objections have been received within the time so specified or granted the Commissioner shall hold an enquiry into the objections in the manner prescribed, and decide whether or not the said Notification should be continued as aforesaid.

    (7) If the Commissioner decides that the said Notification should be continued as aforesaid, he shall make a report to that effect to the Government, who may thereupon, by Notification, declare that the said Notification shall continue in force beyond the dale of the expiry of the period of one year from the 16th July 1965.

    75-C.-(1) Any trustee or any person having an interest, who is aggrieved by the continuance of a Notification under S. 75-A or under S. 75-B may-

    (i) in the case of the continuance of the Notification under S. 75-A, within sixty days from the 16th July, 1965; and

    (ii) in the case of the continuance of the Notification under S. 75-B, within sixty days from the date of the declaration under sub-S. (5) or sub-S. (7) of the said S. 75-B; institute a suit in the Court for the cancellation of such Notification and the Government shall cancel the Notification if the Court so directs:

    Provided that the Court shall have no power to suspend the operation of the Notification pending the disposal of the suit.

    (2) Any party aggrieved by a decree of the Court under sub-S. (1) may, within ninety days from the date of the decree, appeal to the High Court.

    (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 75-A or S. 75-B, if the Government, after taking into consideration such matters relating to the management and administration of the religious institution as may be prescribed are satisfied that it is no longer necessary to continue a Notification, continued in force under S. 75-A or under 75-B they may cancel the Notification.

    14. In view of the enactment of S. 75-A, G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956 whose validity was negatived by the Supreme Court was given a fresh lease of life for one year from 16.7.1965 This in turn, extended the life of G.O No. 638 dated 25.5.1937 till that date. Besides, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-S. (7) of S. 75-B of Madras Act 22 of 1959 the Government issued G.O No. 2347 (Revenue) dated 13.7.1966 directing the continuance of Notification No. 638 dated 25.5.1937 beyond 15th July, 1966. The Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments also issued Notification No. 7120/66 dated 17.5.1966 for the continuance of the earlier Notification and called upon the trustees of all the Kattalai to show cause why the Notification already issued under Chapter VI-A of Act II of 1927 and which continues to be in force till 17.6.1966 should not be further continued.

    15. Thereafter under S. 75-B of the Act three suits came to be filed. While the Adheenakarthar of Dharmapuram Mutt has instituted O.S No. 11 of 1968 and O.S No. 15 of 19681 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Nagapattinam, O.S No. 12 of 1968 of the same court it is by the Adheenakarthar of Velakurichi Mutt. In O.S No. 11 of 1968 plaintiff seeks cancellation of G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956 Whereas the prayer in O.S Nos. 12 and 15 of 1968 is for cancellation of G.O No. 2347 (Revenue) dated 13.7.1966 declaring that Notification No. 638 dated 25.5.1937 relating to Sri Thiyagarajaswami Devasthanam and the Kattalais attache thereto at Tiruvarur shall continue to be in force beyond 15th July 1956. Evidently after the institution of O.S No. 15 of 1968, the earlier action O.S No. 11 of 1968 has become infructious.

    16. The two plaintiffs alleged in their respective plaints that the continuance of G.O No. 3069 (Revenue) dated 4.8.1956 till 15.7.1966 by enacting S. 75-A is invalid both under Art. 15 and Art. 19 of the Constitution. It is not valid also for the reason that it has been issued without giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs to state their objections. Since the said Notification has been declared invalid by the Supreme Court, neither the first defendant nor the second defendant Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments has any right to continue the same. The show cause notice of the second defendant dated 17.5.1966 purported to have been issued under S. 75-B of he Act is defective for the reason that it did not indicate that the second defendant was satisfied as to the necessity for the continuance of the earlier Notification beyond 15.7.1966 As a result of the prolonging of the impugned G.O the Executive Officer continues to have control over Rajan Kattalai and its properties inspite of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1965 (2) M.L.J 167). This, in effect, is an encroachment on the rights of th plaintiff as the hereditary trustee of the Kattalai. The Executive Officer of the temple had acted prejudicial to the welfare of the Kattalai all along by granting permanent leases of the properties of the Trust and diverting the funds of the Trust to other Kattalais. The various services of the Kattalai were not carried out by the Executive Officer in the proper manner. Though all the rights of the plaintiffs as the hereditary trustees of the Kattalais were restored in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the fruits of the decree have been taken away by the enactment of the impugned provisions. The welfare of the temple would be est served by the Commissioner initialing proceedings for the settlement of a scheme with sufficient provisions to bring about co-operation and co-ordination among the various Kattalais, in case it is found wanting. The provisions of S. 75-A enabling the continuance of the Notification, not merely for a period of five years from 30.9.1956 but also up to the dale of the publication of the Act, and Ordinance namely 16.7.1965 and for a period of one year thereafter reverse the verdict of the Supreme Court in an arbitrary manner. The Notification and extension thereof even without any time limit amounts in effect to take over of the administration by the first defendant through the second defendant Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments.

    17. The defendants resisted the suit by pleading in the written statement that the temple has no income of its own and has to depend for all its services on the proper performance of the trust connected with the Kattalais. The Court's scheme was not conducive to the proper administration of the Kattalais or the supervision thereof. The major Kattalais attached to the temple were mismanaged. There was no cooperation among the trustees of Ulthurai Kattalai. The trustees of the present plaintiff Kattalai did not keep; the various services attached to them. The entire income of Kattalais was not brought into account. For these reasons, steps were taken to notify the temple and various kattalais attached thereto as early as on 25.5.1937 in G.O No. 638 After the judgment of the Supreme Court in C.A No. 560 of 1964 (1965 (2) M.L.J 167) invalidating the Notification dated 4.8.1956 the Government felt doubt as to the validity of all the actions taken in pursuance of the said Notification not only in respect of Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple, Tiruvarur, but also in respect of certain other temples covered by the said Notification. So in the interests of proper administration of all the religious institutions in question the Government of Madras promulgated Ordinance No. 1 of 1965 as Legislature of the State was not then in session. The said Amendment Act and consequential Notification became imperative in order to secure a co-ordinating agency for the proper and efficient functioning of the several Kattalais and the Devasthanam as a whole.

    18. After trial, learned Subordinate Judge while holding that G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956 has become invalid in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1965(2) M.L.J 167, however, found that in view of Amendment Act 16 of 1965 it continued to be in force. Even though it is clear that in order to take away the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court, Ordinance 1 of 1965 and Amendment Act 16 of 1965 had been passed, their validity could be decided only by the High Court and Supreme Court. He further held that the Executive Officer appointed under the Notification acted to the detriment of the interests of the Kattalais. There is force in the claim of the present appellants that the Executive Officer was not acting in the best interests of the Kattalais. However, he felt that there was necessity for central agency for the co-ordination of the functions of various Kattalais and for rendering proper and efficient service to Lord Thiyagaraja. The due and regular performance of the services and festivals required the centralised and co-ordinating Executive Authority. The Executive Officer appointed under the Notification was able to regulate the maintenance of the services in the temple by the various Kattalais and to administer the temple smoothly all these years. There was evidence establishing that for a long time there were misunderstandings between the various Kattalais trustees as a result of which the services to the temple suffered. In that view of the matter he dismissed all the three suits with one set cost of defendants 1 and 2. The said judgment and decree are challenged in these appeals.

    19. On the various contentions made by both sides these questions arise for our consideration:—

    1) Whether S. 75-A of the Act is valid in so far as the Notification in G.O No. 3069 dated 4.9.1956 is concerned?

    2) Whether the Notification in G.O No. 2347 dated 13.7.1966 passed under S. 75-B of the Act is valid?

    3) If the Notifications are valid, are they liable to be cancelled in view of the merits of the case?

    4) Whether the appeals A.S Nos. 647 and 648 of 1983 are maintainable in view of the death of the person who originally filed the suit in the trial Court? Whether the application for amendment of cause title can be ordered?

    20. Thiru B. Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the avowed object of the impugned Notifications under Ss. 75-A and 75-B of the Act is to get over the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1965(2) M.L.J 167. There is no method by which the decision of the Supreme Court could have been avoided. S. 75-A directly interferes with the above said judgment of the Apex Court. The Ordinance and Act cannot have overriding effect on the review power of Courts. There can be no valid Notification which provides for continuation of an order quashed by the highest Court of the land. So S. 75-A which enables the continuance of an earlier Notification held invalid by the Court is void. S. 75-B seeks to continue the Notification which was non-est or no longer existed. Ordinance 1 of 1965 and Act 16 of 1965 are colourable legislations to over-ride the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court. Besides, contrary to the provisions of the scheme decree and inspite of objections by the trustee of the Rajan Kattalai, funds of that Kattalais have been diverted for various other purposes not connected with the duties of Rajan Kattalai and that the appointment of the Executive Officer to manage the properties of Rajan Kattalai as per Notification will wreck the trust beyond recognition. The impugned Notifications will destroy the independence of the Kattalai and the remedy is worse than the disease itself. The theory of learned Subordinate Judge that renovation and other work of the temple required the administration of all the Kattalais under one authority has no basis. The renovation work requires primarily contribution from various Kattalais and where it is given no further general control is necessary.

    21. S. 75-A extracted above enables the continuance of all prior Notifications including G.O No. 3069 (Revenue) dated 4.8.1956 for a period of one year from 16th July, 1965. However, the Supreme Court has quashed the said Notification on 10.2.1965 in its decision reported in 1965(2) M.L.J 167. Thereafter, on 16.7.1965 Madras Ordinance 1 of 1965 was promulgated. The explanatory statement for the introduction of this ordinance assumes importance in this case. The statement runs as under:—

    In Sri La Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. State of Madras (Civil Appeal No. 560 of 1964), the Supreme Court has held as invalid the Government Notification, dated 4th August, 1956, issued under S. 64(4) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951) continuing for a period of five years from 30th September, 1956 the Notification No. 638 dated 25th May 1937 declaring that the Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple, Tiruvarur and the specific endowments attached thereto shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927) The grounds on which the Supreme Court struck down the Notification was the failure to comply with the principles of natural justice before issuing the Notification. As a result of the above judgment of the Supreme Court the Notification dated the 4th August, 1956 has become unenforceable and as such the Thiyagarajaswami Temple will not be subject to the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable endowments Act, 1959 (Madras Act 52 of 1959). The judgment has given room for doubt as to the validity of all actions taken in pursuance of the Notification not only in respect of the temple aforesaid but also in respect of certain other temples covered by the said Notification. The Government have carefully examined the judgment of the Supreme Court and consider that in the interests of the administration of the religious institutions in question, the above stale of affairs cannot be allowed to continue. Accordingly the Government propose to validate all such Notifications and also all acts and proceedings etc., taken in pursuance of the said Notification. It is proposed to continue the said Notifications for a period upto the date of publication of the Ordinance and for a period of one year thereafter. The Ordinance provides for the further continuance of the Notifications, after issuing show cause notice to the trustees and other persons having interest. The Ordinance also confers a right of suit to the parties aggrieved by the continuance of a Notification. The draft Ordinance seeks to achieve the above objects.”

    From this it is evident that the purpose of passing this Ordinance is only to get over the effect of the Court's decisions which invalidated G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956

    22. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that Government has no power to issue an Ordinance to take away the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court. If it chooses to do so, it is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. In the case of a validating Act besides the Legislature possessing competence over the subject matter by validation, legislature must remove the defect which the courts had found in the previous law. But in this case there was no endeavour to remedy the defect in the impugned Notification as pointed out by the Supreme Court in 1965(2) M.L.J 167. In support of his contention he cited the decision in I.N Saksena v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R 1976 S.C 2250). There the Slate. Government raised the age of compulsory retirement for Government servants to 58 years by a Memorandum. While framing the Rules under the Proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution, the clause empowering the Government to retire a Government servant on the attainment of the age of 55 years was not incorporated therein. The appellant, a District and Sessions Judge was retired from service after he completed 55 years and before he completed 58 years. He successfully challenged the said order of compulsory retirement in the Supreme Court. Thereafter, an Ordinance was promulgated which later on became an Act of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature. The said Act validated the retirement of certain Government servants including the appellant, despite the judgment of the Apex Court. The appellant again filed a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed. An appeal to the Supreme Court was also dismissed holding that the impugned Act cured the defects from which the Memorandum and the orders of retirement made thereunder were suffering. The Supreme Court has observed as under:—

    “The distinction between a ‘legislative’ act ‘and a judicial’ act is well known, though in some specific instances the line which separates one category from the other may not be easily discernible. Adjudication of the rights of the parties according to law enacted by the Legislature is a judicial function. In the performance of this function, the Court interprets and gives effect to the intent and mandate of the Legislature as embodied in the statute. On the other hand, it is for the Legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties and transactions and to require the Court to give effect to that law. While, in view of this distinction between legislative and judicial functions, the Legislature cannot by a bare declaration, without more, directly over-rule, reverse or over-ride a judicial decision, it may, at any time in exercise of the plenary powers conferred on it by Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by enacting The valid law on topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective, curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is based. As pointed out by Ray C.J in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1978 (2) S.C.R 347), the rendering ineffective of judgments or orders of competent courts and tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is a well-known pattern of all validating Acts. Such validating legislation which removes the causes for ineffectiveness or invalidity of actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power”.

    As stated earlier the impugned G.O was held invalid for the reason that it was issued without giving an opportunity to the appellant to show cause why the earlier Notification should not be extended. Evidently there has been no endeavour in the present enactment to rectify this defect before validating the Notification for one year. Instead the only purpose of S. 75-A appears to be to keep the earlier Notification alive with all its infirmities pointed out by the Courts.

    23. In the matter of: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (AIR 1992 S.C 522), the next decision cited by learned counsel for the appellants, the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance (1991) was held unconstitutional. for the reason that the Ordinance directly nullified the decision of the Tribunal dated 25th June, 1991. While doing so, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Legislature can change the basis on which a decision is given by the Court and thus change the law in general, which will affect a class of persons and events at large. It cannot, however, set aside an individual decision interparties and affect their rights and liabilities alone. Such an act on the part of the Legislature amounts to exercising the judicial power of the State and to functioning as an appellate court or Tribunal.

    24. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (A.I.R 1978 S.C 803) a settlement was arrived at between the Life Insurance Corporation of India and its employees relating to the terms and conditions of service of Class III and Class IV employees including bonus payable to them. The Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 1976 considerably curtailed the rights of the employees to bonus in industrial establishments. But by reason of S. 32 of the Payment of Bonus Act, the L.I.C was outside the purview of its operation. The Central Government decided the employees of establishments which were not covered by the Bonus Act would not be eligible for payment of bonus. Thereupon L.I.C was advised by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, that no further payment of bonus should be made to its employees without gelling the same cleared by the Government. The Corporation accordingly issued instructions not to pay bonus to its employees until further instructions. Thereupon, the Employees Association moved the High Court for issue of a writ directing the Life Insurance Corporation to act in accordance with the terms of an earlier settlement. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition, while the Letters Patent Appeal was pending, Parliament passed the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Setllement) Act, 1976. So there was no necessity for proceeding with the Letters Patent Appeal. And the Division Bench made no order therein. The two of the Employees Association filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Act, 1976. Held that it would be unfair to adopt the legislative procedure to undo a settlement which had become the basis of the decision of a High Court. Even if legislation can remove the basis of a decision it has to do it by an alteration of general rights of a class but not by simply excluding two specific settlements between the Corporation and its employees from the purview of S. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since the object of the impugned Act was, in effect, to take away the force of the judgment of the High Court, it would be invalid for trenching upon the judicial power. Even if an impugned Legislation seeks to take away the basis of the judgment without mentioning it, yet where the rights of the citizens against the State are concerned the Court should adopt an interpretation which upholds those rights. Therefore, the rights which had passed into those embodied in a judgment and become the basis of a mandamus from the High Court, could not be taken away in an indirect fashion.

    25. Yet another decision relied on by learned counsel for the appellants is P. Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1987 S.C 663). There the Apex Court held that it is a basic principle of the rule of law that the exercise of power by the Executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution but must also be in accordance with law and the power of judicial review is conferred by the Constitution with a view to ensuring that the law is observed and there is compliance with the requirement of law on the part of the Executive and other authorities. It is through the power of judicial review conferred on an independent institutional authority such as the High Court that the rule of law is maintained and every organ of the State is kept within the limits of the law. Now if the exercise of the power of judicial review can be set at naught by the State Government by overriding the decision given against it, it would sound the death knell of the rule of law. The rule of law would cease to have any meaning, because then it would be open to the State Government to defy the law and yet to get away with it.

    26. On the ratio laid down in the decisions referred to above, the enactment of S. 75-A cannot stand the lest of judicial scrutiny. In the present case by introducing S. 75-A the Legislature has simply directed the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments and Executive Officer of Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple to disobey or disregard the decision of the highest court of the land in 1965(2) M.L.J 167. The obvious purpose of S. 75-A in extending the impugned Notification is to nullify the effect of this decision of the Supreme Court. The object in the explanatory note Ex. B33 makes no secret of the said fact and in fact the written statements filed on behalf of the Department and the Government aver that the Court's scheme was not conducive to the proper administration of the Kattalais or the supervision thereof. The steps were taken to notify the temple and the various Kattalais attached thereto. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1965(2) M.L.J 167 the Government felt that the existing state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue and so in the interests of proper administration of all the religious institutions including that of Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple it was imperative to continue the earlier Notifications beyond 15.7.1966 No doubt the Legislatures under the Constitution have, within the prescribed limits, power to make laws prospectively as well as retrospectively. By exercise of those powers a legislature can remove the basis of the decision rendered by a competent court thereby rendering the decision ineffective, but no legislature in the country has power to set aside an individual decision Inter partes and often their rights and liabilities alone. In the words of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal case, such an act on the part of the Legislature amounts to exercising the judicial power of the State and to functioning as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. Since Notification in G.O No. 3069 dated 4.8.1956 is singly declared to be valid under S. 75-A, this Section makes a direct in road into the judicial powers of the State, and so it has necessarily to be struck down so far as this Notification is concerned.

    27. S. 75-B of the Act enables the Commissioner to continue any Notification which was validated by virtue of S. 75-A beyond 16th July 1966 after calling upon the trustee concerned to show cause why it should not be so continued. Notification No. 638 dated 25.8.1937 is statutorily extended till 16.7.1965 and for a period of one year later in view of S. 75-A of the Act read with G.O No. 3069 (Revenue) dated 4.8.1966 Notification No. 2347 (Revenue) dated 13.7.1966 was issued declaring that the Notification No. 638 would continue beyond 15.7.1966 We have already seen that there could be no valid extension of the Notification under S. 75-A. Learned counsel for the appellants next contends that where a Notification is quashed its existence ceases. There can be no order continuing that which does not exist. In other words, there can be no law which seeks to extend the provisions of a rule which is nun est. By the time G.O No. 2347 (Revenue) dated 13.7.1966 was published, Notification No. 638 dated 25.5.1937 was no longer in existence by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court. So there is substance in the claim of learned counsel for the appellants that this G.O No. 2347 passed under S. 75-B of the Act is not valid.

    28. Thiru M.N Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Sri Thiyagarajaswami temple has no property of its own. For its daily pooja expenses it depends on the various Kattalais attached to it. The bickerings and quarrels among the trustees or Kattalaidars even in small matters made the temple to suffer for its requirements. This is sufficient to show that even for daily pooja, co-ordination among various Kattalaidars is necessary. And so, the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit for the reason that there is imperative necessity for the central agency for co-ordination of the functions of the various Kattalais. The Kattalais cannot serve the purpose without the temple. The properties of the temple are distributed among the Kattalais which are under separate trustees and the maintenance of the temple, its services and festivals depend upon the Kattalais being administered in proper co-ordination. The Executive Officer appointed under the Notification has been able to regulate the maintenance of the services in the temple by the various kattalais and to administer the temple smoothly all these years. And a central agency under the control of H.R and C.E Board is essential to maintain the services of various Kattalais. Evidently this cannot be a ground for validating the impugned Notifications. In fact, learned Subordinate Judge himself has found that the Executive Officer was not acting in the best interests of the Kattalai. The Department can always regulate the services of the temple by ensuring that the various Kuttalaidars make their contributions properly. And in view of our decision that the Notifications are not valid, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case.

    29. O.S No. 11 of 1968 as well as O.S No. 15 of 1968 were instituted by Sri La Sri Kailai Subramania Dcsika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi, sole and hereditary trustee of Rajan Kattalai attached to Thiyagarajaswami Dcvasthanam at Tiruvarur, residing at Dharmapuram Mutt, Mayuram Taluk and Munsifi. During the pendency of the suits, on 10.11.1971 the said Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi Avergal attained Paripoornam. Then Sri-la-Sri Shanmugha Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi was installed as the Adheenakarthar and Pandara Sannadhi of Dharmapurain Mutt. By virtue of his office he became the hereditary trustee of Rajan Kattalai also. In I.A No. 128 of 1972 in O.S No. 15 of 1968 the said Shanmugha Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi got him substituted as the plaintiff in the place of Sri Subramauia Desika in his capacity as the sole and hereditary trustee of Rajan Kattalai. This order of substitution was passed by learned Subordinate Judge in an application by Shanmugha Desika under O. 22, R. 10 and 151, C.P.C However, there was neither an application for the consequential amendment of the plaint nor the substitution was carried out in the original plaint in O.S No. 15 of 1968. It does not appear that there was any application for substitution of the new incumbent of the office in O.S No. 11 of 1968. When the judgment and decrees were passed on 17.5.1980 in the two suits O.S Nos. 11 and 15 of 1968 the name of Subramama Desiga alone was on record. The present appeals A.S Nos. 647 and 648 of 1983 on the file of this Court were also instituted only in the name of Sri Subramauia Desika though the vakalath in favour of the appellant's counsel was signedtby Shanmugha Desika. Sri M.N Padmanabhan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents argued that the appeals having been filed in the name of a dead person, they are not valid. In support of his contention he places reliance on Khetramohan v. Moni Beheri (AIR 1962 Orissa 128). There one of the plaintiffs was reported to be dead during the pendency of the suit in the Court of the District Munsif. His daughter applied for being substituted in place of her father and for amending the plaint accordingly. This was allowed. But due to some negligence in the Munsif's office this order was not implemented and the plaint was not corrected. The parties also omitted to remind the Court about the matter, with the result that when the judgment was pronounced in favour of the plaintiffs and when the decree was drawn up, the name of the father continued to be shown as one of the plaintiffs in the decree. In the decree of the lower appellate court also, the same error continued. But during the pendency of the second appeal the defendants-appellants discovered the mistake and they applied to the High Court to allow the substitution of the name of the daughter in place of the father, in case the court did not hold the decree of the lower appellate court a nullity. The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court held that once petition for substitution by the legal representative was allowed she was entitled to assume that the Court would implement its own order in due course. As the daughter was not made a party either in the lower appellate court, or in the High Court, the appeal must abate so far as her interest in the suit property was concerned. As her interest were joint with those of the other plaintiffs and not severable, the consequence must necessarily be the abatement of the entire appeal as a whole. Otherwise there will be a conflict between the decisions of two courts in respect of the same property which must be avoided. The ruling in that case is only against the respondents and not in their favour.

    30. As we have already stated, in I.A No. 128 of 1972 in O.S No. 15 of 1968 the trial Court had permitted the present Pandara Sannadhi to come to record in the place of the former Adheenakarthar who attained Paripoornam on 10.11.1971 It is true that there is no subsequent application by the plaintiff seeking permission of the Court to amend the cause title of the plaint consequence to the order in I.A No. 128 of 1972, Thiru M.N Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel for the respondents pleaded that it was incumbent on the part of the plaintiffs to come forward with an application for the consequential amendment and to carry out the same in the original plaint. On his failure to do so, it is as if that the decree of the trial court had been passed against a dead person and the present appeals have also been instituted by a person who was not in existance at that time and as a result of the same these appeals are nun est. But he is unable to point out any provision either in the Code of Civil Procedure or Civil Rules of Practice or the appellate side Rules of the High Court for such a proposition. From the scheme of Code of Civil Procedure we find that Order 22 deals with death, marriage and insolvency of parties. The procedure to be followed in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff is stated in Rule 3 of O. 22. The relevant part of this Rule reads that where one of two or more plaintiffs dies or a sole plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. As per sub-rule (2) of R. 3, where within the time limited by law no such application is made, the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. And this O. 2 nowhere states that besides taking steps to come on record us the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff, the said legal representative is enjoined to do any thing else. It was represented during arguments by learned counsel for the respondents that all the subordinate courts insist filing an application for consequential amendment of plaint whenever a legal representative of either plaintiff or defendant is ordered to be impleaded. However, we do not think that such a procedure is warranted either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Civil Rules of Practice. So the failure on the part of the appellant to get the plaint amended and to carry out the amendment in the original plaint consequent to the order passed in I.A No. 128 of 1972 in O.S No. 15 of 1968 cannot be fatal to the appeal as claimed by the respondents. In all cases where a new party is impleaded in a suit as a legal representative or otherwise, the original plaint must be suitably amended by the office of the court and attested in red ink by the Presiding Officer. A reference to the number of the petition and the dale of order must be made in red ink as usually done. The plaintiff must file a true copy of the plaint carrying out the amendment along with a memo referring to the particulars of the order of the Court.

    31. It is also significant to note that I.A No. 128 of 1972 is not an application under O. 22, R. 3. Instead, it is one under O. 22, R. 10, C.P.C for the substitution of the new Pandara Sannadhi and Hereditary Trustee in the place of the deceased Pandara Sannadhi and Hereditary Trustee. The new trustee has to come on record not as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff but for the reason that there has been a devolution of interest during the pendency of the suit on account of the passing away of the previous trustee. In Thirumalai v. Arunachalla (AIR 1926 Madras 540) a Single Judge of this Court has held that the trustee are not legal representatives with the meaning of the expression in S. 2(ii), C.P.C of their predecessors in office. Where some of the trustees die or retire during the pendency of a suit and new persons are re-elected to fill their place; it is a case of devolution of an are interest during the pendency of a suit and the elected persons can be added as parties under O. 22, R. 10, C.P.C notwithstanding the question of limitation.

    32. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Viswanathuswami Devasthanam v. Koodalinga (AIR 1928 Madras 246) that the mere fact of the appointment of new trustees by the Temple Committee even though the new trustees did not lake over charge of the office of trusteeship does not render a nullity the decree and judgment passed by the Court of competent jurisdiction against the Devasthanam. The mere resignation by a trustee being accepted does not tend the whole proceeding to the same position as in the case of the death of a party. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code, with regard to new trustees being brought on record. In the absence of any such provision the dismissal or resignation of one trustee and the appointment of another can only be regarded in the light of what is called in R. 0, O. 22, Civil Procedure Code, a devolution of interest. If, pending the proceeding there is a devolution of interest, that is the right or interest by virtue of which the proceeding was originally instituted, comes to be transferred to or to be vested in some third party, the Civil Procedure Code allows such a new person to come in and implead himself or to be brought on the record otherwise. It was argued on behalf of the appellants in that case that the idol no doubt is a juristic person but there must be other persons who must sue or be sued in respect of the rights vested in the idol and if a trustee sues as a person entitled to do so on behalf of an idol, he ceases to be a person competent to represent the idol the moment he ceased to be a trustee either by death or resignation. The Division Bench found that there was, no doubt, some force in the argument so advanced. However, it pointed out that it has often been held that the judgments in respect of the temples and idols obtained by or against de facto trustees thereof, are binding if otherwise unassailable in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been obtained by or against trustee de jure. If the true theory is that it is only persons who as the trustees or otherwise competent to enforce the rights of temples or idols that should, as parties to the suit, sue or be sued, then as the suit or appeal in this case has been properly instituted, there must be some provision of law which makes such a proceeding incompetent before it can be argued that a judgment or decree passed therein is a nullity. There is a provision in the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that on the death of a party a legal representative should be brought on the record within a particular time limited and in default the proceedings abates subject, of course, to other remedial measures. There is no such provision with regard to trustees. In the absence of any such provision it seems to them that the dismissal or resignation of one trustee and the appointment of another can only be regarded in the light of what is called in the Code of Civil Procedure in R. 10, O. 22, a devolution of any interest. It is significant that the Legislature, in that Rule, uses the words “any interest” and a right to maintain a suit must certainly be regarded as an interest within the meaning of that Rule. If, therefore, pending the proceeding there is a devolution of interest, that is the right or interest by virtue of which the proceeding was originally instituted, comes to be transferred to or to be vested in some third party, the Code of Civil Procedure allows such a new person to come in and implead himself or to be brought on the record otherwise. But the whole policy of the Code is that if the proceeding originally instituted is proper and right and decision obtained therein is binding on all persons on whom the interest or right may devolve pending the disposal of the proceedings. If that is the true theory of the Civil Procedure Code then it seems to the Judgment there is really no difficulty at all in that case. It was, no doubt, open to the new trustees if and when appointed to apply to the Court to be brought on the record and make themselves parties to the appeal. That they did not do, and there being no specific or positive provision by which the appeal or proceeding can be said to have abated on the resignation or dismissal even of a person holding the representative character, it is difficult to agree with the contention put forward on behalf of the appellants, and hold that on the mere resignation by trustee being accepted, the whole proceeding lends to the same position as in the case of the death of a party. If the Legislature had intended any such result surely it would have provided for it.

    33. In Sri Pushpagiri Mutt v. Ramalinga Sastri (1979 (1) M.L.J 54) an Executive Officer was appointed for the plaintiff Mutt by the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Andhra Pradesh, in pursuance of a scheme framed therefor. The plaintiff-Mutt filed the suit for a declaration and possession regarding some house in Park Town, Madras. The plaintiff-Mutt was described in the pleading as the Executive Officer of Sri Pushpagiri Mutt, Cuddappah, Cuddappah District. While the suit was partheard, it was dismissed for default. The application for restoration was also dismissed. Thereupon, the Mutt filed a Civil Miscellaneous appeal with the same cause title. During the pendency of the C.M.A an application was filed for permission to amend the cause title by substituting a new one is the name of the Peedathipathy of the Mutt represented by its Manager. That petition was dismissed by the trial court and the revision preferred to this Court against that order was also dismissed for default. Thereafter the trial Court dismissed the C.M.A on the reasoning that the Executive Officer of the Mutt was not competent to maintain the appeal in view of the order of dismissal passed in the C.M.P Thereafter there was a revision to this Court and Nainar Sundaram, J. (as he then was) was held:

    “Any change in the representation of the plaintiff-Mutt due to change of circumstances or subsequent events can be taken note of and the plaintiff-Mutt must be allowed to bring in the proper representative on record in the lis. Proper representation of the party is a question of description of the party, and not one of addition of new parties. Neither the description of the plaintiff-Mutt in the Appeal Memorandum in C.M.A No. 65 of 1972, which has merely carried over and adopted the description in th suit, nor the description that was sought to be introduced in the application, C.M.P No. 1013, is a proper one; and it does not bring to the forefront the patent fact that it is really Sri Pushpagiri Mutt, Cuddappah who is the plaintiff in the suit and the appellant in the Appeal. Viewed in the above light; and taking into consideration the features of the case, as disclosed above, there was no warrant in law for the Court below, to dismiss the appeal.”

    34. In Gopala Krishnayya v. Lakshmana Rao (49 M.L.J 590 Full Bench) the sole respondent was alive when the lower appellate court passed its decree but he was dead when the second appeal was filed in the High Court. In an application to direct the amendment of cause-title in the second appeal by substituting the name of the legal representative in the place of the deceased respondent the Full Bench has held that if an appeal is presented against a person who was dead at the date of presentation, the Court may, under S. 153, Civil Procedure Code, permit the cause-title to be amended or may return the Appeal Memorandum for amendment and representation. But the Court will, if the appeal is but of time against the legal representative, have to excuse the delay in presentation before it can proceed to hear the appeal. Although the appeal may be incompetent owing to the wrong person being named as respondent, the Court which deals with it is acting in a proceeding in a suit and as such as full power under S. 153 to direct an amendment of the Appeal Memorandum. The Court has power to amend the cause-title but that it is a matter for its discretion whether it should excuse the delay in presentation.

    35. Though the ratio laid down in the last two decisions cited by learned counsel may not be of much assistance in the present proceedings, the principle enunciated in Viswanathaswami Devasthanam v. Koodalinga governs the controversy herein. As pointed out in that case succession of one trustee by another is only a case of devolution of interest as contemplated under O. 22, R. 10, C.P.C Abatement of suit come in under O. 22, R. 3(2) or O. 22, R. 4(3) only on the failure to bring on record the legal representative of the concerned plaintiff or defendants as the case may be. But these provisions do not apply in the case of death of a trustee. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code with regard to new trustee being brought on record. In the absence of any provision analogous to O. 22, R. 3(2), we are not inclined to accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that either the appeals had abated on the omission to enter the name of Shanmugha Dcsika on record alter the demise of the previous instituted on behalf of Rajan Kallalai. This is only a case of proper description of the appellant and not one of audition of new party. And we are of the view that C.M.P Nos. 13481 and 13483 of 1993 to amend the cause-title and to substitute the present hereditary trustee in the place of the deceased Adheenakarthar have to be allowed.

    36. C.M.P No. 13482 of 1993 by the appellant in A.S No. 648 of 1983 is to admit the special audit report of the H.R & C.E Department relating to fasli years 1393 to 1397 as additional documents in that appeal. Since we have found that there is no necessity to go into the merit of the case, this petition has to be dismissed as unnecessary.

    37. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the judgment and decrees of the trial Court are set aside and suits suits are decreed as prayed for. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout. C.M.P Nos. 13481 and 13483 of 1993 are allowed and C.M.P No. 13482 of 1993 is dismissed. No cost.

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    Sri-La-Sri Kailai Subramania Desiga Gnanasambanda Pandarasannadhi v. State Of Madras
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