JUDGMENT

Srinivasan, J.

These four appeals arise out of a common judgment rendered in four suits tried together in which evidence is recorded in common. The earliest suit is at present bearing the number O.S No. 3 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif, Poonamallee. That was filed on 11.11.1981 That is a suit for recovery of possession and arrears of rent in a sum of Rs. 2,975/- upto October, 1981. That suit has been filed by T.G Sairam and G. Rama. They have claimed title to the property under a purchase dated 16.2.1981 The only defendant in the suit in the appellant before us.

2. The next suit in chronology is O.S No. 52 of 1984 filed by the appellant herein in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee for specific performance of a contract dated 1.6.1978 directing the defendants to execute and register a sale deed and to receive a sum of Rs. 37,500/- or any other sum of as may be determined by the Court. The defendants in that suit are R.B.S Mani, K. Sankaran, T.G Sairam and Rama Bai. Defendants 3 and 4 in that suit are the plaintiffs in O.S No. 3 of 1987 referred to earlier. The first defendant was the prior owner of the suit property and the second defendant was his power agent. That suit the second defendant was his power agent. That suit having been dismissed, the plaintiff in that suit has preferred A.S No. 1284 of 1989. The other two suits are O.S No. 349 of 1987 and 68 of 1988 for recovery of arrears of rent for subsequent periods, one for October 1981 to June 1984 and another for July 1984 to January 1988 and the only defendant in both the suits is the Appellant herein. The suits were decreed and the defendant has preferred appeals. Thus, the appellant in all the four appeals is the same person, while respondents 3 and 4 in A.S No. 1284 of 1989, which arises out of the suit for specific performance are respondents 1 and 2 in other three appeals. In A.S 1284 of 1989, two more persons have got impleaded as respondents 5 and 6 on the ground that they have purchased the property from respondents 3 and 4 during the pendency of the appeal on 6.9.1991 In the other appeals they have been impleaded as Respondents 3 and 4. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the parties by their rank in A.S No. 1284 of 1989.

3. Under Ex. B11, dated 28.5.1978, the appellant entered into a lease agreement with reference to the suit property with respondents 1 and 2 for a period of 11 months. The lease is to commence from 1.6.1978 The rent is fixed at Rs. 200/- per mensem and charges for amenities provided is fixed at Rs. 150/- per mensem. Thus, the appellant is liable to pay Rs. 350/- per mensem under the deed of lease. The other terms of the lease deed are usually found in all the lease deeds. It is the case of the appellant that there was an agreement for sale of the suit property in his favour on 1.6.1978 According to him, he got into possession of the property only in part performance of the agreement for sale. In fact, he denied the tenancy in his written statement filed in the suit for possession instituted by respondents 3 and 4 in 1981, as stated earlier. The agreement for sale is admittedly oral. The exact date of the agreement is not clear from the evidence, though according to the appellant it was on 1.6.1978 According to respondents 1 and 2 it was some time after the appellant became a lessee under Ex. B11. The first document as between the parties after Ex. B11 is Ex. A3 dated 1.8.1979 That is a letter written by the second respondent to the appellant. It is stated therein that a cheque issued by the appellant had been dishonoured and the appellant should meet the second respondent the very next day without fail. The purpose of the meeting is not clearly mentioned, but it is stated that the matter is very urgent and he should start as soon as he gets the letter.

4. The next document is Ex. B2 dated 25.8.1979, which is a dishonoured cheque for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- issued by the appellant in favour of the second respondent. Obviously, that could not have been the cheque mentioned in Ex. A3. On 29.1.1980, the appellant wrote to the second respondent under Ex. B3 acknowledging receipt of a letter from him. It is stated by the appellant therein that there was some delay in getting the money and he had been undergoing several hardships in order to purchase the same. It is also mentioned that he had paid money only for that purpose. He has assured the second respondent that the entire money would be paid in the Tamil month of Chithrai. The Tamil month of Chithrai usually commences from the middle of April and ends in the middle of May. It is also stated in the letter that the appellant is very sorry for the delay in concluding the transaction and he would, however, conclude it in the month of Chithrai. He would not delay the matter any further. He requested the second respondent to inform the first respondent about the same. It is stated that he was going to Bangalore on 30/1, as some money was due to him from a party there and he would get the money and complete the transaction. It was also prayed that the second respondent should help him in this regard. He assured the second respondent that he would meet him only with money. This is the first letter which refers to the agreement for sale.

5. On 12.4.1980, the appellant wrote under Ex. B4 to the second respondent complaining that in spite of his assurance that he would pay the money and complete the transaction in the month of Chithrai, the latter had been taking other people to show the house for the purpose of sale. He has assured that he had made arrangements for getting the money and before the end of the month of Chithrai he would pay the entire amount and get the document registered. He has also stated that he had already negotiated for sale of his land in his village and it will be completed within two weeks. At the end of the letter, he has stated that if he is not able to complete it within Chithrai, he would personally come to the second respondent. He has requested the second respondent not to receive advance from anybody else till the end of the Chithrai or show the house. In the last sentence he has said that even if he looses his life, he would pay the entire money before the end of Chithrai. There is one sentence which refers to the event of default on his part. But, the entire sentence is not readable. Having regard to the other portions of the letter, the learned trial Judge has taken the view that the appellant has stated therein that in case of default, the second respondent could sell the property to others. The interpretation adopted by the trial Judge appears to be correct. We see no reason to differ therefrom. In the context that is the only possible way of reading the letter.

6. The next document is a legal opinion given by Aiyar & Dolia that the owners have marketable title to the property. Obviously, the opinion has been obtained by defendants 3 and 4, That is dated 5.5.1980

7. Ex. B5 is a letter dated 6.5.1980 written by the appellant to the second respondent stating that he would have paid the entire money and settled the transaction even in the prior week, but on account of unforeseen reasons, there was a delay. He has assured the second respondent that he would complete the transaction in the next week positively. He has also requested the second respondent not to come to any other conclusion and that his aim is only to pay the entire money and have the document registered as early as possible. In the last sentence he has reassured that in the next week, the money will be sent.

8. In Ex. B6 dated 8.5.1980, the appellant has again stated that he would get the money within two or three weeks therefrom and he will complete the transaction by then. He has stated that he knows that the respondents would feel sorry for not completing the transaction and he would pay the balance definitely. He has prayed for being pardoned for the delay caused by him.

9. On 16.6.1980, the appellant wrote Ex. B7 to the second respondent enclosing a draft for Rs. 5,000/-. He has apologised for sending a small amount. He has stated that there would be no further delay and he will pay the entire balance within a short time and complete the transaction. He has stated that he is embarrassed himself for sending only Rs. 5,000/-. He has assured that he will keep up his word, and the entire amount will be arranged for within next week.

10. Ex. B8 is a letter dated 1.7.1980 enclosing another draft for Rs. 5,000/-. He has expressed his inability to pay the entire money and prayed for excuse. He has assured that he will not delay the matter further and he will pay the entire amount within a short period and close the account. Ex. B9 is a letter dated 8.7.1980 in which the appellant has stated that he was informed earlier by the second respondent that the demand draft sent on 15.5.1980 had not been received by the letter and, therefore, he was sending the very same draft once again along with the said letter. According to that letter, he had paid a sum of Rs. 30,000/- by then by way of advance.

11. On 8.9.1980 the second respondent sent a detailed letter to the appellant stating that the latter expressed his willingness to purchase the building for a sum of Rs. 70,000/- within a period of six months from 1.6.1978 and that he will pay rent for the building at the agreed rate till full payment is made and the sale deed is registered. That letter is marked as Ex. B10. Reference is also made in that letter to the lease deed executed on 28.5.1978 for a period of eleven months. The letter refers to the fact that the appellant failed to keep up his promise and again and again making requests for further extension The appellant is informed that the proposal to sell the house stood cancelled as the appellant has failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. It is also stated that a sum of Rs. 30,000/- had been received in all by the second respondent. The details are furnished as follows:—

24-4-1979 - Rs. 5,000 12-5-1980 - Rs. 5,000 4-7-1980 - Rs. 5,000 14.8.1979 - Rs. 5,000 19-6-1980 - Rs. 5,000 9-7-1980 - Rs. 5,000 Grand Total = Rs. 30,000/-/”

The claim of the appellant that he had paid a sum of Rs. 35,000/- by way of advance is denied. It is pointed out that a cheque for Rs. 5,000/- had been dishonoured and thus, the total amount was only Rs. 30,000/-. It is further stated that the rent due for the building till the end of September 1980 worked out to Rs. 9800/- and deducting the same, the balance was payable to the appellant. The appellant is called upon to vacate the building and hand over the key. He has assured that the balance would be paid to him on his vacating the premises. To this letter, there was no reply by the appellant, though he admits receipt thereof.

12. The next letter is dated 25.9.1980 marked as Ex. B14. It is sent by registered post by the second respondent to the appellant. The letter was returned to the second respondent with the endorsement “not found”. On the envelope we find that endorsements have been made from 25.9.1980 onwards till 9.10.1980 The repeated endorsement is “not found”. In that letter, the second respondent has given a statement of account that the total amount received from the appellant was Rs. 30,101 and deducting the rent due for the building from 1.6.1978 to end of 30.9.1980 at Rs. 350/- per mensem working out to Rs. 9,800/- the balance was Rs. 20,301/-. A cheque for the said amount was enclosed. It is also stated that a sum of Rs. 700/- by way of advance rent for two months was being retained by the second respondent and it will be returned to the appellant on his vacating the premises.

13. We have stated earlier that the aforesaid letter was returned with the endorsements “Not found” on the envelope from 25.9.1980 to 9.10.1980 But, on 8.10.1980, the appellant himself wrote a letter from the very same address to the second respondent under Ex. B1. That shows that the endorsement “Not found” made on the envelope Ex. B13 does not reflect the correct position. The appellant's letter dated 8.10.1980 is to the effect that his statement that a sum of Rs. 35,000/- had been paid as advance was correct and the respondent's version that only a sum of Rs. 30,000/- had been paid was not correct. He has further stated that he would pay the entire amount before the next Thai, meaning thereby from the middle of January to the middle of February 1981. Again he has stated that he would not fail to keep up his word. He has also stated that he was leaving for Bombay on 9.10.1980 and as soon as he returned from Bombay, he would pay the entire money.

14. The next Thai referred to in the letter ended on 11.2.1981 The Tamil month of Masi began on 12.2.1981 On 16.2.1981 the second respondent as power agent of the first respondent sold the property to respondents 3 and 4 under two documents, Exs. B21 and B22. The consideration is Rs. 70,000/- for Ex. B21 and Rs. 21,000/- for EX. B22.

15. Thereafter, the second respondent wrote a letter to the appellant on 12.3.1981 under Ex. B24 informing him that the property had been sold on 16.2.1981 to respondents 3 and 4. The appellant is called upon to attorn the tenancy to the said purchasers and pay the monthly rent agreed to by him from 16.2.1991 It is also pointed out that the appellant was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 1,587.50 till the end of 15.2.1981 and the said amount will be deducted from the sum of Rs. 20,301/- which was sent earlier by cheque to the appellant and which returned to the second respondent. It is also stated that the sum of Rs. 700/- paid as advance rent and retained by the second respondent has been handed over to the purchasers. This letter has also been received by the appellant, but he has not chosen to send any reply.

16. On 23.3.1981, the second respondent wrote to the appellant under Ex. A4. In that letter it is pointed out that in spite of informing the appellant in person and through letters and in spite of several opportunities having been given to him, it is only the fault of the appellant in not having purchased the property. A particular sentence in that letter is relied on by the appellant's counsel. Hence, we are extracting the same in vernacular:—

17. The sentence is interpreted by learned counsel for the appellant that it contains an admission that the time fixed for completion of transaction was three years. Though it was originally fixed as six months, it was extended by three years later. It is contended by learned counsel that the period of three years should be calculated from the date of the letter viz., 23.3.1981, or at least from 1.1.1979 According to him, the first period of six months ended on 31.12,1978 and the period of three years commenced from 1.1.1979 There is no merit in this contention. The sentence only means that the appellant had been dragging on the matter from six months to nearly three years. It is only a statement of fact referred to in a state of indignation. That does not mean that the parties had agreed for extension of the time for three years. The letter proceeds to say that the property having been sold to another person, the appellant is entitled only to get back the amount which is due to him. The amount is calculated at Rs. 18,713.50. A cheque on the Bank of Baroda, Mylapore Branch is enclosed with the letter. The appellant has requested to send a reply immediately. It is now stated at the Bar that the said cheque has not been encashed.

18. Even after that letter, there was no reaction on the part of the appellant. He sent a lawyer's notice to respondents 2 to 4 to only on 10.6.1982 under Ex. A1. In that letter it is alleged that the appellant entered into an agreement for sale and in part performance of the said agreement he was put in possession. It is also alleged that he agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 350/- as rent till the sale is completed and no time limit was fixed for the completion of the sale. Reference is made to the amounts paid by the appellant and it is stated that a total sum of Rs. 32,500/- has been paid by the appellant to the second respondent. It is further alleged that respondents 3 and 4 knowing fully well about the agreement, purchased the property and they are not bona fide purchasers for value, It is stated that the appellant has always been willing and ready to pay the balance of consideration and complete the sale. A reply was sent to this notice by a lawyer on behalf of the second respondent on 19.6.1982 under Ex. A2. While denying the allegations made by the appellant in his notice, it is stated therein that the appellant became a tenant in the first instance on 28.5.1978 and agreed to pay rent and thereafter expressed a desire to purchase the property. It is stated that the respondent agreed to sell the property making it very clear that time was the essence of the contract of sale and the entire amount should be paid within a period of six months. It is alleged that subsequently the appellant wanted time till 15.5.1979, but he did not complete the transaction by them. Reference is made to the correspondence exchanged between the parties and the receipt of a letter dated 12.2.1981 referred to by the appellant in his notice is denied. We should mention at this stage that the appellant has not produced any letter dated 12.2.1981 or a copy thereof though it is alleged by him that the said letter was sent by registered post and refused to be received by the respondents. Reference is then made to the letter dated 25.9.1980 and the return thereof with the endorsement “not found”. It is pointed out in that notice that the appellant would be liable to meet the costs of the suit and would be taking a risk, if a suit is filed.

19. Thereafter, the appellant filed on 23.9.1982 the suit for specific performance, in the plaint it is alleged that the first defendant agreed to receive the consideration in driblets and register the sale deed as and when the plaintiff wanted him to execute the sale deed and as such, no time limit was fixed for the execution of the document. It was also alleged that the appellant is in possession in part performance of the contract. Having stated that a sum of Rs. 32,500/- has been paid by way of advance, it is only the balance that is due to the defendants. It is recited in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the plaintiff has ample means to pay the balance of sale consideration and to take the sale deed at all relevant times. In paragraph 6 of the plaint it is stated that after coming to know the alleged sale deed in favour of respondents 3 and 4. a panchayat was held in the presence of respectable people like Mr. Govindarajan, Ex. Panchayat Board President of Valasaravakkam, Madras-87, Mr. Kasi Nadar son of Peria Nadar and others for executing the sale deed in favour of the appellant. It is also alleged that the post card written by the said Mr. Govindarajan in that connection will be traced out and filed later. It should be mentioned that no such post card has been filed in Court; nor any of the alleged panchayatdars has been examined as a witness in this case.

20. The defendants have filed written statements. While the second defendant has reiterated the case stated in the notice issued prior to the suit and disputed the panchayat alleged to have been held, defendants 3 and 4 have claimed that they have purchased the property bona fide for full value without notice of the alleged agreement in favour of the plaintiff.

21. The trial court has given the following findings:— 1) The appellant is not in possession in part performance of the contract as claimed by him, but is in possession only as a tenant (2) The appellant's case that no time limit was fixed for completion of the transaction and the respondent agreed to receive the amounts in driblets is false. (3) The agreement for sale is not valid in law as no time limit is specified. (4) The case of the appellant that he paid a sum of Rs. 32.500/- is false and he paid only Rs. 30,101/- towards the sale consideration. (5) The appellant has never been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He has not also deposited the balance of consideration at the time of filing of the suit or at any later date. (6) The appellant having agreed that if he fails to conclude the transaction before the end of Tamil month Chithrai, cannot make a grievance of the sale in favour of respondents 3 and 4. (7) The appellant is liable to pay the arrears of rent as claimed by the respondents in all the three suits. On the above findings, the trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance and decreed the other three suits.

22. We have already referred to the entire documentary evidence on record. A perusal of the same shows that the appellant has never been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He has not been able to pay the amount of consideration as agreed, he has not even been able to pay the rent of Rs. 350/- per mensem as specified in the lease deed Ex. B11. The appellant has been repeatedly praying for time and on every occasion he has been giving an assurance that he will complete the transaction within a short time thereafter. In the letter dated 29.1.1980, Ex. B3, the appellant assured that he would complete the transaction before the end of Tamil Month Chithrai i.e, before the middle of May 1980. Once again he assured the respondents that he would complete the transaction before the end of Thai. That was under Ex. B1 dated 8.10.1980 Thus, the respondents have been waiting for the appellant to complete the transaction and were as much considerate as possible. They were waiting till the end of Thai. In fact, they informed the appellant that they would proceed to sell the property to others if he did not complete the transaction as agreed to by him. It is only thereafter, they executed Ex. B21 and Ex. B22 on 16.2.1981 selling the property to respondents 3 and 4.

23. In the oral evidence, the appellant has not fared any better. He has repeated the false case pleaded in the plaint. As regards the alleged panchayat, he has deposed that a panchayat was held in the presence of the president of Valasaravakkam village panchayat and he collected money pursuant to the panchayat. He claims to have sent a sum of Rs. 10,000/- being a portion thereof by draft from Bangalore. The draft never reached the respondents. As regards the lease transaction, he has stated that he was occupying the premises as a tenant at the time of agreement. He has reiterated the same in the chief-examination itself that even before the agreement, he entered into a lease transaction. It is his further case that what all was agreed no other details were determined. It is also stated that it was not determined as to how much amount should be paid in each instalment nor the time within which the sale deed should be completed was decided, according to him. He has no explanation for his failure to reply to the letters written by the second respondent, to which we have made reference already. He has admitted that he has not paid any amount whatever for the building, though he adds that if the second respondent had demanded rent he would have paid the same and that he is prepared to pay the rent now. In the cross examination he has stated that he has not taken any steps to get back the lease after the agreement for sale was entered. He states that he is liable to pay rent till he gets a sale deed. His examination was over on 11.4.1989 The examination of D.W 1 was completed on 20.6.1989 and the evidence of D.W 2 was completed on 28.6.1989 Thereafter, the appellant filed applications to recall himself and he examined himself once again on 18.7.1989 He marked Exs. A3 and A4. He claims that he sent a reply to Ex. A4, but a copy of the reply has not been filed.

24. It is not necessary to refer to the evidence of the respondents as the evidence of the appellant is wholly unsatisfactory. It is clear from what we have stated above that the appellant has never been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is well settled that a person cannot claim the relief of specific performance unless he proves his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. (Vide H.G Krishna Reddy & Co. v. M. Thimmiah (AIR 1983 Madras 169 = 96 L.W 88). It is also seen that the appellant has come to Court with a false case that no time limit was fixed for completion of the transaction and that he was permitted to pay the amounts in driblets. We have already referred to the letters which show that the appellant himself fixed the time limit and the respondents gracefully agreed for such extensions. In spite of such extensions, the appellant failed to perform his part of the contract. It is also seen that the appellant has put forward a false case that there was a panchayat. There is no evidence whatever to substantiate that case.

25. As regards the character of possession the appellant has again chosen to deny the tenancy. In tact, in the written statement filed by him in O.S No. 3 of 1987 he has categorically asserted as follows:—

“This defendant specifically denies having executed a letter of tenancy either in favour of the plaintiffs or their vendor”.

This written statement was filed on 26.3.1982 Six months later, he has filed the suit for specific performance on 23.9.1982 Once again he has reiterated that there was no tenancy and he is in possession only pursuant to the contract of sale. That case is falsified by the production of Ex. B11, which he had to admit. We nave already referred to his admission that there was a tenancy agreement before the agreement for sale. Thus, the appellant is guilty of making a false plea. It is well known that a person who has come to court with a false case is not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. Vide G. Chelliah Nadar (died) and 4 others v. Periasamy Nadar and 3 others (1993-2-L.W. 84) and Nallaya Gounder and another v. P. Ramaswami Gounder and 3 other 1993-2-L.W. 86).

26. It is contended that time is not the essence of the contract and the mere fact that the appellant has not been able to pay the entire amount within a particular time will not disentitle him to the relief of specific performance. No doubt, ordinarily in contracts relating to immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract. But, in the facts and circumstances of each case, the court can come to a conclusion in that in a particular case, time has been made the essence of the contract. In Dr. Bal Saroop Daulat Ram v. Lt. Col. Lakhbir Singh Kirpal Singh and another (AIR 1964 Punjab 375), a Division Bench has held that the normal initial presumption of time not ordinarily being of the essence of contract in case of sale of immovable property, is not statutory or absolute and irrebuttable, and circumstances of a given contract may clearly negative it. In Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani (AIR 1993 S.C 1742), the court stated that though as a general proposition of law time is not the essence of the contract in the case of sale of immovable property, yet the parties can intend to make time as the essence. On the facts of the case, the Court held that the time was of the essence of contract. In the present case, we hold that though initially the respondents were willing to extend the time as requested by the appellant, they have made it clear to him unequivocally that he should complete the transaction before a particular date. In fact, the appellant himself has assured the respondents that in case of default, they were free to seek other purchasers. Hence, in this case we hold that the appellant is not entitled to claim the relief of specific performance as he has not come to Court within the time. We have also pointed out that the suit has been filed long after the appellant was informed of the sale in favour of respondents 3 and 4. There is absolutely no explanation on record as to why the appellant was keeping quiet for such a long time.

27. As regards the quantum of amount paid, the appellant has not proved that he paid a sum of Rs. 32,000/- as claimed by him. The evidence on record only proves that he had paid a sum of Rs. 30,101/- as found by the trial court. In the evidence, the appellant claims that he paid a sum of Rs. 2500/- towards taxes and repairs. But, there is nothing on record to substantiate the said claim. No tax receipt has been filed by the appellant. Hence, we affirm the finding of the trial court that the appellant paid only Rs. 30,101/- and he has raised a false plea in that regard also.

28. Learned counsel for the respondents have drawn our attention to the judgment in Rakha Singh v. Santakha (AIR 1976 Himachal Pradesh 66). The facts of the case are almost similar. The agreement was entered on June 4, 1965 and after a protracted correspondence between the parties, the vendor finally wrote to the purchaser on 20.12.1965 that the sale deed must be executed in the month of December, 1965. He also sent a notice to the purchaser on 24.12.1965, but received no reply. On 10.1.1966, the vendor sold the property to third parties. Thereafter, the suit for specific performance was filed. The contention was that a notice repudiating the contract was not given by the vendor and a reasonable opportunity was not offered to the purchaser to perform his part of the contract and as such, a decree for specific performance must be granted. Rejecting the said contention, the court said:—

“One of the essential factors in a suit for specific performance of a contract is that the plaintiff must first allege and then if the matter is traversed, prove (a) that he has performed all the conditions which under the contract he was bound to perform, and (b) that he has been ready and willing at all times from the time of the contract down to the date of suit, to perform his part of the contract. It is true that in a contract for sale and purchase of land time is not essence of contract but either party can make it so by giving notice. A similar intention may be inferred from the nature of the property, surrounding circumstances and whether commercial element is involved. Readiness and willingness to perform includes ability to perform. It is incumbent upon the buyer to satisfy the Court that he was ready and willing with the money or had the capacity to pay for the property and that he had at all events made proper and reasonable preparations and arrangements for securing the purchase money. One has then to consider the facts and circumstances arising in the case in order to arrive at a finding as to whether Raksha Singh was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.”

29. In the present case, a letter was sent by the second respondent clearly informing the appellant that the contract stood cancelled. That is under Ex. B10 dated 8.9.1990 The appellant having received the said letter, has not sent any reply thereto. There is no explanation as to why he did not send a reply.

30. Learned counsel also refers to the decision of a Division Bench of Allahabad. High Court in Sohan Lal v. Atal Nath (AIR 1933 Allahabad 846). The Division Bench said that indefiniteness of time may be a ground for refusing specific performance. On the facts of the case, the Bench held that there was no such indefiniteness. But, in the present case, the appellant's version is that the time was not fixed. If the term of the contract are vague, they cannot be enforced in a court of law. Vide S. 29 of the Contract Act.

31. Learned counsel for the appellant invites our attention to the decision of the Kerala High Court in Nair Service Society, Changanacherry v. R.M Palat (AIR 1966 Kerala 311). The court said that if there is no statement in the contract regarding the price to be paid, the law allows a standard of reasonableness and accordingly, a fair or reasonable price was recoverable on the basis of a term to be implied in the contract; but when the terms of a contract exclude that a reasonable or a fair market price was intended by the parties, it is not possible to imply such a term. No doubt in this case, there is no dispute as to the price of the property. But, there is no definiteness as to the time of performance.

32. We have already referred to the circumstances that the appellant caused the return of Ex. B18 with a false endorsement that he was not found, though he was very much present in the said address written on the envelope and he had himself written a letter on 8.10.1980 That shows the extent to which the appellant will go in order to defeat the rightful claim of the respondents. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the court below has rightly refused to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant and dismissed the suit for specific performance. By no stretch of imagination, the appellant is a person entitled to claim the equitable relief of specific performance. Consequently, A.S No. 1284 of 1981 is dismissed with costs.

33. In A.S No. 162 of 1990 a new contention is sought to be raised by learned counsel for the appellant. It is contended that the suit is based on a tenancy and the court fee payable on the plaint is also under S. 43 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act only on the basis of a tenancy. Reliance is placed in the case of the respondents that the appellant entered the property ascertainment in the first instance and he was in possession only as such. It is contended by learned counsel that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would apply to the case and the suit in the civil court is not maintainable. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (AIR 1991 S.C 1094 = 1991-2-L.W. 654), learned counsel contends that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction in the case of a tenant who is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, even if the tenant has denied the title of the landlord. This contention was not urged either in the trial court or in the memorandum of appeal in this court. For the first time, the point was urged in the course of arguments in the appeal by learned senior counsel for the appellant. No affidavit is filed before us stating that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act have been extended to the area in question. The property is situated in Valasaravakkam Village. Saidapet Taluk. The description of property contained in the various suits shows that it is within Valasaravakkam village. There is material on record to show that Valasaravakkam is a Town Panchayat. We have already referred to the plea of the appellant in the plaint in O.S No. 52 of 1984 that a panchayat was held in the presence of respectable people like Mr. Govindarajan, Ex-panchayat Board President of Valasaravakkam. In the evidence, he has stated once again that the Panchayat was held in the presence of the President of the village Panchayat. Though he calls it a village Panchayat, the evidence on record shows that it is a Town Panchayat. Ex. B21 is the sale deed under which respondents 3 and 4 have purchased the property from respondents 1 and 2. In Annexure 1-A to the sale deed, the annual rental value is mentioned as Rs. 331.10 as per panchayat tax. A typed set of papers has been filed in this court in CMP. No. 16996 of 1992 in CMP. No. 5480 of 1990 in A.S No. 162 of 1990. The typed set of papers is filed by counsel for respondents 3 and 4 in that appeal (Respondents 5 and 6 in A.S 1284 of 1989). Reliance was placed by learned Senior counsel for the appellant on a document contained in the said typed set. The typed set is accepted to contain true and correct copies. One of the documents included in the typed set is a copy of the plaint filed by the appellant in O.S No. 1863 of 1991 on 30.9.1991 It is a suit filed by the appellant against respondents 5 and 6 for injunction restraining them from interfering with his possession. There is a specific averment in paragraph 10 of the plaint that the property is situated within the jurisdiction of the Court of District Munsif Poonamallee. That proves that the property is not within the City limits. The contention raised by learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the property is situated in a part of the Madras City is on the basis of the Postal Division that Valasaravakkam is Madras-87 and that respondents 5 and 6 themselves filed a suit as against respondents 3 and 4 on the original side of this court in C.S No. 986 of 1991 which ended in a compromise. It is stated by learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 that the suit was filed in this court because the case of action for the suit viz., the agreement on the basis of which the suit was filed, was entered in Madras.

34. There is an order by the Executive Officer of the Town Panchayat of Valasaravakkam transferring the registry in favour of respondents 5 and 6 from that of respondents 3 and 4. That is found at page 207 of the said typed set of papers. That shows that Valasaravakkam is a Town Panchayat. A tax receipt has also been included in the typed set and it is found at page 201. That is issued by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat. That evidences payment of tax for the period from 1.4.1992 to 30.9.1992 That also shows that the property is situated within the Town Panchayat.

35. The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is not applicable to the entire State of Tamil Nadu as such. S. 1(2)(c) provides that the Act shall apply to the City of Madras and to the City of Madurai and to all municipalities constituted or deemed to have been constituted under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 in the State. We have now found that Valasaravakkam is only a Town Panchayat and not a Municipality. Hence, the Act by its own force will not apply. Under sub-clause (c) to Sub.S (2) of S. 1, the Act provides that the Government may, by notification, apply all or any of the provisions of the Act except Sub-S. (2) of S. 3, to any other area in the state with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification, and may cancel or modify any such notification. Counsel appearing before us on either side has not been in a position to assert whether a notification has been made or not. The burden is on the appellant to prove that such a notification has been made. Yet, we directed the Registry to contract the Secretariat and find out whether a notification has been issued. We have been informed that so far the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has not been extended to Valasaravakkam Town Panchayat. The burden is certainly on the appellant to prove that the Act has been extended to the Town Panchayat in which the suit property is situate and the civil court has no jurisdiction. As pointed out already, the appellant has failed to produce any material whatever in support of that contention.

36. Hence, we reject the contention of learned Senior counsel for the appellant based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in East India Corporation Ltd. Case (AIR 1991 SC 1094 = 1991-2-L.W. 654). Consequently, the appellant will have no defence whatever to the suit or possession. There is no doubt that the plaintiffs in the suit, who are respondents 3 and 4 are entitled to the property, having purchased the same under Exs. B21 and B22, and they being the owners and the tenancy which was granted to the appellant earlier by defendants 1 and 2 having been terminated, respondents 3 and 4 are entitled to get a decree for possession. The decree passed by the trial court in O.S No. 8 of 1987 for possession is to be confirmed.

37. As regards the claim for arrears of rent, in the three suits O.S Nos. 3 of 1987, 349 of 1987 and 68 of 1988, the appellant has no case whatever. In the evidence he has admitted that he is prepared to pay the rent as agreed. It is also admitted that he has not paid a pie towards rent from 1.6.1978 till the application for stay filed by him in the present appeal was dismissed as regards the decree for recovery of rent. It is stated now that in the execution proceedings, the appellant has paid the entire rent due. Whatever it may be, the decrees for rent passed in the three suits are unassailable and they have to be confirmed. Consequently the three appeals, A.S Nos. 162 to 164 of 1990 are dismissed with costs in A.S No. 162 of 1990.

38. Thus all the four appeals are dismissed with costs in A.S 124/89 and A.S 162/90. No costs in A.S 163 and 164 of 1990.

KA/RR/VCS