Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C.R.P No. 3220 of 1984.

Attorney(S)

Mr. M.K Kabir for Petitioner
Mr. S. Adaikalam for Respondent.

Judges

Somasundaram, J.

Acts

Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act VII of 1960, hereinafter called the Act.
Section 2(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XV of 1946.
Rent Control) Act, 1946.
Rent Control) Act, 1960,

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision) — Rent Control Matter

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (owner) filed R.C.O.P. No. 51 of 1981 before the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Mayiladuthurai, seeking eviction of the respondents under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 ("the Act"). The petition property consisted of three shops with vacant site on Road No. II, Cuddalore Mayavaram. A prior tenant, Thirunavukkarasu, had operated a service station and had put up asbestos-sheet sheds and a compound wall on the site. The respondents purchased the business and those asbestos-sheet sheds from Thirunavukkarasu and, on 25-11-1976, executed a registered lease (Ex. A-1) with the petitioner. Under Ex. A-1 the respondents agreed to remove at their cost the asbestos-sheet sheds and compound walls at the end of the tenancy. The petitioner alleged the existing shop buildings were old and required demolition and reconstruction and had applied to the municipality for a licence to rebuild.

At first instance the Rent Controller found that the lease (Ex. A-1) covered three shops and the vacant site, held the eviction petition under the Act to be maintainable, and found the petitioner's requirement to demolish and reconstruct bona fide, and ordered eviction. The respondents appealed (K.C.A. No. 4 of 1983) before the Appellate Authority (Sub-Court, Mayiladuthurai). The Appellate Authority affirmed that the lease was in respect of buildings as well as vacant site and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the respondents filed the present civil revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the subject-matter of the lease (three shops together with the vacant site and certain asbestos-sheet sheds) amounted to a "building" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, and consequently whether the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act was maintainable.
Whether the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority had rendered an adequate finding on the condition of the petition property and the bona fides of the petitioner's requirement for demolition and reconstruction, and whether the respondents could raise in this revision a plea on that point which they had not challenged before the Appellate Authority (i.e., whether the plea abandoned on appeal could be re-agitated in revision as a pure question of law).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord's) Case

The petitioner is the owner of the property comprising three shops with a vacant site and sought eviction so as to demolish the existing shops and reconstruct a new building, having applied to the municipality for a licence to rebuild.
The petitioner alleged the tenancy covered three shops and the vacant site as per Ex. A-1, and that the respondents had agreed under Ex. A-1 to remove any asbestos-sheet sheds and compound walls put up by the previous tenant at the end of the tenancy.
On the evidence, the Rent Controller found the shops were old and the petitioner's requirement to demolish and reconstruct was bona fide; the petitioner relied on those factual findings and sought eviction under S.14(1)(b) of the Act.

Respondents' (Tenants') Arguments

The respondents contended the lease was a composite transaction effectively of land and temporary structures: originally the premises had been let as a long lease of site (in or about 1956) and the earlier tenant had put up ramps and temporary structures on the vacant site.
They asserted the asbestos-sheet sheds and compound wall put up by Thirunavukkarasu were sold to them and therefore belonged to the respondents; on that basis the respondents argued the transaction was not covered by the Act and the petition for eviction under the Act was not maintainable.
The respondents also contended the petitioner's stated requirement for demolition and reconstruction was not bona fide — they argued the shop buildings were in good condition and did not require demolition; additionally they later argued that neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority had rendered a specific finding as to the condition of the property and thus eviction should not have been ordered. Counsel for the respondents further submitted that the plea could be raised in this revision as a pure question of law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
J.H. Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar	The decision addressed whether a lease comprising small sheds and vacant site constituted a "building" under the relevant Madras Rent Control Act.	The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that where the subject-matter of a lease comprises sheds and vacant site (and later erected structures), the lease can be a lease of a "building" within the statute's meaning. The court applied that reasoning to hold Ex. A-1 covered a building.
Salay Md. Sait v. J. MS. Charity (1969) 1 Mad LJ (SC) 16	Held that in determining whether a lease is of vacant land or of a "building" both the form and the substance of the transaction must be taken into account.	The court cited and applied this principle: it examined the form (lease deed Ex. A-1) and the substance (admissions in pleadings and evidence) and concluded the tenancy was of a building within S.2(2) of the Act.
(1990) 106 Mad LW 547 — P. Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited	Relied upon by respondents in support of the contention concerning the landlord's bona fide requirement and adequacy of findings regarding property condition.	The court noted respondents relied on this authority but treated such reliance as not decisive here: the court found the factual finding of bona fides by the Rent Controller (supported by evidence) had not been challenged on appeal, so the precedent did not assist the respondents in the revision.
Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust Ltd.	Principle on when a pure question of law not raised or abandoned in the lower appellate court may be permitted to be raised in a higher appeal (discretionary, consider conduct and circumstances).	The court quoted this authority and applied it to hold that, although pure questions of law can sometimes be raised later, where a factual finding (on bona fides) was made on evidence and not challenged on appeal, the respondent cannot re-raise that factual plea in revision. The authority supported denying permission to re-agitate the abandoned plea.
AIR 1960 Jammu & Kashmir 35	One of several authorities cited by respondents for the broader proposition that a pure question of law not agitated in the lower appellate court may be permitted to be raised later.	The court observed that these authorities generally stand for the proposition about pure questions of law, but held they were not applicable to the present facts because the plea raised here involved a factual finding abandoned on appeal.
(FB)	Cited in the opinion as part of a list of authorities relied on by respondents (the opinion gives this shorthand reference without full detail).	The court treated this entry as part of the array of authorities relied on for the general proposition about raising questions of law, but held the line of authority did not assist respondents on the present facts.
AIR 1979 Gauhati 10	Listed among the decisions respondents cited concerning procedural points on raising questions of law in later proceedings.	The court noted it but concluded the cited authorities were not applicable because the present plea was factual and had been abandoned before the Appellate Authority.
(1982) 2 Mad LJ 109	Listed among several Madras decisions cited by respondents on related procedural principles.	The court acknowledged reliance on these decisions but distinguished them on the basis that they concern pure questions of law, whereas the present disputed issue on bona fides was a factual finding.
(1981) 1 Mad LJ 250	Listed among decisions cited by respondents (as authorities for the procedural proposition regarding pure questions of law).	The court found these authorities did not apply to permit re-raising a factual plea abandoned on appeal and therefore did not assist respondents in revision.
(1982) 1 Mad LJ 318	Listed among decisions relied on by respondents for the proposition about pure questions of law.	The court again distinguished these authorities on the ground that the present matter turned on an unchallenged factual finding and so they did not entitle respondents to revive the plea in revision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytical strands corresponding to the principal contentions.

1. Whether the lease was of a "building" within S.2(2) and whether eviction was maintainable

The court examined the statutory definition of "building" in Section 2(2) of the Act, noting that the definition includes a building or part of a building let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and also contemplates appurtenant garden/grounds/outhouses and furnished items.
The court referred to precedent (J.H. Irani and Salay Md. Sait) for the principle that both the form and substance of the transaction must be considered when determining whether a letting is of vacant land or of a building.
Turning to the specific evidence and documents in the present matter, the court relied on the terms of Ex. A-1 (the lease deed dated 25-11-1976) and parties' admissions in pleadings: the lease described three shops with vacant land; respondents admitted the lease was a composite one and that originally there were three small shops occupying about 350 sq. ft.; it was admitted that Thirunavukkarasu had put up asbestos-sheet sheds and that the respondents purchased the business and the sheds and entered into Ex. A-1 on the same day.
The court emphasized specific terms of Ex. A-1: the respondents agreed to remove at their cost the asbestos-sheet sheds and compound wall at the end of the tenancy, and the lease required the petitioner to undertake tile replacement and other repairs of the three shops — indicating expenditure and maintenance obligations consistent with a lease of building premises.
On that basis, applying the cited precedents, the court concluded the subject-matter of the tenancy comprised (a) three shops, (b) the site on which earlier sheds were put up, and (c) the vacant land — and thereby held the tenancy was of a "building" within Section 2(2) of the Act. Consequently, the petition for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) was maintainable. The court expressly upheld the conclusions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on this point as correct and not requiring interference.

2. Whether respondents could re-raise on revision the plea that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide

The court addressed respondents' second contention that the lower authorities did not render a specific finding on the condition of the property and that the respondents could raise that issue in revision as a pure question of law, relying on several authorities.
The court examined the record and noted that the Rent Controller had made a factual finding that the petitioner's requirement for demolition and reconstruction was bona fide, based on oral evidence of P.W.1 and document Ex. A-2.
Crucially, the court observed that the respondents did not challenge this factual finding before the Appellate Authority; the Appellate Authority recorded that the counsel for the tenants did not challenge the finding on bona fides and only argued maintainability.
Applying the principle from Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust Ltd. — that a pure question of law not raised or abandoned below may be permitted in a later appeal but the court must exercise discretion in view of facts and conduct — the court distinguished the present case: the plea here was not a pure question of law but a factual matter decided on evidence and abandoned before the Appellate Authority.
The court therefore held the respondents, having abandoned the plea as to bona fides before the Appellate Authority, could not re-raise that factual plea in this revision. It further held the other authorities cited by respondents (which support raising pure questions of law) were inapplicable to the present facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is DISMISSED. The court upheld the Rent Controller's and the Appellate Authority's findings that the lease (Ex. A-1) was in respect of a "building" within Section 2(2) of the Act and that the petitioner's requirement for demolition and reconstruction was bona fide. The court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The eviction order in favour of the petitioner stands; the respondents' challenge in this civil revision fails and the Rent Controller's and Appellate Authority's decisions remain undisturbed.
On legal principles: The court reaffirmed that (i) the substance and form of a transaction must be examined to determine whether a letting is of a "building" under the Act, and (ii) a factual finding supported by evidence and not challenged on appeal cannot be re-opened in revision as a pure question of law. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of the case.

Note: This summary is confined to the information contained in the provided opinion. Where the opinion itself listed certain authorities with abbreviated or partial citations, those are reproduced as cited in the opinion without supplementation.

Show full summary ...

Rajagopal Vandaiyar & Sons Ii Road, Koranad Mayiladuthurai Reptd. By Managing Partner, Rajagopal Vandaiyar And Another v. D. Joseph Nadar

1. The respondents is R.C.O.P. No. 51 of 1981 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Mayiladuthurai arc the petitioner in the said R.C.O.P. is the respondent in this civil revision petition. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as per the nomenclature given to them in the R.C.O.P.

2. The petitioner filed R.C.O.P. No. 51 of 1981 against the respondent for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act VII of 1960, hereinafter called the Act. The case of the petitioner is as follows: The petitioner is the owner of the petition mentioned property consisting of three shops with vacant site situated in Road No. II, Cusba Mayavaram. One Thirunavukkarasu was a tenant of the property under the petitioner and he was having a service station in the petition mentioned premises. The said Thirunavukkarasu had put up some asbestos sheet sheds and compound walls for the purpose of his business. The respondents purchased the business and the asbestos sheet sheds etc., for continuing to do the same business from the said Thirunavukkarasu. The respondents also entered into a tenancy agreement with the petitioner on 25-11-1976 and executed a registered rent deed on that date. As per the rent deed dated 25-11-1976 the respondents agreed to remove at his cost the asbestos sheet sheds and compound walls put up by Thirunavukkarasu at the end of the tenancy. The shop buildings in the petition mentioned property have become old and they have to be demolished for reconstructing a fresh building on the site after demolishing the shops. The petitioner has applied for licence to the municipality for putting up a building in the petition mentioned property after demolishing the existing shops.

3. The respondents resisted the application contending as follows:-- The lease in favour of the respondents is a composite one and, therefore, the provisions of the Act will not apply to the transaction and the petition for eviction filed before the Rent Controller is not maintainable. The premises was originally given on long lease to one Sri G. Nataraja Iyer in or about 1956 for the purpose of running an automobile business and service station in the petition mentioned property. At that time there were only three small shops occupying an extent of about 350 s.ft. The original tenant Nataraja Iyer put up for the purpose of his business ramps, temporary structures etc., on the vacant sites of the petition mentioned property. Subsequently the said Nataraja Iyer assigned his lease and also the business in favour of the Thirunavukkarasu in 1966. The said Thirunavukkarasu put up pucca asbestos sheet sheds and a compound wall for the purpose of his business. Thereafter the said Thirunavukkarasu sold his business and the asbestos sheet sheds put up by him in the petition mentioned property to the respondents on 25-11-1976. On the same day the respondent have entered into a tenancy agreement with the petitioner in respect of the petition mentioned property. The application filed by the petitioner for eviction on the ground that the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide as the shop buildings concerned in the tease are in good condition and they do not require demolition for reconstruction.

4. The Rent Controller, on the basis of the evidence on record, found that what was let out by the petitioner to the respondents under the lease deed dated 25-11-1976 marked as Ex. A1 in this case was three shops and vacant site and the petition for eviction filed under the provisions of the Act is maintainable. The Rent Controller further found on the basis of the evidence that the shops are old and the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned property for demolishing the existing shops and for reconstructing new buildings on the site is bona fide. Consequently the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the respondents. As against order of the Rent Controller the respondents filed K.C. A. No. 4 of 1983 before the Appellate Authority (Sub-Court, Mayiladuthurai.) Before the Appellate Authority the respondents did not canvass the correctness of the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned property for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide. The only point that was urged before the Appellate Authority was that the petition for eviction filed before the Rent Controller under provisions of the Act is not maintainable. The Appellate Authority confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller that the lease in favour of the respondent is both in respect of buildings as well as the vacant site and, therefore, the petition for eviction filed under provisions of the Act is maintainable. Consequently the Appellate Authority dismissed the Rent Control Appeal. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Authority the respondents have preferred the present civil revision petition.

5. Mr. M. K. Kabir, learned Counsel for the respondents in the first place contended that the petitioner leased out only the site for the specific purpose of a car service station to one Nataraja Iyer, Subsequently the said Nataraja Iyer assigned the tenancy agreement in favour of Thirunavukkarasu, who, at his cost put some asbestos sheet sheds and a compound wall, in the petition mentioned premises and from Thirunavukkarasu the respondents have purchased the asbestos sheet sheds and the compound wall; Inasmuch as the said asbestos sheet sheds and the compound wall put up in the petition mentioned property do not belong to the petitioner, the petition for eviction filed under the provisions of the Act is not maintainable. The learned counsel further contended that as the respondents have become the owners of the asbestos sheet sheds and compound wall put up in the petition mentioned property, the petitioner cannot file a petition for eviction seeking for recovery of vacant possession of the site after the removal of the asbestos sheet sheds and the compound wall. The petition for eviction filed by the petitioner under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act will be maintainable, if, what was let out to the respondents by the petitioner under the tenancy agreement Ex. A-1 is a building within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. Therefore, the question we have to examine in this case is whether the property let out by the petitioner to the respondents is a building within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. The backdrop of law may be briefly examined before going into the factual details. Section 2(2) of the Act defines a building and it runs as follows :

"building" means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes.

(a) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut,

(b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house".

The inclusion of hut in the definition and other indications in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of S. 2(2) of the Act point to the fact that the word "building" is used to denote a structure of the nature of a house intended for human habitation or for using it for non-residential purpose such as carrying on business. Hence if we take the definition of the "building" along with the purpose of the Act, it includes not only a building but even a part of it. A building consists of not only the superstructure but also the site on which the superstructure stands. In the decision J.H. Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, , the subject-matter of the lease consisted of-

(i) small sheds at one end of the premises;

(ii) the site on which the tenant subsequently put up a cinema theatre;

(iii) all the vacant space within, exclusive of the theatre and sheds.

The question arose in that case whether what was let out was a building within the definition of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946. For the appellant in that case It was contended that the description of the premises in the lease deed as well as in the prior leases pointed out to the land principally as a subject matter of the letting and since the sheds occupied only an inconsequential part of the entire premises there was no reason to suppose that what was let out was a building. The Division Bench did not accept the said contention of the appellant-landlord that in substance the letting was of land and not of any building. The Division Bench held that inasmuch as the subject-matter of the leased consisted of small sheds at one end of the premises and the vacant site on which the tenant subsequently put up a cinema theatre, the lease in that case was a lease of the building within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XV of 1946. In Salay Md. Sait v. J. MS. Charity, (1969) 1 Mad LJ (SC) 16, the Supreme Court, after referring to the decision in J.H. Irani v. Chidambaran Chettiar, , observed as follows:--

"In order to determine whether a lease is of a vacant land or of a 'building' within the meaning of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, both the form and the substance of the transaction must be taken into account"

If the ratio of the above decisions is applied to the facts of the present case, there is no difficulty in holding that what was let out by the petitioner to the respondents is a building within the meaning of S. 2(2) of the Act. It is the specific case of the petitioner in para 3 of the petition for eviction that what was let out to the respondent under the lease deed Ex. A-I dated 25-1-1976 was three shops with vacant site. In para 2 of the counter-affidavit the respondents have categorically admitted that the lease in his favour is a composite one. In para 3 of the counter-affidavit the respondents have also admitted that when the premises was let out originally to Nataraja Iyer in or about 1956 there were three small shops occupying an extent of about 350 s.ft. in extent. Ex.A-1, the lease deed executed by the respondents in favour of the petitioner goes to show that three shops with vacant land was let out by the petitioner to the respondent under the said document dated 27-11-1976. It is also the admitted case of both the parties that the tenant Thirunavukkarasu who was having a service station in the petition mentioned property put up some asbestos sheet sheds and compound walls and from Tirunavukkarasu the respondents have purchased the business as well as the asbestos sheet sheds for continuing the same business on 25-11-1976 and on the same day the respondents entered into a lease agreement with the petitioner in respect of the petition mentioned property under Ex. A-1 which includes the three shops and a vacant site. As per the terms of the lease deed, Ex. A-1, the respondents agreed to remove at their cost the asbestos sheet sheds and a compound wall put up by Thirunavukkarasu at the end of the tenancy. A perusal of the lease deed Ex.A-1 also shows that as per the terms of the lease deed, the petitioner has to change the tiles and attend to the other repair works of three shop which were let out under Ex.A-1. From Ex. A-1 it is clear that the subject-matter of the tenancy in this case comprises (a) three shops (b) the site on which the previous tenant Tirunavukkarasu put up some asbestos sheet sheds; and (c) the vacant land. As the subject-matter of the tenancy under Ex. A-1 includes three shops and vacant site, it has to be held that what was let out by the petitioner to the respondents under Ex. A-1 is a building within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. The lease in favour of the respondents under Ex. A-1 does not cease to be a lease of the building merely because some asbestos sheet sheds put up in a portion of the vacant site by the previous tenant Tirunavakkarasu were purchased by the second respondent particulary when he has agreed under Ex. A-1 to remove the same at the end of that tenancy. Therefore, it has to be held that what was let out by the petitioner to the respondents under Ex. A-1 is a building within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and the petition for eviction filed under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act is maintainable. The conclusions arrived at by the Rent Controller as well as by the Appellate Authority in this regard are correct and do not call for interference in this revision.

6. The second contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority rendered any specific finding with regard to the condition of the petition mentioned property and in the absence of the said finding the Authorities below erred in ordering eviction on the ground that the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide in view of the decision in (1990) 106 Mad LW 547 (SC) (P. ORR & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Limited). The learned counsel further contended that though the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide, is not challenged by the respondents before the Appellate Authority and the said plea was abandoned before the Appellate Authority, but, still in the revision before this Court, he can raise the very same plea once again as the plea pertains to a pure question of law. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decisions reported in (1) AIR 1960 Jannu & Kashmir 35; (2) (FB); (3) AIR 1979 Gauhati 10; (4) ; (5) ; (6) (1982) 2 Mad LJ 109; (7) (1981) 1 Mad LJ 250; and (8) (1982) 1 Mad LJ 318.

I am unable to accept the above contention of the learned counsel for he respondents. In Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust Ltd., , the Supreme Court, dealing with the question when and what questions can be permitted to be raised for the first time in the second appeal observed as follows :--

"A pure question of law not agitated or abandoned in the lower appellate court can be allowed to be raised in second appeal under S. 39(2) but the Court in exercise of its discretion has to consider whether it should be permitted to be raised and while giving permission the Court has to look at all the facts and circumstances, the conduct of the party seeking to raise it being of great importance"

Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances in that case, the Supreme Court held that the plea of absence of valid notice terminating the contractual tenancy which was abandoned before the Appellate Tribunal should not have been allowed to be raised in the second appeal. In the present the respondents raised a plea before the Rent Controller that the petitioner's requirement of the petitioner mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide. Both the parties let in evidence with regard to that plea. The Rent Controller, on the basis of the oral evidence of P.W. 1 and the document Ex. A-2 rendered a finding that the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide. That finding of the Rent Controller is a finding on a question of fact based on evidence. Admittedly the respondents have not challenged the correctness of the above finding of the Rent Controller before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority in para 6 of its judgment has specifically observed that the counsel for the tenants did not challenge the finding of the Rent Controller that the landlord's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide and the only point urged by the counsel for the tenant before the Appellate Authority was that the petition for eviction filed before the Rent Controller under the provisions of the Act is not maintainable. In these circumstances it cannot be said that such plea viz. the landlord's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide, raised before the Rent Controller by the tenant but abandoned before the appellate Authority pertains to a pure question of law. Taking into consideration the above facts and circumstances it has to be held that the respondents who have abandoned the plea that the petitioner's requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide, before the appellate Authority, are not entitled to raise the same plea in this revision. The several decisions relied on the learned counsel for the respondents and which are referred above will not apply to the facts of the present case, because they are authorities only for the proposition that a pure question of law not agitated or abandoned in the lower appellate court can be allowed to be raised in the second appeal. But, that is not the position in the present case. The plea, that, the petitioner's requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide raised before the Rent Controller by the respondent but abandoned before the Appellate Authority cannot be allowed to be raised again in revision before this Court. There is no merit in "this civil revision petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Rajagopal Vandaiyar ... v. D. Joseph Nadar