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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • provisions of S. 2(y) of the Criminal Procedure Code read with section 8 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 13(1) of the General Clauses Act
  • section 44 of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 43 of the said Code
  • provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (Act IX of 1875)
  • sections 44 and 43 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875,
  • directs.6. Section 125(1) Cr. P.C
  • sections 488 and 125 Cr. P.C
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of S. 2(y) of the Criminal Procedure Code read with section 8 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 13(1) of the General Clauses Act
  • section 44 of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 43 of the said Code
  • provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (Act IX of 1875)
  • sections 44 and 43 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875,
  • directs.6. Section 125(1) Cr. P.C
  • sections 488 and 125 Cr. P.C
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the mother of the respondent. The petitioner's husband, T.P.S. Hariram Sait (the respondent's father), died, after which the petitioner became Managing Director of T.P. Sokkalal Beedi Factory Private Limited, Tirunelveli. The petitioner and the late husband had five children; the respondent is a daughter approximately 31 years of age, who was brought up by the petitioner and studied up to the 10th Standard.

Following certain misunderstandings between mother and daughter, the respondent has been living separately from the petitioner for over two years. The respondent filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli (M.C. No. 79 of 1988), claiming maintenance of Rs. 500 per month from her mother on the ground that she has no source of income and was driven out of the house after objecting to the petitioner’s close relationship with one Thomas Fernando.

The petitioner filed a petition under the inherent powers of Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking to quash the maintenance proceedings on the ground that Section 125 Cr.P.C. does not provide for maintenance to a daughter who has attained majority unless she is unable to maintain herself by reason of physical or mental abnormality or injury.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a daughter who has attained majority (and is not married) can claim maintenance under Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C. in the absence of any averment of physical or mental abnormality or injury causing inability to maintain herself.
  2. Whether the term "injury" in Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C. must be given the meaning assigned to "injury" in Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code (read with Section 43 IPC via Section 2(y) Cr.P.C.), i.e., whether "injury" must be "illegal" or "unlawful" to attract Section 125(1)(c).
  3. Whether a mother can be directed to pay maintenance to her daughter under Section 125 Cr.P.C., having regard to the language of the provision and related statutory interpretation principles.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner / Appellant (represented by Mr. I. Subramaniam)

  • Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C. limits maintenance for a child who has attained majority (and is not a married daughter) to cases where inability to maintain arises due to physical or mental abnormality or injury; absent such a condition, the remedy is not under Section 125 but in civil court.
  • Reliance on the difference in wording between old Section 488 Cr.P.C. and present Section 125 Cr.P.C. to show a deliberate legislative limitation: under the old provision the only limitation was "unable to maintain itself", whereas the new provision narrows claims by major children to specified causes.
  • On the facts, the respondent is an admitted major (about 31 years) and there is no averment of any physical or mental abnormality or injury which renders her unable to maintain herself.

Respondent (represented by Mr. S. Ashok Kumar)

  • Paragraph 6 of the maintenance petition averred that movements/relationship between the petitioner and Thomas Fernando have "caused a grave damage to the reputation of the family of the petitioner and also caused injury in the mind of the petitioner" — counsel argued that this "injury" falls within the "injury" contemplated by Section 125(1)(c).
  • Counsel sought to import the definition of "injury" from Section 44 IPC (via Section 2(y) Cr.P.C.), which defines "injury" as "any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property", and relied on Section 43 IPC for the meaning of "illegal".

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggrawal, (1969) 3 SCC 802 : AIR 1970 SC 446 : 1970 Cri LJ 522 Established that under the old Section 488 Cr.P.C. the word “child” did not mean a minor and the sole limitation was "unable to maintain itself"; highlighted that Section 125 of the new Code departs from the old position and imposes specific limitations for major children. The court relied on this authority to explain the legislative change: S.125 narrows entitlement of major children to cases of inability to maintain due to physical or mental abnormality or injury.
King-Emperor v. Fazlur Rahman, AIR 1930 Patna 593 : 1931 (32) Cri LJ 87 Addressed the meaning of the word "illegal" (cited by respondent's counsel to equate "illegal" with "unlawful"). The court observed that this decision would not assist the respondent's argument in light of the court's reasoning on the contextual meaning of "injury" in Section 125(1)(c).
Mst. Khedani Rajwarin v. Lagansingh, AIR 1921 Patna 379 : 1921 (22) Cri LJ 336 Interpreted old Section 488 Cr.P.C., noting omission to define age was intentional so maintenance could continue throughout life if inability to maintain arose from a mental or corporeal defect. The opinion cited this case as supporting the historic view that inability to maintain was the prime factor; the court used it to contrast the old position with the more limited reach of Section 125(1)(c).
AIR 1969 Delhi 235 : 1969 Cri LJ 965 (referred to as Nanak Chand v. Chander Kishore in the opinion) Delhi High Court held a fully grown person suffering from a crippling disease or physical/mental affliction and unable to earn is entitled to maintenance similar to a person of tender years. The court treated this observation as consistent with the position under Section 125(1)(c) and as persuasive support that major children with crippling conditions fall within Section 125(1)(c).
Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh, (1979) 1 SCC 560 : AIR 1979 SC 381 : 1979 Cri LJ 318 Affirmed that under Section 125 Cr.P.C. a child who has attained majority is not entitled to maintenance unless unable to maintain by reason of physical or mental abnormality or injury. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to confirm the limited ambit of Section 125(1)(c) for major children and to frame the test for entitlement.
State v. Ishwarlal, AIR 1950 Nagpur 231 Interpreted "child" in old Section 488 Cr.P.C., holding omission of age reference was to confer maintenance so long as inability to maintain persisted. Cited to show historical understanding that inability to maintain was the key factor and to support the interpretive contrast with Section 125(1)(c).
Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashe Rao Rajaram Sawai, (1987) 2 SCC 278 : AIR 1987 SC 1100 : 1987 Cri LJ 977 Considered statutory interpretation (Section 2(y) Cr.P.C. read with Section 8 IPC and General Clauses Act) and held that the pronoun "his" in clause (d) of Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. includes females. The court cited this decision to indicate that a mother could be included within the class of persons who may be directed to pay maintenance (i.e., gender-neutral application of pronouns in the provision).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by comparing the wording of the old Section 488 Cr.P.C. with the present Section 125 Cr.P.C., noting that the earlier provision had the broader phrase "unable to maintain itself" while Section 125(1)(c) explicitly restricts recovery by a major (not being a married daughter) to cases where inability to maintain arises "by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury."

The court analyzed whether the term "injury" in Section 125(1)(c) should be given the definition contained in Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code (via Section 2(y) Cr.P.C.). Section 44 IPC defines "injury" as "any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property," and Section 43 IPC defines "illegal."

The court rejected the need to import the IPC definition of "injury" into Section 125(1)(c) on contextual grounds. The court reasoned that the context of Section 125(1)(c) ties the concept of "injury" to the resulting inability to maintain oneself. If "injury" required illegal causation (as in Section 44 IPC), then a person who sustains a disabling injury accidentally (not illegally caused) would be excluded from Section 125(1)(c) — a result contrary to the social object of Section 125, which is a summary remedy to prevent vagrancy and to compel support for those who have a moral claim.

The court therefore interpreted "injury" in Section 125(1)(c) in the light of the section’s protective purpose: it can include physical or mental harm that results in inability to maintain oneself, without requiring that the harm be illegally caused. The court observed that "physical or mental abnormality" will prima facie include congenital defects and that "injury" could arise at any time, including after majority, provided it causes inability to maintain.

Applying that interpretive framework to the facts, the court examined paragraph 6 of the maintenance petition, which alleged that the petitioner's relationship with Thomas Fernando "caused a grave damage to the reputation of the family of the petitioner and also caused injury in the mind of the petitioner." The court held that the averment of "injury in the mind of the petitioner" (i.e., damage to reputation and mental hurt) did not amount to the kind of injury contemplated by Section 125(1)(c) as interpreted in context — that is, an injury producing inability to maintain oneself. Consequently, the respondent had not pleaded any physical or mental abnormality or injury that rendered her unable to maintain herself.

The court also addressed the question whether a mother can be directed to pay maintenance and noted that the provision is to be read in a gender-neutral manner (citing Dr. Vijaya Manohar Arbat). However, the court did not need to finally decide that question in this petition because the substantive threshold under Section 125(1)(c) was not satisfied on the facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was allowed and the trial proceedings were quashed. The court's core ruling can be summarized as: QUASHED — the respondent cannot invoke Section 125 Cr.P.C. to claim maintenance on the facts pleaded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The proceedings in M.C. No. 79 of 1988 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli, are quashed; the respondent’s maintenance petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is dismissed by way of quashing for failure to establish the statutory threshold under Section 125(1)(c).
  • The court interpreted "injury" in Section 125(1)(c) as tied to an inability to maintain oneself and not requiring the narrower, IPC-style requirement of illegal causation; nevertheless, on the pleaded facts in paragraph 6 the respondent did not show injury causing inability to maintain.
  • No new broad precedent beyond the application of the established tests was proclaimed; the court applied existing authorities and statutory interpretation to the facts and concluded that the statutory threshold for a major child under Section 125(1)(c) was not met in this case.

Disposition

Petition allowed. Proceedings in M.C. No. 79 of 1988 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli are quashed.

    T.P.S.H Selva Saroja v. T.P.S.H Sasinathana .

    1. The petitioner is the mother of the respondent. The petitioner's husband, T.P.S Hariram Sait, who is the father of the, respondent, died necessitating the petitioner taking over as Managing Director of T.P Sokkalal Beedi Factory Private Limited, Tirunelvelli. The petitioner and late T.P.S Hariram Sait have five children born out of the wedlock of whom the respondent is a daughter, aged about 31 years. The death of the respondent's father appears to be when she was small child. The petitioner brought up the respondent and the respondent studied up to 10th Standard. Consequent to the status of the petitioner's family the daughter of the respondent was brought up in comfort.

    2. Due to certain misunderstandings between the mother and the daughter, the respondent is now living away from the petitioner for over two years. The respondent has chosen to file a petition under S. 125 Cr. P.C before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Tirunelveli in M.C No. 79 of 1988 claiming maintenance for herself from her mother.

    3. The averments in the petition for maintenance indicate that one Thomas Fernando, a chartered accountant, often visited the family house and moved very closely with the petitioner. It is also averred that the said Thomas Fernando interfered with the family affairs which was not to the liking of the respondent. Thus the respondent objected to such interference, it is her case that she was illtreated. Further, the respondent was driven out of the house since she was deemed to be a hindrance to the close relationship between the petitioner and the said Thomas Fernando. The respondent claims that the movements between Thomas Fernando and the petitioner had caused great damage to the reputation of the family of the respondent and has also caused injury for her mind. The respondent states that she has no source of income and she has been suffering for her livelihood and clothing, by staying separately for over two years. She requires in her estimate Rs. 500/- per month to maintain herself. It is also her grievance that though the petitioner is getting sufficient income she is not maintaining the respondent, who is admittedly aged 31 years, though urimarried.

    4. The petitioner seeks to invoke the inherent powers under S. 482 Cr. P.C to quash the proceedings in M.O No. 79 of 1988 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,. Tirunelveli on the ground that S. 125 Cr. P.C will not take within its fold award of maintenance to a daughter, who had attained majority and who does not suffer from any physical or mental abnormality or injury by reason of which she was not able to maintain herself. The proceedings in the trial court are challenged as ab initio void and without jurisdiction necessitating striking down.

    5. Mr. I. Subramaniam, learned counsel for the petitioner, in the context of S. 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C would contend that a child, who had attained majority (not being a married daughter) can claim maintenance only if it is unable to maintain itself by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury. If the respondent will not come within this category, the remedy for her will not be under S. 125 Cr. P.C but could be only in the civil court. He has brought to my notice similar provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 when S. 488 Cr. P.C was the corresponding section. S. 488(1) read as tinder:

    “If any person having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain, itself, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the Ist Class, may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding Rs. 500/- in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs”.

    6. Section 125(1) Cr. P.C reads as hereunder:

    “Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents:— (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain—

    (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or

    (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or

    (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or

    (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the;whole as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:

    “Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means.

    Explanation — For the purpose of this 1 Chapter.—

    (a) “minor” means a person who, Tinder the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, is deemed not to have attained his majority;

    (b) “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried”.

    7. Basing on the difference of wording in sections 488 and 125 Cr. P.C learned counsel would contend that though a child in 488 did not mean a minor son or daughter, the rule of limitation being the expression “unable to maintain itself”, Under S. 125 Cr. P.C “inability to maintain itself” must be by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury in the case of children, who had attained majority (not being a married daughter). On the facts of this case, he would contend that the respondent is admittedly a major aged 31 years, and there is no averment in the petition of any physical or mental abnormality or injury whch could be related to her inability to maintain herself.

    8. Per contra, Mr. S. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, would refer to paragraph 6 of the maintenance petition where the following averment has been made:

    “The movements with Thomas Fernando by the respondent has caused a grave damage to the reputation of the family of the petitioner and also caused injury in the mind of the petitioner”.

    9. And contend that the injury mentioned therein would fall within the injury contemplated under S. 125(1)(c) of the Code. He would seek to substantiate his contention, that the meaning of injury will have reference to section 44 of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 43 of the said Code since injury had not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and in terms of S. 2(y) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the words and expressions used and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code will have meanings I respectively assigned to them in that Code. 1 S. 44 of the Indian Penal Code defines injury asunder:

    “The word ‘injury’ denotes any harm I whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property”.

    10. The word ‘illegal’ is defined in S. 43 of the Indian Penal Code as follows:

    “The word ‘illegal’ is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal in him to omit”.

    11. Both counsel have referred to a few decisions rendered by various Courts, though none of them have touched this controversy in question. Reference will be made to the cases cited by the counsel in the relevant context.

    12. Though there were conflicting judicial decisions when S. 488 Cr. P.C ruled the field, regarding the scope and meaning of the expression ‘child’ vis-a-vis majority, the matter was set at rest by the Supreme Court in Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggrawal, (1969) 3 SCC 802 : AIR 1970 SC 446 : (1970 Cri LJ 522) wherein it was held that the child referred to in S. 488 of the old Code did not mean a minor son or daughter and that the only limitation was contained in the expression ‘unable to maintain itself’. However, S. 125 of the new Code has made a departure and defines the expression ‘minor’ and limits the condition under which a child who has attained majority can claim maintenance. A minor has been explained to mean a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (Act IX of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority. For the child who has attained majority, S. 125(1)(c) places certain limitations. The liability to maintain a child, who has attained majority, can arise only—

    a. if that child is not a married daughter;

    b if it is unable to maintain itself on account of

    (1) Physical or mental abnormality; or

    (2) injury.

    13. It is, therefore, seen that the Act makes it clear that any child, who has attained majority, is not automatically entitled to claim maintenance, even if he is unable to maintain himself, as was the case in the old Code bul inability to maintain should arise out of physical or mental abnormality or injury. In the past as well as in the present, the limitation is the inability to maintain itself. This inability to maintain in the case of a major must be by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury. A mere physical or mental abnormality or a mere injury, which does not make the child unable to maintain itself will not be covered under S. 125(1)(c) of the Code.

    14. The question to be considered next will be, whether ‘injury’ mentioned in, S. 125(1)(c) of the Code will take its meaning assigned in S. 44, 1.P.C.S 2(y) of the Criminal Procedure Code reads, in this Code unless the context otherwise requires “words and expressions” used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. This clause naturally must be read as qualified by the words unless the context otherwise requires. The context of ‘injury’ used in S. 125(1)(c) of the Code does not, to my mind, require reference to sections 44 and 43 of the Indian Penal Code since iris correlated to the inability to maintain itself. However, let us test the need for importing the meaning of ‘injury’ to S. 125(1)(c) from S. 44 I.P.C ‘Injury’ need not necessarily denote physical injury, for, it can be mental as well. ‘Injury’ contemplated under S. 44 I.P.C, is harm whatever illegally caused to any person etc. This illegal causation of injury in the context of this petition is stated to be covered by that part of S. 44 I.P.C which reads or which furnishes ground for a civil action”. For example, let us take a case of a major, who falls down unexpectedly without intervention of any one else and sustains a bodily injury which results in inability to maintain himself. The injury sustained by him cannot be said to have been caused illegally. If the definition of injury in S. 44 I.P.C were to be attracted, this person will have to be taken out of the purview of S. 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C since the injury which has resulted in inability to maintain had not been illegally caused. That cannot be the object of S. 125 Cr. P.C which provides a summary remedy for neglected wives and children. The object of the maintenance proceedings is not to punish a parent but to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can do so to support those who are unable to support themselves and Who have a moral claim to support. This section is a measure of social justice and is enacted to protect certain category of children contemplated therein. To my mind, it appears, that the context of S. 125(1)(c) does not require reference to the definition of ‘injury’ rendered in S. 44 I.P.C The words “physical or mental abnormality” will prima facie take in congenital defects while ‘injury’ leading to inability to maintain itself can have reference be at any point of time even after the attaining of majority. It may even be possible to take in all cases of physical or mental abnormality which need not necessarily be congenital. The keynote of the section appears to be on the phrase ‘unable to maintain itself’. Mr. Ashok Kumar had referred to King-Emperor v. Fazlur Rahman*, AIR 1930 Patna 593 : (1931 (32) Cri LJ 87) to contend that the word ‘illegal’ has the same meaning as unlawful. This decision will not help him in view of my discussion on this aspect earlier. In AIR 1921 Patna 379 (1) : (1921 (22) Cri LJ 336) (Mst. Khedani Rajwarin v. Lagansingh) the Patna High Court while dealing with S. 488 Cr. P.C observed that the omission to define the age was probably intentional so as to allow the maintenance to continue even throughout the life if Owing to some mental or corporeal defect the person is unable to maintain himself. The Law Commission in its 41st report observed that the said decision had lucidly explained the position as aforementioned, with which they agreed. In AIR 1969 Delhi 235 : (1969 Cri LJ 965), (Nanak Chand v. Chander Kishore) the Delhi High Court held that a fully grown up person, who is suffering from a crippling disease or some physical or mental affliction and is, therefore, unable to earn for himself nor has he any independent means of his own is as much a child entitled to speedy and immediate relief from his parent as the person of tender years or one who has not yet attained majority. This observation will correctly fit in to the provisions of S. 125.(1)(c) Cr. P.C We have already seen earlier that the Supreme Court has affirmed this view of the Delhi High Court in the context of S. 488 Cr. P.C In (1979) 1 SCC 560 : AIR 1979 SC 381 : (1979 Cri LJ 318) Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh observation has been made that under S. 125 Cr. P.C a child, who has attained majority is not entitled to be awarded maintenance unless such child is unable to maintain itself by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury. In AIR 1950 Nagpur 231 (The State v. Ishwarlal) while considering the word ‘child’ in S. 488 Cr. P.C it was held that reference to age had been purposely omitted from it because the object of the section was to confer a right on any son or daughter to obtain maintenance from the father so long as he or she is unable to maintain himself and herself. That inability to maintain was the prime factor fits in, in the new Code as well but for the limitation prescribed for the entitlement of major children to obtain maintenance from the parent.

    15. An argument was advanced by Mr. I. Subramaniam, that a mother cannot be directed to pay maintenance to her daughter since such course does not appear to be contemplated under S. 125 Cr. P.C This question need not have to be gone into in this petition. However, one cannot overlook that in the context of the social purpose and the moral obligation cast on the mother she could be easily excluded from her liability once it is shown that she has sufficient means of her own, independent of the father and the child would come within the purview of S. 125(1)(b) or (c). The Supreme Court in Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashe Rao Rajaram Sawai (1987) 2 SCC 278 : AIR 1987 SC 1100 : (1987 Cri LJ 977), while, considering the obligation of a married, daughter to maintain her father, has held that in view of the provisions of S. 2(y) of the Criminal Procedure Code read with section 8 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 13(1) of the General Clauses Act the pronoun his as used in clause (d) of S. 125(1) Cr. P.C includes both male and a female.

    16. The net result of the analysis leads to the conclusion that the word ‘injury’ used in S. 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C will have to be read in the context of inability to maintain, which does not require recourse to the definition of injury in the Indian Penal Code. Paragraph 6 of the maintenance petition where the word ‘injury’ in the mind of the petitioner has been used does not really come within the scope of the injury contemplated under S. 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C

    17. I am of the view that the respondent cannot invoke the provisions of S. 125 Cr. P.C to claim maintenance from her mother, the petitioner. In the result, the petition is allowed, and the proceedings in M.C No. 79 of 1988 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tirunelveli are quashed.

    18. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    T.P.S.H Selva Saroja v. T.P.S.H Sasinathana .
    (Mar 23, 1989)