AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Two brothers filed separate writ petitions seeking admission to Government Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu for the M.B.B.S. or B.D.S. degree courses for the academic year 1985-86 under the quota of twelve seats reserved for "children born of inter-caste marriage" enumerated in Annexure I of the prospectus issued by the first respondent. Neither petitioner was selected. Each petition prayed for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Category (iv) (the parts of the reservation formula that give preference to children born of inter‑caste marriages involving SC/ST) insofar as those sub-clauses related to the petitioners, and for directions to admit each petitioner to first-year medical studies for 1985-86.

The petitioners are Thiru Ramesh (a major) and Thiru Hari Ganesh (a minor represented by his father and guardian Thiru P. Shanmugham). It is stated that Ramesh applied in 1983-84, raising a procedural note about entitlement to relief for 1985-86, but the petitions were pursued on the substantive ground that the preference in Clauses (1) and (2) of Category (iv) discriminated against children born of other types of inter‑caste marriages.

Annexure I of the prospectus set out 12 seats under Category (iv) for "Children born of inter-caste marriage" and then prescribed an order of preference in Clauses (1) and (2): (1) children of inter-caste marriages between SC/ST and Forward Communities; (2) children of inter‑caste marriages between SC/ST and Most Backward/Backward Classes. The petitioners themselves are children of an inter-caste marriage between their father (belonging to a Backward community) and their mother (belonging to a Forward community).

Respondents filed a counter-affidavit; the Advocate General sought to treat it as common to both petitions. The petitions were heard and decided by S. Natarajan, J., who considered the constitutional validity of the reservation and the prescribed order of preference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State can reserve a certain number of seats in Government medical colleges for special categories of candidates (such as "children born of inter-caste marriage").
  2. Whether the State is entitled to prescribe an order of preference for filling up those reserved seats (specifically, preference for children of inter‑caste marriages involving members of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners are children of an inter-caste marriage between a Backward community father and a Forward community mother; they fall within Category (iv) as defined.
  • Although reservation of 12 seats for children born of inter-caste marriage is permissible, the preference shown in Clauses (1) and (2) for children born of inter-caste marriages involving Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes is discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • Counsel relied on Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1952 SC 123) and State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (AIR 1951 SC 318) to support the contention that the preferential classification offends equality.
  • The petitioners sought quashing of Clauses (1) and (2) insofar as they related to the petitioners, and an order directing admission; alternatively, the petitioner’s counsel asked at least one of the two petitioners be admitted.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The reservation under Category (iv) (and Clauses (1) and (2)) was designed to encourage inter‑caste marriages involving members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes with Forward Communities or Backward Classes, and is therefore valid.
  • The State, funding the medical colleges, has the right to reserve seats for weaker sections of society who require upliftment; such reservation is consistent with Article 46 of the Constitution.
  • The policy of reservation in Category (iv) and Clauses (1) and (2) does not violate Articles 14, 15 or 19 of the Constitution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123 Relied upon by petitioners to support their argument that the preferential clauses were discriminatory under Article 14. The court noted the petitioners' reliance on this authority but did not accept that reliance as deciding the issue in favour of the petitioners; the court rejected the claim of discriminatory classification in the circumstances of this reservation scheme.
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 Relied upon by petitioners in support of their Article 14 challenge. The court recorded that petitioners placed reliance on this case but concluded that the preference in Clauses (1) and (2) did not violate Article 14 and therefore the reliance did not lead to quashing the clauses.
Shri Ram Krishna Daliam v. Shri Justice Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 : AIR 1958 SC 538 Principle that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification. The court followed the ratio and used it to support the proposition that reasonable classification is permissible and that the State may set apart certain seats for special categories.
Chitra Ghosh v. Union, (1969) 2 SCC 228 : (1970) 1 SCR 413 : AIR 1970 SC 35 Affirmation that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it permits reasonable classification; examples of valid reservations based on handicaps. The court cited Chitra Ghosh for the proposition that reasonable classification is constitutionally permissible and that reservations addressing special handicaps or disabilities are justifiable; used to support validity of Clauses (1) and (2).
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335 : AIR 1981 SC 1829 Where classes are essentially different, Article 14 is not attracted; Art. 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. The court relied on this case to reinforce that differently treating essentially different classes (here, children of inter-caste marriages involving SC/ST) does not offend Article 14.
Murthy Match Works v. Asst. Collector, Excise, (1974) 4 SCC 428 : AIR 1974 SC 497 Equality of treatment regardless of inequality of realities is neither justice nor homage to the constitutional principle. The court cited this authority to support the view that equal treatment in the face of unequal social realities is improper, supporting differential treatment for those suffering greater disadvantages (i.e., children whose parents include SC/ST).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed two central legal questions: (i) whether the State may reserve seats for special categories; and (ii) whether the State may prescribe an order of preference within such reservations.

On the first question, the court observed Article 46, which directs the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of weaker sections, particularly Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. From this constitutional duty, the court concluded that the State is entitled to take appropriate measures, including reservation, to uplift weaker sections and that members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes can legitimately claim priority of consideration even among weaker sections.

The court applied settled doctrine that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification. It relied on Chitra Ghosh and Shri Ram Krishna Daliam to show that reasonable classification is constitutionally permissible. The court accepted the concession from petitioners' counsel that reservation for children born of inter-caste marriages could be a reasonable classification, but identified the petitioners' objection as specifically directed at the sub-classification that gives preference to inter‑caste marriages involving SC/ST.

The court addressed the matter both legally and sociologically. Factually and socially, it analysed the entrenched caste system and concluded that marriages between members of Forward or Backward communities and members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes constitute a more significant social breakthrough — they more directly remove the stigma of untouchability — than inter-caste marriages between Forward and Backward communities. The court reasoned that this social reality justifies giving greater weight to marriages involving SC/ST for purposes of affirmative measures designed to combat untouchability and assist social upliftment.

Legally, the court drew on Air India v. Nergesh Meerza to emphasize that Article 14 does not prohibit reasonable classification where classes are essentially different, and Murthy Match Works to emphasize that treating unequals equally is neither just nor constitutionally mandated. The court concluded that Clauses (1) and (2) of Category (iv) constitute a permissible preference within a valid reserved category because children born of inter-caste marriages involving SC/ST have different and greater social handicaps that justify preferential treatment.

The court rejected the petitioners' further submission that priority should instead be given to children of inter‑religious marriages, noting that Christians and Muslims do not suffer the specific social disgrace of untouchability that affects Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; thus that submission did not undermine the statutory preference directed at combating untouchability.

Finally, the court considered the petitioners' request that at least one of them be admitted on compassionate or equitable grounds because some private medical colleges had come up and the Government filled some seats, but found no legal basis to direct such an admission and declined to make any recommendation to the Government.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were dismissed. The court upheld the validity of Clauses (1) and (2) of Category (iv) in Annexure I of the prospectus and found that the preference for children born of inter-caste marriages involving Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes did not violate Article 14.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' challenge failed; they were not granted admission and the court refused to order or recommend admission of at least one petitioner.
  • The procedural consequence: Both writ petitions were dismissed and there was no order as to costs.
  • Broader legal implication: The court affirmed that reservation of seats for special categories is permissible and that the State may prescribe an order of preference within such reservations when reasonable classification is shown by reference to social realities (specifically to combat untouchability). The opinion does not announce that a new precedent was created beyond applying existing authorities and constitutional principles.

    S. Hari Ganesh (Minor) And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Another

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    S. Natarajan, J.:— These two writ petitions have been filed by two brothers, who sought admission in any of the Government Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu for the M.B.B.S, or B.D.S Degree Course in the quota of twelve seats reserved for children born of intercaste marriage, under the special categories of candidates enumerated in Annexure I of the prospectus issued by the first respondent. Since neither of them was selected, the two petitioners have filed the respective petitions praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus in favour of each for quashing sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Category (iv) of the reservations specified in Annexure I so far as it relates to each of them, and in addition, for the directions being issued to the respondents to admit each one of them in the first year of the M.B.B.S Degree Course for the academic year 1985-86.

    2. Thiru Ramesh, petitioner in W.P No. 9647 of 1985, is a major while Thiru Hari Ganesh, petitioner in W.P No. 8390 of 1985 is a minor represented by his father and guardian Thiru P. Shanmugham. It is stated that Thiru Ramesh applied for admission for the M.B.B.S,/B.D.S Course in the year 1983-84. If so, it is not clear how the petitioner is entitled to seek the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus relating to the selections that have been made for the academic year 1985-86. Be that as it may, the ground on which the two writ petitions are founded, is of limited dimension. For admission of students to the Government Medical Colleges in Tamil Nadu for the M.B.B.S,/B.D.S/B.Pharm Courses, 1985-86, it was announced in the prospectus that selections would be made for a total number of 1072 seats in the various medical colleges, existing as well as proposed, in different parts of the State. Annexure I of the prospectus sets out the number of seats reserved for certain special categories of candidates in the State of Tamil Nadu. Candidates wishing to apply for selection to one of the seats reserved for the special categories have been directed to indicate clearly the particular category under which they seek admission. The categories of reservation are as under:

    Category of ReservationNo. of seats for 1985-86(i) For Physically handicapped3(ii) For Widows10(iii) Eminent Sportsmen3(iv) Children born of inter-caste marriage in the order of preference mentioned below:12(1) For the Children born of inter-caste marriage between SC/ST and Forward Communities(2) For the children born of inter-Caste marriage between SC/ST and Most Backward Class/Backward Class Communities(v) Defence Quota6(vi) Children of Freedom Fighters3(vii) Tamil Language Candidate whose parent/parents has/have suffered for the cause of development of Tamil and contributed towards the protection of Tamil6(viii) For orphans from orphanages approved and aided by State Government5

    As we are concerned only with Category (iv) and Cls. (1) and (2), the details of this category alone have been set out and the details of the other categories have not been extracted.

    3. The petitioners are children born of intercaste marriage between their father belonging to a Backward community and their mother belonging to a Forward community. As the reservation under Category (iv) has been made for children born of intercaste marriage, the petitioners contend that the preference shown under Cl. (1) for the children born of intercaste marriage between Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Forward Classes and under Cl. (2) for the children born of intercaste marriage between Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Most Backward Classes, amounts to preferential treatment of those children and it is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Mr. Shanmugham, who argued the petitions on behalf of both the petitioners, strenuously pleaded that the reservation of twelve seats for children born of inter-caste marriage is permissible under the Constitution, but conferring preference to children born of parents of whom one happened to be a member of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, for selection, is discriminatory in nature and such a differentiation violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. In support of his argument he placed reliance on Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123 and State of Bombay v. F.N Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318. Mr. Shanmugham therefore, prayed that Cls. 1 and 2 of Category (iv) of Annexure I in the prospectus should be held unconstitutional and quashed so far as the petitioners are concerned and, in addition, a mandamus should be issued to the respondents to give admission to the two petitioners in the First Year of the M.B.B.S, Degree course for the year 1985-86. Lastly, he pleaded that he will be satisfied if admission is given at least to one of the two petitioners.

    4. The respondents have filed a counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No. 8390 of 1985, but the learned Advocate General stated that it can be treated as a common counter-affidavit in both the writ petitions. Mr. Shanmugham conceded that the defence raised in the counter-affidavit would cover both the petitions.

    5. In the counter-affidavit it is stated that the reservation under Category (iv) has been made mainly with a view to encourage intercaste marriages with members of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes by members of the Forward Communities or Backward Classes, as the case may be, and as such Cls. 1 and 2 in Category (iv) are perfectly valid in law. It is further stated that since the State Government is running the medical college from out of its funds, the Government has a right to reserve certain seats in the medical colleges for the weaker sections of Society as they need upliftment in greater measure: than other sections of society. Lastly, it is stated that the reservation of twelve seats under Category (iv), in terms of Cls. 1 and 2, is in conformity with Art. 46 of the Constitution, and the directive principle contained therein. The counter further states that the policy of reservation contained in Category (iv) together with Cls. 1 and 2, is not violative of Arts. 14, 15 and 19 in any manner.

    6. Having regard to the contentions of the petitioners and the respondents, two questions fall for consideration, viz., whether the State can reserve certain number of seats for special categories of candidates; and secondly, whether the State is entitled to prescribe an order of preference for filling up those seats?

    7. So far as the first question is concerned, it is worthy of note that Art. 46 of the Constitution enjoins the State to promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, particularly members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The State is therefore under a bounden duty to take appropriate measures for promoting the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of society, especially the members belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It therefore follows that even among the weaker sections of people, members belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe can legitimately claim priority of consideration. In Chitra Ghosh v. Union, (1970) 1 SCR 413 : (1969) 2 SCC 228 : AIR 1970 SC 35; it has been laid down, following the ratio in Shri Ram Krishna Daliam v. Shri Justice Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 : (AIR 1958 SC 538), that “while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification.” Mr. Shanmugham concedes the position that the State is entitled to make reasonable classification for setting apart a certain number of seats in the medical college for special categories of candidates, but would, however, say that all candidates falling under a designed category, should be treated equally for purposes of selection under that classification and preferential treatment should not be given to any section of the classified category for admission. In other words, Mr. Shanmugham argued that the reservation of seats for children born of inter-caste marriage is a reasonable classification, but the directions under Cls. 1 and 2 of Category (iv) for preference being given to children born of inter-caste marriages in which one of the spouses is necessarily a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, are discriminatory and will amount to class legislation. It is this portion of the argument which requires consideration.

    8. Before examining the legal content in the arguments of Mr. Shanmugham, we may look at the matter from a general prespective. Theoretically speaking, Society is expected to view every marriage as a lawful union between a man and a woman, and creating marital rights and obligations betwixt them besides legal rights of inheritance to them and their off-springs to the spouses themselves their union by matrimony is an endearing fusion of hearts till death parts them asunder. Thus, conceptually all marriages may seem alike and may call for recognition and respect. But the ways, of the world and the hard facts of life call for realistic perspectives. In a country like ours, where the caste-system has taken deep roots for centuries and created unsurmountable social barriers, the very mention of the word ‘marriage’ brings to the mind of concept of an alliance between a man and a woman of the same caste. The mental picture does not stop with that, but goes further, and conjures visions of an alliance between two families where the economic levels, cultural standards and food habits are parity-oriented. Consequently, even in a marriage between members of the same caste, if disparities are noticed in the levels of wealth, social standing, cultural standards, religious tenets and food habits of the spouses the marriage arouses suspicion and sarcastic comments. In such a society, if a marriage taken place between a member of the Forward Community of Backward Class, on the one hand, and a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, on the other, it is not only starting event, but a revolutionary alliance. The reason for it, it is needless to say, is because of the pernicious caste-system which has dubbed the members of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe as untouchables and thrown them into the abysmal depths of society. It cannot, therefore, be said that all inter-caste marriage are on the same plane and that a marriage between a member of the Forward Community or Backward Class with a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not a greater social break-through than a marriage of a member of the Forward Community with a member of the Backward Class.

    9. Coming, now, to the legal aspect of the matter, we have to bear in mind Arts. 17 and 16 of the Constitution. While under Art. 17 untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden, under Art. 46 the State is obligated to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and especially those of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. The State is, therefore, bound legally and morally to give special recognition to marriages of the so-called caste-Hindus with members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes because such marriages remove the imbalances and inequalities in society to a greater degree than marriages between members of the Forward Communities and members of the Backward Class. Any welfare and secular State, committed to the abolition of untouchability and to the ushering in of an egalitarian society, rid of caste and communal barriers, has necessarily to be given greater weightage and preference to a marriage in which a member of a Forward Community or a Backward Class marries a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. It therefore follows that though the State has reserved twelve seats under the category of ‘Children born of inter-caste marriages’, it is entitled to give preference to (i) children born of inter-caste marriages between members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and members of Forward Communities, and (ii) children born of inter-caste marriages between members of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and members of Most Backward Class/Backward Class. In fact, the category of reservation is essentially in the nature of ‘children born of inter-caste-Hindus and Hindus belonging to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. The status of the children born of such marriages is undoubtedly different from the status given by Society to Children born of inter-caste marriages between members belonging to the Forward Communities and Backward Classes. In such circumstances, there is no scope for arguing that Cls. 1 and 2 of Category (iv) offend Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    10. In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335 : AIR 1981 SC 1829 it was pointed out that where the classes of categories are essentially different, Art. 14 cannot be attracted and that what Art. 14 forbids is hostile discrimination, but not reasonable classification. It was further observed that where persons belonging to a particular class, in view of the special attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like, are differently treated in order to advance and boost members belonging to Backward Class, such classification would not amount to discrimination forbidden by Art. 14 and it has also been observed that Art. 14 would apply only when equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. In another case, Murthy Match Works v. Asst. Collector, Excise, (1974) 4 SCC 428 : (1974) 3 SCR 121 : AIR 1974 SC 497 it has been pointed out that ‘equality of treatment regardless of the inequality of realities, is neither justice nor homage to the Constitutional principle’. In yet another case, Chitra Ghosh v. Union, (1969) 2 SCC 228 : (1970) 1 SCR 413 : AIR 1970 SC 35, the Supreme Court has held that the reservation of seats in the Maulana Azad Medical College for the sons and daughters of (i) residents of Union Territories, other than Delhi, (ii) Central Government Servants posted in Indian Missions abroad, etc., and reservation of seats for Jammu and Kashmir State scholars, were all justifiable, as the reservations had been made with reference to certain handicaps suffered by the concerned students. These pronouncements, therefore, clearly lend authority to our view that the reservation of twelve seats in the medical colleges for children born of inter-caste marriages with preference for children born to spouses of whom one is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, even though the heading of the category is ‘children born on inter-caste marriages’, it is perfectly in accordance with law, and does not offend the Constitutional provisions in any manner. Hence, even from the legal point of view, the criticism levelled by the petitioner about the formula prescribed for filling up the 12 reserved seats under category (iv) cannot be sustained.

    11. Mr. Shanmugham argued that if preference is to be given to offsprings born of revolutionary inter-caste marriages then primacy should be given to children born of inter-religious marriages and not to the children born of inter-caste marriages with members of the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe. He argued that a marriage between a Hindu and a Muslim or a Hindu and a Christian, is for more radical in nature, than a marriage between a member of a Forward Community or a Backward Class with a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. We are afraid Mr. Shanmugham has missed the purpose underlying the reservation of these twelve seats for children of inter-caste marriages in which one of the spouses is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The preference has been given in order to remove the evil of untouchability and to give social upliftment to the children born of inter-caste marriages with persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Even though Christians and Muslims fall outside the fold of Hindu Community, they do not suffer from the disgrace of untouchability. On the other hand, the members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes have been given less than human status by being treated as untouchables. It is in order to remove this injustice, that priority has been given to children born of inter-caste marriages in which one of the spouses is a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for filling up the twelve seats reserved under Category (iv).

    12. Mr. Shanmugham lastly pleaded that since some private medical colleges have been opened and since Government has the right to fill up fifty per cent of the seats from candidates selected by it, the Government may be called upon to give admission to at least one of his two sons. While we fully comprehend the anxiety of Mr. Shanmugham as a father to secure admission for at least one of his sons in the Medical College, we find ourselves unable to accede to his request because there is no basis on which we can make a recommendation to Government in the manner sought for by Mr. Shanmugham.

    13. In the light of our discussion and the resultant conclusion reached by us, it follows that the writ petitions have to fail. Accordingly, they will stand dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs.

    14. Petitions dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    S. Hari Ganesh (Minor) And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Another
    (Jan 3, 1986)