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  • Traffic Act, 1930. While construing S. 38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930,
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, as amended by Act 56 of 1969,
  • Traffic Act, 1960 or the earlier 1930 Act
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  • Sec. 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • S. 203 of the Road Traffic Act, 1960
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Insurance) Act, 1971
  • Traffic Act, 1930.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Traffic Act, 1930. While construing S. 38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930,
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, as amended by Act 56 of 1969,
  • Traffic Act, 1960 or the earlier 1930 Act
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
  • Sec. 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • S. 203 of the Road Traffic Act, 1960
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • Insurance) Act, 1971
  • Traffic Act, 1930.
Smart Summary

Court of Madras — Judgment delivered by Ramanujam, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed by United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madurai (the appellant/insurer) against an award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in M.A.C.O.P. No. 36 of 1976. The claim petition was instituted by the legal representatives of one Alagappan (deceased), who died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor accident on 27-10-1975.

Facts of the accident as presented in the record: Alagappan (aged about 32 years), a senior clerk in the State Bank of India, Kodaikanal, was returning from Madurai to Kodaikanal in car MDA 1194 owned by the 9th respondent and driven by the 10th respondent. At about 6 a.m. near Parayai Mills' gate in Samayanallur on the Dindigul main road, the driver lost control, the car went off the road and struck a tree; the impact caused grievous abdominal injuries (from the gear rod) and Alagappan died the next day at Government Hospital, Madurai.

Procedurally, the claim petition sought Rs. 75,000 as compensation before the Claims Tribunal. The owner and driver (respondents 1 and 3 in the claim petition) remained ex parte before the Tribunal; the insurer alone resisted the claim. The Tribunal found the driver guilty of rash and negligent driving and awarded Rs. 75,000 in favour of certain claimants (claimants 2 to 4), holding that others (claimants 1, 5 to 8) were not dependents. The insurer appealed against that award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the accident occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the car (the third respondent in the claim petition)?
  2. Whether the claimants are entitled to compensation, and if so, to what extent and against whom (specifically whether the insurer is liable given the alleged use of the vehicle for hire)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurer)’s Arguments

  • The vehicle was used for carrying passengers for hire or reward contrary to the terms of the insurance policy (the claim petition itself alleged hire), and therefore the insurer is not liable as the use was unauthorised under the policy.
  • Even if the deceased was a gratuitous passenger, the insurer's liability does not extend to such gratuitous passengers under the terms of the policy and applicable law.
  • The claimants could not be permitted to adduce oral evidence at trial that contradicted their pleadings (which expressly alleged payment of hire), and if the pleadings were mistaken they should have sought amendment before leading evidence.

Claimants' Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The claim petition initially averred that hire charges were paid (Rs. 15 each, according to pleadings), but at trial the claimants (through P.W.1 and P.W.2) asserted that the deceased and others were given a free lift — the earlier averment was a drafting mistake based on incorrect information to the petition-drafter and hearsay.
  • P.W.1 produced documentary evidence regarding the deceased's employment and salary (salary stated as Rs. 1,067 per month) and produced post-mortem and other documents. P.W.2 gave oral evidence that the trip was gratuitous.
  • Counsel for claimants sought latitude from the Tribunal to rectify the factual position and present the genuine version of events at the enquiry instead of relying on the mistaken averment in the written pleadings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bihar Co-operative Motor Vehicles Insurance Society Ltd. v. Rameshwar Raur, AIR 1970 Pat 172 Claims Tribunal is competent to permit amendment of pleadings when such amendment does not prejudice accrued rights of any party. Used to show that if pleadings required correction due to mistake, the Tribunal should have allowed an amendment rather than permit oral evidence contrary to the pleadings without amendment.
Shardaben v. M.I. Pandya, (1971) 12 Guj LR 97 : AIR 1971 Guj 151 Claims Tribunal, though different from a civil court, possesses attributes of a civil court. Applied to support the proposition that the Tribunal must adhere to established rules (e.g., of pleadings and evidence) and cannot ignore salutary rules of law despite power to adopt summary procedures.
Smt. Amarjit Kaur v. Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd., 1969 Acc CJ 286 (Delhi) Every document must be proved before it is relied upon. Cited to reinforce evidentiary requirements and the Tribunal’s obligation to follow rules of evidence and procedure when admitting documents and oral testimony.
Bright v. Ashfold, (1932) 2 KB 153 Early view that a passenger might be treated as a third party for purposes of statutory insurance obligations under the Road Traffic Act, 1930 (construing S.38). Discussed as an historical authority; the court noted the decision but observed that later authorities have not accepted that view as correct when dealing with passenger cover and compulsory insurance.
Motor Insurers' Bureau v. Connell, 1970 Acc CJ 144 Owner of a private car is not obliged to insure passengers even if he occasionally gives them lift for payment; compulsory insurance arises where a vehicle is habitually used for carrying passengers for hire or reward. Relied on to show that occasional paid lifts do not necessarily convert a private vehicle into one requiring compulsory passenger-cover insurance; cited in discussion of passenger cover and the legislative response.
Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., (1977) 2 SCC 745 : AIR 1977 SC 1735 Construction of S.95 of the Motor Vehicles Act: a policy is not required to cover risks to passengers who are not carried for hire or reward; where policy limits liability "except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of S.95", liability is restricted to statutory minimums under S.95. Applied to hold that the policy in the present case — which excludes use for hire — cannot be treated as covering risks to passengers carried for hire or reward; supported the conclusion that the insurer could disclaim liability under the policy terms.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis:

  1. Findings of the Tribunal: The Tribunal had found that the driver drove rashly and negligently and awarded Rs. 75,000 to claimants 2 to 4, holding other claimants were not dependents. The award was made against the owner and driver and also against the insurer.
  2. Pleadings versus Evidence: The claim petition expressly averred that passengers had paid hire charges (Rs. 15). The insurer pleaded non-liability on the ground of unauthorised use (hire). At trial the claimants changed their case orally — P.W.1 and P.W.2 stated the deceased and others had been given a free lift. The Tribunal accepted that changed pleading without formal amendment, primarily relying on P.W.2's oral testimony and counsel's explanation/regret about drafting mistakes.
  3. Legal principle on pleadings and amendment: The Court emphasized the established rule that a party cannot go behind its pleadings and lead evidence contrary to them. If pleadings contain a mistake, the correct procedure is to seek leave to amend the pleadings and then lead evidence in support of the amended pleadings. The Tribunal erred in admitting oral evidence contrary to the pleadings without allowing amendment.
  4. Tribunal's power to adopt summary procedure: The Court acknowledged S.110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, which permits a Claims Tribunal to follow summary procedures in holding enquiries under S.110-B. However, the Court held that this power is subject to rules of natural justice and must not contravene statutory procedure and basic rules of evidence and pleadings. Allowing oral evidence that contradicts pleadings without amendment could prejudice the opposite party and violate principles of natural justice.
  5. Application of authorities on amendment and tribunal powers: The Court cited Bihar Co-operative Motor Vehicles Insurance Society Ltd. v. Rameshwar Raur to show Tribunals may permit amendment where no prejudice accrues, and Shardaben v. M.I. Pandya and Smt. Amarjit Kaur to stress the Tribunal’s obligations analogous to civil courts, including adherence to rules of proof and pleadings.
  6. Factual assessment on hire: The Court analysed P.W.2’s testimony and found it improbable that a private owner/driver, being strangers to the passengers, would give a free lift from Madurai to Kodaikanal. The Tribunal should not have accepted P.W.2’s statement at face value; the probability favoured that the passengers were carried for hire or reward as pleaded originally.
  7. Policy interpretation and statutory context: The insurance policy (Ex. R.1) expressly excluded use "for hire" and limited liability “so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of S.95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.” Applying Pushpabai (Supreme Court) the words limiting liability to S.95 mean the insurer’s liability is restricted to statutory requirements, and the policy’s exclusion for hire prevents coverage of passengers carried for hire or reward.
  8. Interaction with foreign and later authorities: The Court reviewed Bright v. Ashfold and Motor Insurers' Bureau v. Connell to explain the historical and comparative position on passenger coverage and noted Parliament’s response by enacting the Motor Vehicles (Passenger Insurance) Act, 1971 (which made passenger insurance compulsory from 1 Dec 1972). But as to the case at hand, the decisive factor was the policy exclusion and the Tribunal's procedural error in admitting evidence contrary to pleadings without amendment.
  9. Conclusion of reasoning: Because (a) the Tribunal improperly allowed oral evidence contrary to the written pleadings without amendment and (b) the available evidence and probability pointed to use of the car for hire, which was an unauthorised use under the policy, the insurer could properly disclaim liability. Therefore the award against the insurer had to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the award so far as it relates to the appellant-insurer is set aside.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The Tribunal's award of Rs. 75,000 stands as against the owner and driver (respondents 1 and 3 in the original petition) but is set aside insofar as it was made against the insurer (appellant).
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The Court refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in the circumstances of this case.

Broader precedent or law-making: The opinion applies existing authorities and statute to the facts; the Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond construing the pleadings rule, established case law on the scope of insurance coverage for passengers, and the operation of the policy exclusion for hire. In other words, the decision applies existing law to the facts and does not announce a novel principle of law.

    United India Fire And General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madurai v. M.S Durairaj And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Ramanujam, J.:— This is an appeal filed by the United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madurai against the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in M.A.C.O.P No. 36 of 1976, at the instance of the claimants-respondents 1 to 8 therein.

    2. On 27-10-1975, one Alagappan aged about 32 years, who was a senior clerk of the State Bank of India, Kodaikanal, was returning from Madurai to Kodaikanal, in a car MDA 1194, which was owned by the 9th respondent and driven by the 10th respondent herein. At about 6 a.m when the car was going in front of the Parayai Mills' gate in Samayanallur on the Dindigul main road, the driver of the car lost control of the vehicle and the car went to the left end of the road and hit against a tree and as a result of the impact, the gear rod caused grievous injuries on the stomach of Alagappan. He was immediately taken in a bus to the Government Hospital, Madurai where he died the next day. The said car had been insured with the second respondent (appellant herein) in the original petition before the Tribunal. On the ground that the said accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the car by its driver, the legal representatives of the deceased Alagappan claimed a compensation of Rs. 75,000, before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madurai. In the said claim petition respondents 1 and 3, owner of the car and the driver respectively, remained ex parte and the claim was resisted only by the Insurer, second respondent. The objection taken by the insurer was that it has been mentioned in the claim petition, itself that the car was used for carrying passengers on hire, which was against the terms of the insurance policy the insurer was not liable, that in any event, there was no rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the car, that the car was proceeding slowly and cautiously on the proper side of the road at the moderate speed of 35 K.M per hour that there was drizzling at the time and in a turning the car skidded to the left and hit against a tree and that, therefore, the accident cannot be said to be due to rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the car. It also contended that since the injuries sustained by the deceased were very slight, the claim by the legal representatives of Alagappan for compensation of Rs. 75,000 is highly exaggerated.

    3. After going through the counter affidavit filed by the Insurer, a reply affidavit was filed by the claimants, wherein they had again asserted that Alagappan, Arokiaswami and one Velusami travelled in the car on payment of Rs. 15 as hire charges. Further, they have stated that the deceased Alagappan was getting actually a salary of Rs. 1067 per month, at the time of his death.

    4. On these pleadings the following two points were set down for consideration by the Tribunal—

    1. Whether the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the first respondent's car by the third respondent?

    2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation, and to what extent and against whom?

    5. On the side of the claimants, the first claimant had been examined as P.W 1 and another person, who travelled in the car during the time of occurrence, had been examined as P.W 2. P.W 1 had spoken to generally about the occurrence and the death of his son as a result thereof. He has marked Ex. P. 1, Pay certificate given by the branch manager in relation to pay particulars of the deceased. Ex. P. 2 copy of the post-mortem certificate. Ex. P. 3, extract from the death register, Ex. P. 4, S.S.L.C book of the deceased, Ex. P. 5 certificate from the branch manager about the date of joining of the deceased in the bank and Ex. P. 6 copy of the Motor Vehicles Inspector's report P.W 2 had deposed about the facts relating to the accident. On the side of the respondents, no oral evidence was adduced and only Ex. R. 1, the policy of insurance had been marked.

    6. On the first point as to whether there was any rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the car, the Tribunal, after analysing the oral and documentary evidence, above referred to, held that the car was driven in a rash and negligent manner and that the accident was entirely due to such rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the car. On the second point relating to the quantum of compensation and the person who is liable to pay the same, the Tribunal held that a sum of Rs. 75,000 is a fair and reasonable compensation. In that view, it passed an award for the said sum in favour of claimants 2 to 4 as against respondents 1 to 3. The Tribunal had taken the view that the first claimant being the father of the deceased, and claimants 5 to 8 being his brother and sisters, cannot be held to be dependents or legal representatives and that only the mother and children of the deceased, who are claimants 2 to 4, are entitled to claim the compensation as dependents as well as heirs at law of the deceased. The said award has been challenged by the appellant-Insurer of the car.

    7. The main contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant are as follows — (1) That the car, having been used for carrying passengers for hire or reward contrary to the terms of the insurance policy, the insurer is not liable for the accident which had taken place when the car was used for an unauthorised purpose. (2) That even if the car has not been used for carrying the passengers for hire or reward, and the deceased was taken only as a gratuitous passenger the liability of the Insurer will not extend to such gratuitous passengers.

    8. In this case, on the first question the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the claim petition wherein the claimants have stated that the deceased paid hire charges and travelled in the car which was being used as an illicit taxi. Taking note of this averment in the claim petition, itself, the Insurance company in its counter had disclaimed the liability on the ground that the car has been used for an unauthorised purpose. At least after seeing the counter statement, the claimants should have waken up. However, the claimants filed a reply statement asserting that the deceased Alagappan was carried in the vehicle on payment of hire charges. At the stage of trial, however, the first claimant examined as p.w 1, deposed that the deceased was given a free lift by the driver of the car from Madurai to Kodaikanal and P.W 2 had also deposed that himself and two other persons travelled in the car without payment of any hire charges. An objection was taken by the insurer that oral evidence cannot be let in contrary to the pleadings, The claimants had contended that ‘no doubt a blunder has been committed in preparing the petition since the averments had been made on the representations of the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner No. 1 had not witnessed the accident properly and he has spoken to hearsay’. According to the claimants, they knew about the free lift only at the stage of trial, The Tribunal accepted the said new stand taken on behalf of the claimants mainly on the basis of the evidence of P.W 2. The Tribunal felt that as the counsel had expressed regret that the petition had been drafted on a wrong information given by the claimants, and as the counsel had to do justice to his clients and put forward a genuine version of the case in the enquiry, some amount of latitude in the assessment of the averments in the claim petition relating to the use of the car as a taxi had to be allowed and that on the oral evidence of P.W 2, an independent witness who has also travelled in the car at the time of the accident, it must be held that the car was not used as a taxi and the deceased was given only a free lift. The said finding of the Tribunal has been attacked by the appellant as legally unsustainable.

    9. We are of the view that the Tribunal is in error in accepting the evidence of P.W 2 at its face value. It is true P.W 2 has stated that he and the deceased and another were carried in the car gratuitously from Madurai to Kodaikanal. But, it is difficult to accept that statement unless the owner or driver of the car is either related to the persons carried or a close friend of them. The driver or the owner are admittedly utter strangers to the persons who were carried in the vehicle. It is unlikely that the driver of the car would have agreed to give them free lift from Madurai to Kodaikanal, without any hire or reward. It is not claimed, as a matter of fact, by P.W 2, that he knew either the owner or the driver of the car before the date of the accident. Thus, the probability is that the driver of the car carried the deceased and other persons in the car which was proceeding from Madurai to Kodaikanal only for hire or for reward.

    10. According to the appellant, the claimants are in any event, not entitled to go behind their pleadings which contain a categorical averment that the deceased was travelling in the car on payment of hire charges and adduce evidence that he was carried in the car gratuitously which is contrary to the pleadings, and the Tribunal has no justification or jurisdiction to show any latitude in this regards. It is pointed out by the appellant that even if there is a mistaken averment both in the original claim petition as well as in the reply statement, the court can permit the claimants to have their pleadings amended setting out the correct averments and then allow the claimants to adduce evidence on the basis of the amended pleadings and it is not legally possible for the claimants to adduce oral evidence contrary to their own pleadings. There is considerable force in the submission made by the appellant in this regard.

    11. It is well established that a party cannot be allowed to go behind his pleadings and let in evidence contrary to the same. If the averments in the pleadings, as originally set out, required modification on the ground of mistake, inadvertence etc, it may be open to the party to have the pleadings amended by taking a leave of the court and then adduce evidence in accordance with the amended pleadings. That being the legal position, we do not see how the Tribunal in this case without having the pleadings amended, permitted the claimants to adduce evidence contrary to the pleadings. Though the Tribunal in permitting oral evidence to be adduced contrary to the pleadings, has obviously been motivated by some sympathetic considerations to be shown to the claimants and their counsel. We do not see how the Tribunal can on grounds of sympathy go behind the statutory procedure. It is true that Sec. 110-C of the Motor Vehicles Act says that “in holding any enquiry under S. 110-B, the Claims Tribunal, may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit”. But, the said express power given to the Tribunal to formulate its own procedure has to be consistent with rules of natural justice and must not contravene the provisions of law. If the oral evidence is permitted to be adduced by one party contrary to his own pleadings, the other party will naturally be taken by surprise and there will clearly be failure of the rules of natural justice. It cannot be disputed that the Tribunal has got the power to permit a party to amend the pleadings. In Bihar Co-operative Motor Vehicles Insurance Society Ltd. v. Rameshwar Raur, AIR 1970 Pat 172, the Claims Tribunal has been held to be competent to give permission for amendment of the pleadings, when such amendment does not prejudice any accrued right of any party. The fact that the Tribunal is invested with the power to adopt summary procedure for a speedy disposal of the claim petition, does not mean that it can ignore a salutary rule of law which ensures that the parties can adduce evidence only with reference to their own pleadings. The said position does not differ whether the Claims Tribunal is considered to be a court or persona designata. Though the Claims Tribunal is invested with the status different from a civil court, it undoubtedly possesses all the attributes of the court and for all intents and purposes it is a civil court. It has been so held in Shardaben v. M.I Pandya, (1971) 12 Guj LR 97 : (AIR 1971 Guj 151). The Claims Tribunal like other courts of law must not ignore the rule that every document must be proved before it is relied upon — vide Smt. Amarjit Kaur v. Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd., 1969 Acc CJ 286 (Delhi). S. 110-C says that the summary procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal shall subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf. In view of what has been stated above, the Tribunal in this case should not have allowed the claimants to go behind their pleading and to contend that the deceased was a gratuitous passenger, without amending their pleadings. If such a thing were permitted it will lead to an anomalous situation where the claimants' case as per the pleadings will be different from the case as presented at the enquiry, and the opposite party will be at a disadvantageous position, for he will have to meet two cases. This will be obviated if the Tribunal has permitted the claimants to amend their pleadings and to adduce oral evidence in pursuance of the amended pleadings. The Tribunal has held that the deceased was carried as a gratuitous passenger ignoring the pleadings in the claim petition as well as in the reply statement filed by them. If the deceased was carried for hire that will be a purpose not authorised by the terms of the Insurance policy Ex. R. 1. The policy contains the following clause under the head of limitation as to use—

    “The policy does not cover use for hire or …… Use only for special domestic and pleasure purposes and for the insured's business.”

    12. If the deceased was carried in the car for hire, then there has been a use of the car for an unauthorised purpose. In view of the above terms contained in the policy, the Insurance Company cannot be held liable. We are not on the question now whether the driver of the car was authorised by the owner to take passengers for hire or reward. As already pointed out, the award had been passed in this case both against the driver as well as the owner of the car and that portion of the award has become final. Therefore, it is unnecessary, in this appeal to go into the question as to whether the owner of the car is vicariously liable or not. We are only concerned with the case whether the car has been put to an unauthorised use so as to enable the insurer to disclaim the liability to indemnify the owner of the car under the terms of the insurance policy. In view of our finding that the deceased was not a gratuitous passenger it is unnecessary to go into the question as to whether the insurer will be liable for the death of the deceased who was carried in the car as a gratuitous passenger.

    13. The learned counsel for the claimants would contend that the policy in this case is a comprehensive one and therefore, the policy should be taken to cover the death of or bodily injury to a passenger travelling in the car for hire or reward. The learned counsel refers to a decision in Bright v. Ashfold, (1932) 2 KB 153. In that case, a policy has been taken containing a clause that the Insurance company shall not be liable for any accident, loss or damage caused or sustained, while any motor cycle in respect of which indemnity is granted under this policy, is carrying a passenger unless a side car is attached. The insured drove the motor cycle on a road with another person sitting behind him as a passenger on the pillion without a side car being attached to the motor cycle. He was charged with the offence of using a motor vehicle on a road without there being in force in relation to the user of the vehicle such a policy of insurance in respect of third party risks as required by part II of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. While construing S. 38 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the court held that even if a passenger in a motor vehicle was treated as a third party his risk should also be covered by a policy required to be taken under the Road Traffic Act, 1930. However, the view taken in this case has not been accepted as correct in later decisions. In Motor Insurers' Bureau v. Connell, 1970 Acc CJ 144, the court of appeal while construing S. 203 of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 which corresponds to S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act held that the owner of a private car is not bound to insure passengers even if he occasionally gives lift upon payment. In that case, the owner of a private car gave lift to another, who offered him to pay for it. The car met with an accident, and the person sustained injuries. On his filing an action for compensation, a question arose whether, in the circumstances, the car could be said to be a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward within the meaning of the clause as used in S. 203 so as to make it compulsory for the owner to insure such a passenger. The Court held that a private owner of a car was not bound to insure passengers even if he gave a man lift for hire or reward and that the Insurance was compulsory only if a vehicle was asx a practice or habitually used for carrying passengers for hire or reward such as in the case of taxis, motor coaches, private hire cars and the like. Unless there was a habitual carrying of passengers for hire or reward, there was no statutory necessity to obtain a policy covering risks to passengers.

    14. Lord Denning M.R speaking for the Bench held that as the car, in which the deceased travelled agreeing to pay some amount as reward, was not a vehicle in which passengers were normally or habitually carried for hire or reward, that it was a private vehicle and lift was given to a passenger on two or three occasions and that therefore the owner of the car is not bound to insure against injury to the passenger. Lord Denning wound up his judgment with the following observations—

    “I would only add this: many people think the Act should be altered so as to provide compulsory insurance for passengers. I think so too. It is very hard on a passenger that he should be injured by the negligence of the driver and have no recourse for damages. I hope the Parliament will soon remedy the position. Meanwhile. I would suggest that anyone who asks for or accepts a lift should ask the driver ‘Are you insured for passengers or not? for if he is not, and there is an accident, he may be unable to get any compensation”.

    15. The above observations have been taken note of by the Parliament and the Motor Vehicles (Passenger Insurance) Act, 1971 has been enacted to make insurance cover for passenger liability compulsory by repealing paragraph (a) and the proviso to S. 203(4) which came into force on 1st Dec. 1972.

    16. The Supreme Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co, 1977 Acc CJ 343 : ((1977) 2 SCC 745 : AIR 1977 SC 1735) while dealing with the scope of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, as amended by Act 56 of 1969, had pointed out that neither the Road Traffic Act, 1960 or the earlier 1930 Act required users of Motor vehicles to be insured in respect of liability for death or bodily injury to passengers in the vehicle except in the case of a vehicle in which passengers were carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, that Sec. 203(4) of the 1960 Act provided that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon, or entering or getting on to or alighting from, the vehicle at time of occurrence of the event out of which the claims arise. The Supreme Court also referred to the law as regards general exclusion of passengers as stated in Halsbury's, Laws of England, 3rd Edn, Vol. 22 at page 368 para 765 which is as follows—

    “Subject to certain exceptions a policy is not required to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to a person being carried in or upon or entering or getting into or alighting them, the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises.”

    17. Dealing with the plea that the words ‘third party’ are wide enough to cover all persons except the person and the insurer, the Supreme Court held that the Insurance cover is not available to the passengers is made clear by the proviso to sub-section, which provides that a policy shall not be required—

    “Except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by a reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises.”

    18. The Supreme Court held that “it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. As under S. 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured”. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, though it is not compulsory for the owner of a car to insure against the passengers either carried for hire or reward or gratuitously, still he can take a comprehensive policy to cover such risks, which are required to be covered under S. 95 of the Act and that in this case a comprehensive policy having been issued it should be taken to cover the risk of passengers as well. But as already pointed out, the policy on the face of it says that it will not cover the use of the vehicle for hire or reward.

    19. We have already found that in this case the deceased was carried in the vehicle for hire or reward and such use is clearly prohibited by the terms of the policy. Sec. II Liability to third parties — of Insurance Policy (Ex. R. 1) is limited in respect of the liability of the insurer in relation to death of or bodily injury to any person to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Construing the identical clause, the Supreme Court held in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., 1977 Acc CJ 343 : ((1977) 2 SCC 745 : AIR 1977 SC 1735) that the words ‘except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939’ would indicate that the liability is restricted to the liability arising out of the statutory requirements under S. 95 and the second part of clause 1(a) refers to the non-liability for injuries arising in the course of employment of such persons. In view of the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is not open to the claimants in this case to contend that the policy Ex. R. 1 issued in this case which is said to be comprehensive, cannot be said to cover the risk in respect of passengers carried in a vehicle for hire or reward, in respect of whom there is a prohibition under the policy.

    20. In this view of the matter, we have to set aside the award passed by the Tribunal so far as the appellant is concerned. The award of the Tribunal as against respondents 1 and 3 therein will stand. The civil miscellaneous appeal is therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

    21. The learned counsel for the respondents seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, but, in the circumstances, we do not think that this is a fit and proper case for the grant of leave. Hence, leave sought for is refused.

    22. Appeal allowed.

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    United India Fire And General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madurai v. M.S Durairaj And Others
    (Feb 23, 1981)