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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-decree holder, Sri T. A. Sankaralingam, appealed against the order of the Additional District Judge of Salem which had reversed an order of the Additional District Munsif of Sankari in R.E.A. No. 1152 of 1966 arising from execution proceedings R.E.P. No. 131 of 1965, itself founded on O.S. No. 888 of 1960.

On 1 December 1948 four brothers — Sri Nallusami Poosari, Sri Arumugham, Sri Gandhi and Sri Natanasabapathy Poosari (father of the first respondent T. N. Mani) — executed a deed of mortgage in favour of the appellant, reciting ancestral ownership and a loan of Rs. 3,000 with specified interest. Gandhi was a minor at the time and was represented by Arumugham.

When the mortgage debt was not repaid, the appellant instituted O.S. No. 888 of 1960 for realization of the mortgage money. The suit named the executants (including Nallusami, Arumugham and Gandhi) and, because Nadanasabapathy had died, named his wife Mariyayee and his son T. N. Mani (described as a minor aged 16 and represented by his mother) as defendants. Gandhi, Mariyayee, and others were ex parte, and the suit resulted in a decree directing deposit of a specified sum with interest.

In execution (R.E.P. No. 131 of 1965) the appellant sought sale of the mortgaged property. T. N. Mani filed R.E.A. No. 1152 of 1966 seeking release of the properties from execution. He contested the execution on two grounds: (1) that he received the properties in a family partition (a ground later rejected by lower courts and not challenged on appeal) and (2) that he had attained majority before the mortgage suit and therefore, having been shown as a minor, the decree and execution were null and void as against him.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a mortgage decree and consequent execution proceedings bind the first respondent (T. N. Mani) who, though described as a minor in the suit, had in fact attained majority before institution of the mortgage suit.
  2. Whether the mortgage executed by the first respondent's father (Nadanasabapathy) was for family benefit or necessity such that it would bind the first respondent's share.
  3. Whether a decree obtained against an alleged family manager or against one of the coparceners can bind other coparceners (including the first respondent) when the suit was not framed or conducted in a representative capacity.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the mortgage suit was effectively against Nallusami Poosari as manager of the joint family and, therefore, a decree against him would bind the entire family, including the first respondent, even if the first respondent was not impleaded by name in a representative capacity.
  • Reliance was placed on authorities holding that a decree against the manager as representative binds undivided brothers and that a manager can sue and be sued in a representative capacity for liabilities incurred for family purposes.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The first respondent argued that (i) the properties had gone to his share in a family partition (a point rejected below and not pressed on appeal), and (ii) he had attained majority months before the mortgage suit was filed and therefore, being wrongly described as a minor and without notice as a major, the mortgage decree and execution proceedings are null and void as against him.
  • It was also contended that the mortgage executed by his father was not for family benefit or necessity and that his father did not receive any portion of the mortgage money, so Nadanasabapathy's one-fourth share could not be affected by the decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatanarayand Rao v. Venkatasamy Raju (I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 880; (1937) 2 M.L.J. 251; A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610) Where a decree is obtained against a manager as representative of joint Hindu family liabilities, it binds undivided brothers even if they are not named eo nomine. Cited by appellant and considered by the Court. The Court accepted the principle but found it inapplicable on the facts because the plaint did not sue any brother as manager in a representative capacity.
Jagannadham v. Seshagiri Rao (A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 42) Authority relied upon by the learned Additional District Judge to hold that a decree against a person wrongly described as a minor (when he is a major and had no notice) is void as against him. Noted as supporting the District Judge's view that the mortgage decree and execution were null and void as against the first respondent who was wrongly described as a minor.
Murugappa Mudaliar v. Dasappa Nayanim Varu (I.L.R. (1950) Mad. 779; (1950) 1 M.L.J. 1) Similar bench authority used to support the proposition that a decree obtained against one shown as a minor when he was in fact a major and had no notice is void as against him. Relied on by the Additional District Judge; the present Court recorded that these authorities supported the view that the decree would not bind the first respondent.
Papamma v. Narayana ((1947) 1 M.L.J. 274; A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 54) Observed that a decree in a suit against the manager of a Hindu family binds the other members as res judicata, even if they were not named. Referred to by the appellant in support of the representative-capacity principle; Court acknowledged it as supporting the manager-as-representative rule but distinguished it on the facts.
Channabasavegowda v. Rangegowda (A.I.R. 1951 Mys. 38) Full Bench observation that suit against the manager qua manager binds all family members when the debt is due by the whole family. Cited by the appellant; Court noted the principle but found the present suit was not brought in such representative form and hence the precedent did not apply.
Jai Kishan v. Ramchand (A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 1) Principle that a manager can sue and represent the joint family for family liabilities and thus bind other members. Referred to in the appellant's line of authorities supporting representative suits; Court considered but found the factual matrix different here.
Madhgouda v. Halappa (A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 178) Manager can effectively represent other members; decree against manager for liabilities within scope of authority is executable against other members' interests. Cited as part of the body of authorities on managerial representation; Court acknowledged but held they did not determine the present factual question.
Ram Kishan v. Ganga Rao (A.I.R. 1931 Lab. 559) Similar proposition about the manager's capacity to bind the family for liabilities incurred within his authority. Part of the authorities relied upon by appellant; Court treated them as supporting the general principle but found them inapplicable on the particular pleadings here.
Labhu v. Ram (A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 76) If circumstances show that members are asserting individual rights, the principle of manager representing family members does not apply. Recognized by the Court as a limiting principle; Court noted it as an exception to the representative-capacity rule.
Lilabai v. Guruprasad ((1946) 224 I.C. 586) Approval of the principle that manager representation will not operate where members are litigating individual rights. Mentioned as approving the limiting principle articulated in Labhu v. Ram.
Chandi Prasad v. Balaji (A.I.R. 1931 All. 136) If a plaintiff impleads a minor individually but does not obtain a guardian, a decree against the manager does not bind that minor. Cited as an authority showing that absence of proper representation of a minor can prevent application of the manager-binding principle.
Hazaritlal v. Champala ((1961) M.P.L.J. 360) Held that the fact that, besides the manager, other members were added as parties will not necessarily mean the manager was not sued in his representative capacity. The Court noted the decision but held it was not relevant to the particular facts where the plaint expressly sued individuals and did not frame the suit as representative.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the principal contested issue: whether the mortgage decree and execution proceedings would bind the first respondent who was, on the evidence, a major before the mortgage suit was filed but had been shown and proceeded against as a minor.

The Court accepted the following uncontested premises from the record: (a) the first respondent had in fact attained majority some months prior to institution of the mortgage suit; and (b) the finding of the lower courts that the mortgage was for family benefit or necessity (and hence, in principle, capable of binding family members) was not challenged on appeal.

The Court reviewed the authorities on representative suits against the manager of a Hindu joint family. It acknowledged the well-established principle that a decree obtained against a manager sued in a representative capacity will bind undivided brothers and other coparceners if the liability was incurred within the scope of the manager's authority and for family benefit or necessity.

However, the Court emphasized that the controlling circumstance is how the suit was framed and conducted. On a close reading of the plaint in O.S. No. 888 of 1960, the Court found that the suit had not been framed or conducted as a representative suit against any brother qua manager. Instead:

  • All executants of the mortgage who were then alive were impleaded individually;
  • The heir (T. N. Mani) of the deceased executant was specifically impleaded and described as a minor (though he was in fact a major);
  • There was no averment that any defendant was being sued in a representative capacity as manager of the family.

Given this form of pleading and the absence of any allegation that any of the other executants acted as the family manager with authority to represent the first respondent, the Court concluded that the representative-capacity doctrines relied upon by the appellant were inapplicable. The Court noted decisions (including Hazaritlal v. Champala) indicating that adding other members alongside a manager does not always defeat a representative suit, but the Court found that distinction immaterial here because the plaint affirmatively proceeded on individual liability and not on a manager's representative liability.

Because the first respondent had been shown as a minor when he was in fact a major and because he had not been effectively represented as a party in the suit, the Court held that a decree obtained against him as a minor is null and void as against him. The presence of other executants as defendants in the suit could not supply the necessary representation or cure the defect caused by misdescription and lack of notice.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The appeal is dismissed. The Court held that the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings will not bind the share of the first respondent (T. N. Mani) in the mortgaged properties because he was wrongly shown as a minor when in fact he was a major and was not effectively represented in the suit.

Consequences:

  • The direct legal effect is that the portion/share of the first respondent in the properties cannot be affected by the mortgage decree and execution under the facts and pleadings of this case.
  • The Court affirmed the lower courts' concurrent finding on family necessity (that the mortgage was for family benefit), but found that factual conclusion insufficient to bind the first respondent because of the form in which the suit was litigated.
  • The appeal was dismissed without costs and leave granted.

Note: The opinion reviewed and applied existing authorities on the capacity of a family manager to bind coparceners, but the Court did not purport to lay down any new legal principle or broader precedent beyond its application to the specific facts (i.e., where the suit was not framed in a representative capacity and a person was misdescribed as a minor).

    T.A. Sankaralingam v. T.N. Mani And Ors.

    1. Sri T. A. Sankaralingam, the plaintiff-decree holder has preferred this appeal against the order of the learned Additional District Judge of Salem in C.M.A. No. 119 of 1967 reversing the order passed by the learned Additional District Munsif of Sankari at Salem in R.E.A. No. 1152 of 1966 in R.E.P. No. 131 of 1965 in O.S. No. 888 of 1960.

    2. Sri Nallusami Poosari, Sri Arumugham, Sri Gandhi and Sri Natanasabapathy Poosari, the father of Sri T. N. Mani, the first respondent herein who were brothers executed a deed of mortgage on 1st December, 1948 in favour of the appellant herein Sri Sankaralingam comprising the property involved in execution in question. Gandhi who was then a minor was represented by Arumugham. In that document the mortgagors had recited that the properties mentioned in the mortgage schedule belonged to them ancestrally, that they had borrowed in all a sum of Rs. 3,000 under the mortgage and that they had agreed to pay interest at the rate of 12 annas per hundred per month.

    3. As the mortgagors did not pay up the mortgage amount in time, the appellant herein instituted a suit in O.S. No. 888 of 1960 for realising the mortgage money; and apart from Nallusami Poosari, Arumugam and Gandhi, Mariyayee (the wife of Nadanasabapathy) and the first respondent herein T. N. Mani, son of Nadanasabapathy were impleaded in the suit as defendants 2 and 3 respectively. T. N. Mani was described as a minor aged 16 and was represented in that suit by the second defendant Mariyayee, his mother acting as guardian. It was also stated that Gandhi who was a minor at the time of the mortgage had attained majority and was a major on the date of the suit; and it was further alleged that Mariyayee and T. N. Mani were in possession and enjoyment of the assets of Nadanasabapathy, one of the executants of the mortgage, since the latter's death. There was a further averment that, as the suit mortgage debt was borrowed for business and family expenses and as T. N. Mani and Gandhi had derived the benefits of the suit debt, they were bound to pay the suit mortgage money.

    4. Nallusami Poosari, Arumugam and Gandhi as well as Mariyayee who was acting as the guardian of T. N. Mani remained absent and were set ex parte in the suit; and it was decreed that the defendants should deposit into the Court a sum of Rs. 4,477.83 with interest on Rs. 3,454 at 51/2% per annum from the date of the decree on or before 23rd February, 1961.

    5. In execution of the said mortgage decree, the appellant herein filed R.E.P. No. 131 of 1965 for bringing the mortgage property to sale. Thereupon T. N. Mani, the first respondent herein who had been impleaded as the third defendant in the suit and was described therein as a minor represented by his guardian and mother Mariyayee filed R.E.A. No. 1152 of 1966 for releasing the properties from execution proceedings. The execution application was opposed on two grounds: (1) that the properties had fallen to his share in a family partition which took place in or about the year 1950 and that the other respondents had no manner of right in or title to the same, and (2) that, as he had attained majority six months before the mortgage suit was instituted, the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings, in which he was shown as still a minor, are null and void.

    6. The first ground has been rejected by the Courts below on the finding that the partition set up by the first respondent herein is not true and this finding is not now challenged in appeal.

    7. The only question which is seriously urged now relates to the validity of the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings. It is fairly well established and is not now disputed that the first respondent herein had attained majority some months before the mortgage suit was filed; and it is seen that, on his application R.C.A. No. 939 of 1966 in R.E.P. No. 131 of 1965, he was declared a major by the Court of the Additional District Munsiff on 3rd October, 1966. It is contended in the first place that the mortgage decree is invalid, as the first respondent who was already a major had been shown as a minor in the suit. In the second place it is contended that the mortgage executed by the first respondent's father Nadanasabapathy is not for family benefit or necessity and that his father Nadanasabapathy did not receive any pie at all out of the mortgage amount. Nadanasabapathy's 1/4th share in the properties in question cannot therefore be affected by the mortgage decree. Both the Courts below have concurrently found that the mortgage was for family benefit or necessity and that it would bind the first defendant's father Nadanasabapathy; and it appears from the order of the learned Additional District Judge that the only question which was then argued on behalf of the first respondent herein was whether the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings would bind him inasmuch, as he was admittedly a major before the mortgage suit was instituted. I do not find any material to differ from the concurrent finding of the Courts below on the question of family necessity and benefit.

    8. The main question which arises for consideration now in this appeal is whether the mortgage decree and execution proceedings will bind the first respondent herein who is admittedly proved to have been a major on the date of the mortgage suit. The learned Additional District Munsif relying upon a Full Bench decisions of this Court in Venkatanarayand Rao v. Venkatasamy Raju I.L.R. (1937) Mad. 880 : (1937) 2 M.L.J 251 : A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610, has held that the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings will bind the first respondent herein. The learned Additional District Judge, on the other hand, relying upon two Bench decisions of this Court in Jagannadham v. Seshagiri Rao A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 42, and Murugappa Mudaliar v. Dasappa Nayanim Varu I.L.R. (1950) Mad. 779 : (1950) 1 M.LJ. 1, has taken the view that the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings were null and void and cannot bind the first respondent, as he was wrongly described as a minor and had no notice of the proceedings as a major.

    9. The learned Counsel for the appellant-decree-holder concedes that normally a decree against a person who was really a major at that time but had been wrongly sued as a minor will be null and void; but he stoutly contends that Nallusami Poosari was the manager of the joint family after the demise of Nadanasabapathi and that, as he was impleaded as the first defendant, would completely change the position. His contention is that the mortgage suit had been filed against Sri Nallusami Poosari as the manager of the joint family in a representative capacity for realisation of the debt which would bind the entire family, that the mortgage decree would therefore bind the other coparceners including the first respondent herein even if they were not impleaded eo nomine as parties to the mortgage suit and that the misdescription of the first respondent as a minor would be of no consequence in this case.

    10. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Venkatanarayana Rao v. Venkatasamy Raju I.L.R.( 1937) Mad. 880 : (1937) 2 M.L.J. 251 : A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 610, cited above, and the observations of Venkataramana Rao, J., are to the following effect:

    Where a decree has been obtained against a manager as representative of the joint Hindu family liabilities, it will be binding on his undivided brothers and the fact that they are not parties eo nomine will not any the less render them parties to the suit.

    It is also pointed out that, in Papamma v. Narayana (1947) 1 M.L.J. 274 : A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 54, this Court has observed that a decree in a suit against the manager of a Hindu family binds the other members as res judicata and that, merely because the other members were not parties to the suit by name, it does not follow that they are not bound by the decree in the suit. Reference is also made to the decision of a Full Bench of the My sore High Court in Channabasavegowda v. Rangegowda A.I.R. 1951 Mys. 38, wherein Venkataramaiya, J., has observed that a suit filed against the manager qua manager of a Hindu joint family in a representative character will bind all the members of the family, even though they may not actually be made parties to the proceedings when the debt is one due by the whole family.

    11. Reference is also made to other judgments in Jai Kishan v. Ramchand A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 1, Madhgouda v. Halappa A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 178, Ram Kishan v. Ganga Rao A.I.R. 1931. Lab. 559, and these cases lay down that a manager can sue and he sued on behalf of the joint family and can effectively represent all the other members of the family, that hence a decree passed against the manager in respect of a liability incurred within the scope of his authority is executable against the interests of the other members in the family property, even though they had not been made parties to the suit and the decree does not show on the face of it that the defendant had been sued in his capacity as manager and that it is not the frame of the suit or the form of the decree which is conclusive of the matter, but whether the liability which is the basis of the decree was in fact incurred by the defendant within the scope of his authority as the family manager.

    12. It is however pointed out in a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Labhu v. Ram A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 76, that, if, however, there are circumstances pointing to the conclusion that the members of the family are fighting their cause in their individual rights, this principle of the manager's capacity to effectively represent the other members of the family can have no operation. This principle has been approved in Lilabai v. Guruprasad (1946) 224 I.C. 586. In Chandi Prasad v. Balaji A.I.R. 1931 All. 136, it is pointed out by the Allahabad High Court that, if in a suit against the joint family, the plaintiff also impleads a minor member in his individual capacity and does not get a guardian appointed for him, the fact that the manager has been made a party to the suit does not make the decree binding on the minor.

    13. It must, however, be pointed out that in Hazaritlal v. Champala (1961) M.P.L.J. 360, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the fact that, besides the manager, other members of the family were added as parties will not necessarily lead to the inference that the manager was not sued in a representative capacity.

    14. The learned District Munsif has in his order stated that there was no dispute about the fact that the mortgage was executed by the first respondent's father Nadanasapabathy as the head of his branch and his brothers for family business purposes and this statement is not now challenged in appeal. I also agree on principle that the manager of a joint family can be effectively sued by a creditor in a representative capacity and that a decree obtained against him as (manager of the family will effectively bind all the other coparceners of the family, if it is found that the debt was incurred by the manager was for family benefit or necessity. The fact however, remains that the mortgage suit in this case was not filed against any of the I brothers as the manager in a representative capacity on behalf of the joint family. I have elaborately set out the particulars of the plaint in the mortgage suit earlier; and the plaint reveals that the suit was not filed in a representative capacity at all. The mortgage was not executed by the manager of the family and all the brothers were parties to the transaction. None of the brothers was set up in the plaint as the manager of the family; on the other hand, care had been taken to see that all the executants who were then alive and T. N. Mani the sole heir of the other executant (the deceased Nadanasapabathy) were individually represented in the suit. It is true that there was an averment in the plaint to the effect that the mortgage debt was borrowed for business and family expenses; but admittedly there was no averment there that the suit was filed in a representative capacity against the manager of the family. It may be contended on the strength of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hazarilal v. Champalal 1961 M.P.L.J. 360, cited supra that the fact that the other coparceners have been added along with the manager will not be a conclusive circumstance against the suit having been filed in a representative capacity; but I am clear the Madhya Pradesh decision can have no relevance to the facts of this case. As I have already pointed out, the suit was not filed in a representative capacity against the manager of the family; on the other hand, as I have already pointed out the suit was framed against ail the executants of the mortgage as well as the heir of one of the executants who was dead before the institution of the suit. I am therefore dear that the Cases cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant will have no application to the present case.

    15. As the mortgage suit has been filed not in a representative capacity but against the first respondent herein as the heir of his father Nadanasabapathy, it is plain that the mortgage decree will not bind him, unless he was effectively represented. Admittedly he was shown in the mortgage suit as a minor while he was actually a major and it is not disputed that a decree obtained against the first respondent herein as a minor is null and void and will not bind him. The fact that the other executants who are the other members of the family were impleaded as defendants to the suit, in my view, cannot be of any consequence so far as the liability of the first respondent herein under the decree is concerned. Further, in the absence of any allegation that any of them had acted as the manager of the family of which the first respondent was a member, it is plain that they can have no authority to represent him in the mortgage suit or in the execution proceedings. The order of the learned Additional District Judge that the mortgage decree and the execution proceedings will not bind the share of the first respondent herein in the suit properties is therefore proper.

    16. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but under the circumstances without costs. Leave granted.

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    Comments

    T.A. Sankaralingam v. T.N. Mani And Ors.
    (May 11, 1971)