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  • S. 35 of the Specific Relief Act (S. 28 of the present Act).
  • Section 35 of the Specicic Relief Act of 1877. (3)
  • provisions of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act
  • SECTION 28 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • S. 35 of the Specific Relief Act (S. 28 of the present Act).
  • Section 35 of the Specicic Relief Act of 1877. (3)
  • provisions of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act
  • SECTION 28 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Revision Petition arising from I.A. No. 784 of 1966 in O.S. No. 134 of 1965

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a revision petition against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore, made in I.A. No. 784 of 1966 in O.S. No. 134 of 1965. The underlying suit was for specific performance. The plaintiff sought reconveyance of certain properties which he and two others had sold on 5 September 1959 to defendants 1 and 2 (the petitioners in the revision). A claim against a third defendant, a purchaser from defendants 1 and 2 of one of the items, was abandoned.

Defendants 1 and 2 submitted to a decree for specific performance, and the decree (dated 27 June 1966) provided that they should execute a sale-deed and that, in the event of default, the plaintiff was to have the sale-deed executed by the Court and registered. The decree did not specify the period within which the plaintiff was to pay the consideration.

The plaintiff neither paid the defendants nor deposited the purchase-money into court for several months. On 6 December 1966 the defendants sent a notice enquiring whether the plaintiff had deposited the amount; the plaintiff did not reply. The defendants filed I.A. No. 784 of 1966 on 14 December 1966 under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract and dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff filed a counter-claiming readiness and willingness to perform and pay. The interlocutory application was ordered on 7 March 1967, giving the plaintiff 30 days to deposit the amount; the amount was deposited within the 30 days provided in that order. The petitioners in the revision contended that the lower court ought not to have given time to the plaintiff and that their application should have been dismissed without granting further time.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in a suit already decreed for specific performance, the court has the power under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to grant or extend the period within which the purchaser must pay the purchase-money where the original decree did not specify such a period.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's delay and apparent lack of continuous readiness and willingness to perform (i.e., alleged laches) justified rescission of the contract and dismissal of the suit on the defendants' application under Section 28.
  3. If the plaintiff was not continuously ready and willing after the decree, whether the lower court erred in granting him further time to deposit the purchase-money.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The court below was not justified in granting the plaintiff further time to deposit the purchase-money when the plaintiff had failed to pay or deposit the amount for many months after the decree.
  • Given the plaintiff's inaction from June 1966 to December 1966 and beyond, the defendants' application under Section 28 should have been allowed (rescinding the contract and dismissing the suit) rather than giving the plaintiff additional time.

Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff stated that he had always been ready and willing, and was at the relevant time ready and willing, to perform his part of the contract and to pay the purchase-money and take reconveyance.
  • According to the plaintiff's response, despite his assertions of readiness and willingness, the purchase-money was not deposited until the lower court's order giving 30 days, and the deposit was made within that period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 868 Where a person claims specific performance, it is for him to establish continuous readiness and willingness to perform from the date of the contract to the hearing; failure to prove this averment can lead to dismissal. The Court acknowledged this principle and observed that the plaintiff in the present case had not shown continuous readiness and willingness after the decree; this supported the view that the plaintiff had been lax. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to reconcile this principle with the statutory powers under Section 28 and prior authority allowing the original court to retain control and extend time.
Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 208 (Privy Council) The Privy Council observed that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff must allege and, if traversed, prove continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the hearing; failure results in dismissal. The Court cited this passage (via Gomathinayagam Pillai) to illustrate the established requirement of continuous readiness and willingness; the passage bolstered the assessment that the plaintiff had not been continuously ready and willing during the period after the decree.
Abdul Shaker v. Abdul Rahiman (reported in the opinion) Held that a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree; the original court keeps control over the action and may in appropriate cases extend the time for performance, rescind the contract by order, or make other appropriate orders (discussing forms of relief and remedies available to vendor and purchaser). The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the original court retains power after a decree to make just and necessary orders, including extension of time under Section 28. This precedent weighed against the petitioners' contention that the lower court had no jurisdiction to grant further time when the decree had omitted to specify a period.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the factual sequence and concluded that, on the material before it, the plaintiff had not demonstrated continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract after the decree of 27 June 1966. The plaintiff took no steps to pay or deposit purchase-money for several months, failed to reply to the defendants' notice of 6 December 1966, and did not deposit money until after the interlocutory application and the order of 7 March 1967 giving 30 days.

The Court accepted the legal principle (as laid down by the Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai and going back to the Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama) that a claimant for specific performance must prove continuous readiness and willingness from the date of contract to hearing; failure to do so ordinarily leads to dismissal. The Court observed that, if the issue had been open, this lack of continuous readiness and willingness might have justified allowing the defendants' application under Section 28 and rescinding the contract.

However, the Court considered the statutory scheme and prior authority (notably Abdul Shaker v. Abdul Rahiman) which treat a decree for specific performance as preliminary, leaving the original court in control to make consequential orders. The Court analyzed Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the equivalent provisions under the old Act, and concluded that the provision embodies a principle that time for performance of a sale of immovable property is normally not of the essence. The Court reasoned that Section 28 gives the court power to fix or extend the period for payment of purchase-money even after a decree has been passed and even where the decree had not initially fixed a period.

Balancing these considerations, the Court concluded that although the plaintiff had shown laches (lack of continuous readiness and willingness), the lower court's order granting a further period under Section 28 was an exercise of the judicial power to control the action after a preliminary decree. The judge expressly stated that while he might personally have been prepared to allow the defendants' application if the question were purely open, the binding authorities and the statutory power to extend time supported the lower court's exercise of discretion in granting the plaintiff 30 days to deposit the purchase-money.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Civil Revision Petition is DISMISSED. The court upheld the order of the Subordinate Judge of Vellore which granted the plaintiff 30 days to deposit the purchase-money under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the lower court's order granting the plaintiff further time to deposit the purchase-money stands; the revision seeking to set aside that order is dismissed.
  • The opinion recognizes the plaintiff's delay and lack of continuous readiness and willingness, but concludes that the trial court had jurisdiction under Section 28 and relevant precedent to grant an extension of time even where the original decree did not specify a period.
  • The decision does not purport to establish a novel legal principle; instead, it applies existing authorities and statutory provision (Section 28) to uphold the lower court's exercise of discretion. No broader new precedent is announced beyond the application of those existing principles to the facts of this case.

Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been invented or inferred beyond what appears in the opinion.

V.C.S

    Vaiyapuri Reddy And Another v. Sivalinga Reddiar.

    This is a petition to revise the Order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore, in I.A No. 784 of 1966 in O S. No. 134 of 1965. This revision petition arises out of a suit for specific performance. Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit are the Petitioners. The Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of a contract to reconvey certain properties, which had been sold on 5th September 1959 by him aad two others to defendants 1 and 2. The Claim against the third defendant a purchaser from Defendants 1 and 2 of one of the item was given up. The defendants 1 aad 2 submitted to a decree sad therefore, the decree provided that they should execute a saledeed and that in the event of default the plaintiff was to have the sale deed executed by the Court and registered. Unfortunately, the decree did not provide the period within which the plaintiff was to pay the consideration for the sale-deed. The decree was on 27th June, 1966. The plaintiff did not either pay the amount to the defendants or deposit it into court. Therefore, on 6th December 1966 on behalf of the defendants, a notice was sent to the plaintiff stating that the money had not been paid to them nor the draft sale-deed submitted for their approval and, enquiring whether the plaintiff had deposited the said amount to the credit of the defendants. Having received no reply to this notice, the defendants filed on 14th December 1966 LA. No. 784 of 1966. out of which the present revision petition arises, under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for rescinding the contract and dismissing the suit. The plaintiff filed a counter saying that he had always been ready and willing and even now ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and pay the purchasemoney and take a reconveyance. Even then the amount was not deposited. The Interlocutary Application was orded on 7th March 1967 giving 30 days time to deposit the amount and the amount has been deposited within 30 days provided in the Order of the Court. The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the Court below was not justified in granting time to the plaintiff and that in any ease the court could have dismissed their application, but should not have given any time to the plaintiff on the application made by them (defendants).

    The facts which I have already mentioned would show that whatever might have been the position before the date of the consent decree the plaintiff does not seem to have been ready and willing to deposit the amount necessary for getting the reconveyance. The decree was as early as June 1966. Till December, 1966, be did nothing. Even after he received the notice, he did not send a reply offering to pay the amount to the defendants. Even after the defendants had filed a petition under S. 28 of the Act, the plaintiff did not deposit the amount, nor did he deposit the amount till March, 1967, when the lower court made its order, giving him a further time of 30 days. It is, thus obvious that the plaintiff has not been ready and willing to deposit the amount due to the defendants.

    In Gomathinaaagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar A.I.R 1967 S.C 868., it has been pointed out that where a person claims a decree for specific performance, it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that if he failed to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. Their Lordships referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon A.I.R 1928 P.C 208. where the Privy Council pointed out as follows:

    “ In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.”

    Then the Supreme Court went on to say:

    “ The respondent must in suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit.”

    Clearly, in this case, after the date of the decreef the plaintiff has not been able to show that he was coninuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Indeed it is doubtful, if he bad the necessary money with him, considering the fact that from 27th June, 1966, the date of the deeree, to April, 1967, when he seems to have ultimately paid the amount after 10 long months. It may be that he has taken advantage of the unfortunate failure of the court below to specify the period within which, he had to deposit the amount.

    It is urged on behalf of the respondent, however, that while the principle laid down by the Supreme Court will apply for a decision of the suit itself, after the suit has been decreed, it is only the provisions of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act that apply and that section enables the court to extend the period within which the purchase-money should be paid even though it might not hsve been paid within the period fixed by the Court. The argument is that ag S. 28 of the Act centeampates that the court should specify a period within which the amount should be paid and as evenin a case where the plaintiff has beea ready and willing, it is permissible for the eeurt to extead the period further', it would he all the mere clear that the court would have such a power te extend the period where in the first instance it does not fix the period within which the money ought to be paid. Speaking for myself if the question had been an open question I would have beea prepared to hold that the failure of the plaintiff to pay the money or deposit it expeditiously after the decree in his favour showed that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and therefore, the defendants' application uader Section 28 of the Act should be allowed. A Beach of this Court has held ia Abdul Shaker v. Abdul Rahiman, that a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree, the original Court keeping control over the action and having full power to make any just and necessary orders therein including, in appropriate cases, the exteasion of the time, and that the contract is not determined by mere failure of the plaintiff to pay the amount within the specified time. On this point Schwabe, C.J discussing the legal position observed as follows:

    “Specific performance is an equitable remedy which has beea known and used by the Courts of Chancery in England for centuries and appropriate form of judgment have beea approved by learned Equity Judges in England and have-now become almost stereotyped: and these at present in use will be feuad set out ia Seton on Judgments under the title specific perfer mance. On a perusal of them the first thing to be observed is that net one of those forms contained in the first instance a limit of time for payment of the purchase money and not one attempt te make payment of the purchase-money by a certain date a condition of the continuance of the rights under the judgment. After the original judgment for specifi performance it is the definite practice in England that all consequential releif by reason of any party failing to comply with the terms of the judgment must be sought by application to the Court by which the judgment was passed. Such applications are made by motion in the action shewing that in England, after the original Judgment the action is by no means ended but remains under the control of the same Court. If the default is made by the purchaser in paying the purchase-money there are several remedies open to the Vendor. (1) He may on motion in the action obtain an order fixing a definite time and place for payment and delivery over of the conveyance and title deed and can, after the expiration of that time, levy execution for the amount, if not paid (2) he may apply by motion in the action for an order rescinding, not the judgment but the contract, and in order to succeed in such a motion he has to satisfy the Court that there has been a positive refusal, to complete, which it may be obserted in the pre sent case, the respondent has cestainly not proved. A similar right is given by Section 35 of the Specicic Relief Act of 1877. (3) He can enforce his unpaid vendor's lien for the purchase-money and costs. (4) He can by motion ia the action obtain an order for sale by the court of the property when he will be at liberty to bid. The proceeds of the sale are paid into Court and the vendor gets his cont ract price, interest and costs and the purchaser the balauce if any. Where the Vendor is in default, the remedies are even more varied. It would seem to be absurd to hold that the mere fact that a date of completion is fixed in the original decree, to put an end to the action and that the control of the original Court expires on the expiration of that date, and thus subs titute in effect for all the known remedies stated above the simple expedient of treating the action and the decree as dead for all purposes and leaving the vendor in undisturbed posses sion of property………“

    The other learned Judge pointed out as follows:

    “But that it is in the nature of a preliminary and not a final decree is, I think placed beyond doubt by S. 35 of the Specific Relief Act (S. 28 of the present Act). As I read that Section, it lays down that when a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale has been passed and the purchaser makes default in payment of the sum which the Court has ordered him to pay, the Vendor may either file a fresh suit for rescission of the contract or may, in the specific performance suit itself, apply to the Court to rescind the contract. It is perfectly clear that the contract is not determinable or determined by the mere failure to comply with the terms of the decree. It is not determined until the Court orders that it is determined. By the decree for specific performance the Court sets out what it finds the real contract between the parties was, and deolares that such a contract exists and gives what it considers a reasonable time within which the contract shall be carried out. Regarding the decree from this point of view, as a contract, it ts clear in this case, as in most others of the same kind, that time is not of the essence of the contract, and that, until the contract is rescinded by formal order or decree such time for performance, not being an essential part of the contract, may be varied by the Court which has declared what the essential terms of the contract are. It is clear as the learned Chief Justice has shown, that it must be within the power of the Court to vary the time within which the contract shall be performed, as difficulties might arise through no fault whatever of the parties preventing performance within the time specified in the decree; e.g, when a third party has within that period set up a bona fide claim of title to the property, it may even be necessary to direct specifc performance to stand over for a reasonable bat indefinite period, until that claim has been adjudicated.

    I take it then that where specific performance of sale has not been effeted within the period laid down by the decree, it is open (a) to the purchaser to apply to the court for an extension of time for payment of the purchase-money and (b) to the vendor to apply either far a final and peremptory order for specifc performance er for an order rescinding tht contract either immediately or to follow automatically on the expiry of the period peremptorlly granted. The original action is tons open until a final decree or order of such a nature and scope is passed, and the original Court has until then ample power to extend the time for specific performance.”

    Thus, it is obvious that after the decree has been passed even where the decree does not specify the time within which the plaintiff should deposit the amount, it is open to the court to fix a fresh period er extend the period already fixed, though I cannot accept the argument on behalf of the respondent, that they should net be made to suffer for the failure of the court to specify the period in the first instance. But the principles above kid down have some basis. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar if the contract relates to a sale of immoveable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not the essence of the contract. S. 28 of the Act seems to really embody this principle. I, therefore, consider that as the Court has, under S. 28 of the Act, the power to extend the period even where it has already fixed a period within which the plaintiff should deposit the amount, it should be deemed to have the power to either fix a period or grant a fresh period for the plaintiff to deposit the purchase-money where by the decree it has not already fixed a period. If we apply this principle to the facts of this case, even though there bad been laches on the part of the plaintiff, the order passed by the lower appellate court is not one without jurisdiction or one passed in disregard of the principles of equity.

    The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, dismissed.

    V.C.S

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    Vaiyapuri Reddy And Another v. Sivalinga Reddiar.
    (Mar 20, 1968)