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Factual and Procedural Background

This is a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of Prohibition to restrain the Speaker of the Madras Legislative Assembly (respondent 1) and the State of Madras (respondent 2) from proceeding further with the notice marked as Annexure A. The notice asked the petitioner, Mr. C. Subramaniam, to show cause why he should not be held to have committed contempt of the Legislative Assembly in respect of passages reported in a newspaper excerpt (Annexure C) recounting a speech by the petitioner. Annexure B records that the Legislature adopted a motion treating the matter as one of privilege and authorised the Speaker to issue the notice; Annexure A is the notice issued after the Speaker held there was a prima facie case of breach of privilege. The Union of India, the Attorney General of India and the Advocate General of Madras were also included in the array of parties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court should issue a writ of Prohibition restraining the Speaker and the Legislature from proceeding with a notice calling upon a third party to show cause for alleged contempt or breach of privilege.
  2. Whether the powers, privileges and immunities of a State Legislature under Article 194(3) have lapsed by reason of the State Legislature's failure to enact defining legislation within a reasonable time (i.e., whether inaction effects an automatic lapse or extinction).
  3. What is the relationship between the corpus of Parliamentary privileges incorporated by Article 194(3) and Fundamental Rights (especially Article 19(1)(a), Article 20(1) and Article 21) and Article 13 — i.e., to what extent are such privileges subject to constitutional limitations?
  4. Whether proceedings of the Legislature for alleged contempt (or punishment for breach of privilege) engage criminal constitutional protections (notably Articles 20(1) and 21) at the stage of a notice to show cause.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. V.K.T. Chari)

  • The petition proceeds on two related legal aspects set out in the affidavit: (i) the supremacy of Fundamental Rights and constitutional guarantees of liberty of speech and expression (invoking the Preamble and Article 19(1)(a)), and (ii) the contention that the privileges under Article 194(3) are now subject to Fundamental Rights because the State Legislature has failed to enact defining legislation within a reasonable time.
  • Counsel conceded the newspaper report's accuracy and relied on antecedent offices and public duties of the petitioner to emphasise his right to political speech.
  • It was contended that, because Entry 39, List III (Seventh Schedule) and Article 246 govern legislative competence, and because Article 194(3) was transitional in character, inaction by the Legislature should result in lapse of the privileges guaranteed by the second limb of Article 194(3).
  • On juristic norms, it was argued that law which creates penalties or disabilities must be definite and ascertainable; the law of British Parliamentary Privileges is vague ("wilderness of single instances"), relies on many inaccessible sources (Hansard, Erskine May), and therefore cannot satisfy Articles 20(1) and 21; hence a proceeding that may result in detention or similar penalties infringes Article 20(1) and Article 21.
  • The petitioner urged that the present proceeding (a notice to show cause seeking to establish contempt) is essentially criminal in nature and thus engages constitutional protections.

Arguments and Assistance by Amicus Curiae (as conveyed by Mr. M. K. Nambiar)

  • Mr. Nambiar (assisting as amicus) disputed the submission that inaction by the Legislature amounted to lapse; he noted that where the Constitution intends a term it says so explicitly (citing Articles 334, 337, 343 as examples) and pointed to the Australian experience under a similar provision (Section 49) where rights did not lapse despite the passage of time.
  • He argued that the privileges constituted a corpus forming part of the Constitutional scheme and that the contention that they are amorphous or non-justiciable was unsubstantial.
  • He provided authority and historical comparisons to show the body of privileges may be regarded as sufficiently ascertainable and that certain punishments short of indefinite detention (such as reprimand and admonition) are part of the House of Commons practice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sharma's case One of the Supreme Court decisions relied upon to demonstrate that matters regarding privileges and their relation to Fundamental Rights are now clear; together with In re Art. 143 it establishes that any law made under Article 194(3) will be subject to Article 13 and Fundamental Rights. The court treated Sharma's case as authority for the proposition that future legislative enactments defining privileges would be subject to constitutional limitations (Article 13 and Fundamental Rights) and used it to frame the legal backdrop of the dispute.
Dr. Satischandra's case Identified as one of the Supreme Court authorities clarifying the relationship between the Legislature's privileges and constitutional limits. The court regarded this case, with the others cited, as part of the trio of authorities establishing the modern perspective on privileges and their subjection to constitutional constraints.
In re Article 143, Constitution of India Set out constitutional postulates: (a) the Legislature and Judiciary must function harmoniously within their spheres; (b) any law under Article 194(3) will be subject to Article 13 and Fundamental Rights; (c) until such enactment the corpus of privileges will prevail over Article 19(1)(a) but will be subject to Article 21; (d) final orders imposing disabilities are justiciable; and (e) High Court's broad jurisdiction under Article 226. The court relied heavily on passages from this decision (including paragraph 43 and paragraph 129) to determine the perspective of approach, to accept limits on issuing prohibition, to hold that the corpus of privileges is subject to Article 21, and to confirm that orders imposing disabilities are justiciable and thus that it was premature to grant prohibition at the notice stage.
In re Article 148, Constitution of India Discussed the Australian comparison (Section 49) and illustrated that similar provisions did not lapse by inaction in Australia. The court invoked this discussion to reject the submission that Article 194(3) rights automatically lapse by reason of legislative inaction, pointing to the Australian experience as reported in that judgment.
Fontop v. Hampton Cited from Halsbury's as an authority for the proposition that legislative privileges do not include power "to punish by arrest and commitment" (as applied to Commonwealth contexts). The court noted the citation but said it was not further concerned with that aspect for present purposes, since the question here arises under Article 194(3) and the Indian constitutional context.
Doyle v. Falconer Paired with Fontop as authorities cited for limits on punitive powers of legislatures (as reported in Halsbury's). The court recorded the citation but declined to rest further argument upon these authorities for the reasons stated (Indian constitutional provision and present stage of proceedings).
Queen v. Richards (dicta of Dixon C.J.) Dicta that a warrant issued by a Legislature which does not specify the grounds of commitment is conclusive (a view which was not approbated by their Lordships in the discussed judgment). The court observed that the earlier decision had not approved Dixon C.J.'s dictum but found that the point was not directly relevant to the present proceedings, which do not involve a committal or warrant.
Allighari's case Example cited to show the House of Commons treated defamatory or disrespectful speeches outside the House as potentially contemptuous. The court mentioned the existence of such precedents to counter arguments that contempts could not arise from out-of-House publications, though it did not explore this matter further for the present stage.
T.M. Transports (Pte.) Ltd. v. R.T. Authority Authority discussing the proper scope of the writ of prohibition and cautioning that prohibition should not be issued merely because a party affected might prefer to come to this Court; if the tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction the tribunal should be permitted to function and determine its own jurisdiction. The court relied on this decision to emphasise restraint in issuing prohibition where an inferior tribunal (or body) has prima facie jurisdiction; this supported refusal to issue a writ of prohibition against the Speaker's notice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying and setting forth established postulates drawn principally from In re Article 143 and the other Supreme Court authorities cited. It emphasised the constitutional perspective that the Legislature and the Judiciary derive their status from constitutional assignments and must function "rationally, harmoniously and in a spirit of understanding within their respective spheres."

The Court accepted the following propositions as settled by the cited Supreme Court authorities:

  • Any law enacted by a State Legislature under Article 194(3) will be subject to Article 13 and the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
  • Until such enactment is made, the corpus of law (i.e., the body of privileges and immunities derived from the House of Commons) will, under harmonious construction, prevail over Article 19(1)(a) but will remain subject to Article 21 (and to the scope of Article 20(1) insofar as relevant terminology affects Article 21).
  • Final orders imposing disabilities on citizens for alleged breach of privilege or contempt are justiciable; the High Court retains a broad, unrestricted power under Article 226 to entertain such challenges.

The Court then addressed the petitioner's central contentions. It examined the argument that privileges had lapsed by inaction and found that a theory of automatic lapse or lapse by inaction was difficult to sustain. The Court relied on comparative discussion (including the Australian experience) and the submissions of amicus curiae to hold that inaction did not necessarily imply deliberate extinguishment or lapse of the privileges secured by Article 194(3).

On the contention that the corpus of privileges is not "law" in a juristic sense and is too amorphous to meet requirements of definiteness (invoking Articles 20(1) and 21), the Court rejected the submission as unsubstantial. It held that the corpus in question forms part of the constitutional framework and, although some source material (Hansard, Erskine May) may not be readily accessible, that does not render the corpus non-justiciable or non-ascertainable.

The Court also addressed the argument that proceedings for contempt of the Legislature necessarily offended Articles 20(1) and 21 because of the practice of indefinite detention in the House of Commons. The Court observed that at the present stage (a notice to show cause) there was no procedure before the House that impinged on Articles 20(1) or 21; the stage was one of assumption of jurisdiction only and it was premature to treat it as a criminal proceeding attracting those protections in the manner urged by the petitioner.

Finally, the Court considered the nature and proper scope of the writ of Prohibition. Relying on T.M. Transports and the general principle that prohibition should not be used to stifle the legitimate exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal having prima facie jurisdiction, the Court concluded that it should not paralyse the Speaker's present exercise of power to issue a notice under a Resolution of the Legislature.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition was dismissed in limine. The Court held that Article 194(3) invests the Speaker, when empowered by a Resolution of the Legislature, with the right to call upon a third party to show cause why he should not be held to have committed a breach of privilege of the Legislature by way of contempt, and that a writ of prohibition should not be issued at this stage to restrain that exercise of jurisdiction.

IMPLICATIONS:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Speaker and the Legislature may proceed with the notice (the petitioner must answer the show-cause notice); the Court declined to interfere by way of prohibition at the preliminary stage.
  • The Court expressly refrained from deciding on the merits of the alleged contempt: it stated nothing regarding the truth of the averments contained in the notice or whether, if established, they would constitute contempt. Those matters were held to be premature for judicial determination at this stage.
  • No new broad precedent was declared beyond application of established propositions from higher authority; the Court applied existing Supreme Court authorities and declined to extend them to invalidate the Speaker's interim exercise of power to issue a show-cause notice.

    C. Subramaniam, River View. Madras-25 v. The Honourable The Speaker Of The Madras Legislative Assembly, Madras 9 And Others.

    (Delivered by Anantanarayanan, C.J)

    This is a proceeding under Art 226 of the Constitution, for the issue of a writ of Prohibition restraining the Speaker of the Madras Legislative Assembly (respondent 1) and the State of Madras (respondent 2) from proceeding further with the notice forming Annexure A to the petition, asking the petitioner (Mr. C. Subramaniam) to show cause why he should not be held to have committed contempt of the Legislative Assembly. The Union of India, the Attorney General of India and the. Advocate General of Madras have been shown in the array of parties as the third, fourth and fifth respondents to the petition.

    Annexure C to the petition is an excerpt from a leading daily of Madras dated 11-2-1968, describing a speech made by the petitioner at Dindigul, under the caption “Political Fraud”. The report states that Mr. C. Subramaniam (petitioner) referred to the recent Language Bill (more strictly, Language Resolution) adopted by the State Assembly, as the biggest political fraud; In respect of this matter, Annexure B shows that the Legislature adopted a motion to the effect that this was a question of privilege to be dealt with by the House itself, and this motion further authorised the Speaker to issue a notice to Mr. Subramaniam, asking him to show cause why he should not be held to have committed contempt of the House, in respect of the passage in his speech, already set forth. Annexure A is the actual notice to show cause received by the petitioner, after the Speaker had held that there was a prima facie case of breach of privilege.

    The single line of reasoning upon which this petition has been argued before us by Mr. V.K.T Chari for the writ petitioner, proceeds on two related aspects of the law, which are set forth in the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 6 of the affidavit. Before embarking on a scrutiny of this, which is the heart of the matter, we may refer to certain earlier averments in the affidavit. We might immediately state that the accuracy of the report of the speech, is not now in controversy; arguments were submitted, upon the basis of the report being accurate. But the petitioner states that he has been a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Madras, a Member of the Parliament, a Minister of the Madras Government and the Leader of the House in the Madras Assembly, and also a Minister of the Union Government. He is currently holding the political office of the President, Tamilnad Congress Commitee. He has a duty towards the public, particularly in the field of political matters, which he must discharge fearlessly, and by virtue of rights inherent in British Subjects from the days of the Magna Carta, and re-affirmed by the Constitution of India, particularly in the Preamble and in Art. 19 thereof. After nothing these averments, we may first proceed to set forth the reasoning of Mr. Chari, upon the petition. Mr. Chari fully concedes that, whatever might have been the somewhat hazy or in determinate state of rights as between the subject and the Legislature and between the the Legislature and the Judiciary, which hither to prevailed, matters are now clear beyond controversy, by virtue of the dicta of the Supreme Court in three important cases, namely, Sharma's case(1), Dr. Satischandra's case(2) and In re Art. 143, Constitution of India(3),

    At the outest, Mr. Chari stressed the Preamble to the Constitution, particularly the second clause thereof, which enshrines the Solemn resolve to secure to all citizens of this country “liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship”. He would link this with the Fundamental Right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a), but subject to reasonable restrictions under Art. 19 (2). Again, he contends that though the privileges of the State Legislature are guaranteed under Art. 194 (3), in view of the failure of the State Legislature to enact the necessary law within a reasonable time, as contemplated by the first limb of Art. 194 (3), these privileges must now be regarded as subject to the Fundamental Rights of citizens. This Article states:—

    “……the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature of a State…shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution.”

    The line of reasoning that emerges from the further arguments of learned counsel is this. Entry 39 of list 11 of the Seventh Schedule relates to “powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislative Assembly and of the members and the committees thereof….” This has to be read along with Art. 246, which embodies the principles of competency of legislation, respectively by Parliament and by the State Legislatures. The constitution was completed in formulation by the Constituent Assembly en 26-11-1949, and came into effect and force on 26-1-1950. The old Constituent Assembly continued as a single provisional Parliament, till the respective elections were held. Clearly, therefore, Art. 194 (3) was transitional or transitory in character. It was never contemplated that this state of affairs inrespect of the powers, privileges and immunities of the State Legislature should continue for any indefinite term; enacted laws were expected to be made, in this respect as early as convenient. But one indisputable effect of Sharma's case and In re Art. 143 Constitution of India affirming the same proposition, is that any such law hereafter to be made by the Parliament or a State Legislature, would be subject to the Constitutional limitations of Art. 13, and the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The State Legislature was fully aware of this, as petitions had been presented even in Parliament, and the decision of the Supreme Court in In Re Art. 143 Constitution of India was the subject of discussion. Nevertheless, for many years, no law embodying such rights, privileges and immunities hss been made, and this is delibe* rate inaction; the consequence of it must be that what is guaranted under the second limb of Art. 194 (3) to the Legislature, is no longer avaiiable, and must be held to have lapsed by default.

    Linked with this is an argument, upon what may be termed the ‘Juristic norms’ which have to be applied to any law, the infringement of which may expose a subject to penalties, or to any disability. Any Law is a rale, and, further, necessarily a rule of prohibition; or injunction it follows that such a rule, must be definite and ascertainable, before the subject can exposed to untoward consequences, for infringement of the law. The Law of British Parliamentary Privileges is “wilderness of single instances”. This is a vague and amorphous Jurisprudence. Further, it involves a study of what these privileges were as on 26-1-1950, and several of them might have lapsed owing to desuetude. This law is hardly ascertainable for the soures of the law, namely Hansard, running into hundreds of volumes, and Erskine Moy's ‘Parliamentary Practice’ are not even available, without much diffculty, to a lawyer, leave alone a citizen. This entire argument is, in its turn, made to impinge on Art. 20 (1) and Art. 21 of the Constitution, since In re Art 143 Constitution of India, is authority for the view that, though the body of privileges made part of the law under Art. 194 (3) may prevail, so long as this law is enforced, over Art. 19 (1) (a), It does not prevail over Art. 21. It is here stressed that such a proceeding, asking the petitioner to chow cause against a conviction for contempt of the Legislature, is essentially in criminal jurisdiction. Mr. Chari points out, upon authority, that the House of Commons in the United Kingdom, unlike the House of Lords, does not impose a fine of imprisonment for limited periods, but directs an indefinite detention in custody, of the person in contempt This infringes Art. 21 and Art. 20 (1), the combined effect of which Articles is to declare that no person can be proceeded against with regard to any offence, except for the violation of a law in force, and according to procedure established by law”.

    Before dealing with these arguments, it may be necessary to set forth certain postulates or propositions which are very clear and now well established, in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court, already referred to. Since, for this purpose, we have already largely to draw upon the observations in in re Art. 143 Constitution of India. and many paragraphs of this Judgment in the text have been read before us, we shall set forth the bare propositions, in the interests of brevity, confining ourselves to citing only one or two observations of the learned Chief Justice (Gajendragadkar C.J).

    Firstly, the perspective of approach to any question of this kind has been determined, in constitutional terms, in paragraph 43. To quote.

    “In this connection it is necessary to remember that the status, dignity and importance of these two respective institutions, the Legislatures and the Judicatuse are derived primarily from the status, dignity and importance of the respective causes that assigned to their charge by the Constitution. These two august bodies…must function not in antimony nor in a spirit of hostility, but rationally, harmoniously and in a spirit of understanding within their respective spheres……”

    Next it may be taken as now settled, beyond doubt that any Law that the State Legislature may enact under Art. 194 (3), with regard to its powers, privileges and immunitives, will be subject to Art. 13, and the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Thirdly, it may be taken as the Constitutional Law, however, that the Corpus of law which has to prevail, until, such an enactment is made, will not be subject to Art. 19 (1) (a), because, under the rule of harmonious construction, the particular provision in Art. 194 (3) will have to prevail. But, equally, this Corpus of law will be subject to the right guaranteed under Art. 21. We may take it that the content of Art. 21, may have to be interpreted also in the light of the terminology of Art. 20 (1) of the Constitution.

    Fourthly, while the foregoing postulates may be true of the respective spheres of action of the Legislature in respect of its powers and immunities, and the Judiciary, it does not mean that a final order imposing a disability on a subject, for alleged breach of privilege or contempt of the Legislature, will not be justiciable. It has to be carefully noted that in paragraph 129 (page 787), their Lordships have referred to the amplitude of the unrestricted power of the High Court under Art. 226, and, in another context, they have not approbated the dicta of Dixon C.J in the Queen v. Richards that, if the warrant issued by the Legislature does not specify the grounds of commitment, it is conclusive. This matter need not be further referred to for the simple reason that, notwithstanding what Mr. Chari strenuously urged on this aspect, we are not here concerned with any warrant, or anything analogous to a committal proceeding. We are concerned, purely and simply, with a notice to the writ petitioner to show cause why he should not be held to have committed a breach of privilege of the Legislature, by way of contempt of the Legislature. Further, it is clearly premature, and even impossible, to judge now, upon the matter cf the alleged contempt itself, we may add that the affidavit itself contains no averment with regard to this. What we are asked to do is to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly from proceeding further, which is virtually on a ground of absence of an ab initio jurisdiction.

    Mr. Chari has referred to a passage in Hals bury's Laws of England, Simonds Edn. Volume 5, page 478 (Sec. 1058), with regard to the extent of power of the privilege of Legislatures, as applying to the Commonwealth. It is claimed that these privileges do not include any power “to punish by arrest and commitment”. The authorities cited are Fontop v. Hampton and Doyle v. Falconer. But, obviously, we are not further concerned with this aspect, for we are here upon the affect of Art. 194(3) of our Constitution, and the body of rights, privileges and immunities which it thereby secures to the State Legislature. The same observations may apply to the dicta cited from Moore on the Australian Constitution 2nd Edn. page 138-A.

    It is very difficult to see how any theory of automatic lapse, or lapse due to in action, can apply to Art. 194(3), in its relation to the State Legislature. It is of considerable interest to note, and this is discussed in In re Art 148 Constitution of India itself, that Sec. 49 of the Australian Constitution was in almost identical terms, except that the operative word was ‘declare’. But, as Mr. Nambiar, assisting us as amicus curiae, has emphasised, though tbis was over sixty years ago enactments have not superseded the state of rights secured for the Legislature by Sec. 49 in Australia, except in two minor respects; apparently, the Legislature was content with the body of rights, privileges and immunities thus secured, without seeking any enlargement or modification. We may take notice of the fact that certain petitions have been submitted to Parliament and to the State Legislatare, stressing the need for early enactment, in the interest of the Rule of law, Mr. Chari has described; but is impossible to arrive at any conclusion that the inaction is deliberate; far more so, to sustain any theory that such inaction has the effect of a lapse or extinction. Per contra, Mr. Nambiar points out that where the Constitution intends setting a term to any situation of rights, it explicitly says so, and Art. 334, 337 and 343 are very clear instances.

    The argument that these powers, privileges and immunities thus secured for the Legislature, do not form a law at all, in the juristic sense, is equally unsubstantial. Actually, this Corpus Is part of the Constitution itself. Nor can it be contended that this law is amorphous and unascertainable, though it may be true that certain sources of the law, comprising precedents, are not easily available. Mr. Nambiar has set forth before us certain interesting passages in “Constitutional and Administrative Law” by Hood Phillips (3rd Edn) pages 186 and 187. It is very clear from these paragraphs, that defamatory or disrespectful speeches, outside the House of Commons, by third parties, reflecting on the House, or tending to bring tbe House into contempt or ridicule could be properly regarded as contempt of the Legislature. There are even precedents, such as Allighari's case(4) but we need not explore any further into this aspect here, for obvious reasons. The argument that this is essentially a criminal jurisdiction, because, as observed in In re Art. 143 Constitution of India, the practice of the House of Commons has been, not to impose fine for contempt, while it may detain indefinitely, is clearly quite inapplicable to the present stage of the proceedings. This is a stage of assumption of jurisdiction, and nothing more. Actually, if we are to judge from the passage at page 189 of Hood Phillips (earlier cited), Reprimand and Admonition are also included in forms of punishment, which are open to the House of Commons. It is impossible to accept the argument that we have, at the present stage, any proeedure whatever, which impinges on Art. 20 (1) or Art. 21 of the Constitution of India.

    Finally, a word may be stated about the character of a writ of prohibition, even though this court is not confined to the precise scope of the Prerogative Writs in the United Kingdom, and Art. 226 embodies a wider amplitude of power. The history of this writ, and the true scope of its issue and function, were discussed by a Division Bench of this Court in T.M Transports (Pte.) Ltd. v. R.T Authority The following few lines from that decision are useful, as sucriently stating the situation at law (at page 12).

    “if, in each one of these cases, a party, who might be affected by such a possible decision, can be permitted to come up to this court and ask for prohibition to go, through it might be perfectly probable that the inferior Tribunal would have jurisdiction, upon facts being established in a particular way, this would really imply that many proceedings quite within the competence of such authorities, or which may be ultimately found to be comprised in the jurisdiction, may be stifled at the outset…If there is jurisdiction over the matter before the Tribunal prima facie and facts canvassed betore it, one way or another, may affect the issue as to the boundary of that jurisdiction, we think, that, the Tribunal should be permitted to function, and to determine its own jurisdiction the writ should not issue to prralyse such an enquiry”.

    For the above reasons, we are clearly of the view that Art. 194 (3) invests the Speaker of the Legislature, empowered by a Resolution of the Legislature, with the right to call upon a third party, like the writ petitioner, to show cause why he should not be held to have committed a breach of the privilege of the Legislature, by way of contempt. That is all that has happened, and a writ of prohibition need not be issurd by this court to stifle the very exercise of that jurisdiction. We need not emphasise, both as a matter of caution and as a necessary corollary, that we are stating nothing whatever about the averments themselves in the notice, or the degree to which such facts will or will not constitute a contempt of the Legislature. These are matters which it is quite premature for us to refer to, at this stage. This writ petition will, therefore, be dismissed in limine.

    We must record our obligation to Mr. M. K. Nambiyar, appearing with Mr. K.K Venugopal, who has rendered us valuable assistance as amicus curiae

    v.c.s

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