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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • S. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. S. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, corresponds to S. 73 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 1961.
  • Article 329 (b) of the Constitution and the Representation of People's Act.
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963. R. 29, Cl. (5)
  • S. 73 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.
  • Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act (VII of 1962)
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • S. 279 of the District Municipalities Act
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963,
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961,
  • Representation of People's Act, 1951,
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Act
  • sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of S. 73,
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. S. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, corresponds to S. 73 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 1961.
  • Article 329 (b) of the Constitution and the Representation of People's Act.
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963. R. 29, Cl. (5)
  • S. 73 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.
  • Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act (VII of 1962)
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • S. 279 of the District Municipalities Act
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963,
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961,
  • Representation of People's Act, 1951,
  • Madras Co-operative Societies Act
  • sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of S. 73,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges the proceedings and decision of a Scrutinising Committee dated 4 November 1965 that rejected the petitioner's nomination for election as a Director of the Tiruchirappalli District Co-operative Central Bank Limited. The Bank's Board consists of 19 directors; 17 had been elected and two seats remained (one to be elected from the Lalgudi Co-operative Supervising Union and one from fixed-deposit holders). The petitioner's term, determined by lots as part of the staggered retirement arrangement, expired on 31 December 1965. The petitioner filed his nomination on 3 November 1965 for election from the Lalgudi Supervising Union. During scrutiny, an objection was raised that the petitioner had seconded another candidate (the sixth respondent) and, on that ground, the Scrutinising Committee (comprising the first respondent and respondents 2–5) rejected the petitioner's nomination. The petitioner denied having seconded the sixth respondent for the Central Bank post (asserting any seconding related to the Union governing body) and alleged fraud in alteration of the nomination paper; the committee rejected that factual plea. The petitioner then approached the High Court by way of writ of certiorari seeking quashing of the Scrutinising Committee's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Scrutinising Committee lawfully could reject the petitioner's nomination on the ground that he had seconded another candidate, in the absence of any statutory or rule-based disqualification for such an act.
  2. Whether the High Court could, by writ under Article 226, entertain and quash the Scrutinising Committee's order rejecting a nomination before the declaration of election results, given the remedies and referral scheme under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (in particular S. 73 and related sections).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that he did not second the nomination of the sixth respondent for election to the Central Bank but only for the governing body of the Union, and that the nomination paper had been altered (fraud), a factual matter rejected by the Scrutinising Committee.
  • Alternatively, the petitioner argued that even if he had seconded the sixth respondent for the Central Bank election, there is no provision in the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, the rules, or the Bank's bye-laws that disqualifies a candidate for having seconded another candidate; therefore the committee lacked power to disqualify on that ground and its rejection was beyond jurisdiction.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents maintained that the nomination was rightly rejected because the petitioner had seconded another candidate.
  • They further argued that even if the rejection was erroneous, statutory remedies exist: disputes touching the constitution of the committee (including nomination validity) fall under S. 73 and are to be referred to the Registrar after declaration of results; thus a writ petition before declaration was not appropriate.
  • They contended the Registrar's powers (including under S. 97 and S. 120) did not furnish a pre-declaration remedy for the petitioner: S. 73's proviso bars reference before declaration; S. 97 revision was said not to be available because the Scrutinising Committee is not an "officer" or "committee" as defined; S. 120 could not be used by the petitioner to seek governmental intervention.
  • Reliance was placed on Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (Supreme Court) to argue that the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain pre-declaration election nomination disputes is restricted in other statutory contexts (e.g., parliamentary/state elections) and, by analogy, interference before declaration was improper. The respondents also relied on decisions (including Thakur Prasad and Lakshmiah) to argue against pre-declaration writ intervention and to stress that the scrutiny committee is not a judicial/statutory tribunal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madhava Rao v. Surya Rao (Full Bench) Held that validity of a nomination for election to a registered society's Board is a dispute "touching the business" of the society (corresponding to present S. 73). The Court relied on this authority to conclude that rejection of a nomination is a dispute within the ambit of S. 73 (i.e., touching constitution of the committee), which ordinarily falls to be referred to the Registrar.
Yonnuswami v. Returning Officer (Supreme Court) Held that "election" means the entire process, comprising several stages, and can include nomination. The Court used this principle (and allied decisions) to support the view that nomination rejection is part of the election process and thus an election dispute under S. 73.
Muthuvelappa Gounder v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies Affirmed that "election" in its wide sense includes nomination and the whole process commences from nomination. The Court applied this to reinforce that rejection of a nomination is an election dispute under S. 73, but noted the statutory limitation (proviso) preventing reference to the Registrar before declaration of results.
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal (Supreme Court) Held that the High Court has no jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain petitions regarding improper rejection of nomination papers for Parliament/State Assembly elections, in light of Article 329 and the Representation of the People Act, which prescribe exclusive electoral remedies and stages. The Court considered Ponnuswami as strongly relied upon by respondents but distinguished it: Article 329 and the Representation of the People Act specifically remove High Court jurisdiction in those contexts, whereas the Madras Co-operative Societies Act did not have an equivalent explicit bar on Article 226 jurisdiction.
Thakur Prasad v. V. S. Mehta (Madhya Pradesh High Court) Adopted Ponnuswami's approach and held that statutory election schemes sought to give finality to stages of election and that matters should be determined after the election is over; indicated reluctance to interfere before notification/declaration. The Court noted this authority as supportive of the proposition that interference before declaration is generally undesirable, but treated it as distinguishable and not overriding where a rejection is clearly without jurisdiction.
Lakshmiah v. Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. Held a writ under Article 226 could not issue against a Board's rejection of a nomination where the Board acted under non-statutory regulations framed by the society; the Board was not a statutory tribunal and the remedy lay under the statutory referral provisions (S. 51 corresponding to S. 73). The Court distinguished this case on the ground that after the 1961 Act and subsequent statutory rules (Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 and 1963), the rules are statutory in character and enforceable by writ; hence Lakshmiah did not preclude writ relief in the present circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured analysis, linking statutory provisions, the rules governing nominations, and the jurisprudence on the meaning of "election" and the scope of remedies:

  1. Examination of statutory scheme and rules:
    • The Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963 (R. 29(5) and R. 29(6)) prescribe the form and formal requirements for nomination (Form No. 3), the presentation and receipt procedure, and empower the scrutiny committee to examine nomination papers and reject nominations after summary inquiry, recording brief reasons.
    • Separately, disqualifications are enumerated under S. 28 of Act LIII of 1961; neither the Act, the rules, nor the bye-laws expressly disqualify a candidate for having seconded another candidate.
    Conclusion drawn: In the absence of a specific statutory or rule-based prohibition, rejection of a nomination on the ground that the candidate seconded another was beyond the Scrutinising Committee's powers and therefore without jurisdiction.
  2. Consideration of alternative statutory remedies and jurisdictional barriers:
    • S. 73 provides for reference of disputes touching the constitution of the committee (which includes nomination disputes) to the Registrar but contains a proviso excluding disputes in connection with an election from being referred until after declaration of the result.
    • Therefore, though nomination disputes fall under S. 73 in substance, the Registrar cannot be approached prior to declaration; S. 73(6) allows interlocutory orders only in disputes referable under S. 73, i.e., post-declaration disputes.
    • Arguments that S. 97 (power to call for records/revision) or S. 120 (government direction to Registrar) could be used were rejected by the Court on the grounds articulated in the opinion: the scrutiny committee does not fall within the definition of an "officer" or "committee" for S. 97 purposes and S. 120 is not a vehicle the petitioner could properly invoke for relief in this context.
    Conclusion drawn: Statutory routes envisaged by the Act do not provide a pre-declaration remedy in the Registrar/Government fora for the present complaint.
  3. On High Court's remedial powers and comparative authority:
    • The respondents relied on Ponnuswami and analogous authorities to assert that pre-declaration intervention is inappropriate. The Court acknowledged those decisions but distinguished them because in the parliamentary/state election context Article 329 and the Representation of the People Act expressly exclude High Court jurisdiction — no similar express bar exists in the Madras Co-operative Societies Act.
    • The Court accepted the general policy that judicial interference in the middle of an electoral process is undesirable, but held that where an impugned rejection is "without jurisdiction and on the face of it unsupportable in law" and where denial of relief would cause considerable hardship, the High Court's wide powers under Article 226 may appropriately be exercised even before declaration of results.
    Conclusion drawn: The absence of an express statutory ouster of Article 226 jurisdiction under the Madras Act, combined with the manifest illegality of the rejection on grounds for which no disqualification exists, justified pre-declaration writ relief in this case.
  4. Treatment of earlier decision (Lakshmiah):
    • The Court observed Lakshmiah was premised on elections conducted under non-statutory society regulations where the body deciding objections was not a statutory tribunal; after the 1961 Act and the statutory Rules (1961 and 1963), the rules have statutory character and are enforceable via writ, so Lakshmiah did not bar relief here.
  5. Overall application to facts:
    • Because there was no provision disqualifying a candidate for seconding another, and because the Scrutinising Committee's rejection rested on precisely that ground, the rejection was on its face unsupportable in law and beyond the committee's powers.
    • Given the illegality and the potential hardship of denying interim relief until post-declaration remedies became available, the Court concluded it should exercise its Article 226 jurisdiction to quash the committee's order prior to declaration of results.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Writ Petition is allowed and a writ of certiorari is issued quashing the order of the Scrutinising Committee dated 4th November 1965 that rejected the petitioner's nomination.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the Scrutinising Committee's order rejecting the petitioner's nomination was quashed by the High Court and the writ petition was allowed.
  • No costs were awarded ("No costs").
  • The opinion does not announce that it is creating a novel or general rule displacing the statutory election scheme; rather, it proceeds on the particular statutory interpretation and facts of the case. The Court emphasized that interference before declaration is exceptional and depends on whether the impugned action is clearly without jurisdiction; the opinion does not set forth an express broad ruling substituting the statutory referral regime.
V.C.S

    P.B.K Raja Chidambaram v. R.P Rathna Sarma And Others

    This petition is filed praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records connected with the proceedings of the Scrutiny Committee for the election of a Director to the Tiruchirappalli District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, dated 4th November, 1965, and for quashing the same as illegal and without jurisdiction.

    The Tiruchirappalli District Co-operative Central Bank consists of 19 Directors. Out of the 19 Directors, 17 had already been elected. One Director has to be elected from the Lalgudi Co-operative Supervising Union and another from individuals holding fixed deposits. The business year of the Bank begins from 1st January and end by the 31st December. The term of office of elected members is three years but it is provided that one-third number of members elected to the Board, at the first election shall retire at the end of the first year after such election and another one third number of members to retire in the second year. The members that are to retire are to be determined by lots cast by the Board. As a result of the lots cast, the petitioner's term as a Director of the Bank expired on 31st December, 1965. The petitioner wanted to be elected to the District Co-operative Central Bank from the Lalgudi Co-operative Supervising Union.

    On 3rd November, 1965, the petitioner filed his nomination for election to the Central Bank. When the nominations were taken up for scrutiny by the Scrutinising Committee consisting of the first respondent, President of theSupervising Union, and respondents 2 to 5, the members of the Committee, an objection was raised to the nomination of the petitioner en the ground that he had seconded the nomination of the sixth respondent. This objection was upheld by respondents 1 to 5, and the nomination of the petitioner was rejected.

    The petitioner questioned the correctness of the rejection of his nomination on the ground that he did not second the nomination of the sixth respondent for election to the Central Bank, but only for election to the governing body of the Union and that fraud was played upon him by changing the name in the nomination paper. This plea of the petitioner was rejected by the Scrutinising Committee. As this finding by the Scrutinising Committee is one of fact, it was rightly not raised before this Court.

    The only contention raised in this Court was that even if the petitioner is found to have seconded the nomination of the sixth respondent for the election to the Central Bank, that would not invalidate his nomination, as there is no prohibition against a candidate nominating another. The procedure as to elections is elaborately laid down in the Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963. R. 29, Cl. (5) relates to nomination of a candidate for election. It requires that the nomination should be made in Form No. 3 which will be supplied to any member free of cost on application. Form No. 3 requires the name of the society, admission number and name of the candidate, father's name, and his address. The admission number and name of the seconder are also to be given. Every nomination paper shall be signed by two members whose names are included in the list. The nomination papers should be presented in person to the president of the society before the date and hour specified. After receipt of the nomination paper, the person who receives it shall enter in the nomination paper the serial number and certify the date and hour at which the nomination paper was received by him and acknowledge receipt of the nomination paper. R. 29, Cl. (6) relates to scrutiny and it enables the committee to examine the nomination papers and decide all objections which may be made at the time to any nomination and either on such objection or on its own motion after such summary enquiry if any, as the committee thinks necessary, reject any nomination for valid reasons. The committee is also required to record in writing a brief statement of its reasons for its rejection. Apart from the requirements under R. 29 (5), a candidate shall be ineligible for being elected or appointed as a member of the committee if he suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in S. 28 of Act LIII of 1961. Neither the Co-operative Societiee Act nor the rules framed under it or the bye-laws of the Central Bank expressly state that the nomination of a candidate who has seconded the candidature of another shall be disqualified and his nomination rejected. In the absence of any specific rule, the disqualification and the rejection of the nomination on this ground is beyond the powers of the Scrutinising Committee.

    It was next contended on behalf of the respondents that even if the nomination of the petitioner was erroneous rejected, the petitioner has other remedies and a relief by way of a writ of certiorari is not available to him.

    S. 73 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, provides that if any dispute arises touching the constitution of the committee, such dispute shall be referred the Registrar for decision. It has been held that the election of an officer is certainly a part of the business of the society. A Full Bench of this Court in Madhava Rao v. Surya Rao(1), laid down that the validity of a nomination of a candidate for election to the Board of Directors of a registered society is a dispute “touching the business” of the society within the meaning of S. 51, which corresponds to present S. 73 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Yonnuswami v. Returning Officer(2), and followed by this Court in Muthuvelappa Gounder v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies(3), that the word ‘election means the entire process which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing’ on the result of the process. The view expressed in Muthuvelappa Gounder v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (3), is that the whole process of election commenced from the state of nomination, and the word “election” as including nomination also in its wide sense of the term. On the authority of the decisions cited above, there can be no doubt that the rejection of a nomination paper is a dispute touching theconstitution of the committee under S. 73. Bat the proviso to clause (1) of S. 73 excludes any dispute relating to or in connection with the election to a committee being referred to the Registrar under this sub-section till the date of the declaration of the result of such election. The only remedy of the person whose nomination is rejected is to approach the Registrar under S. 73 after the date of the declaration, his remedy before that date having been barred by the provise to S. 73. Clause (6) of S. 73 provides that the Registrar may pass such interlocutory orders as he may deem fit in the interests of justice. The power to pass interlocutory orders will only be available in disputes which can be referred to him under S. 73, that is, election disputes after the date of the declaration of the results of such elections. As an election dispute before the date of declaration of results cannot be referred to him under S. 73, he will not have any power to pass any order in an election dispute regarding the rejection of a nomination before the declaration of the election results. It was contended that even if the dispute cannot be referred to the Registrar, an application can be made to him under S. 97 for examining the record of any officer subordinate to him and revising the order. It was submitted that the power of revision is available in cases not covered under S. 96. S. 96 (1) provides for an appeal to the Tribunal against the order of the Registrar under sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of S. 73, and if no appeal was available under S. 96, the dispute not being one referable under S. 73, an application under S. 97 was maintainable. S. 97 empowers the Registrar to call for and examine the record of any officer subordinate to him. An ‘officer’, as defined in S. 2 (8) includes a member of Committee and any other person empowered under the rules or the by-laws to give directions in regard to the business of the society. A ‘committee’ is defined as meaning the governing body of a registered society. The scrutiny committee is not the governing body of the registered society and therefore its members are not members of a committee as required by the definition. Though the scrutiny committee is empowered to scrutinise the nominations and accept or reject them, it cannot be stated that they have any power to give directions in regard to the business of the society. The scrutiny of the nomination would not amount to a direction regarding the business of the society.

    The powers of the registrar to entertain any dispute in connection with the election of a candidate before the date of declaration of the results is specifically prohibited under the proviso to S. 73. It will not be logical to read into S. 27 an intention to empower the Registrar to go into a dispute relating to rejection of nomination before the date of declaration under S. 97 by way of a revision unless there are express provisions to that effect. I am unable to agree with the contention that under S- 97 the Registrar, though prohibited from entertaining an appeal, could entertain a revision against the order rejecting a nomination pending declaration of the results. Reference was made to S. 120 and it was submitted that the Government could direct the Registrar to make an enquiry into the rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner. S. 120 is intended to enable the Government to direct the Registrar to make an enquiry or to take appropriate proceedings under the Act in any case specified in their order. S. 120 cannot be availed of by the petitioner to a approach the Government for relief. A consideration of the various sections makes it clear that though the dispute relating to the rejection of a nomination can be referred to the Registrar it can only be done after the declaration of the results and the petitioner has no remedy to question the correctness of the invalidation of the nomination before the declaration of the results. The Petitioner is also not entitled to prefer an application for revision under S. 97 to the Registrar or to the Government under S. 120.

    Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the intention of the Legislature was not to provide any remedy against the order of rejection of the nomination until the results were declared the purpose being to avoid unnecessary prolongation of the process of election. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal. It was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court has no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Censtitution to entertain petitions regarding improper rejection by the Returning Officer of nomination papers of candidates for election either to the House of Parliament or to the State Assembly and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has been excluded in regard to matters provided for in Article 329 which covers all‘electoral matters’. The Court expressed the view that Article 329 (b) was encated to prescribe the manner in which and the stage at which this ground and other grounds which may be raised under the law to call the election in question, could be urged. Article 329 (b) of the Constitution prohibits the questioning of election to the Houses of Parliament and Legislatures of the State except by any election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. The Representation of People's Act, 1951, was enacted in pursuance of the powers conferred under Article 329 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Act, particularly sections 80, 100, 105 and 170 make it clear that no petition regarding election could be entertained before the declaration of the results of the election. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that a reading of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act and the rules framed thereunder would show that interference bef re the stage of declaration of the results was not intended. But it has to be noted that the power of the High Court to interfere under Article 226 against the order of rejection of the nomination before the declaration of the results has not been specifically taken away under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act as in the case of elections to the Houses of Parliament and Legislature by Article 329 (b) of the Constitution and the Representation of People's Act. Without the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution being taken away by competent authority, the contention that the High Court has no power to interfere cannot be accepted as sound. While admitting that the High Court's power to interfere in this case has not been taken away, it was argued that interference at this stage would have the effect of regarding the process of election and would be contrary to the spirit of the enactment. In support of this plea, learned Counsel relied on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in Thakur Prasad v. V.S Mehta. Dixit, C.J, to whom the question was referred to on a difference of opinion, was of the view that the High Court's decision in Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal, was directly in point and held that the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act (VII of 1962) and the rules framed thereunder intended to give a sort of finality to different stages of election and to provide that all matters arising during the election shall be determined and adjudicated upon, after the election is over. The learned Judge, while holding that the provisions of the Act did not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or 227 observed that it is not proper to interfere with the orders of the Returning Officer before any election or co-option under the Aet is notified.

    The contention that under the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, it was not intended to provide any remedy against the rejection of a nomination paper till the declaration of the result is made is based on the proviso in S. 73. The section read as a whole makes it clear that the Registrar is not empowered to take the matter as an election dispute at any stage before the declaration of the result. But that does not mean that the Legislature intended that the question cannot be agitated before a civil Court or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The right to resort to civil Court cannot be barred unless it is specifically prohibited. So also, the wide power of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be curtailed unless by one or other of the articles of the Constitution of India. The only question, therefore, that has to be considered whether it is desirable that the High Court should interfere at the stage before the election result is declared. The answer to this question would depend on the facts of the case. If the rejection of the nomination is without jurisdiction and on the face of it unsupportable in law and the denial of a remedy at this stage would cause considerable hardship to the petitioner, the High Court will not hesitate to exercise the powers conferred on it by the Constitution. In this case it has been pointed out that neither the Act, the Rules nor the bye-laws disqualify the nomination on the ground that he seconded to the nomination of somebody else. In this connection it may be noted that under S. 279 of the District Municipalities Act and under the Panchayats Act an elector desiring to stand is forbidden from signing the nomination paper as an elector or as secondor. There is no such prohibition in the election under the Madras Co-operative Societies Act and such prohibition cannot be inferred. The rejeotion of the nomination papers, therefore, on the face of it is unsupportable.

    Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that even if it is held that the rejection itillegal and unsupportable in law, the High Court should not interfere with it as the scrutiny committee is not a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal statutorily entrusted with the right and duty to decide disputes between parties. Reliance was placed on the decision of a Bench of this Court reported in Lakshmiah v. Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. (I). In that case the petitioner prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the Board of Directors of a Co-operative Society in so far as it related to the rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner. Certain regulations were framed by the Society for the conduct of election of Directors from among the members of the Society. These regulations empowered the Board to consider the objections to the nominations for the election of members to the Board of Directors. The Board was not a statutory tribunal, but was only discharging functions entrusted to it by regulations. Those regulations were framed by the Society itself and had no statutory force. On the facts, therefore it was held that a writ under Article 226 cannot be issued. It was pointed out by the Bench that the petitioner could seek his remedy under S. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act. S. 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, corresponds to S. 73 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 1961. It is pleaded that the Bench decision is an authority for the proposition that a writ does not lie against the order of the scrutiny committee. Though S. 73 of the 1961 Act is more or less the same as S. 51 of the 1932 Act, it has to be noted that statutory rules were framed (The Madras Cooperative Societies Rules) under the powers conferred by Sub-Ss. (1) and (2) of S. 119. It is not denied that the rules are not statutory rules or that they are not enforceable by the issue of a Writ. After the enactment of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, and the framing of the Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 and the framing of the Madras Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963, the decision in Lakshmiah v. Sriperumbudur Taluk Co-operative Marketing Societies Ltd., is inapplicable.

    On a consideration of all the circumstances in the case, I am satisfied that even though the results of the election have not been declared, this is a fit case in which a writ of cartiorari should issue quashing the order of the scrutiny committee rejecting the nomination of the petitioner. The Writ Petition is allowed. No costs.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    P.B.K Raja Chidambaram v. R.P Rathna Sarma And Others
    (Feb 17, 1966)