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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956. This Act
  • Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961
  • Kerala(3) the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961
  • Act by Arts. 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution
  • Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964,
  • PUNJAB SECURITY OF LAND TENURES ACT 1953
  • Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,
  • Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961,
  • Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Land Holdings Act, 1957,
  • Art. 31-B, the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956. This Act
  • Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961
  • Kerala(3) the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961
  • Act by Arts. 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution
  • Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964,
  • PUNJAB SECURITY OF LAND TENURES ACT 1953
  • Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,
  • Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961,
  • Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Land Holdings Act, 1957,
  • Art. 31-B, the Act
Smart Summary

Veeraswami, J. — Summary of Opinion concerning the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, notwithstanding its subsequent inclusion in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. For convenience the Court heard the batch together on validity, but dealt with interpretation and fact-specific questions separately. The opinion concentrates on Writ Petition Nos. 1543 of 1964, 416 of 1965 and 1473 of 1965.

In W.P. 1543 of 1964 the petitioner sought a mandamus restraining the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Vellore, and the State of Madras from proceedings against him and the lands listed in his supporting affidavit. The petitioner had filed a statutory return disclosing family members and an aggregate holding of 185-47 acres. Relevant transactions disclosed in the affidavit include:

  • Sale on 9 February 1962 conveying 7 acres 25 cents.
  • Settlement deed dated 6 April 1962 purportedly gifting 78-47½ acres to the petitioner’s wife.
  • Family arrangement dated 27 March 1963 allotting specific acreages among family members (including minor sons).
  • Gift deed dated 25 March 1964 by the petitioner’s wife settling 39 acres on three minor daughters.

The Authorised Officer held an enquiry, summoned evidence and (according to the petitioner) found the sale and settlement deeds void. The petitioner contended the Authorised Officer lacked jurisdiction and that the Act itself was invalid. Although the affidavit pleaded various fundamental-rights grounds, at hearing the attack was not pursued under Part III rights (in view of the bar created by Art. 31-B) and instead focused on other grounds available to the petitioner. The respondents defended the Act principally on the protection afforded by Arts. 31-A and 31-B as amended by the Seventeenth Amendment. The petitions were dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 is void ab initio in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Krishnaswami v. State of Madras and therefore not validated simply by inclusion in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment (i.e., whether Art. 31-B can validate a post‑Constitution statute hit by Art. 13(2)).
  2. Whether the Act is within the legislative competence of the State — specifically whether the pith and substance fall under Entry 18 of List II (land; rights in or over land) and/or Entry 42 of List III (acquisition of property) of the Seventh Schedule.
  3. Whether the retrospective language and scope of Art. 31-B extends to Acts already struck down by courts and to rules made under those Acts (i.e., the proper construction of Art. 31-B).
  4. Whether the Authorised Officer has jurisdiction under the Act (notably S. 11) to decide questions of title in the course of ceiling proceedings.
  5. Whether the Act's mechanism (including its definition of "family" and the resulting acquisition and compensation provisions) constitutes a colourable exercise of power or otherwise exceeds constitutional limits.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (leading counsel Sri Vedantachari) arguments

  • The Act was struck down as invalid by the Supreme Court in Krishnaswami v. State of Madras and is therefore void ab initio; Art. 31-B cannot validate it without a separate validating Act by the Madras Legislature.
  • The Act is incompetent for want of legislative power — it does not fall within Entry 18 of List II or Entry 42 of List III.
  • The term "that is to say" in Entry 18 limits the scope of "land, rights in or over land" so the State cannot, by ceiling legislation, destroy rights (only adjust them between landlord and tenant).
  • The Act's artificial definition of "family" improperly aggregates property under different titles to create a surplus and justify acquisition; this is a colourable exercise of power.
  • Art. 31‑B does not revive or give retrospective life to laws that were void ab initio or to rules made under them (reliance on the phrase “continue in force” and “ever to have become void”).

Respondents' arguments

  • The Act is protected and validated by Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution as amended by the Seventeenth Amendment (which placed the Act in the Ninth Schedule).
  • Parliament validly exercised its constituent power in the Seventeenth Amendment to validate and protect these measures notwithstanding earlier judicial invalidation (relying on Sajjan Singh).
  • The pith and substance of the Act — fixing ceiling, acquiring surplus land and distributing it — falls within the ambit of "land; rights in or over land" (Entry 18, List II) and Entry 42, List III provides acquisition power; existing precedents support State competence to enact ceiling legislation.
  • The rules made under the Act are validated as a natural consequence of validating the Act itself; once the Act is treated as valid from inception, rules made under it also obtain validation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnaswami v. State of Madras Supreme Court had struck down the Madras Act (finding Ss. 5 and 50 violative of Art. 14). Court acknowledged this earlier striking down but held that the Seventeenth Amendment and Art. 31‑B — properly construed — validate Acts in the Ninth Schedule; Krishnaswami did not by itself prevent validation under Art. 31‑B.
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajastan Considered validity of Seventeenth Amendment; held challenge to Amendment on grounds of Parliament's competence and retrospective validation was rejected. Cited to show Parliament could, by constituent power, place Acts in Ninth Schedule and that the Amendment is retrospective and not invalidated by prior judicial decisions.
Karimbil Kunhikonan (In Petition v. No. 114 of 61) Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 was struck down as unconstitutional (as stated in the opinion). Used to illustrate that several agrarian reform measures had been held invalid in courts, motivating the Seventeenth Amendment's validation of multiple enactments.
Deepchand v. State of Uttar Pradesh Principle: A statute beyond legislative competence or contrary to fundamental rights is void ab initio; a later grant of power by constitutional amendment does not revive a stillborn statute without reenactment. Court discussed the principle at length but distinguished it on the ground that Art. 31‑B is an express constitutional provision that validates Acts in the Ninth Schedule retrospectively; therefore Deepchand did not assist petitioners in this context.
Mahendralal v. State of Uttar Pradesh Affirmation of the view that subsequent amendment does not ipso jure revive a stillborn enactment (as referred to in the opinion). Referenced as an authority consistent with Deepchand; Court nonetheless held Art. 31‑B is a special validating provision that operates differently.
Tan Bug Taim v. Collector of Bombay Judicial observations on whether the phrase "that is to say" is limitative when construing heads of legislative power. Court expressly disagreed with a restrictive reading of "that is to say" advanced in that decision and held the phrase is illustrative, not restrictive, for the purpose of Entry 18.
Atmaram v. State of Punjab Upheld Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953 under Entry 18 (including provisions fixing ceiling and releasing land for re-settlement). Relied upon to support that ceiling legislation and related reforms fall within Entry 18 (land; rights in or over land).
Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay Upheld Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956 (ceiling and acquisition) as within Entry 18. Used as precedent to support that ceiling and acquisition legislation falls within State competence under Entry 18.
Kunhikoman (Kunhikonan) v. State of Kerala Supreme Court held main provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act were within State competence under Entry 18 and Entry 42. Cited to reinforce that similar ceiling and distribution schemes are within the State's legislative competence.
Anil Kumari v. Deputy Commissioner and Collector Assam High Court held the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1957 competent under Entry 18 and Entry 42. Another supporting authority showing analogous ceiling legislation has been upheld as within State competence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner addressing: (i) the effect of prior judicial invalidation of the Madras Act, (ii) the effect of the Seventeenth Amendment and Articles 31‑A/31‑B, (iii) the Act's legislative competency, (iv) the construction of contentious statutory phrases and provisions, and (v) the procedural question of the Authorised Officer's jurisdiction.

1. Effect of prior judicial invalidation and Deepchand

The petitioners relied on the general principle extracted from Deepchand — that a law void for want of legislative power or because it infringes fundamental rights is void ab initio and cannot be revived by a later constitutional amendment without reenactment. The Court accepted the correctness of that principle as a general rule. Deepchand (and Mahendralal) were discussed: if a statute was incompetent at the time of enactment, later-acquired power does not automatically validate it.

2. Distinguishing Deepchand on the basis of Art. 31-B

The Court held that Art. 31‑B is not merely a removal of the limitation under Art. 13(2) but an express constitutional provision which validates the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule "notwithstanding" inconsistency with Part III. The language of Art. 31‑B — including the phrase "shall not be deemed to be void" and "ever to have become void" — was interpreted as clearly retrospective: it revives and validates Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule from their inception, even if earlier struck down by courts. Thus Deepchand did not assist the petitioners because Art. 31‑B operates as an express validating constitutional provision.

3. Scope and retrospective effect of Art. 31‑B

The Court analysed the wording and context of Art. 31‑B and concluded it gives retrospective effect and comprehensively validates both pre‑ and post‑Constitution laws included in the Ninth Schedule — including those already struck down — and also (by necessary consequence) validates rules made under such Acts. The Court rejected arguments that "continue in force" or "ever to have become void" limit the Article to Acts valid at inception but later invalidated.

4. Legislative competency — pith and substance; interpretation of Entry 18

The Court applied the pith-and-substance doctrine to determine whether the Madras Act fell within State legislative competence. It identified the pith and substance as agrarian reform: fixing ceilings on agricultural holdings, acquiring surplus land and distributing it to landless and small holders. The Court held that this clearly falls within "land; rights in or over land" under Entry 18, List II. The Court rejected a restrictive reading of the qualifying phrase "that is to say", treating it as illustrative rather than limiting; it preferred a liberal construction of Entry 18 so as to include incidental and ancillary matters necessary to effect agrarian reform. The Court relied on multiple precedents (Atmaram, Sri Ram Ram Narain, Kunhikoman, Anil Kumari) to show analogous statutes had been held intra vires Entry 18 (and Entry 42 where acquisition was involved).

5. Entry 42 and acquisition/compensation

The Court held that acquisition of surplus land and provisions for compensation fall within Entry 42 of List III; the Act does not effect an improper transfer of title from one person to another as a substantive equivalent of private conveyance but uses the statutory acquisition machinery. In view of Art. 31‑B, the Act cannot be attacked on Art. 31 grounds. The Court therefore found the Act within legislative competence under Entry 18 (List II) and Entry 42 (List III).

6. Colourable exercise / definition of "family"

The petitioners argued that the artificial statutory definition of "family" aggregates disparate titles to create a surplus and thereby effect an unwarranted deprivation. The Court treated this as another aspect of the competence/fundamental-rights attack and, having rejected those attacks, found the argument untenable. The statutory aggregation/fiction was held to be part of the mechanism for applying the ceiling and ascertaining surplus; it did not constitute a colourable exercise of power in the sense asserted by petitioners.

7. Jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer (S.11) and remedies

The petitioner contended the Authorised Officer lacked power to decide the validity of transfers. The Court observed S.11 expressly authorises the Authorised Officer to decide questions of title in certain cases, and that remedies against such orders are provided by the Act. The Court suggested that issues of construction and fact-specific interpretation would be more suitably decided when disposing of individual petitions in light of their facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were dismissed. The Court upheld the validity of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 — as placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment — and held that:

  • Article 31‑B, as framed by the Seventeenth Amendment, operates to validate the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule retrospectively ("ever to have become void") and therefore the impugned Act is not void ab initio by reason of earlier judicial invalidation under Part III;
  • The pith and substance of the Act (fixing ceiling, acquiring surplus and distribution) falls within the legislative competence of the State under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of List III;
  • The rules made under the Act are, by necessary consequence of the Act's validation, to be treated as validated; and
  • The Authorised Officer has statutory power (S.11) in certain cases to decide questions of title and the Act provides remedies against those orders.

Implications (direct effects): The direct practical effects stated in the opinion are:

  • The specific writ petitions under consideration (W.P. 1543 of 1964, 416 of 1965 and 1473 of 1965) were dismissed with costs (counsel's fee Rs. 100 each).
  • The impugned Act stands validated as a law within State competence and is to be treated as having been valid from its inception by virtue of Art. 31‑B as construed by the Court.
  • The Authorised Officer may decide title in the manner contemplated by the Act and the statutory remedies are available to aggrieved persons.
  • The Court noted certain observations made in related petitions (W.P. 1474 of 1965 and 242 of 1965) concerning Ss. 22 and 9(2)(b) of the Act and expected respondents to take those observations into account in further proceedings; this is an instruction to authorities rather than a new legal principle announced in the present disposals.

The opinion does not state that it establishes any broader novel precedent beyond its rulings on the construction and effect of Art. 31‑B and the competence of State legislature to enact such ceiling legislation; it confines its orders to dismissal of the petitions and the attendant consequences described above.

End of summary (based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion).

    N. Krishnaraju Reddiar And Others v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Vellore And Others

    (Delivered by Veeraswami, J.)

    In a batch of writ petitions, which we have heard, the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961 is assailed on certain grounds, notwithstanding the fact that it was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution of India by the Seventeenth Amendment. Further, the scope and effect of some of the provisions of the Act as applicable to particular facts in each case, have to be decided. Though for convenience sake, the batch of petitions was heard together on the validity of the Act, on second question of interpretation we propose to deal with these petitions separately, in the light of the facts in each of them. We shall at the moment confine ourselves to W.P 1543 of 1964 and 416 and 1473 of 1965. The first of them is for mandamus directing the Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Vellore and the State of Madras to forbear from taking proceedings against the petitioner and the lands set out in the schedule attached to his affidavit in support of the petition under the provisions of the Act. In compliance with a notice served on him, the petitioner filed a return on 25th December, 1962, in which he disclosed the members of his family including his minor sons and unmarried daughters, an extent of 185-47 acres as lands deemed to have been held by him at the date of the commencement of the Act. On 6th April, 1962 he had executed a settlement deed in favour of his wife making a gift to her of an extent of 78-47½ acres at Bodinayakanpatti and on 27th March, 1963, there was a family arrangement in respect of all the lands belonging to the family at which 35 acres 58 cents were allotted to the petitioner's share, 34-31 acres to his minor son Manimalan and 34-32 acres to another minor son of his by name Ravichandran. On 25th March, 1964, the petitioner's wife executed a gift deed settling 39 acres on her three minor daughters. On 9th February, 1962, the petitioner had executed a sale in favour of one Periaswami Gounder conveying 7 acres 25 cents in Namakkal Taluk in Salem Dt. The Authorised Officer, after summoning the evidence from the petitioner, held an enquiry and eventually found, according to the petitioner, that the sale deed dated 9th February, 1962 and the settlement deed dated 6th April, 1962, were void. The petitioner maintains that the Authorised Officer had no jurisdiction to do so and that the Act itself is invalid. Though in the affidavit in support of the petition, various grounds based on fundamental rights have been raised, actually at the hearing, the attack on the validity of the Act was not based on violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner evidently because of the bar under Art. 31-B of the Constitution but was confined to certain other grounds claimed to be still available to the petitioner which we shall refer to presently. The petitioner says that by reason of the provisions of the Act, treating the total extent of the properties covered by various transactions aforementioned has been owned by a single family, the petitioner, his wife, his sons and daughters are required to part with a substantial portion of their properties. The respondents counter the attack mainly on the basis of the protection afforded to the Act by Arts. 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution as amended by the Seventeenth Amendment in 1964. They deny that the Act is open to any challenge on any ground.

    The challenge to the validity of the Act is on the following grounds: (1) The Act having been struck down as invalid by the Supreme Court in Krishnaswami v. State of Madras(1), it is non est and is void ab initio. Art. 31-B does not help to validate it without a separate validating Act passed by the Madras Legislature, and (2) the Act is incompetent for want of legislative power.

    We shall notice the provisions of the impugned Act in some detail when we deal with the second ground. Briefly, the Act fixes a ceiling on agricultural land holdings in the State of Madras and provides for acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling, and distribution of the lands so acquired to the landless and other persons among the rural population. The Act is pursuant to the directive policy contained in Art. 39(a) and (b) of the Constitution and has been enacted to do away with the great disparity in the ownership of agricultural lands leading to the concentration of such land in the hands of a few persons and to distribute the agricultural land in such a way as will best subserve the common good increase agricultural production and promote justice, social and economic. The Bill, which was published on 6th April, 1960, was introduced in the Legislative Assembly of this State on 14th April, 1960. After its passage through the Legislature and the assent of the President, the Act was published in the Fort St. George Gazette. It provided that it was to come into force from the date of the publication of the bill. On 2nd October, 1962, there was a notification under S. 8 of the Act, relating to the furnishing of returns by persons holding lands in excess of ceiling area. On 9th March, 1964, in Krishnaswami v. State of Madras, the Supreme Court struck down the entire Act because Ss. 5 and 50 of the Act violated Art. 14 of the Constitution. On 20th June, 1964, the Parliament in exercise of its constituent power passed the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964, including the Act in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. The validity of this Amendment was questioned on certain grounds in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajastan(2) but the contention was rejected on 30th October, 1964. Arts. 31-A and 31-B were first inserted in the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the first intended to save laws providing for the acquisition of estates and the other for validation of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that they were in violation of one or more of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The history and the circumstances in which these two Articles came to be inserted are well known and have been reiterated by Courts more than once and it will suffice to refer to Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajastan. The laws giving effect to the policy of agrarian reform and abolition of zamindaries were declared to be unconstitutional in some of the States but held valid in others in about 1951 and there were appeals pending in the Supreme Court regarding the matter. The First Amendment to the Constitution was, therefore, made inserting the two Articles which afforded protection to certain laws whose main object was to bring about agrarian reforms. But the protection so afforded was limited to an attack based on the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. In 1955 came the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution somewhat widening the scope of Art. 31-A and extending the protection to a larger area. In 1. Karimbil Kunhikonan (In Petition v. No. 114 Of 61)(3) the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961 was struck down as unconstitutional and as we mentioned the present impugned Act was similarly struck down in Krishnaswami v. State of Madras. Measures providing for agricultural land ceiling and distribution of excess lands in certain other States were also under challenge. And so by the Seventeenth Amendment, 44 enactments in different States of which the impugned Act is one were inserted in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and were placed within the purview of Art. 31-B. Art. 13(1) renders pre-Constitution laws void to the extent of their inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and Cl. (2) of the Article, by using similar phraseology, declares that they shall be invalid to the extent they take away or abridge the rights conferred by that Part. Art. 31-B aims at saving the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule notwithstanding their violation of the provisions of Part III and thus validating the acts and regulations, enabling them to continue in force notwithstanding any judgment, decrees or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary.

    Sri Vedantachari for some of the petitioners whose leading argument has been adopted by the rest of the petitioners, contends that the impugned Act, a post-Constitution law, to which Art. 13(2) applies was void ab initio and was, therefore, stillborn because it took away or abridged the rights conferred by Part II and contravened Art. 13(2) and that such an Act is not validated by a subsequent Amendment to the Constitution removing the constitution limitation. The principle of the argument is undoubtedly correct and is supported by Deepchand v. State of Uttar Pradesh(4). Where an Act of a Legislature is incompetent either because it violates any of the fundamental rights under part III or there is lack of power under the relative legislative Entry, the Act is void ab initio and can have no force from the very inception. Such an Act in either case is stillborn. If, by subsequent amendment of the Constitution, the required legislative power is conferred or the Constitutional limitation in relation to the fundamental rights is lifted, that will not ipso juri have the effect of reviving the still born Act. The majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Deepchand v. State of Uttar Pradesh observed:

    “The validity of a statute is to be tested by the Constitutional power of a legislature at the time of its enactment by that Legislature, and, if thus tested, it is beyond the legislative power, it is not rendered valid without re-enactment, if later by Constitutional amendment, the necessary legislative power is granted. ‘An after-acquired power cannot ex proprio vigore, validate a statute void when enacted.”

    For purposes of this test as held in that case, it makes no difference to the Legislative power whether it is in relation to lack of it under the relative legislative list or a limitation upon the legislative power in the form of fundamental rights, since both represent only two aspects of want of legislative power. Though there may be legislative power to enact a particular law, still if it is in contravention of the fundamental rights, the effect of Art. 13(2) upon such law has been stated thus by the Supreme Court at page 656:

    “A plain reading of the clause indicates without any reasonable doubt that the prohibition goes to the root of the matter and limits the State's power to make law; the law made in spite of the prohibition is a still born law.”

    The earlier decisions were considered and in the light of the discussion with reference to them the Supreme Court summarised the resultant propositions at page 664:

    “(i) Whether the Constitution affirmatively confers power on the legislature to make laws subjectwise or negatively prohibits it from infringing any fundamental right, they represent only two aspects of want of legislative power; (2) the Constitution in express terms makes the power of a Legislature to make laws in regard to the entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and thereby circumscribes or reduces the said power by the limitations laid down in part III of the Constitution; (iii) it follows from the premises that a law made in derogation or in excess of that power would be ab initio void wholly or to the extent of the contravention as the case may be; and (iv) the doctrine of eclipse can be invoked only in the case of a law valid when made, but a shadow is cast on it by supervening constitutional inconsistency or supervening existing statutory inconsistency; when the shadow is removed, the impugned Act is free from all blemish or infirmity.”

    The last proposition applies to pre-Constitution laws which falls within the purview of Art. 13(1). This view of the Supreme Court that no distinction can be made between a post-Constitution law beyond the legislative competence and a law in violation of fundamental rights for purposes of Art. 13(2), that in either case the law will be invalid ab initio and that a subsequent Amendment of the Constitution supplying the power of removing the ban cannot automatically revive such law finds affirmance in Mahendralal v. State of Uttar Pradesh

    But is it not open to the constitutent power which is supreme, to expressly validate a law hit by Art. 13(2) of the Constitution by removing the prohibition specifically with reference to such law? In our opinion, the answer must be in the affirmative. If a law in the teeth of a constitutional prohibition is invalid from its inception, we can see no valid objection to the constituent power lifting the prohibition retrospectively and providing that the law should not be deemed to be void by reason of that prohibition, thereby reviving and validating the law right through. That is what Art. 31B does. In terms it says that none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall be deemed to be void or even ever to have become void on the ground that such Acts or Regulations are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III. The Article further provides that such Acts and Regulations shall continue in force notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a Court or Tribunal to the contrary subject of course to the power of the competent Legislature to repeal or amend them. Art. 31-B is not, therefore, merely a subsequent Amendment of the Constitution removing with retrospective effect the ban or prohibition under Art. 13(2) but is itself expressly validating the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule, notwithstanding the prohibition and declaring that they shall continue in force. Deepchand v. State of Uttar Pradesh does not therefore assist the petitioners. The validity of the Seventeeth Amendment to the Constitution was attacked in the Supreme Court in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajastan on the ground that its true purpose and object was to legislate in respect of land and the subject fell within the jurisdiction of the State Legislature and that the Parliament had no power to legislate in respect of land. The argument was also presented in another form and in the light of the scheme of Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution. In repelling the contention, the Supreme Court held:

    “What the impugned Act purports to do is not to make any land legislation but to protect and validate the legislative measures in respect of agrarian reforms passed by the different State Legislatures in the country by granting them immunity from attack based on the plea that they contravene fundamental rights. Parliament, in enacting the impugned Act, was not making any provisions of land legislation. It was not validating land legislations already passed by the State Legislatures in that behalf”.

    Likewise another argument of the petitioners is also met by this decision. It held that the Seventeenth Amendment does not in substance purport to set aside the decisions of Courts of competent jurisdiction and which some of the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule has been declared to be invalid and that the Constituent power conferred by Art. 368 on the Parliament could be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. The Seventeenth Amendment is obviously retrospective in its effect and it has that effect notwithstanding the decisions of Courts.

    It is next contended that Art. 31B, on a proper interpretation of its terms, does not save the impugned Art. It is stated that the language employed by the Article is not appropriate to cover Acts and Regulations which were void ab initio and the Article is not retrospective in its operation so as to validate such Acts and Regulations. Reliance is placed in support of the construction on the words ‘ever to have become void’ and it is contended that they signified Acts and Regulations which were valid at inception but became void at a subsequent state on the ground that they were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights under Part III of the Constitution. It is further argued that the use of the words “continue in force” in the concluding part of the Article also supports that view. We are unable to accept the contention. The Article on the face of it, having regard to its language, the object, and the circumstances in which it was introduced and the defects it sought to rectify, is clearly, in our opinion, retrospective in its operation. The words ‘ever to have become void’ make it beyond doubt that this is the effect of the Article. The same effect is conveyed also by the words ‘none of the Acts and Regulations……shall be deemed to be void….” The intention of the Article is to revive and validate both Acts and Regulations which fall within the purview of clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 13, and, in our view, the language of Art. 31-B quite clearly and appropriately gives effect to that intention. Sri Venugopal for some of the petitioners contends that the Article in dealing with the Acts added to the Ninth Schedule makes a difference between those which violate the provisions of Part III but not struck down by Courts, and Acts struck down by Courts and that in the latter case it does not give to such Acts life retrospectively. According to learned Counsel, this is clear from the phraseology ‘continue in force’ which is suggestive of only a future effect. This contention also, as it seems to us, is unsound. In our opinion, there is no such dichotomy in the Article, and the Acts and Regulations referred to in the first part of the Article are comprehensive and there is no reason to think that they do not include also those struck down by Courts. The first part of the Article saves and validates both pre and post Constitution Acts and Regulations and the second part of the Article specifically referring to struck down Acts is only by way of abundant caution and to make it plain that if some of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule happened to have been struck down by Courts, they would nevertheless continue in force, but such continuance in force is by reason of the validation of those Acts and Regulations made by the first part of the Article. The validation of Acts and Regulations is not confined in our opinion, to those Acts and Regulations not struck down but extends to all Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule. In any event, says Sri Venugopal, inasmuch as the Article validates only the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule, in the absence of a clause saving actions taken and things done, the rules made under the impugned Act are not saved and validated. We are not impressed by this argument as well. When the effect of the Article is that the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule Should be taken to have been always valid, the natural consequence will be that the rules made thereunder also get automatically validated. We cannot say that when the Acts were valid from inception, they were nevertheless not so when the rules were made thereunder. It is true that this construction might possibly lead to certain hardships, incovenience and perhaps even absurdities. The Act creates offences for its purpose, provides for limitations in certain cases and attaches liabilities. But we dare say that those, who are charged with the duties of administering the Act, will take due note of the factual position and the circumstances in which the impugned Act was validated and not act unreasonably in prosecuting for offences supposed to have been committed before the Act was validated by the constitutional amendment or insisting upon limitation or pursuing liabilities for the period prior to the validation. No doubt, Courts if possible, avoid a construction which will lead to such an uneviable position. But it is equally clear that when Art. 31-B is clearly retrospective and validates the impugned Act from its inception, we cannot imagine that it was invalid when rules thereunder were made.

    We pass on to a consideration of the question of legislative competency to make the impugned Act. Sri Vedantachari contends that it will fall neither under Entry 18 of List II nor under Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General maintains just to the contrary and says that both the Entries read together provide necessary power for the State Legislature to enact the impugned Act. Before we deal with this contention, the main provisions of the Act should be noticed. We have already given the outlines of it. As we said, its primary object is to give effect to the directive principles contained in Art. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution and to do away with the concentration of agricultural lands in the hands of few, to fix a ceiling on agricultural holding, to acquire the surplus agricultural land and distribute the same among the landless and other persons among the rural population. The concentration of agricultural land cannot be tackled without fixing a ceiling and ceiling necessarily leads to acquisition of the excess over the ceiling area and distribution of the same. The Act contains fourteen Chapters. Chapter I deals with preliminary including definitions, Chapter II with fixation of ceiling on land holdings, Chapter III with ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on certain transfers, Chapter VI with compensation for the excess land acquired, Chapter VIII with cultivating tenant's ceiling area, Chapter IX with exemption and Chapter XIII with disposal of land acquired. The rest of the Chapter relate to the constitution of the Land Board, Sugar Factory Board and miscellaneous matter. S. 3 defines, among others, ceiling area, cultivating tenant family, owner, person and standard acre. The definition of ‘family’ is quite artificial and means in relation to a person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and also his or her minor sons, unmarried daughters and minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother are dead. But in regard to persons governed by Hindu Law, family will not include “minor sons”, minor grandsons between whom and the other members of the family, a partition by means of a registered instrument has taken place or in respect of whose family properties, a preliminary decree for partition has been passed before the date of the commencement of the Act. By “owner” is meant any person holding land in severally or jointly or in common under a ryotwari settlement or in any way subject to the payment of revenue direct to the Government, landholder as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, or a ryot as defined in that Act or an inamdar not being a landholder as aforesaid and includes full owner or limited owner, the lessee of any leasehold village or his heirs, assignees, legal representatives or persons deriving rights through him. “Person” is defined to include any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not. “Standard acre” is defined as so much area dependent upon the character of the land and the quantum of land revenue pertaining thereto, “Surplus land” means the land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area and declared to be surplus by or under the provisions of the Act. The term “tenant” also has been defined. S. 5 fixes the ceiling area for a person or a family. In the case of a person, the ceiling area, subject to the other provisions of the Act, shall be 30 standard acres and in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, it shall be a similar extent. If the family consists of more members than five, an additional five standard acres is allowed for every member of the family in excess of five. For the purpose of the section, all lands held individually by the members of the family or jointly by some or by all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. In calculating the extent held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, a Marumakatayam tarwad, an Aliyasantana family or a Nambudiri Illom shall be taken into account; in calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals or by a company shall be taken into account. Where the stridhana land held by any female member of a family together with the other land held by all the members of that family, is in excess of 30 standard acres the female member concerned may hold, in addition to the extent of land which the family is entitled to hold under Sub-S. (1), stridhana land not exceeding 10 standard acres. There are further provisions in this regard. S. 6 provides for basis of calculation of the extent of land held by a founder of a trust. S. 7 directs that on and from the date of the commencement of the Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided in the Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VII, be entitled to hold in excess of the ceiling area. S. 8 requires furnishing of returns in the prescribed form and containing the particulars on certain specified matters. S. 11 authorises an authorised officer to decide questions of title in certain cases and under S. 12, after the disposal of objections, a final statement is published specifying therein the entire land held by a person, the land to be retained by him within the ceiling area and the land declared to be surplus land and such other particulars as may be prescribed. The autorised officer shall serve a copy of the statement on the persons concerned which will be conclusive of the facts stated therein. Provisions are made for amendment of the final statement in certain cases and for power to rectify bona fide mistakes and clerical errors. S. 16 deals with reverter of possession within the limits to the possessory mortgagor in certain cases from the possessory mortgagee for purposes of ceiling. S. 18 deals with acquisition of surplus land and says that after the publication of the final statement under Ss. 12 or 14, the Government shall publish a notification to the effect that the surplus land is required for a public purpose. Sub-S. (3) of the section is to the effect that on the publication of the notification under Sub-S. (1), the land specified in the notification together with the trees standing on such land and buildings, machinery, plant or apparatus constructed, erected or fixed on such land and used for agricultural purposes, shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, be deemed to have been acquired for a public purpose and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of such publication and all right, title and interest of all persons in such land shall, with effect from the said date, be deemed to have been extinguished. Sub-S. (4) enables the authorised officer to take possession of any land notified in Sub-S. (1). Ss. 19 to 23 contain provisions regarding ceiling on future acquisition and restriction on certain transfers as well as penalties for contravention. S. 50 is concerned with determining of compensation for land acquired by the Government. Sub-S. (1) of that section says that every person whose right, title and interest in any land is acquired by the Government shall be paid compensation according to the rate specified in Sch. III. The rest of the section provides for the procedure to be followed in determining compensation. S. 51 deals with claims of mortgagee or chargeholder on surplus land and S. 52 with claims of limited owner on surplus land. Ss. 53 and 54 deal with claims of maintenance-holder on surplus land and compensation to certain tenants. S. 55 deals with mode of payment of compensation. Under the Chapter relating to the cultivating tenant's ceiling area, the principle of ceiling is applied to cultivating tenants as defined in the Act. S. 61 provides that every cultivating tenant who holds on the notified date land in excess of the cultivating tenant's ceiling area should within 90 days from the said date of notification furnish a return containing the required particulars; and the ceiling area for a cultivating tenant is fixed at five standard acres held by him partly as a cultivating tenant and partly as owner or wholly as cultivating tenant. The excess of the ceiling area is taken by the authorised officer who is required to distribute possession of such land to the landless persons or to persons holding land below the cultivating tenant's ceiling area. Compensation is also provided by S. 66 to tenants in certain cases. Under S. 94, the Government is empowered to make rules after taking into consideration the objects specified in the preamble to the Act providing for the manner in which the lands acquired by the Government under the Act should be disposed of. The rules so made are required to be placed before the Legislature for its approval. Sub-S. (2) of S. 94 contains certain principles for preference in certain cases in the matter of distribution of the land acquired by the Government. S. 110 contains the power for the Government to make rules and regulations specifically in the specified manner. Sch. III to the Act provides for payment of compensation for land acquired by the Government under the Act and the form of compensation will be multiples of the net annual income on slab basis. Rules made by the Government for disposal of lands contain certain guiding principles in the matter.

    The argument of Sri Vedantachari is that the Act is not a legislation on land or rights in or over land. He says that Entry 18 in List II is of a limited scope and the essence of it is contravention of property. Learned Counsel argues that under the Entry you can limit and not destroy rights. According to him, ceiling necessarily implies distribution involving destruction of rights. His contention is that you can legislate over one or more components of rights but not dispose of the entirety of the rights under the guise of land ceiling. The substance of the power under Entry 18, says Sri Vedantachari, is related to the relationship of landlord and tenant and the adjustment thereof. He concedes that there may be ceiling but he would say that it should be short of deprivation and should be only in the course of adjustments of rights and liabilities as between landlord and tenant. He adds that though “land” by itself is very comprehensive and very wide by itself, the words “that is to say” limit the scope of land to what is enumerated following the words “that is to say”. “Rights in or over land”, according to learned Counsel, should be understood as relatable to those that go with the relationship of landlord and tenant and land tenures.

    In deciding whether an Act is within the ambit of a legislative Entry, we have first to see what the pith and substance of that Act are and bear in mind the broad principles of construction of heads of power in an organic law. The pith and substance of the impugned Act are to take a further step in the agrarian reform and solve the problem of concentration of agricultural lands. The Act, therefore, provides for ceiling of agricultural holdings and necessarily, therefore, for acquisition of surplus over the ceiling area and for distribution of such surplus to tenants or landless among the agricultural population. That clearly falls within the ambit of land, rights in or over land in Entry 18. The Entry should be read as liberally and as widely as possible and should be taken to include all incidental and ancillary matters. If the Entry merely used the expression “land” it is obvious that it would be impossible to contend that the impugned Act is not within its ambit. But it is contended that the wide amplitude of the word “land” is narrowed down by the words following “land” and principally by the words “that is to say,” the effect of which, according to learned Counsel, is to restrict the scope. We are unable to take this view. It is true that Bhagwati J., as he then was, in Tan Bug Taim v. Collector of Bombay construing the words “that is to say” was inclined to think that those words were limitative and not merely illustrative. With respect, we do not share that view. The learned Judge himself referred to the following passage in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary:

    “‘That is to say’ is the commencement of an ancillary clause which explains the meaning of the principal clause. It has the following properties: (1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause; (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the principal clause is general in terms it may restrict it”.

    Taking the last item the learned Judge considered that it would not be possible to read item 21 in List II of Sch. VII to the Government of India Act which corresponds to Entry 18 in List II of the Constitution as comprising or comprehending anything beyond what has been described in particular items following the word “that is to say”. We should not forget that we are concerned with the construction of a head of a legislative power and in such a case unless we are compelled by the language, we ought to put upon the head the widest possible construction. On a comparative reading of the relative Entries in the three Lists, we do not see why the expression “land” in Entry 18, List II should not be given its full amplitude and we do not think that the words “that is to say” justify a different construction. In our opinion, those words are merely illustrative and not restrictive or limitative. In any case “rights in or over land” are comprehensive enough to include a legislation which fixes a ceiling on agricultural holding and provides for acquisition of the surplus and distribution of the same to the landless.

    In Atmaram v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court held that the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953 was competent under Entry 18 in List II of Sch. VII to the Constitution. Among other provisions, this Act provided for ceiling on land holding, a permissible area in relation to landlord and tenant being restricted to thirty standard acres and thereby released a large area for re-settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under the provisions of the Act. The Court upheld the validity of the Act under Entry 18 with these observations at page 522:

    “It will be noticed that the Entry (Entry 18) read along with Art. 246(3) of the Constitution, has vested exclusive power in the State to make laws with respect to ‘rights in or over land’ land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant……”

    The provisions of the Act sect out above, deal with the landlord's rights in land in relation to his tenant, so as to modify the landlord's rights in land and correspondingly, to expand the tenant's rights therein. Each of the expressions ‘right in or over land’ and ‘land tenures’ is comprehensive enough to take in measures of reforms of land tenure, limiting the extent of land in cultivating possession of the land owner, and thus, releasing larger areas of land to be made available for cultivating by tenants”.

    Similarly in Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay the Supreme Court dealt with the validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act 1956. This Act also fixed a ceiling of agricultural holding, and provided for acquisition of land in excess of it and distribution of the same with a view to give effect to the directive principles contained in Arts. 38 and 39 of the Constitution and the policy of establishing a socialistic pattern of society within the meaning of those Articles. On a construction of Entry 18 with reference to the principles of construction, the Supreme Court said—

    “Having regard to the principle of construction enunciated above it is clear that the impugned Act is covered by Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Sechedule to the Constitution and is a legislation with reference to “land” and this plea of legislative incompetence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned Act therefore fails”.

    In Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala in which one of the questions was as to the legislative competency to enact the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961, the Supreme Court was of opinion—

    “But if one looks at the purpose and object of the Act it will be clear that the main provisions of the Act are clearly within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under item 18 of List II and item 42 of list III.”

    The main purpose of the Kerala Act was to do away with intermediaries, fix a ceiling and give the excess land to the landless and those who hold lands much below the ceiling. The method employed to carry out the object was first to acquire land and thereafter assign it to the cultivating tenant and landless and those with small extents of land. The Assam High Court in Anil Kumari v. Deputy Commissioner and Collector held that the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1957, was competent for the State Legislature to enact under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of List III.

    Sri Vedantachari tried to distinguish those decisions and contended that in every one of those cases, while the landlord's right was curtailed, there was corresponding expansion of the tenant's right. We do not think that the Madras Act which is impugned is substantially different from the Act dealt with in those decisions from the standpoint of the main purpose and the scheme and method of achieving that purpose, namely, destroying concentration of agricultural holding, acquisition and distribution of the excess over the ceiling area. In any case, we are unable to accept the view that the legislation to be valid under Entry 18 should do no more than adjustment of rights and liabilities as between landlord and tenant—curtailing the rights of the landlord and correspondingly increasing the rights of the tenant.

    Sri Venantachari also argues that the acquisition of the surplus land will not fall under Entry 42 of the List III particularly in view of artificial definition of “family” which applies both for the purpose of computation of the extent of the agricultural holding for fixation of ceiling area and also for determination of compensation for the excess land acquired and payment thereof. The provisions relating to acquisition clearly law down that the excess land acquired will vest in the State on acquisition and we can find no justification for the contention that the Act provides for transfer of land or title from one person to another for purposes of determination and payment of compensation. The Act does make provision for enunciating the principles for determination and payment of compensation and this Court cannot go into the question of adequacy or quantum of compensation. Further, by reason of Art. 31-B, the Act is not open to attack on ground of violation of Art. 31. We hold, therefore, that the impugned Act is within the legislative competency of the State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II and Entry 42 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

    Sri Vedantachari contends that the impugned Act in so far as it relates to acquisition and payment of compensation is a colourable exercise of power under Entry 42 of List III. He says that by an artificial definition of a “family” and by a fiction, we cannot regard properties under different titles as properties of one person or family, arrive at a surplus and then say that the surplus is acquired. This argument differs only in form from the attack on the Act on the ground that it lacks legislative competency and offends fundamental rights. We have already repelled that attack and upheld the validity of the Act. In our view, the effect of the provisions of the Act, in relation to the definition of ‘family’ and the ascertainment of aurplus over the ceiling area is merely for the purpose of applying ceiling and ascertaining the purplus. The provisions of the Act nowhere, as already mentioned, provide for power to compel transfer from one person to another. Nor are titles mixed up for the purpose of payment of compensation. The argument is really not open in view of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution relating to the power of acquisition and of the terms of Art. 31-B.

    There remains the question of construction of the impugned Act. We think that this question will have to be decided more conveniently while disposing of each petition in the light of its facts. The petitioner in W.P 1543 of 1964 has stated in his affidavit that the Authorised Officer has no power to decide the validity of the transfers. As already noticed by us, S. 11 provides for it and the Authorised Officer has power to decide questions of title in certain cases. If the petitioner is aggrieved, the Act provides remedy against the orders of the Authorised Officer. The facts in W.P 416 and 1473 of 1965 are of the same pattern and do not require detailed notice. They raise more or less the same questions as W.P 1543 of 1964.

    The petitions are all dismissed with costs, Counsel's fee Rs. 100 in each.

    (W.P 416 of 1965 and 1473 of 1965)

    (These petitions coming on this day for being mentioned, the Court made the following):

    Though we dismissed W.P 1473 of 1965, 1543 of 1964 and 416 of 1965, since we have made certain observations in W.P 1474 of 1965 and 242 of 1965 in relation to Ss. 22 and 9(2)(b) of the Act and in the circumstances, the respondents may, we expect, take these observations into account in dealing with the relative matters further.

    V.C.S

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    N. Krishnaraju Reddiar And Others v. The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Vellore And Others
    (Jul 29, 1966)