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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959,
  • rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959.
  • Madras General Sales Tax Rules, rule 22. Rule 22(5)
  • section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act
  • [rule 15(1) of the Madras General Sales
  • Rule 5 of the Central Sales Tax Rules
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959,
  • sub-section (3) of section 3.4.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959,
  • rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959.
  • Madras General Sales Tax Rules, rule 22. Rule 22(5)
  • section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act
  • [rule 15(1) of the Madras General Sales
  • Rule 5 of the Central Sales Tax Rules
  • Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959,
  • sub-section (3) of section 3.4.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ramakrishnan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore IV, assessed Messrs F. Rose Mary Carpentry Works (dealers in radio cabinets) for the year 1960–61 on a turnover of Rs. 35,106-15 nP at 7 per cent under serial No. 5 of the First Schedule to the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (which lists radios, accessories, etc.). Section 3(3) of the Act provides a reduced rate of 1 per cent where goods listed in the First Schedule are sold for use as component parts of other scheduled goods, subject to a prescribed declaration (Form XVII) being furnished in the prescribed manner.

The assessing authority held that a "radio cabinet" was an accessory under serial No. 5 and not a component part eligible for the 1 per cent rate; he also held that the assessee failed to attach the required declaration in Form XVII to the original Form A-1 return filed on 1 May 1961 (the declaration was submitted on 30 May 1961 with a second Form A-1). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reversed the assessing officer, treating the radio cabinet as a component part and accepting the second return with declarations as valid, assessing turnover at 1 per cent.

The Board of Revenue sua motu took up the matter under section 34, held that a government memorandum of 10 November 1960 treated "radio cabinet" as an accessory which cannot become a component part for s.3(3), and also held that the failure to attach Form XVII to the original return (rule 22(5)) disqualified the assessee from the reduced rate. The Board set aside the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order and restored the assessing officer's order. The assessee appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a "radio cabinet" is a "component part" of a radio within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and hence eligible for the reduced 1 per cent rate.
  2. Whether the failure to attach the declaration in Form XVII to the original Form A-1 return precludes the assessee from claiming the reduced rate, or whether the subsequent return filed with the declaration (after notice to rectify a defect) can be treated as a valid re-submission and satisfy the proviso to section 3(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The word "component" should be given its ordinary meaning (as shown in well-known dictionaries): a constituent or part of which a finished product is made; a radio cabinet is an essential constituent of a finished radio and thus a component part of a radio.
  • Although a radio cabinet had been characterized as an "accessory" for purposes of prior assessments, that classification does not prevent it from being a component part in the sense used in section 3(3); the present appeal was not challenging the assessment history but arguing for the meaning of "component".
  • Regarding the omission to attach Form XVII to the original return: the proviso to section 3(3) requires furnishing the declaration "in the prescribed manner" (i.e., rules such as rule 22). The assessee filed an initial Form A-1 on 1 May 1961 signed per pro by the proprietor's husband; after notice dated 24 May 1961 calling for the proprietor's signature and indicating assessment at 7 per cent, the assessee filed a second Form A-1 rectifying signature and enclosing Form XVII. The second return was substantively the same and should be treated as a re-submission of the original return after rectification; enclosures to the re-presented document should be treated as valid from the date of original presentation.
  • The appellant relied on decisions (including a Kerala High Court decision) holding that "prescribed manner" need not import a temporal bar if the required documents are produced before assessment, and cited authorities supporting the assessing authority's discretion to accept delayed returns where appropriate.

Respondent / Board of Revenue's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Board of Revenue accepted the Government memorandum of 10 November 1960 that "radio cabinet" is only an accessory falling under item 5 of Schedule 1; what is an accessory cannot become a component part for the purposes of the proviso to section 3(3).
  • Even if a radio cabinet were a component part, the assessee failed to attach the declaration in Form XVII to the original Form A-1 return as required by rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959. There is no provision to condone such omission or delay; hence the assessee was not eligible for the reduced rate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abraham v. Sales Tax Officer & Others [1964] 15 S.T.C. 110 (Kerala High Court) Held that the phrase "prescribed manner" in section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act did not necessarily include a time element; if requisite forms ("C" Forms) were produced before assessment, the assessing officer must take them into account. The opinion cites this decision as supportive of the view that production of required declarations before assessment may be effective even if not strictly attached to the original return; the Court notes that this decision differs from an earlier Bench decision of this High Court but uses it in distinguishing the present facts.
Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons [1962] 13 S.T.C. 680 (Bench of this High Court) Interpreted section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act to include a time element within "prescribed manner", holding that delay in submission of "C" Forms could not be excused and departmental officers/Tribunal could not condone such delay. The Court distinguishes that case on the facts: in Parekutti the requisite declarations were not produced before the assessing or appellate authorities and no explanation was given, whereas in the present case the second return with declarations was produced before assessment after a notice to rectify defects. The Court therefore does not treat Parekutti as controlling the present issue.
State of Madras v. M.P. Ibrahim Kunhi (Bench of this Court) Holds that a return filed beyond the prescribed period can still be a valid return and the assessing authority has discretion to accept it; if delay is condoned (expressly or impliedly) the assessing authority may accept it after verifying correctness. The Court cites this decision to support the proposition that assessing authorities possess discretion to accept returns or excuse delay in appropriate circumstances; it uses this principle to distinguish the strict approach of the Parekutti Bench decision and to justify treating the rectified second return as valid in the present case.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Pyarelal Malholra (Andhra High Court) Holds that although the assessee cannot claim a right to have the delay condoned, the taxing authority may, in the exercise of discretion, excuse the delay and make assessment on that basis. The Court relies on this principle to reinforce the view that the assessing authority (and by extension appellate authority) has discretion to accept rectified or belated submissions under appropriate circumstances; this supports the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's treatment of the second return as valid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a series of discrete analytical steps strictly grounded in the text of the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court set out serial No. 5 of the First Schedule (which includes "accessories" of radios) and section 3(3) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which grants a 1 per cent rate where scheduled goods are sold as component parts of other scheduled goods, subject to a prescribed declaration. The Court noted an explanatory provision defining "component part" was added later by Act 44 of 1961 after the order of assessment.
  2. Assessing and appellate findings: The assessing officer treated "radio cabinet" as an accessory and denied the 1 per cent rate; the Appellate Assistant Commissioner found that a radio cabinet is a component part of a finished radio (identifiable constituent) and accepted the second return with Form XVII as valid, thus assessing at 1 per cent.
  3. Board of Revenue's revision: The Board relied on a government memorandum (10 November 1960) classifying "radio cabinet" as an accessory and invoked rule 22(5) to say that the declaration was not attached to the original return; the Board concluded there was no provision to condone the omission and restored the higher assessment.
  4. Meaning of "component": The Court accepted the appellant's dictionary-based submissions that "component" means a constituent part of a finished product. Applying that ordinary meaning to the facts, the Court held that a finished radio can be resolved into identifiable constituent parts including the wooden cabinet manufactured by the assessee; therefore a radio cabinet is a component part of a radio within the meaning of section 3(3).
  5. Procedural compliance and the second return: The Court analysed the proviso to section 3(3) requiring the declaration in the "prescribed manner" and rule 22(5) requiring attachment of the original portion of the declaration to the return. The factual matrix: the first Form A-1 was signed per pro; after notice calling for rectification (24 May 1961) the assessee filed a second Form A-1 rectifying the signature and enclosing Form XVII. The second return was substantively the same, with only a slight amendment to total turnover.
  6. Distinguishing precedents and discretionary power: The Court considered conflicting precedents (Kerala decision vs. Bench decision of this Court) and relied upon Bench decisions (State of Madras v. M.P. Ibrahim Kunhi and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Pyarelal Malholra) recognizing a discretion in the assessing authority to accept delayed or rectified returns in appropriate circumstances. The Court distinguished Parekutti Hajee Sons because that case involved failure to produce declarations before assessing or appellate authorities and no explanation; whereas here the second return with declarations was before the assessing authority after notice to rectify defects.
  7. Application to present case: The Court held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was entitled, in the circumstances (notice calling attention to defects and subsequent rectification with declaration), to treat the second return and its enclosures as a re-presentation of the original return and to accept the declaration as valid for the purposes of section 3(3). The Board of Revenue had not considered this aspect and had proceeded only on the ground of non-attachment to the first return.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court's final disposition was to allow the appeal. It set aside the order of the Board of Revenue and restored the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, with no order as to costs. The practical effect of that restoration was that the turnover in question was assessed at the lower rate of 1 per cent under section 3(3).

Implications:

  • Direct consequence for the parties: The assessee (F. Rose Mary Carpentry Works) is entitled to the benefit of the 1 per cent rate for the sales of radio cabinets for the assessment year in question, as the Court found radio cabinets to be component parts and accepted the second return with declarations as valid in the circumstances.
  • On precedent/new law: The opinion distinguishes earlier conflicting authorities and applies principles recognizing the assessing authority's discretion to accept rectified or belated submissions in appropriate circumstances. The opinion itself does not state that it creates a new, general rule beyond the decision on the facts; accordingly, no broader rule beyond the application to these facts is expressly proclaimed in the text.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or holdings beyond those present in the opinion have been added.

    F. Rose Mary Carpentry Works, Coimbatore v. The State Of Madras

    Ramakrishnan, J.:— The Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore IV, assessed Messrs F. Rose Mary Carpentry Works, Coimbatore, dealers in radio cabinets, for the year 1960-61, on a turnover of Rs. 35,106-15 nP. at 7 per cent. This tax was leviable at 7 per cent. under serial No. 5 of the First Schedule to the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, which reads:

    “Wireless reception instruments and apparatus, radios and radio gramophones, electrical valves, accumulators, amplifiers and loud speakers and spare parts and accessories thereof.”

    2. There is however one more provision, namely, that contained in section 3(3) of the Act, which reads:

    “3. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the tax payable by a dealer in respect of any sale of goods mentioned in the First Schedule by such dealer to another for use by the latter as component part of any other goods mentioned in that Schedule, which he intends to manufacture for sale inside the State, shall be at the rate of only one per cent. on the turnover relating to such sale:

    Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to any sale unless the dealer selling the goods furnishes to the assessing authority in the prescribed manner a declaration duly filed in and signed by the dealer to whom the goods are sold containing the prescribed particulars in a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘component part’ means an article which forms an identifiable constituent of the finished product and which along with others goes to make up the finished product.”

    3. It may be also worthwhile to mention that by Act 44 of 1961, which came into force subsequent to the order of assessment in this case, the explanation above extracted was added to sub-section (3) of section 3.

    4. The view of the Joint Commercial Tax Officer, the assessing authority, was that “radio cabinet” was an accessory within the meaning of serial number 5 in Schedule I aforesaid, but it would not be a component part to attract the benefit of the lower rate of 1 per cent. tax under section 3(3). He also held further that when the assessee submitted his return in Form A-1 on 1st May, 1961, he did not send with it the required declaration in Form XVII. But this declaration was submitted by him only on 30th May, 1961, along with another Form A-1 return and the assessee claimed relief of the lower rate of tax under section 3(3) of the Act The prayer was not conceded as the declarations were not attached to the original return filed, as required by the provisions of rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, and also for the reason that radio cabinets were not component parts of radios but only accessories thereto. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore, who reversed the finding of the assessing authority. In the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, radio cabinet forms a component part of a radio because it is in fact used in the manufacture of a “finished radio”, which does not undergo change, and is identifiable as such in the finished product. Therefore, he held that the proviso to section 3(3) enabling the lower rate of 1 per cent. would apply to the sales in question. So far as the omission to enclose the declaration in Form XVII along with the return was concerned, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed that it was indisputable that the declarations had been filed along with the second Form A-1 return, which, but for the slight amendment of the total turnover remained the same as the one submitted in the first instance, that the taxable turnover was the same in both the returns and that therefore, Form XVII declarations filed by the assessee could be accepted as valid under the Act. The turnover was thus assessed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner at 1 per cent.

    5. The Board of Revenue suo motu took up the case for revision under section 34 of the Act. The Board of Revenue was of the view that as the Government issued a memorandum on 10th November, 1960, which clarified that “radio cabinet” was only an accessory falling under item 5 of Schedule 1, what is an accessory of a radio cannot become a component part for the purpose of the proviso to section 3(3). The Board of Revenue also held that even if “radio cabinet” be regarded as a “component part”, the assessee failed to attach the declaration in Form XVII to his return as required by rule 22(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, 1959. There was a failure to comply with the said rule and in the absence of any provision to condone the omission or delay, the assessee was not eligible to the reduced rate of one per cent. Therefore, the Board of Revenue set aside the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order and restored the order of the Joint Commercial Tax Officer. From this decision of the Board of Revenue, the assessee has filed the present appeal before us.

    6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the Board of Revenue while it confirmed the finding that radio cabinet was an accessory to a radio falling within serial number 5 of the First Schedule, however erred in holding that it cannot form a component part of a radio within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Act. He refers to the meaning of the term “component” given in various well-known dictionaries. Thus, Chambers' Dictionary defines “component” as one of the parts or elements of which anything is made up, or into which it may be resolved. Oxford Dictionary defines “component” as a constituent part or element. There can be very little doubt that a finished radio set (which is the meaning to be given to the word “radio” m the context of serial number 5 of the First Schedule) has an essential component part, the wooden cabinet in which the valves, loud speaker and other mechanical contrivances of a radio are housed, and if a radio set is opened up it can certainly be resolved into several component parts which will include the wooden cabinet. It is this wooden cabinet that is manufactured by the assessee and which is the subject-matter of the dispute. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a radio cabinet is a component part of a radio. It should be pointed out that we are not now asked to canvass the correctness of the finding of the assessing authority as well as of the Board of Revenue, that a radio cabinet is an accessory of a radio. It is on the basis that it is such an accessory that the present assessment of 7 per cent. has been made. But in view of the meaning to be given to the word “component” and the familiar knowledge as to what a radio set is composed of, it is obvious that a radio cabinet is a component part of a radio. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view of the Board of Revenue is not correct, and we hold that the assessee is entitled to the lower rate of assessment under section 3(3) of the Act.

    7. So far as the second argument about the omission of the assessee to enclose to the Form A-1 return, a declaration in Form XVII is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant refers to the terms of the proviso to section 3(3), which requires that a declaration should be furnished to the assessing authority in the prescribed manner containing the prescribed particulars and in a prescribed form obtained from the prescribed authority. The word “prescribe” must refer to the rules issued for the purpose, namely, the Madras General Sales Tax Rules, rule 22. Rule 22(5) states that a dealer shall attach to his return of turnover in which that sale is included, the portion marked “original” of the declaration received by him from the purchasing dealer. In the present case, the dealer submitted a return of turnover in Form A-1 on the first day of May [rule 15(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules]; but it was signed by the assessee's husband per pro the assessee's firm. On 24th May, 1961, the assessing officer issued a notice to the assessee directing that the return in Form A-1 should be signed by the proprietor. The notice also mentioned that since radio cabinet was a component part of a radio, it would be assessed at 7 per cent. Learned counsel for the assessee contends that during the prior years the radio cabinets were not assessed at the higher rate of 7 per cent. and that only when the notice was sent to her on 24th May, 1961, did she become aware that the assessing authority proposed to assess the turnover in radio cabinets at 7 per cent. Acting on the notice, and on the direction therein to obtain the signature of the assessee in lieu of the signature of her husband, the assessee made out another return containing substantially the same particulars as in the earlier return and enclosed thereto a declaration in Form XVII which she had obtained in the meantime. The contention of the assessee is that the declaration sent in the above circumstances along with the rectified second return, must be deemed as a vaild return with proper enclosures, for the purpose of levy of the lower rate of tax.

    8. Learned counsel for the assessee also referred to a decision of the Kerala High Court in Abraham…* v. Sales Tax Officer & Others… [1964] 15 S.T.C 110., which held that the words “prescribed manner” in section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act in regard to the submission of “C” Forms under that Act would not take in the time element. Therefore, if the required “C” Forms were produced before the assessing officer before the order of assessment was made, he had to take those forms into account in passing the assessment order. The Kerala High Court in expressing the above view differed from a judgment of a Bench of this High Court in Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons [1962] 13 S.T.C 680., which also interpreted section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act and held that the term “prescribed manner” would include also the time element and therefore it was not open to the departmental officers or the Tribunal to excuse the delay in the submission of “C” Form return. Rule 5 of the Central Sales Tax Rules framed in the Madras State provided that the dealer should submit a return of his transactions in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in Form 1 together with the connected declaration form before the 25th of each month. The assessee in that case did not submit the “C” Form return along with the monthly return in Form 1 before the 25th of the succeeding month. He failed to sumit “C” Form returns even along with the last return of the year and not even at the time when the final assessment was made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. He did not give any explanation for his failure. Therefore, the transactions were assessed at 7 per cent. and the benefit of the lower rate of assessment was not given to the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the decision of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. When the assessee appealed to the Tribunal, the Tribunal observed that as the “C” Forms had been submitted before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, he could have accepted them. Thereafter, the Tribunal condoned the delay and directed the turnover to be assessed at the lower rate. It was in such circumstances that this Court held that when once the failure to furnish the “C” Form declarations to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner had been established, the necessary result would follow, viz., that the transactions were taken outside the scope of section 8(1) of the Act and it was not open to the Tribunal to excuse the delay in the submission of the “C” Form declarations because no such power to excuse the delay was contemplated by the Act or the Rules. Unless the return was accompanied by the declaration in the prescribed manner the transaction ceased to fall within the scope of section 8(1) of the Act. Learned counsel for the assessee pointed out that the present case can be distinguished from the Bench decision on the ground that this is not a case where the delay in filing the declaration form has to be excused or condoned. What the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did in the case was to treat the second return filed by the assessee after the original return was sent back to him for rectification of a defect in substance as the original return itself. The enclosure to the return thus submitted after rectification was treated by him as an enclosure to the original return itself. This procedure is one which is adopted in several other analogous procedures for receiving documents like a plaint in a suit, or memorandum of grounds in an appeal. Such plaints or memos of appeal are often returned for rectifying some defect or other, and when they are re-submitted with the defect rectified, the plaint or appeal memo so returned is treated as taking effect from the date of the original presentation. Any enclosures that accompany the re-presented document are also treated as valid from the date of the original presentation. In the present case, no doubt, the first return was not sent back to the assessee, but the assessee's attention was called to the defects in it, by a notice to her. In effect this served to call the attention of the assessee to the necessity for submitting a declaration form as an enclosure to her return in the event of her desire to obtain the benefit of section 3(3). Thereafter, the assessee complied with the notice and submitted a return rectifying the defect in the matter of signature, and also supplying the necessary declaration form. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner points out that except for a slight amendment, the total turnover was the same in both the returns and that the taxable turnover was the same. He was, therefore, prepared to treat the second return with the declaration as a re-presentation of the original return itself after rectifying certain defects. We are of the opinion that in the circumstances mentioned above, the present case can be distinguished from the one dealt with by the Bench of this Court above cited. In this case there was no occasion to condone any delay as such. The question was whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was in error, in the circumstances of this case, in treating the subsequent return with its enclosed declaration forms in effect as a re-submission of the original return and therefore having validity from the date of the original return. The Board of Revenue has not at all adverted to this aspect of the case, but proceeded on the short ground that the assessee had failed to attach the declaration form to the first return submitted by her.

    9. Our attention has been drawn to a prior decision of a Bench of this Court in State Of Madras v. M.P. Ibrahim Kunhi, where the learned Judge expressed the view that though the assessee had submitted the return beyond the period prescribed by section 9(1) [which corresponds to section 12(1) of the Act of 1959], it was certainly a valid return in the sense that there was no legal bar to its acceptance by the assessing authority in the exercise of his discretion, though it was filed beyond the period prescribed by rules under section 9(1). The Bench also observed:

    “If however the delay in the submission of the return was condoned, either expressly or even impliedly, the assessing authority had the jurisdiction to accept it as the basis of assessment after verifying the correctness of the return.”

    10. To a similar effect is the view of the Andhra High Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Pyarelal Malholra, where the learned Judges observed:

    “Though the assessee could not claim as of right to have the delay condoned in the submission of the return, it was competent for the taxing authority to excuse the delay in the exercise of its discretion and make the assessment on the basis of it.”

    11. These decisions, which refer to the power of condonation of delay vesting in the assessing authority, have not been taken into consideration in the decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons. Further, we have already pointed out in that case, the question of condonation arose before the Tribunal after the assessee had failed to submit the proper enclosures to his return both before the assessing authority as well as before the appellate authority; but the question dealt with in the two decisions mentioned above is a power of condonation available to the assessing authority, though, according to the rules, the assessee cannot as of right insist upon such a condonation. Such a power, according to the above decisions, can be exercised in its discretion by the assessing authority. In the present case, the facts are that the return in the proper form was before the assessing authority who refused to treat it as a valid return, but the appellate authority in its discretion, treated it as a valid one. We have already given reasons which distinguish the present case from that in Deputy Commissioner (Commercial Taxes), Coimbatore v. Parekutti Hajee Sons because here we have not so much of a case for condonation of delay, as a case where a subsequent return was treated as one validly submitted in compliance with a notice calling for rectification of defects in the first return.

    12. We are of the opinion that the decision of the Board of Revenue, in the above circumstances, cannot be upheld. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Board of Revenue and restore the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. There will be no order as to costs.

    13. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    F. Rose Mary Carpentry Works, Coimbatore v. The State Of Madras
    (Aug 10, 1964)