Citation Codes

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Case Number

W.P No. 195 of 1960.

Attorney(S)

Messrs. S. Mohan Kumaramangalam and S. Ramaswami for Petr.
Mr. K. Rajah Iyer instructed by Mr. C. Duraiswami of Messrs. King and Partridge for Respt.

Judges

Veeraswami, J.

Acts

S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Sub-S. (1) of this Section
(1) of Sec. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-S. (2) of S. 20 of the 1950 Act
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act,
(2) of S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
ARBITRATION ACT 1940
S, 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
REVENUE RECOVERY ACT
(2) of S. 20 of the 1950 Act.
Sub-section of S. 33-C

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Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — Application under S.33‑C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition arises from an application under S.33‑C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, seeking computation in money of a "good attendance bonus" for October 1958 that was awarded to certain workmen by an award made under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.

Chronology and procedural history (as stated in the opinion):

29 March 1955: A section of the workmen of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd. made demands on management.
5 October 1955: A strike notice was issued.
24 November 1955: The workmen went on strike; the State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, under S.10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
25 November 1955: The parties agreed to private arbitration under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940; the strike was called off and the Government directed reference to private arbitration.
29 February 1956: The original reference under S.10(1)(c) was dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal.
19 January 1957: Private arbitration produced an award; one relief in that award was the good attendance bonus for October 1958.
12 April 1957: A court decree followed on the arbitration award.
Before the Labour Court: Management objected to maintainability of the S.33‑C(2) application; the Labour Court dismissed the application.
Result: The aggrieved workman approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the phrase "any benefit" in S.33‑C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, includes benefits awarded outside the Industrial Disputes Act (specifically, an award made under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940) and thus is amenable to computation in terms of money under S.33‑C(2).
Whether the omission in S.33‑C(2) of the words present in the repealed S.20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (namely, the phrase "under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal"), is significant and indicates a deliberate legislative intent to give S.33‑C(2) a wider scope than the earlier provision.

Arguments of the Parties

Management's Arguments (before the Labour Court and noted in the opinion)

The application under S.33‑C(2) was not maintainable because "any benefit" in Sub‑section (2) should be confined to benefits arising under a settlement or an award under the Industrial Disputes Act (including Chapter V‑A).
If a benefit accrues to a workman outside the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (for example, under an award made under the Indian Arbitration Act), that benefit could not be the subject matter of an application under S.33‑C(2).

Petitioner's Arguments (before this Court)

Sub‑section (2) of S.33‑C should be read widely and is not controlled or restricted by Sub‑section (1); consequently, "any benefit", whatever its source, if it relates to the terms and conditions of employment and is capable of computation in money, falls within S.33‑C(2).
Support for this broad reading was sought from the omission of the words "under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal" (which appeared in the repealed S.20(2) of the 1950 Act) from Sub‑section (2) of S.33‑C — the omission was argued to be significant and indicative of legislative intent to widen Sub‑section (2)'s scope.
Counsel for the petitioner relied on prior authorities (e.g., Shree Amarsingh Mills, Ltd. v. Nagrashma) to support the contention that "any benefit" could include monetary claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Railway Employees' Co‑operative Bank Ltd., Madras v. Labour Court, Madras (first instance)	Considered scope of S.33‑C(2); Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. held the sub‑section had a wider scope (reading the omission as significant).	The Court noted this first‑instance view but explicitly declined to accept it as correct on further consideration.
Railway Employees' Co‑operative Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras (Division Bench)	The Division Bench expressed that S.33‑C(2) likely had no application to claims outside the Industrial Disputes Act and recognised force in arguments contrary to Rajagopala Aiyangar, J.'s view.	The present court adhered to the Division Bench's inclination and relied on it to support a restrictive interpretation of "any benefit" in S.33‑C(2).
Shree Amarsingh Mills, Ltd. v. Nagrashma and others	Decided a question concerning lay‑off compensation and whether "any benefit" in S.33‑C(2) could include a monetary claim.	The court held this authority did not decide the precise question at issue in the present case; it was therefore not of assistance to the petitioner on the central point.
Madavalal v. State of Bihar	Referenced by petitioner (specific rule/principle not described in the opinion).	The opinion states this decision was not helpful in resolving the scope of "any benefit" in S.33‑C(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis is driven by textual interpretation, the object of S.33‑C and consideration of possible anomalies that a broad reading might create. The reasoning proceeds in the following steps, closely following the text of the opinion:

Purpose and object: The court identifies the object of S.33‑C as providing a cheap and speedy remedy for a workman to realise the benefit of a settlement or an award (or benefits under Chapter V‑A) through the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act. This purpose informs the interpretation of the section.
Textual context — combined reading: The court reads Sub‑section (2) in the context of Sub‑section (1). Where a benefit is already expressed in monetary terms it falls directly under Sub‑section (1); where it is not, but is capable of computation in money, Sub‑section (2) permits conversion into a monetary amount, to be realized by the execution machinery provided in Sub‑section (1).
Scope of "any benefit": Given the object and the relationship between the two sub‑sections, the court holds that "any benefit" in Sub‑section (2) should be read as meaning benefits that flow from a settlement, an award or under Chapter V‑A of the Industrial Disputes Act — i.e., benefits that arise within the statutory disposal mechanism contemplated by that Act.
Significance of omission in drafting: The court acknowledges the omission of the words "under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal" (which appeared in the repealed S.20(2) of the 1950 Act) from S.33‑C(2). However, it interprets that omission as apparently aimed at avoiding redundancy, not as intending to broaden the scope of Sub‑section (2) to include any benefit arising wholly outside the Industrial Disputes Act.
Avoidance of anomalous results: The court considers the anomaly pointed out by counsel for the management. If Sub‑section (2) were read widely, an award made under the Arbitration Act that contained both a monetary portion and a non‑monetary (convertible) portion could give rise to different remedial routes for different parts of the same award (Revenue Recovery Act for the monetary portion and S.33‑C conversion for the non‑monetary portion), which would be an unlikely legislative design in the absence of express words.
Precedential support and evaluation: The court reviews earlier judicial pronouncements. It notes that an earlier single‑judge decision had taken a wider view, but a subsequent Division Bench had expressed force against that view; on reflection the present court adheres to the restrictive interpretation that S.33‑C(2) applies only to benefits arising under the Industrial Disputes Act framework.
Treatment of other authorities: The court explains that Shree Amarsingh Mills (a lay‑off compensation case) and Madavalal v. State of Bihar do not decide the precise question here and thus do not assist the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE PETITION IS DISMISSED. The court holds that the good attendance benefit awarded under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, is not within the scope of Sub‑section (2) of S.33‑C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The rule nisi is discharged, and there will be no order as to costs.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The workman's application to have the arbitration‑awarded good attendance bonus converted into a money amount under S.33‑C(2) is unsuccessful; execution under S.33‑C(2) is not available for that award.
Scope of S.33‑C(2): The court confirms a restrictive reading — S.33‑C(2) applies to benefits that flow from settlements, awards or provisions under Chapter V‑A of the Industrial Disputes Act and does not extend to benefits awarded entirely outside that statutory framework (for example, awards made under the Indian Arbitration Act).
Broader precedent: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel, expansive principle beyond its interpretative conclusion; it expressly relies on statutory purpose and prior judicial treatment to resolve the question. The decision therefore determines the parties' rights in this case but does not assert that it creates a new, sweeping precedent beyond the matters discussed.

V.C.S

This summary is prepared solely from the provided opinion text and does not add information beyond that source.

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Daniel Dorairaj v. The Management Of The Buckingham And Carnatic Co., Ltd., Madras And Another.

This petition arises out of an application made under S, 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for computation in terms of money the good attendance bonus for October 1958 granted to the workers concerned by an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. Certain demands were made by a section of the workmen of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd., on 29th March, 1955, on the management and this was followed by a strike notice on 5th October 1955. The workmen concerned actually went into a strike on 24th November 1955. The same day, the State Government in exercise of their powers under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act, referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. But it would appear that an agreement was arrived at between the management and the workmen to have the dispute referred to private arbitration under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. In view of this agreement, the next day, i.e, 25th November, 1955, the strike was called off. Evidently giving effect to the agreement, the Government directed a reference to private arbitration. The original reference under S. 10(1)(c) stood therefore dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal on 29th February, 1956. The private arbitration ended in an award dated 19th January, 1957. On the foot of this award, a decree of Court also followed which is dated 12th April 1957. One of the reliefs awarded under the award, was the good attendance bonus for October 1958 to the workmen.

Before the Labour Court, on behalf of the management of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd., the objection was taken that the application was not maintainable under S. 33-C(2). Their contention was that what was contemplated by “any benefit” in Sub-S.(2) of S. 33-C should be under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that, if any benefit accrued to any workman outside the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, that could not be the subject matter of an application under S. 33-C(2). This view of the scope of Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C found favour with the Labour Court with the result the application for conversion of the benefit into money was dismissed. The aggrieved workman has, therefore, come up to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

For the petitioner in this Court, it has been strenuously contended that Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C is of a wide scope, uncontrolled by the provisions of Sub-S. (1) and that any benefit, whatever the sources of it may be provided it related to the terms and conditions of employment of workman, which is capable of being computed in terms of money, would fall within the scope of Sub-S. (2). In support of this contention particular reference is made to the repealed S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Sub-S. (1) of this Section is in terms identical with those of Sub-S. (1) of Sec. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-S. (2) of S. 20 of the 1950 Act reads:

“Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to the rules made under this Act, be determined by that Industrial Tribunal, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-S, (1).”

The point made with reference to this sub-section is that the omission in Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C of the words “under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal” is significant and points to the fact that the legislature intended to make the scope of Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C wider than what it was under Sub-S. (2) of S. 20 of the 1950 Act. The point thus urged is one of some importance and requires a careful scrutiny.

The object of S. 33-C patently is to provide a cheap and speedy remedy for the workman to have the benefit of a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A realised through the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act. The benefit may be expressed in terms of money in which case it will directly fall under Sub-S. (1). Where it is not so, the benefit, provided it is capable of being computed in terms of money, and when so computed, the machinery provided for execution under Sub-S. (1) will apply. A combined reading of the two Sub-section of S. 33-C prima facie leave the impression that “any benefit” mentioned in Sub S. (2) in the context of Sub-S. (1) means any benefit due to a workman under a settlement or an award under the provision of Chapter of the Industrial Disputes act. The primary object, as I said of the entire section being to provide a machinery for speedy execution there appears to be no special reason why Sub-S (2) should be read de hors that purpose and as comprehending any benefit whatever awarded outside the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Having provided for execution of a settlement or an award under which money is due, any benefit computed under Sub-S. (2) in terms of money, is also made realisable though the machinery provided for Sub-S (1) no more, in my opinion, is the scope of Sub-S. (2). It is no doubt true that in the 1950 Act aforesaid the words, “under a settlement or an award” occurred in Sub-S. (2) of S. 20, and those words have been omitted in Sub S. (2) of S. 33-C. But this omission, in my opinion, is apparently due to the fact that the Legislature wanted to avoid redundancy. I am unable to read into the omission of those words an intention on the part of the legislature to give a wider amplitude to the words “any benefit”. If that were the intention, the Legislature could have expressed it in more clear terms.

In Railway Employees' Co-operative Bank Ltd., Madras v. Labour Court, Madras (1), which arose out of an application under S. 33-C(2) for computing in terms of money a benefit due to the applicant under the provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., had to consider the scope of that sub-section. The learned Judge, mainly basing his reasoning on the omission in Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C, the words “under an award or a decision of an, Industrial Tribunal”, was of the opinion that the scope of Sub-S. (2) was wider and that the application, therefore, was maintainable. On appeal from this judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in Railway Employees Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras (2), to which I was a party, observed:

“There is a considerable force in the contention of Mr. Vasantha Pai for the bank (appellant) that S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would have no application to the facts of this case and it was not intended to provide for a claim such as we have in this case………We should not however be understood as accepting the view of Rajagopala Aiyangar, J., on the point.

Though the point was not finally decided by us in that case, we, prima facie, recognised the force of the argument against the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. as to the scope of Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C. On further examination, I adhere to the view we were inclined to take in that case.

In my opinion, “any benefit” under Sub-S. (2) means only that which flows from a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

There are certain other considerations which seem to lend support to the above view of mine: Sri K. Rajah Aiyar appering for the management contended that to interpret Sub-S. (2) in any other manner may lead to an anomaly. He pointed out, supposing an award was passed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act partly in terms of money and partly in terms of ascertain benefit computable in terms of money value, could it be said that so far as the money portion of the award was concerned, the remedy was to invoke the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and in respect of the rest of the award not in terms of money but convertible into money it could after such conversion, he executed through the machinery of Sub-S. (2) read with Sub-S. (1) of S. 33-C. The learned Counsel states that such intention could not be attributed to the Legislature in enacting the first two subjections of S. 33-C. The contention is not without force. The point is when a particular remedy is provided by Sub-S. (1) with reference to the money portion of the award, there is no reason, without specific Words which compel a different view, to interpret Sub-S. (2) as of a wider scope-merely because the words “any benefit” occur in that sub section. Those words will have to be understood in the light of the object of the whole section and in the context of Sub-S. (2) read along with Sub-S. (1) and not read disjunctively. Otherwise, in respect of the same award, as pointed out by Sri K. Rajah Aiyar, it would mean that difference remedies through different means are contemplated by the. Legislature which, to my mind, does not appear to be the case. One other consideration, according to Sri K. Rajah Aiyar, is the use of the, word “the” in the words “the employer’ in the Sub-S. (2) as contrasted with “an employer” in Sub-S. (1) it significant. The suggestion is that Sub-S. (2) is, therefore, really related to and goes with or takes colour from Sub-S. (1). But I do not think that the interpretation of the scope of Sub-S. (2) need be rested on this ground.

On behalf of the petitioner Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam invited my attention to the decision in Shree Amarsingh Mills, Ltd. v. Nagrashma and others . That was a case of lay off compensation and the only question that was decided there was whether the word “any benefit” in Sub-S. (2) would comprehend or include a claim of monetary benefit also. The precise question that fails to be decided in that case was not raised or decided in that case and it, therefore, does not afford any assistance to the petitioner. My attention was also invited to the decision in Madavalal v. State of Bihar , but this too, in my opinion is not helpful in deciding the ambit of the words “any benefit” in Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C.

I hold, therefore, agreeing with the. Labour Court, that the good attendance benefit awarded under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is not within the Scope of Sub-S. (2) of S. 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition is dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.

V.C.S

Daniel Dorairaj v. The Management Of The Buckingham And Carnatic Co., Ltd., Madras And Another.

Legal Opinion Summary — Application under S.33‑C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Management's Arguments (before the Labour Court and noted in the opinion)

Petitioner's Arguments (before this Court)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Daniel Dorairaj v. The Management Of The Buckingham And Carnatic Co., Ltd., Madras And Another.

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