Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

A.A.O Nos. 49 and 147 of 1958.

Attorney(S)

Messrs. K. Parasaran for Appt.
The Govt. Pleader for State.
Mr. M. Natesan for Respts.

Judges

Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.

Acts

provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Telegraph Act.
provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act
S. 12 of the Indian Electricity Act
S. 51 of the Electricity Act
S. 12 of the Electricity Act.
Sub-section (2) of S. 12

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Jagannatha Iyer, sued for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove high-tension electric lines and posts from his property and for damages (Rs. 990 for a specified past period and future damages calculated at Rs. 360 per year). The high-tension lines and posts had been erected across the plaintiff's lands and coconut groves beginning late 1951. The plaintiff alleged trespass and claimed the defendants had earlier assured him the arrangement was temporary and that a permanent route would not interfere with his land; that assurance had not been implemented.

The learned District Munsif of Manamadurai (trial court) framed multiple issues, treated the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction — that the proper remedy lay before the District Magistrate — and dismissed the suit under the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Telegraph Act. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga reversed the District Munsif, held the civil court had jurisdiction, allowed the plaintiff's appeal and remanded the suit for fresh disposal. Two appeals were then preferred against that reversal: C.M.A. No. 49 of 1958 by the first defendant (the electric company, which had been taken over by the State) and C.M.A. No. 147 of 1958 by the second defendant (the State Government). The present judgment considers those two appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's suit for removal of high-tension lines and for damages, or whether the remedy is exclusively before the District Magistrate under the Indian Electricity Act (particularly S. 12) and by analogy the Indian Telegraph Act.
Whether the plaintiff's claim for mandatory injunction and damages in respect of alleged trespass is barred by the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and/or the Indian Telegraph Act.
Whether the statutory provisions (including S. 12 and S. 51 of the Electricity Act) and related provisions (e.g., sections dealing with compensation, arbitration, or immunity) oust the civil court's jurisdiction in a case of this type.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

The high-tension lines had been finally fixed and the plaintiff had not objected in a manner that prevented fixation; estoppel was pleaded (the plaintiff supposedly desired the route as it helped him obtain energy for proposed pump sets).
The land had not been materially affected or rendered uncultivable except at negligible points where posts were fixed, and therefore the plaintiff had no cause of action.
The suit was misconceived and unsustainable in law because the civil court lacked jurisdiction: the remedy was to be sought under the Indian Electricity Act and Indian Telegraph Act (primarily S. 12 of the Electricity Act) or before the District Magistrate.
The suit was barred by statutory provisions (Indian Electricity Act and Indian Telegraph Act); limitation and the failure to serve a statutory notice when impleading the State were also argued.
Reliance was placed on several judicial decisions (cited in the record) to support the contention that the civil court was not the proper forum.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position

The plaintiff alleged trespass and sought removal of the posts and lines, damages for the period 1-1-1953 to 1-10-1955, and future damages; he relied on the proposition that his remedy included the common-law relief for trespass and was not displaced by S. 12.
The plaintiff pointed to the defendants' assurance (a letter dated 12-10-1951) that the arrangement was temporary and that permanent lines would be laid elsewhere, which assurance went unfulfilled.
He had given notice (dated 12-8-1954) asking the defendants to remove the lines by 31-12-1954 or pay damages from 1-1-1953; the action was therefore framed as trespass and damages rather than as a matter exclusively for statutory compensation proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dewa Singh v. Bazal Dad, AIR 1928 Lah 562	Cited by the trial court in support of the contention that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under the Electricity/Telegraph legislation.	The trial court relied on it; the present court noted it was among authorities relied upon but found those decisions inapplicable to the facts of this case for the reasons explained in the judgment.
Amar Singh v. Khattar E.E.G. Supply Co., AIR 1941 Pesh 73	Cited as authority supporting the ouster of civil jurisdiction in certain circumstances.	Relied on by the trial court; the present court held the ruling unexceptionable on its facts but not helpful or applicable to the present facts.
Secretary of State v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1936 Pat 87	Invoked to support the proposition that statutory remedies under the Electricity/Telegraph Acts may oust ordinary civil remedies.	Cited by the trial court; the present court recorded it but concluded it did not apply to the facts before it.
Viswanathasami Temple v. Asst. Engineer, Surveys, Electricity Dept., Trichinopoly, 1940-2 Mad LJ 254 (AIR 1940 Mad 900)	Invoked by appellants as authority on jurisdiction/relief where electricity works affect property.	The court observed the rulings were "unexceptionable" but not applicable to the present case's facts.
Jairaj Behari v. U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., ILR 1941 All 425 (AIR 1941 All 301)	Cited by appellants as relevant precedent on statutory provisions and jurisdiction.	Recognised as unexceptionable on its facts but the court found it inapplicable to the facts here. Certain observations in other decisions were actually contrary to the appellants' contentions.
Jit Singh v. Gujranwala Electric Supply Co. Ltd., AIR 1929 Lah 226	Decision bearing on disputes between landowners and electric supply companies.	The court considered it more apposite to the facts of the present case than some other authorities relied upon by the appellants.
Bashir Ahmed v. Crown, AIR 1951 Punj 57 (FB)	Authority relevant to disputes involving property and public works.	Viewed as more apposite to the facts of the present case.
Mary Margaret v. Premanadan, 1958-1 Andh WR 283	Recent single-judge decision dealing with jurisdictional questions in similar contexts.	The court expressed entire agreement with that decision and relied on it as supporting the conclusion that civil courts retain jurisdiction in appropriate cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and contextual analysis of the relevant provisions of the Indian Electricity Act (particularly S. 12 and S. 51) and of the Indian Telegraph Act as relied upon by the appellants and by the trial court. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps as reflected in the judgment:

Characterisation of the plaintiff's remedy: The court emphasized that the relief sought by the plaintiff — removal of posts/lines and damages for trespass — is a common-law remedy for interference with the plaintiff's right to enjoyment of his private land. The court treated the nature of the remedy as central to the jurisdictional question.
Examination of S. 12 (Indian Electricity Act):
- The court analysed sub-section (1), observing it deals with licensee powers regarding streets, railways or tramways; it found that sub-s. (1) did not apply to the plaintiff's private land.
- The court then turned to sub-section (2) (the main provision relied upon by the appellants). It noted that sub-s. (2) expressly excludes authority for a licensee to lay or place electric supply lines on land "not dedicated to public use" without the consent of the local authority or owner/occupier. Thus, sub-s. (2) does not authorize entry onto private land without consent.
- The court analysed the provisos to sub-s. (2) and concluded they are limited in scope: the first proviso deals only with supports for aerial lines (stays/struts) and authorises such fixation only if the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police directs in writing. The court found no order by the District Magistrate/Commissioner had been obtained in this case, and the proviso therefore did not validate the defendants' actions.
- Sub-section (3), which permits the District Magistrate or Commissioner to fix compensation when making an order under sub-s. (2), was held to be inapplicable because no such order by the District Magistrate had been or could be shown to have been made.
Analysis of S. 51 (Indian Electricity Act) and analogy to the Telegraph Act:
- The court considered S. 51, noting it permits the State Government to confer powers subject to limitations and to subject those powers to the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act. The court held S. 51 did not assist the appellants because the power conferred is subject to many restrictions and is for placing appliances/apparatus for transmission of energy, not for carrying high-tension lines over private land in a manner that interferes with enjoyment of land.
- The court rejected the appellants' attempt to rely on analogy to telegraph/telephone lines, stressing differences of scale and danger between telegraph/telephone lines and high-tension electric supply lines.
Jurisdictional conclusion:
- The court observed there is no provision in the Electricity Act which expressly or implicitly ousts the civil court's jurisdiction in relation to a claim of the type pleaded (trespass and damages). Although the Act contains provisions for arbitration and for certain statutory determinations (e.g., references to the District Judge for compensation and immunities for public officers), a straightforward trespass claim seeking removal of unauthorized fixtures and damages is not provided for or displaced by the Act.
- The court relied on the legal principle (stated in the judgment) that absent express ouster of civil jurisdiction by statute, it must be presumed a civil court retains jurisdiction. The court concluded the plaintiff's remedy at common law had not been replaced by S. 12 or S. 51 of the Electricity Act.
Treatment of precedents:
- The court considered authorities cited by the appellants and the trial court and concluded that while some of those decisions were unexceptionable on their facts, they were not applicable to the facts of the present case. The court identified other decisions (Jit Singh, Bashir Ahmed, Mary Margaret v. Premanadan) as more apposite and agreed with the reasoning of Mary Margaret.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court upheld the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga that the civil court has jurisdiction to try the plaintiff's suit. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed. The judgment specifically notes: appeals dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. The court dismissed the appeals with costs in C.M.A. No. 147 of 1958.

Implications: As a direct effect of this decision, the plaintiff's suit for removal of high-tension lines and for damages may be proceeded with in the civil court; the statutory provisions relied upon by the appellants (notably S. 12 and S. 51 of the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Telegraph Act by analogy) do not, on the facts of this case, oust civil court jurisdiction or preclude a common-law trespass claim. The opinion does not set out any broader rule purporting to establish a general ouster of civil jurisdiction in similar cases; it addresses the specific statutory construction and factual circumstances of the present disputes and concludes that no express ouster of civil jurisdiction exists in the Electricity Act for claims of this character.

Leave to appeal was refused. Appeals dismissed.

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The South Madras Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., At Tiruchirapalli Through Its Managing Agents, Seshasayee Bros Ltd., Tiruchirapalli v. T.L Jagannatha Aiyar And Others

JUDGMENT (1) These are two appeals filed against the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga in A. S. No. 45 of 1957 reversing the decision of the learned District Munsif of Manamadurai in O. S. No. 210 of 1955. The learned District Munsif had held that the suit did not lie in a civil court and that the proper forum was the District Magistrate and therefore dismissed the suit on the preliminary issue. On appeal by the plaintiff the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the decision of the District Munsiff and held that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The two defendants who are aggrieved by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge have preferred these two appeals.

(2) As a matter of fact it has not been made clear as to what subsisting interest the first defendant has in the suit in so far as it has been made clear that the first defendant company was taken over by the State Government and the State Government is now managing the entire question of laying the supply lines and distributing the electric energy. However both the electric company which has gone out of existence and whose place has been taken up by the State Government, and the State Government who stepped into the shoes of the Electric company have preferred these appeals. C. M. A. Nos. 49 of 1958 is by the first defendant Electric company, and C. M. A. No. 147 of 1958 is by the second defendant, the State Government.

(3) The suit that has been preferred by the plaintiff Jagannatha Iyer is for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the High Tension lines and posts from the plaintiff's property and for recovery of Rs. 990 representing damages for the period from 1-1-1953 to 1-10-1955 at the rate of Rs. 360 per year, and for recovery of future damages at the same rate. The plaintiff's case is that he is the proprietor of Thattangulam village. With a view to supply electric current to Tiruppavanam town from Manalur, the first defendant company had laid high tension electric lines to a length of one mile across the plaintiff's lands and cocoanut topes in the said villages.

The planting of posts to support the lines began at the end of 1951. These operations were objected to by the plaintiff, and more especially when the laying of the high tension lines was commenced, but the first defendant's engineer wrote a letter to the plaintiff dated 12-10-1951, stating that the arrangement was only a temporary one and that the permanent lines will be laid in a different place without any hindrance to the plaintiff's land. Actually after this letter was written, nothing was done in order to shift the lines from the plaintiff's land.

The plaintiff would appear to have demanded the shifting of the lines as undertaken by the first defendant company. Seeing that the first defendant company did not comply with their undertaking, and the plaintiff having suffered damage to his property, a notice was sent on 12-8-1954, on behalf of the plaintiff to the first defendant to remove the lines and posts within 31-12-1954 or to pay damages by way of rent from 1-1-1953. The case of the plaintiff was that the action of the first defendant company was trespass against which the plaintiff was entitled to relief.

Therefore the plaintiff estimated his loss at Rs. 500 but he was content with claiming only Rs. 360 per year and filed the suit to recover this amount and also for a mandatory injunction against both the defendants to remove the High Tension lines and the posts etc. (4) Both the defendants would appear to have contended that the high tension lines were finally fixed without any objection on the part of the plaintiff. They pleaded that the plaintiff actually required the line to be laid along the said route expressing that it would be easier for him to obtain energy for the pump sets he had proposed to erect in his cocoanut gardens. So the plea of estoppel was put forward against the plaint allegations. The further plea of the defendants was that the land had not been affected in any way, nor rendered uncultivable to any extent except at a few negligible points at which the high tension posts had been fixed up.

Therefore their contention was that the plaintiff had no cause of action. Their further plea was that the plaintiff's claim was obviously misconceived and not sustainable in law and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and the suit was barred under the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Telegraph Act. The question of limitation was also taken up. In any event, it was contended on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction and that the damages claimed were excessive. There was a further plea by the second defendant that the statutory notice had not been given when the second defendant was impleaded.

(5) The learned District Munsif framed as many as eight issues and two additional issues as well. The third issue among the ten issues was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and whether the suit as framed against the defendants was not sustainable. This issue was taken up for trial as a preliminary issue and the learned District Munsif after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable in a civil court and that the remedy should have been sought before the District Magistrate.

Therefore the learned District Munsif dismissed the suit holding on issues 3 and 7 that the civil court had no jurisdiction and that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Telegraph Act. The learned District Munsif largely relied upon S. 12 of the Indian Electricity Act and the decisions in Dewa Singh v. Bazal Dad, AIR 1928 Lah 562, Amar Singh v. Khattar E. E. G. Supply Co., AIR 1941 Pesh 73 and Secretary of State v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1936 Pat 87, which according to him supported the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants.

He also made reference to Ss. 16 and 17 of the Indian Telegraph Act which authorised the District and Sessions Judge to fix damages. These he referred to by way of analogy in coming to the conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction, and held that the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act and the Indian Telegraph Act were a bar to the institution of the suit in the civil court.

(6) The plaintiff took up the matter on appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga and the learned Subordinate Judge in a very well reasoned judgment has come to the contrary conclusion and has held that the suit was triable by a civil court and that the civil court had ample jurisdiction to try the case of the type before him. He has adduced very cogent and convincing reasons for his decision. He therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of the lower court and remanded the suit for fresh disposal in the light of his observations. Both the first and second defendants aggrieved by this reversal of the decree of the learned District Munsif have preferred these appeals.

(7) Mr. Parasaran appearing on behalf of the first defendant contended that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the suit was maintainable in the civil court. The learned Government Pleader also has contended very vigorously that the suit in question could not be tried by a civil court and that the only remedy open to the plaintiff was to go before the District Magistrate for compensation as provided for under S. 12 of the Electricity Act. I am afraid I cannot agree with the contention of either Mr. Parasaran for the first defendant or the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the State Government. Even a cursory glance of the averments in the plaint would show that the nature of the remedy the plaintiff has sought to enforce against the defendants does not fall within the ambit of S. 12 or any sub-section thereof.

If S. 12 is carefully considered it will be seen that the first sub-section of that section does not at all apply to the facts of the present case. That sub-section provides that a licensee may open, and break upon the soil and pavement of any street, railway or tramway. Obviously the plaintiff is not having any street, railway or tramway. It is his own private land on which he has grown the cocoanut tope. Even so, sub-clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of sub-s. (1) do not have any bearing on the facts of the present case. It is only sub-s. (2) of S. 12 that has been largely relied upon by the learned counsel for the first defendant and also by the learned Government Pleader.

Sub-section (2) of S. 12 is to the effect that nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall be deemed to authorise or empower a licensee, without the consent of the local authority or of the owner and occupier concerned, as the case may be, to lay down or place any electric supply line or other work, in, through or against any building, or on, over or under any land not dedicated to public use thereon, whereover or whereunder any electric supply line or work has not already been lawfully laid down or placed by such licencee. This sub-section clearly excludes the authority or the power of the licensee to do anything on any person's land without his consent, either it be the local authority or the private owner, or occupier concerned.

But then emphasis is laid on the first and second proviso of this sub-section. A close scrutiny of the language of these two provisos also does not lend support to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendants. Whereas the main part of sub-sec. (2) relates to the laying down or placing of any electric supply line or other work in, through or against any building, or on, over or under any land not dedicated to public use thereon, whereover or whereunder any electric supply line or work has not already been lawfully laid down or placed by such licensee, the first of the provisos relates only to the support of an aerial line or any stay or strut required for the sole purpose of securing in position any support of an aerial line, and if such support of an aerial line is to be resorted to it may be fixed on any building or land or having been so fixed, may be altered, notwithstanding the objection of the owner or occupier of such building or land, provided the District Magistrate or in a presidency town the Commissioner of Police, by order in writing so directs.

At this stage it must be made clear that in the instant case the licensee has not obtained any order from the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police as required by this proviso in order to enable the licensee to proceed with the fixing of the support of an aerial line or any stay or strut. Therefore two things are clear from a reading of this proviso; the first is that the proviso relates to only fixing of any support of an aerial line or any stay or strut for securing in position any support of an aerial line and the second is that if objection is taken the District Magistrate or the Commissioner as the case may be is authorised to give direction empowering or authorising the licensee to proceed with the fixing of the support, stay or strut.

These two things do not obtain in the present case. On the other hand, the case is in simpliciter a case for directing the removal of the posts that have already been fixed without the permission of the owner and without any authorisation from the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police, and this is covered mostly by sub-sec. (2) the main part thereof. The first proviso has therefore no application to this case. It is only when support for aerial line or any stay or strut that has been fixed to secure the aerial line, the second proviso comes into operation and if any owner or occupier of a building or land of such support, stay or strut shows sufficient cause, the District Magistrate or in a presidency town the Commissioner of Police may by an order in writing direct any such support, stay or strut to be removed or altered.

Then comes sub-sec. (3) of S. 12. This gives power to the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police as the case may be, when making an order under sub-s. (2), to fix the amount of compensation or of annual rent, or of both, which should in his opinion be paid by the licensee to the owner or occupier. In this case when the District Magistrate has not himself made any order under sub-sec. (2) and no reference having been made at any stage by the licensee or anybody else who has interest in the carrying on of the high tension lines over the plaintiff's property, the question of fixing of compensation does not arise.

When the order itself has not been made by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner the amount of compensation or annual rent is not called upon to be fixed by this authority. It is only after any such order fixing the compensation has been passed by the District Magistrate or the Police Commissioner that any revision will have to be made by the Provincial Government. That is covered by sub-sec. (4). Sub-sec. (5) of S. 12 is not relevant for the purposes of this case.

(8) It is contended therefore by the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the first defendant that since the District Magistrate has been authorised to pass orders under sub-sec. (2) and under sub-sec. (3) to fix compensation, the remedy is before the District Magistrate and not before the civil court. True if the matter related to what is referred to in the two provisos there will be substance in the contention that the remedy is to be sought from the District Magistrate and not from the civil court. But what the plaintiff seeks to enforce is a violation of his right to enjoyment of his land without any interference or hindrance from any person and that is what is provided for by sub-sec. (2).

In so far as the licensee has not taken the owner's permission to carry the high tension lines over his land and across the cocoanut tope to a length of over one mile--on the other hand the evidence goes to show the licensee having assured the plaintiff that the carrying of the lines on his land is merely a temporary measure and that the permanent measure would be such as would not interfere with any rights to his land and this assurance not having been carried into effect, the remedy the plaintiff seeks to enforce against the defendants is one that was available to him at common law and this remedy has not been provided for by S. 12 in order to contend that the District Magistrate is the proper forum which should be approached for enforcing such right.

The supply of electric energy to institutions, companies or individuals stands on quite a different footing from the establishment of means of communication such as telegraph lines or the telephone lines. No question of urgency has been pleaded by the learned counsel for the first defendant in carrying the high tension lines on properties belonging to private individuals or local authorities. It cannot be said from the language employed in S. 12 that the rights of parties may be violated in view of the urgency of the high tension lines being carried through another man's property.

On the other hand, sub-sec. (2) of S. 12 clearly lays down that the licensee is not authorised, to carry high tension lines or lay down those lines either on the land or above the land of any private individual or any local authority without his consent and S. 12 does not authorise him to do so. The defendants therefore cannot rely upon the analogy of the power vested in the Telegraph Act to carry telegraphic or telephone lines on properties belonging to private owners. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon S. 51 of the Electricity Act which enables the State Government to confer upon the licensee power for the placing of appliances and apparatus for the transmission of energy, subject to such conditions and restrictions as the State Government may think fit to impose and subject to the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act any of the powers which the Telegraph authority possesses under the Act, with respect to the placing of telegraph lines and posts for the purposes of a telegraph established or maintained by the Government or to be so established or maintained.

But this section again is not of any great assistance to the learned counsel for the defendants. The power that is sought to be conferred by the State Government under this is subject to the many limitations and restrictions contained in this section, the most important restriction being that the power could be only for the placing of appliances and apparatus for transmission of energy, and not for the purpose of carrying High Tension lines on any man's property, whereby considerable damage and hindrance is caused to the proper enjoyment of the land.

As has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent the danger that would ensue by the telegraphic or telephonic lines is by no means on a par with the danger from High Tension lines for the supply of electric energy; and as could be noticed, lines for the telegraphic and telephonic communications are meagre and fewer whereas the lines for carrying the High tension lines for electric energy either for domestic or industrial purposes are far too many and they are always likely to cause danger to any person if carelessly handled.

That apart, whether the civil court has jurisdiction or not depends entirely on the remedy that is sought to be enforced by the plaintiff who has come to court. I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the remedy that the plaintiff is seeking has been provided for by the statute and that S. 12 is self-contained for that purpose. As I have already observed the remedy that the plaintiff has sought to enforce against the defendants is not provided for by S. 12 or any of the sub-sections or provisos to that. Therefore in my opinion neither S. 12 nor S. 51 will be of any avail to the appellants in these cases.

(9) A further point has also been urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. There is no provision in the Act which expressly or by implication ousts the jurisdiction of the civil court in a case like the one under consideration. No doubt there is provision for reference to arbitration and also for decision by the District Judge in certain cases of claim for compensation. But a claim for the type that is contained in the plaint presented by the plaintiff in this case is not the one that is contemplated by these provisions. Section 52 for instance provides for arbitration.

Section 50 provides that no suit shall lie against any public officer for what he has done in the discharge of his duty. Therefore it is well-known and a well-established principle of law that unless there is express ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil court it must be presumed that ordinarily a civil court has jurisdiction and in this case the liability has not been excluded from the purview of the civil court and there is no provision of law contained in the Electricity Act for its adjudication. A complaint of trespass of the kind complained of in the present case and damages therefor is not provided for by any of the sections of the Electricity Act.

(10) The learned counsel for the appellants invited my attention to a series of decisions. Mr. Parasaran has invited my attention in particular to AIR 1941 Pesh 73, Viswanathasami Temple v. Asst. Engineer, Surveys, Electricity Dept., Trichinopoly, 1940-2 Mad LJ 254: (AIR 1940 Mad 900). The rulings in these two cases are unexceptionable but the question is how far these rulings would be applicable to the facts of the present case. In my view these rulings are of no assistance to the learned counsel. Even so the learned Government Pleader has cited the decision in AIR 1936 Pat 87, Jairaj Behari v. U. P. Electric Supply Co., Ltd., ILR 1941 All 425: (AIR 1941 All 301). With due respect these decisions are quite unexceptionable on the facts of the cases with which they dealt but so far as the facts in the present case are concerned these decisions have no application whatsoever.

Certain observations in these decisions are in fact contrary to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The decisions in Jit Singh v. Gujranwala Electric Supply Co., Ltd., AIR 1929 Lah 226, Bashir Ahmed v. Crown, AIR 1951 Punj 57 (FB), seem to be more apposite to the facts of the present case. On the question of jurisdiction Mr. Natesan invited my attention to the latest decision of a single Judge of the Andhra High Court in Mary Margaret v. Premanadan, 1958-1 Andh WR 283. I am in entire agreement with that decision.

(11) Therefore on a consideration of the entire facts and the arguments of learned counsel I have come to the conclusion that in the present case the civil court has ample jurisdiction to try the suit and the conclusion to which the learned Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga has come is quite warranted and justified. That decision is upheld and these appeals are dismissed with costs in C. M. A. No. 147 of 1958.

(12) Leave is asked for and is refused.

(13) Appeals dismissed.

The South Madras Ele... v. T.L Jagannatha Aiyar...