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  • SECTION 27 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Sections 25 and 26, to which Section 27
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Sections 21 to 27 of the Evidence Act,
  • provisions of Section 164 Crl. P. C,
  • of1 Section 164 Crl. P. C.
  • Section 164 Crl. P. C.
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  • SECTION 27 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Sections 25 and 26, to which Section 27
  • Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Sections 21 to 27 of the Evidence Act,
  • provisions of Section 164 Crl. P. C,
  • of1 Section 164 Crl. P. C.
  • Section 164 Crl. P. C.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Ramachandran, was convicted of murder and of causing disappearance of evidence under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced to death for murder by the Sessions Judge of Tanjore. The Sessions Judge did not impose a separate sentence under Section 201 IPC, relying on a Bench decision in Ramagounden, In re (54 Mad LW 561 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad 275). The factual narrative in the opinion describes that the deceased, a woman named Pappal, and the appellant were cousins engaged in illicit intimacy (an incestuous and prohibited relationship). Pappal had left her husband and was living with her mother (P.W. 1); the appellant occupied the rear portion of the same house.

On 11-3-1959 the appellant and the deceased were seen proceeding towards the east of the village, the appellant then carrying an aruval; the deceased was not seen alive afterwards. The appellant appeared before the Judicial Sub‑Magistrate, Mr. Raghavachari (P.W. 7), on 13th March (the opinion records this date), and surrendered, making a statement that he had murdered Pappal on 11th March. The magistrate recorded what the accused told him (Ex. P.2) and sent a copy to the police (Ex. P.2-a), on which investigation followed.

Acting on the appellant's directions, police officers and others were taken to the Coleroon river bund on 14th March where the appellant produced the corpse, which had been placed in two gunny bags (M.Os. 6 and 7). Chemical analysis showed blood staining on one bag. Jewellery and other items identified by the mother (P.W. 1) were recovered from the body (M.Os. 1–4). The appellant also pointed out a spot from which blood‑stained earth was recovered and produced an aruval (M.O. 5), a spade (M.O. 9) and some clothes from his house.

The autopsy (P.W. 9; Ex. P.4) established a large ante‑mortem incised wound on the left side of the neck cutting muscles, vessels, trachea and oesophagus — a necessarily fatal injury. There was also evidence of an extra‑judicial confession to one Mani (P.W. 6) on the night of 11th March, though the Sessions Judge did not rely on that evidence for specified reasons. At trial the accused denied the illicit intimacy and advanced defences denying various parts of the prosecution narrative, including that his statement to the magistrate was made at police prompting.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the importance and weight to be attached to an extra‑judicial confession (here, the statement made by the appellant to the magistrate) that is subsequently retracted?
  2. Whether the statement made by the appellant to the Circle Inspector (Ex. P.12), given while the appellant was in magisterial custody but before formal police custody, should be excluded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act; and if excluded, whether the appellant's conduct (e.g., unearthing the body) can corroborate the retracted confession.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion contains descriptions of the defence's case and the prosecution's case; these are summarized below as presented in the text.

Appellant's Arguments (Defence)

  • Denial of the illicit intimacy with Pappal.
  • Admitted appearing before the Magistrate (the opinion records the date as the 18th March at one point) and making an extra‑judicial confession then, but alleged that the police met him in Papanasam Bazar and asked him to proceed to the Magistrate and make such a statement (i.e., the confession was tutored by police).
  • Asserted that he only indicated spots which the police had earlier shown to him and that he did not actually unearth the body himself.
  • Denied making any statement to the Circle Inspector (P.W. 16) and contended that the police themselves seized material objects from his house.

Prosecution's Case

  • Prosecution presented extensive evidence of the illicit relationship (P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) and witnesses who saw the appellant and deceased together with an aruval on 11‑3‑1959 (P.W. 8).
  • Contended that the appellant voluntarily surrendered to the Judicial Sub‑Magistrate and confessed to the murder, which led to police investigation (Ex. P.2 and Ex. P.2‑a).
  • Prosecution relied on the appellant directing police and officers to the burial spot, recovery of the corpse in two gunny bags (one stained with human blood), identification of the corpse by the mother and recovery of jewellery (M.Os.1–4), discovery of blood‑stained earth, and production of the aruval and spade from the appellant's house.
  • Medical evidence (P.W. 9) established a fatal incised wound; prosecution argued that, together with the appellant's conduct in locating the body and other recoveries, these facts corroborated the confessions and established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramagounden, In re, 54 Mad LW 561 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad 275 Authority relied upon by the Sessions Judge when deciding not to impose a separate sentence under Section 201 IPC. The Sessions Judge followed this Bench decision and did not impose a separate sentence for Section 201; the appellate opinion records that reliance.
Titus, In re, 54 Mad LW 81 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad 720 Observation that admissions provable in civil cases are not inadmissible in criminal cases as such; general principles on admissions. Used to explain the general relevance of admissions and confessions under the Evidence Act.
Nazir Ahmad v. King‑Emperor, 71 Mad LJ 476 : A.I.R. 1936 PC 253 Decision addressing a magistrate's failure to comply with Section 164 Cr.P.C.; statute prescribes mode for confessions made to magistrates during investigation. The court interpreted this authority to mean it does not affect the admissibility of extra‑judicial confessions; it clarifies that Nazir Ahmad condemns improper methods of magistrates recording confessions during investigations but does not render extra‑judicial confessions inadmissible.
Arunachala Reddi v. Emperor, 35 Mad LW 607 : A.I.R. 1932 Mad 500 Confessions are relevant under the Evidence Act unless rendered inadmissible by law; confessions to magistrates recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Cited as a case like the present where confession to a magistrate was treated as relevant; supports admissibility of confessions as admissions.
Nainarnuthu v. Emperor, 50 Mad LW 784 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad 138 Confession made to a magistrate who was not concerned with investigation could be admissible though not recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.; admissible as report of first information and as admission. Applied to support the proposition that a magistrate's recording procedure under Section 164 is not a prerequisite to admissibility of such statements when the magistrate is not conducting the investigation.
Durlav Narasudra v. Emperor, 36 Cal WN 373 : A.I.R. 1932 Cal 297 Represents the strict interpretation that "in the custody of a police officer" in Section 27 refers to formal police custody after arrest; highlights a legal paradox. Quoted to illustrate the strict line of authority and the resulting anomaly; used as an example the court considered undesirable to adopt rigidly.
Peria Gumsami Counter v. Emperor, 1941 Mad WN Crl 94 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad 765 Held Section 27 did not apply to a statement made to a police officer before formal custody. Noted as part of the Madras line of cases that assume Section 27 requires formal police custody; distinguished in the court's analysis.
Kambala Kalikamurthi, 1936 Mad WN Cr.159 Expresses dicta that Section 27 would not apply unless the accused was in formal police custody. Referenced as another Madras authority taking the narrow view of "custody" for Section 27.
In re Kamakshi Naidu, ILR 1943 Mad 456 : A.I.R. 1943 Mad 89 Held that a confession made while in police custody (though custody was for another offence) was admissible under Section 27. Cited to show that Section 27 has been applied in Madras where custody existed even if not in relation to the offence under investigation.
Santokhi Beldar v. Emperor, ILR 12 Pat 241 : A.I.R. 1933 Pat 149 Full Bench of Patna held that a person who voluntarily stated circumstances of a crime to a police officer had submitted himself to the custody of that officer within Section 46(1) Cr.P.C., and Section 27 applied. Used as authority for a wider interpretation of "custody" under Section 27 to include voluntary submission to police or similar forms of control.
Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy, ILR 49 Cal 167 : A.I.R. 1922 Cal 342 Early Calcutta decision supporting a broader meaning of custody under Section 27. Cited as part of the Calcutta line holding that "custody" may include surveillance, restraint or practical control and thus bring statements within Section 27.
Chotey Lai v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1954 All 687 Held that "custody" for Section 27 did not necessarily mean formal custody but included surveillance or restriction by the police. Used to support the wider interpretation that the court ultimately adopts for Section 27 in this case.
Mt. Jamubia Partap v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 Nag 200 Held that even without formal arrest, for practical purposes an accused might be in police custody and Section 27 could apply. Cited as authority supporting practical or effective custody being sufficient for Section 27.
Rambabu Jadav v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1938 Pat 60 Patna held Section 27 could apply where the accused was in judicial custody in hospital and police examined him with court permission. Referenced to show examples where Section 27 was applied despite lack of formal police custody in conventional terms.
Ramkishan v. Bombay State Supreme Court decision referred to in the opinion in support of reasoning on interpretation of Sections 25–27 of the Evidence Act (the opinion cites it for assistance). Mentioned as a Supreme Court decision relevant to the relationship of Sections 25 and 26 to Section 27; the opinion directs the reader to that authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning follows two principal strands: (A) admissibility and weight of the extra‑judicial confession to the magistrate; and (B) scope of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in relation to a statement made to a police officer while the accused was in magisterial (judicial) custody.

(A) Extra‑judicial confession to the magistrate:

  • The court explained that admissions (of which confessions are a species) are relevant under the Evidence Act unless rendered inadmissible by a statutory or other recognised infirmity. An extra‑judicial confession is one made outside the mode prescribed for judicial confessions (i.e., Section 164 Cr.P.C.).
  • The weight accorded to an extra‑judicial confession depends entirely on context: the circumstances, the person to whom it was made, and whether it appears voluntary. Judicial confession obtains weight because Section 164 prescribes safeguards; extra‑judicial confessions may be retracted and similarly require corroboration of material particulars before being fully acted upon.
  • Decisions such as Nazir Ahmad, Arunachala Reddi and Nainarnuthu were examined; the court clarified that Nazir Ahmad does not make extra‑judicial confessions inadmissible—its scope is different (dealing with magistrates failing to follow Section 164 in investigations). Therefore, the appellant's confession to the magistrate (who was not then conducting the investigation) was admissible both as an admission and as a report of first information, and because it was spontaneously made to a magistrate unaware of the circumstances, it was entitled to great weight unless there was credible reason to believe it was tutored by police.

(B) Application of Section 27 (statement to Circle Inspector):

  • The court examined two lines of judicial authority on the meaning of "in the custody of a police officer" in Section 27. One line (including some Madras decisions and the Durlav Narasudra decision) had adopted a narrow interpretation that Section 27 applies only to formal police custody after arrest, producing a paradoxical result. Another line (Calcutta, Patna, Allahabad, Nagpur decisions cited) had adopted a wider, pragmatic interpretation: "custody" may include effective control, surveillance, voluntary submission to police, interrogation before arrest, or situations where a person reasonably perceives himself to be under police control.
  • The court concluded that a rigid, formalistic meaning of "custody" is not justified by the context or the scheme of Sections 25–27 (where Section 27 functions as a proviso/exception). The spirit of the section suggests that where a person submits himself to police custody or control with the consciousness of temporary custody or control, information given to the officer leading to discovery of a relevant fact may be proved under Section 27.
  • Applying that conclusion to the facts, although the appellant was formally in judicial custody under a remand order, when he was interrogated by the Circle Inspector he was temporarily in the "custody of the police officer" for the purposes of Section 27. Hence the statement to the Circle Inspector (Ex. P.12) was admissible under Section 27.
  • Finally, the court observed that even if Ex. P.12 were excluded, ample independent corroborative material existed: the appellant's conduct in unearthing the body, the blood stain on one gunny bag, recovery of blood‑stained earth from a spot indicated by the appellant, and the medical evidence. These facts materially corroborated the retracted confession and established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the convictions on both charges (murder under Section 302 IPC and causing disappearance of the evidence under Section 201 IPC) and confirmed the death sentence imposed for murder. The appeal was dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's convictions and the death sentence for murder were upheld; the appeal was dismissed.
  • Evidential implications: The court confirmed that an extra‑judicial confession made voluntarily to a magistrate who was not conducting the investigation is admissible and, depending on surrounding circumstances, may carry significant weight. Retraction does not render such confessions unusable; corroboration of material particulars is required where retraction occurs.
  • Interpretation of Section 27: The court adopted a wider, pragmatic interpretation of the phrase "in the custody of a police officer" in Section 27 of the Evidence Act — holding that temporary or practical submission to police custody/control (even while formally under magisterial remand) can bring a subsequent statement within Section 27. Thus, the statement made to the Circle Inspector (Ex. P.12) was admissible.
  • Scope of precedent: The court surveyed conflicting lines of authority and articulated reasons for avoiding a rigid formalism that would narrow Section 27; it relied on a range of High Court decisions and referred to a Supreme Court decision (Ramkishan v. Bombay State) for related reasoning. The opinion resolves the particular factual question before it by reference to these authorities and concludes that even if the Circle Inspector's statement were excluded, the prosecution's corroborative evidence was sufficient to convict beyond reasonable doubt.

Final Disposition: Convictions and sentence of death affirmed; appeal dismissed.

    Ramachandran, In Re.

    1. The appellant, Ramachandran, has been convicted of the murder of a woman named Pappal, ands also of causing disappearance of the evidence of offence (Ss. 302 IPC and 201 I. P. C), and-sentenced to death for the offence of murder. The learned Sessions Judge of Tanjore, who tried the ease, has not imposed a separate sentence Under Section 201 IPC as he considered that, that was: not required or desirable, following the Bench decision of this Court in Ramagounden, In re. 54 Mad; LW 561 : A.I.R. 1942 Mad 275(2).

    2. The appellant and Pappal, deceased, were related, being cousins and the appellant is a young-man of about 22, while the woman definitely older. The two were in illicit intimacy, which was also-a prohibited relationship, amounting to incest. Pappal was married and had two _ children, but she had left her husband, and was living with her mother, P, W. 1, in a house, the rear portion of which was occupied by the accused. We have very considerable evidence regarding the illicit intimacy, consisting of the testimonies of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. There is also evidence that the deceased was of loose conduct with others as well, and this. is spoken to by P.Ws. 2 and 4. The suggestion for prosecution is that sexual jealousy probably motivated the appellant to commit this crime.

    3. On Wednesday, 11-3-1959, the appellant and the deceased were seen by Sambandaitn, P.W. 8 proceeding towards the eastern portion of the-village, the appellant then having an aruval. After that, the victim was not seen alive by anyone.

    4. Though Pappal thus disappeared, neither her' mother P.W. 1, nor any one else, seems to-have suspected anything gravely amiss. But at about 4-25 p. m, on 13th March, the appellant appeared before Mr. Raghavachari, P.W. 7, the Judicial. Sub Magistrate of Papanasam, while the officer was in his court hall. The appellant then surrendered himself, after making a statement that he had murdered Pappal on the 11th March. It is important to note that both the mother of the victim, P.W. 1, and the police came to know of this offence only through learning about the statement of the accused to the magistrate. The subsequent', report of P.W. 1 to the village headman, (Ex. P 1),, and the yadhasts (Exs. P. 5 and P. 5-a) were rightly excluded from consideration by the learned Session Tudge, as within the ambit of Section 162 CrIPC This apart, the Sub Magistrate recorded what the accused told him (Ex. P. 2) and sent a copy of the record to the police (Ex. P. 2-a), upon which alone investigation followed. After the accused was remanded to the sub-jail by the magistrate, he was-interviewed by the Circle Inspector. P.W. 16, to-whom the accused gave some information. _ The; evidence shows that this information was furnished previous to the order of the Sub Magistrate (Ex. P. 3-a), formally delivering the appellant into police-custody. The importance of this will be obvious; later.

    5. In pursuance of his own statement, the appellant took the circle inspector, the executive magistrate, P.W. 15, the Medical Officer, P.W. 9 and others to the Coleroon river bund on the .afternoon of the 14th March, and took out the corpse -of the deceased from the spot of burial. The body had been placed in two gunny bags, (M. Os, 6 and 7) and chemical analysis showed that one of them was stained with human blood. There is no doubt about the identification of the corpse, and this /rests upon the evidence of the mother P.W. 1, and .also upon the identity of jewels and other properties taken from the body (M. Os. 1 to 4). The .appellant then took the officers to another spot, wherefrom blood-stained earth was recovered alter the indicated the spot. The appellant after this took the party of officers to his house, and produced from where he had kept them, the aruval (M. O. 5) and the spade (M. O. 9) and some clothes. Chemical analysis did not reveal that these were stained with human blood, but, as the learned sessions Judge surmises, it is very probable that the rival and spade were washed in the river after the crime.

    6. The autopsy in this case very clearly show-fid that the woman had been murdered. According to the doctor, P.W. 9, the canse of death was an ante mortem incised injury, 5 1/2" x 3" x 3" on "the left side of the neck, cutting muscles, blood vessels, the trachen and oesophagus. This was a .necessarily fatal injury, which must have caused instantaneous death. There was a suggestion in defence in the lower court, that the appellant admitted to the Circle Inspector P.W. 16 that he had given 3 cuts to the victim, while the autospy revealed only a simple incised wound. But, as the (learned sessions Judge, points out, this was not followed up, as it ought to have been done, by cross-examining the medical officer P.W. 9 On the point whether more than one cut with an aruval could have caused the injury set forth in the post mortem certificate, Ex. P. 4.

    7. Apart from all this testimony, there was come other evidence about another extra-judicial confession made by the appellant on the night of the 11th March itself at about 10 p. m, to one Mani, P.W. 6. P.Ws. 5 and P.W. 6 speak to this confession, but the learned Sessions Judge did not take this evidence into consideration, because these witnesses were not examined till the 14th March and they did not earlier report the admission of the crime by the accused, either to the police, or even to the mother, P.W. 1. We are not dear that this confession should be necessarily disbelieved on this account, and it is noteworthy that q definite hostility is suggested against these witnesses. But, in view of the ample evidence in this case connecting the accused with the crime, this is not of great importance.

    8. At the trial, the accused denied the illicit intimacy with Pappal altogether. He admitted the facts of his appearance before the Magistrate on the 18th March, and the extra-judicial confession-then made by him. He also admitted that he took a party of police and other officers to the Celeron river bund, and pointed out the spot of burial, but :his defence was that he indicated the spot shown to him earlier by the police, that he did not actually unearth the body, that he made no statement to the circle inspector P.W. 16, and that the police themselves seized material objects from his house. With regard to the extra-judicial confession to the magistrate, his case was that the police met him In Papanasam Bazar St. and asked him to proceed 'to the Magistrate and make a statement like that and that he did so.

    In our view these defences do not appear to the even remotely probable, for the prosecution evidence makes it clear beyond all doubt that neither the police nor even the mother of the victim, P. Vf. 1, had any suspicion that the woman had been murdered, prior to the statement made by the accused himself to the magistrate. Nor is there anything to indicate that the police knew the spot of burial, and the spot from which the blood stained earth was seized, at any earlier time, before the appellant indicated those spots to the party of police and officers. Since it is indisputable that the woman died as a result of homicidal violence, viz., a mortal injury inflicted with a sharp, heavy weapon like an aruval, the question is whether these tacts suffice to bring home guilt to the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt.

    9. But, before we proceed into an analysis of this aspect, there are two questions of legal interest and significance, which arise in this case and to which we must turn. They have to be first examined, and they may be set forth as follows: Firstly, We have the question, what is the importance and weight to be attached to an extra-judicial confession, like the one made in this case, by the appellant to the magistrate, retracted as it stands? Secondly, we have the question of even greater legal significance, whether the statement made by the appellant to the Circle Inspector (Ex. P. 12), admittedly made at a time when the appellant was in a magisterial custody, but not in formal: police custody, should be excluded from evidence Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act? If that statement is to be excluded, we must further consider whether the prosecution can rely upon the conduct of the accused in unearthing the body etc. to corroborate the material facts of the retracted confession.

    10. The scheme of Sections 21 to 27 of the Evidence Act, when examined, shows that this group of Sections relates_ to admissions, of which a confession by an accused is a species, and to certain circumstances which may prohibit the proof of such confessions or admissions. A confession is a kind of admission, and there is no clear-cut line of demarcation between the two. Again, admissions may be relevant in civil as well as in criminal cases and, as observed by Horwill J. in Titus, in re, 54 Mad LW 81: A.I.R. 1941 Mad 720, admissions that might be proved in civil cases, are not inadmissible in criminal cases as such. An extra-judicial confession is merely a confession made outside the scope of a judicial confess ion recorded during the investigation of a crime by a magistrate, after complying with the formalities of1 Section 164 Crl. P. C. The weight to be accorded to such a confession would depend entirely upon the context of circumstances, the person to wham it was made, and the actual conditions under which it was made, which may probably the voluntary nature and truth of the confession, or otherwise.

    A judicially recorded confession is given weight, purely because the law prescribes various precautions which have to be observed by the recording magistrate, who is bound to satisfy himself that, as far as he can ascertain, the confession is being voluntarily made. An extra judicial confession may be retracted, precisely like a judicial confession. In either contingency, the courts would look to material corroboration of the confessional statement, before fully accepting and acting upon it. The decision of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King1 Emperor 71 Mad LJ 476 : A.I.R. 1936 PC 253 (2)". seems to have caused some misconception upon this aspect, which should be made clear. That was a case in which a confession was made to a magistrate during the course of an investigation, and the magistrate empowered to record it did not comply with the provisions of Section 164 Crl. P. C, and merely made certain memoranda, even which were later destroyed. The important observation of their Lordships, summing up the true nature of the decision and its precise applicability was as follows:

    The effect of the statute is clearly to prescribe the mode in which confessions are to be dealt with by magistrates when made during an investigation, and to render inadmissible any attempt to deal with them in the method proposed in the present case.

    This decision, therefore, does not at all affect the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions, or the probative value to be attached to them. Two decisions of this Court make this very clear. Arunachala Reddi v. Emperor 35 Mad LW 607 : A.I.R. 1932 Mad 500, was a case like the present, where the accused, after committing the offence of murder, went straight to the nearest magistrate and made a statement confessing the offence. Only in that case, the confession was recorded in the manner prescribed by Section 164 Crl. P. C. Waller and Krishnan Pandalai, JJ. pointed out that confessions, like other admissions, are relevant under the Evidence Act, unless rendered inadmissible by some circumstance of an invalidating character declared by law. Section 164 Crl. P. C. did not exclude confession otherwise admissible. Again in Nainarnuthu v. Emperor 50 Mad LW 784 : A.I.R. 1940 Mad 138, Burn and Stoddard JJ. held that where the accused proceeded to a magistrate after the murder and confessed the occurrence, and the confession was not recorded Under Section 1G4 Crl. P, C. for the very good reason that the magistrate was not then concerned with the investigation of the crime, the statement was admissible, both as a report of first information and otherwise under the law relating to admission. The true scope and applicability of 71 Mad LJ 476: v. A.I.R. 1936 PC 253(2) is also indicated here.'

    11. Hence, upon this aspect, we must conclude that the present extra-judicial confession is admissible, both upon the law relating to admissions, and as a report of first information. As the magistrate was not then concerned with the investigation of this murder, the procedure Under Section 164 Crl. P. C. was not adopted, and no infirmity attaches to the statement because of this fact. The Weight to be given to such an extra-judicial confession depends entirely upon the circumstances under which it was made. Where, as in this case, it was spontaneously made by an accused, to a magistrate, who was not even aware of the identity of the person appearing before him, or of the fact that any murder had occurred, the confession is certainly entitled to very great weight, unless there are any reasons for accepting the suggestion in defence or even considering it probable, that the police had tutored the appellant to go and make such a confession.

    Where the confession is retracted, corroboration of material particulars is certainly necessarv, but this would apply equally to confession? judicially recorded. In a certain sense, an extra-judicial confession of this character is even more likely to have been voluntarily made, than a judicial confession, for the simple reason that, whatever the formalities complied with n judicial confession is almost invariably recorded only after the accused comes under the nossible influence of the police,, subsequent to his arrest. Any general impression that prevails that extra-judicial confessions, upon the whole, are necessarily inferior in weight and probative value, would, therefore, not be correct. Everything would denend upon the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.

    12. We may now proceed to a discussion of the more difficult problem, whether the information furnished to the Circle Inspector ought to be excluded in evidence, as not within the scope of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

    13. We may immediately state that an examination of the authorities upon this matter, shows fovo broad aspects or tendencies. In a certain line of cases, it has been, tacitly assumed, upon a reading of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, without much further discussion or scmtj iy, that the words "in the custody of a police officer" occurring in the Section necessarily relate to a formally authorised police custody, taking place alter arrest. There is no comment upon the absurdity of the result of such strict interpretation, which, of course, is the consequence of the language itself prima facia set forth tersely and with force if we may say so Kdth great respect, by Rankin T. in Durlav Naraa-sudra v. Emperor 36 Cal WN 373 : A.I.R. 1932 Cal 297, as follows:

    There might be reason in saying that if a man is in custody, what he may have said cannot bs admitted, but there can be none at all in saying that it is inadmissible in evidence against him, because he is not in custody. Yet this is the consequence of saying that Section 27 is more than a proviso to Section 26. It, is, however, well held by that authority that, that is so and, until the legislature takes the matter in hand, the paradox expressed in the present case will continue to be law.

    The cases of this Court that bear upon this particular question of the nature of the custody, generally assume that unless the accused be in police custody formally authorised, or in such custody after arrest, Section 27 would not apply. Thus, in Peria Gumsami Counter v. Emperor 1941 Mad WN Crl 94 : A.I.R. 1941 Mad 765, Wadsworth and Somayya JJ. held that Section 27 did not apply to a statement made by an accused to a police officer, before the deponent came into the formal custody of that officer. Similar dicta are to be found in Kambala Kalikamurthi, 1936 Mad WN Cr. 159. In In re, Kamakshi Naidu ILR 1943 Mad 456 : A.I.R. 1943 Mad 89, Horwill J. held that a confession made by an accused in police custody was admissible Under Section 27, though the custody itself was not in connection with the offence relating to which the confession was made, but in connection with another offence.

    14. But we find a different line of cases, particularly of the Calcutta, Allahabad and Niigpu High Courts, where a definite attempt has been made to apply a less rigid interpretation to the expression custody occurring in Section 27. If that interpretation were to be adopted, it would certainly render admissible the information (Ex. P. 12) in the present case, which was given by the accused to the Circle Inspector while he was formally in magisterial custody, and before the magistrate had made an order authorising his detention in police custody. The interpretation has proceeded so far as to suggest that police "custody" in the terms of Section 27 might well include surveillance, interrogation before arrest etc, In Santokhi Beldar v. Emperor ILR 12 Pat 241 : A.I.R. 1933 Pat 149, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court held that when a person who went to a police officer and voluntarily stated the circumstances of a crime, accusing himself of committing it, he submitted himself to the custody of that officer within the meaning of Section 46 (1) Cr.PC, and that Section 27 of the Evidence Act applied to the statement.

    This followed an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan Singh Roy ILR 49 Cal 167 : A.I.R. 1922 Cal 342. In Chotey Lai v. State of U. P. A.I.R. 1954 All 687, it was held that with reference to Section 27 "custody" did not mean formal custody, but included any kind of surveillance ,or restriction or restraint by the police. In Mt. Jamubia Partap v. Emperor A.I.R. 1936 Nag 200, Grille and Gruer JJ., observed that even if the accused in the case had not been formally arrested at the time when she gave the information, she was for all practical purposes in police custody, and that Section 27 therefore applied. In Rambabu Jadav v. Emperor A.I.R. 1938 Pat 60, the accused was in hospital, in judicial custody, and the police officer examined him with the permission of court. The Patna High Court observed that Section 27 could well be appled to a case of that kind, because actual police custody was then prevailing,

    15. We do not think it is necessary to examine other cases of other High Courts bearing upon the matter, for the trend of the wider interpretation that we have referred to, becomes clear from, an examination of the authorities already cited. As far as the authorities in Madras are concerned, the question does not appear to have been discussed in the form in which it now presents itself to us, arising strictly from the facts of this case; It may be impossible to resolve the "paradox" referred to by Rankin J,, without legislative amendment, but it is certainly desirable to apply a wider interpretation if it could be properly done, so that the anomaly is considerably minimised. Apart from this, we see no reason at why the expression relating to police custody occurring in Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act should be rigidly interpreted.

    After all, what the spirit of the language employed appears to imply is that, where a person submits himself to the custody of a police officer, with the consciousness that temporarily at least he is in such custody, or such control, whether formally authorised in some manner or otherwise, the information Riven by him to such officer, leading to the discovery of a relevant fact, may be proved within the scope of the Section. To limit the meaning of the expression further, by imposing conditions as to the time of arrest, the existence or absence of a formal magisterial order authorising police custody or interrogation, etc., does not seem to be justified either by the context, or by any-Inherent feature of the scheme_ of Sections 25 and 26, to which Section 27 clearly constitutes a proviso or exception. Please see the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkishan v. Bombay State, (S) .

    16. Therefore, we would conclude that the statement made by the accused to the Circle Inspector, in the present case, was perfectly admissible Under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Though, formally, the accused was in judicial custody under an order of remand made by the magistrate, he was temporarily in the 'custody of the police officer', when he was interrogated, and must be held to have- been in such custody for the purposes of the applicability of Section 27. But, even If we exclude the statement, there is ample corro-boration material in the present case to bring home Roil to the accused. The conduct of the accused In unearthing the body, the discovery of blood stains upon one if the gunny bags in which the body was placed, the seizure of blood-stained earth from another spot pointed out by the accused, the medical evidence itself, all amply and materially corroborate his retracted confession. His guilt was established overwhelmingly, and beyond any reasonable doubt.

    17. We would therefore confirm the convictions, both upon the charge of murder and the charge of causing disappearance of evidence of the crime. The sentence of death imposed with reference to the charge of murder is the only one that could be fitly imposed, in the circumstances of the case. The accused seems to have planned the offence, and there is absolutely nothing to suggest that he acted suddenly, in the heat of passion or anger, or even that some kind of altercation preceded the murder, The accused had no rights over the woman, and there is, again, nothing to Indicate that any particular conduct on her part was an immediate provocation. We therefore confirm the sentence also, and dismiss the appeal.

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    Ramachandran, In Re.
    (Sep 5, 1959)