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  • provisions of the second sub-section of S. 19 f the Act (Act IV of 1938)
  • Act, Act IV of 1938.In the first place S. 10 of the Amending Act
  • S. 10 of the Amending Act or Sub-S. (2) of S. 19
  • Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938,
  • S. 19 (2), S. 16 (iii) of Act XXIII of 1948
  • S. 16 (iii) of the Amendment Act
  • (2) of S. 19 of Act IV of 1938.
  • S. 19(2). This Amending Act
  • S. 16 of the Amending Act,
  • Act (22nd March 1938) S. 13
  • S. 19 (2) of the 1938 Act,
  • Amending Act of 1948.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of the second sub-section of S. 19 f the Act (Act IV of 1938)
  • Act, Act IV of 1938.In the first place S. 10 of the Amending Act
  • S. 10 of the Amending Act or Sub-S. (2) of S. 19
  • Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938,
  • S. 19 (2), S. 16 (iii) of Act XXIII of 1948
  • S. 16 (iii) of the Amendment Act
  • (2) of S. 19 of Act IV of 1938.
  • S. 19(2). This Amending Act
  • S. 16 of the Amending Act,
  • Act (22nd March 1938) S. 13
  • S. 19 (2) of the 1938 Act,
  • Amending Act of 1948.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from execution proceedings in O. S. No. 267 of 1947 (Sub Court, Coimbatore). The judgment-debtor (appellant before this Court) had executed a promissory note dated 26 September 1944 stipulating interest at 6% per annum. The suit for recovery was filed on 25 September 1947; the appellant's written statement dated 19 January 1948 raised no objection to the rate of interest. The suit was decreed on 10 February 1948 with interest at 6% per annum. Execution resulted in attachment and sale of the appellant's properties on 8 February 1950 to a stranger; petitions to set aside that sale were dismissed and the sale was confirmed on 19 December 1952.

Before delivery of possession to the auction purchaser, the appellant filed three applications seeking relief under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938 (the Act), as amended by Amending Act XXIII of 1948. These applications sought (a) scaling down of the decree debt under S.19(2) as introduced by the 1948 amendment (I.A. No. 87 of 1953), (b) stay of delivery of possession and further execution proceedings under S.20 (E.A. No. 64 of 1953), and (c) setting aside the sale under Ss.23-A and 23-B as introduced by the 1948 amendment (E.A. No. 3 of 1953). The Subordinate Judge dismissed these applications; the District Judge confirmed those orders on appeal. The appellant then filed C.M.S.A. Nos. 91 and 92 of 1954 and C.M.S.A. No. 80 of 1955, and obtained leave under the Letters Patent leading to L.P.A. Nos. 48 and 49 of 1957. All these matters were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "the commencement of this Act" in S.19(2), as inserted by Amending Act XXIII of 1948, refers to the commencement of the parent Act (Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938 — 22 March 1938) or to the commencement of the Amending Act (published 25 January 1949).
  2. Whether S.19(2) (as amended) applies so as to allow scaling down of a decree passed after 22 March 1938 (in this case, a decree based on a 1944 promissory note and decreed in 1948) where the underlying debt was payable at or before the relevant "commencement" referred to by the section.
  3. Consequentially, whether the sale held in execution (8 February 1950) and confirmed (19 December 1952) could be set aside under Ss.23-A and 23-B of the Act (as introduced by the 1948 amendment), or whether those remedies depend on entitlement to scaling down under S.19(2).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellant contended that the word "commencement" in S.19(2) should be read to mean the commencement of the Amending Act (i.e., 25 January 1949). Under that construction, S.19(2) would apply to decrees passed after the commencement of the Amending Act where the debt was payable at that commencement.
  • Learned counsel also relied on S.16(iii) of the Amending Act (which provides that the amendments apply to suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of the Amending Act) to argue that the amending provisions should apply because, although sale and confirmation had occurred, possession had not been delivered to the purchaser.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of opposing party arguments; the respondent's specific contentions are not set out in the text beyond general reference to other objections to setting aside the sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lingappa Chettiar v. Chinnaswami Naidu Approval by another Bench for the Court's construction of S.19(2) (i.e., supporting the view that the "commencement" refers to the parent Act and that the appellant's promissory-note debt of 1944 did not fall within S.19(2)). The Court noted that its construction of S.19(2) had the approval of another Bench in this case and relied on that approval as support for its conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to relief under S.19(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded mainly by textual, contextual and purposive construction of S.19 as amended:

  1. Textual starting-point: The Court examined S.19 as originally enacted. That provision (original S.19) expressly applied where "before the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt" — i.e., the benefit of scaling down was available to decrees passed before the parent Act's commencement (22 March 1938). Decrees passed after that date were, on the original wording, outside its scope.
  2. Purpose and antecedent context: The Court emphasized that the amendment (inserting S.19(2) by Amending Act XXIII of 1948) must be read in the context of S.19(1). The Amending Act directed that S.19 be renumbered as sub-section (1) and that a sub-section (2) be added. Therefore, the two sub-sections are to be read together, with the phrases in sub-section (2) referring back to the antecedent expressions in sub-section (1).
  3. Grammar and reference: Because S.19(1) opens with "where before the commencement of this Act," the Court concluded that the expression "after the commencement of this Act" in S.19(2) must refer to the same "commencement" (i.e., the commencement of the parent Act), and the phrase "at such commencement" at the end of S.19(2) also points back to that antecedent.
  4. Mischief rule and object: The Court referred to the statement of objects and reasons for the Amending Act, observing the amendment was designed to remedy a perceived problem (the plea of res judicata preventing relief where suits were brought after the parent Act). Reading S.19(2) to refer to the parent Act (22 March 1938) aligns with that remedial purpose by making clear that the amendment covers decrees passed after 22 March 1938 in respect of debts payable at or before 22 March 1938.
  5. Rejection of appellant's construction due to anomaly: The Court analyzed the appellant's proposed construction (reading "commencement" as the Amending Act's commencement in January 1949) and found it would create an anomaly: decrees passed between 22 March 1938 and January 1949 would be left unprovided for by either sub-section, contrary to the object of the amendment. This consequence was held to be an additional compelling reason to reject the appellant's construction.
  6. Limited role of S.16(iii) of the Amending Act: The Court considered the appellant's invocation of S.16(iii) (which applies the amendments to suits/proceedings where the decree or order has not been executed or satisfied in full before the Amending Act's commencement). The Court held that S.16(iii) did not assist in construing the meaning of S.19(2) itself; and even if S.19(2) were construed in the appellant's favour, S.16(iii) would be relevant to whether the amending provisions could apply in a particular proceeding. In the Court's view, S.16(iii) did not enlarge the textual reach of S.19(2) as argued by the appellant.
  7. Application to facts: Applying this construction, the Court found that the appellant's promissory note (dated 1944) and the decree based on it (decreed in 1948) did not concern a debt payable at the "commencement" of the parent Act (22 March 1938). Therefore, the decree did not fall within S.19(2) as the Court construed that subsection.
  8. Effect on other issues: Because the appellant was not entitled to scaling down under S.19(2), the Court did not need to consider the broader scope of Ss.23-A and B or other respondent objections to setting aside the sale; the main contention failed at the S.19(2) point.
  9. Support from prior bench: The Court observed that another Bench of the Court had approved the same construction in Lingappa Chettiar v. Chinnaswami Naidu and treated that as supportive of the present conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeals. Specifically, C. M. S. A. No. 80 of 1955 fails and is dismissed; L. P. A. Nos. 48 and 49 of 1957 also fail and are dismissed.

Immediate implications and consequences:

  • The appellant is not entitled to have the decree in O. S. No. 267 of 1947 scaled down under S.19(2) as introduced by Amending Act XXIII of 1948, on the construction adopted by the Court.
  • Because the appellant cannot obtain scaling down under S.19(2), he cannot obtain the relief of setting aside the execution sale (held on 8 February 1950 and confirmed on 19 December 1952) under Ss.23-A and 23-B as sought in the applications; the Court did not further examine the detailed scope of Ss.23-A and B in consequence.
  • The respondents are entitled to costs; the Court awarded costs including one consolidated counsel fee in the three appeals amounting to Rs. 300.

The opinion does not purport to establish any broader rule beyond its textual and contextual construction of S.19(2). It records that another Bench had approved the construction relied on here; the decision resolves the parties' disputes by dismissal of the appellant's claims.

    Govindaswami Goundar v. Ramaswami Goundan And Others

    (Delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

    The Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred against the judgments of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in C. M. S.A Nos. 91 and 92 of 1954. The subject matter of C. M. S. A. No. 80 of 1955 arises out of the same proceedings as those out of which the other C. M. S. As, arose and is by the same appellant as in the Letters Patent Appeals and hence all these have been heard together.

    The points arising in these appeals are simple and a few facts are necessary to be stated to appreciate how they arise. The judgment-debtor in O. S. No. 267 of 1947 on the file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore, is the appellant in the three appeals before us. That suit was for recovery of money due on a promissory note executed on 26th September 1944, which stipulated for interest at six per cent per annum. The suit was filed on 25th September 1947 and in the written statement filed by the appellant on 19th January 1948 no objection was raised to the legality of the rate of interest charged in the promissory note. The suit was decreed on 10th February 1948 and interest at six per cent per annum being that stipulated for in the promissory note, was allowed. In execution of this decree the properties of the appellant were attached and brought to sale and were sold on 8th February, 1950, when they were purchased by a stranger to the suit. Petitions were filed for setting aside the sale on grounds which it is unnecessary to mention in detail in the view we have taken on the other points urged by the appellant before us but they were dismissed and the sale was confirmed on 19th December 1952. Before the auction purchaser obtained delivery of possession of the properties under the sale, the appellant filed three applications all seeking relief under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938, which we shall refer to as the Act, and the three matters now before us arise out of them.

    The appellant is admittedly an “agriculturist” as defined in the Act. In regard to liabilities incurred by “agriculturists” after the commencement of the Act (22nd March 1938) S. 13 enacted that the maximum interest they were bound to pay was simple interest at 61/4 per cent per annum. The interest of six per cent per annum stipulated in the promissory note dated 26th September 1944 and for which a decree was passed was therefore, well within the maximum allowed by S. 13 of the Act. S. 13 however, contained a proviso which ran: “Provided that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette alter and fix any other rate of interest from time to time.” The State Government by a notification dated 29th July 1947 reduced the maximum rate of interest exigible from agriculturists from 61/4 per cent per annum, as provided in S. 13 of the Act to 51/2 per cent per annum. Though this notification had effect from 29th July 1947 the appellant did not dispute the lawfulness of the rate of interest provided in the promissory note when he filed his written statement on 19th January 1948; and as we have stated earlier the decree dated 10th February 1948 provided for interest at six per cent per annum. Normally objections available to a defendant but not raised during the trial of the action should be held to be concluded against the defendant by the decree of the Court, and such objections could not be permitted to be raised as any bar to the execution of the decree passed or as invalidating proceedings in execution including sale for realisation of amounts due under a decree. Some inroad into this normal rule was effected by provisions introduced by the Amending Act XXIII of 1948. and it is the precise scope of these new provisions that comes up for consideration in these appeals.

    Basing himself on the provisions introduced by the Amending Act XXIII of 1948 to which we shall advert presently, the appellant filed three applications which, if allowed, would have led to the scaling down of the decree debt and as a consequence thereof would have permitted him to have the sale held on 8th Feburary, 1950 and confirmed on 19th December, 1952, set aside.

    On 3rd December 1952 the appellant filed 1. A. No. 87 of 1953 for scaling down the decree under the provisions of the second sub-section of S. 19 οf the Act (Act IV of 1938) which was introduced by the Amending Act of 1948. In furtherence of this petition for the scaling down of the decree debt he also filed on 21st December 1952 an application under S. 20 of the Act for stay of delivery of possession and also of all further proceedings in execution pending the disposal of the application for scaling down (E. A. No. 64 of 1953). Along with this and on the same date he also filed E. A. No. 3 of 1953 for setting aside the sale held on 8th February 1950 under S. 23-A and B both of which were introduced by the Amending Act of 1948. All these applications were dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the main ground, that the provisions of S. 19(2) regarding the scaling down of decrees were not applicable to the decree in O. S. 267 of 1947 against the appellant. The learned Judge who disposed of these applications also found that if the judgment-debtor was not entitled to the scaling down under the provisions of S. 19 (2) of the Act, the sale held on 8th Feburuary 1950 could not also be set aside. Other reasons were also adduced as to why the provisions of Ss. 23-A and B would not apply to get the sale set aside. From the dismissal of these applications the appellant preferred appeals to the District Judge, who confirmed the decisions of the trial Court. C. M. S. A. No. 80 of 1955 was filed against the order in appeal in I. A. No. 87 of 1953 while C. M. S. A. Nos. 91 and 92 of 1954 are against the orders in E. A. No. 64 of 1953 and E. A. No. 3 of 1953 respectively. C. M. S. As. 91 and 92 of 1954 were heard together by Panchapakesa Ayyar J. and he dismissed the appeals but granted leave to the appellant under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, and it is in consequence of this grant of leave that L. P. A. Nos. 48 and 49 of 1957 are before us. It would be seen that the matter involved in C. M. S. A. No. 80 of 1955 is intimately connected with the Letters Patent Appeals and hence they have all been heard together.

    It is not disputed by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar, learned Counsel for the appellant, that the relief of setting aside the sale prayed for in E. A. No. 3 of 1952, out of which L. P. A. No. 48 of 1957 arises would not be available, unless the appellant was entitled to have the scaling down of the decree in O. S. No. 267 of 1947 under the second sub-section of S. 19 introduced by the Amending Act of 1948.

    All the three Courts which have dealt with the matter have held that S. 19 (2) of the Act was inapplicable to the debt sought to be scaled down by the appellant in the present case and we find ourselves in agreement with this view. S. 19, as originally enacted in Act IV of 1938, had only One sub-section which ran, to quote the material words:

    “Where before the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt, it shall on the application of any judgment debtor who is an agriculturist…….apply the provisions of this Act to such decree and shall notwithstanding anything contained in the C.P.C 1908, amend the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction as the case may be.”

    On its terms the benefit of scaling down would be available only in respect of decrees passed “before the commencement of the Act” i.e, before 22nd March 1938, and decrees passed after that date were outside its scop. Where a suit was pending for payment of moneys due from an “agriculturist” and a decree came to be passed subsequently, it was held by this Court that the judgment debtor ought to bring to the notice of the Court at the time the decree was being passed the relief to which he would be entitled under the statute, and that if he failed to do so the decree passed could not be amended subsequently by resort to S. 19. It necessarily followed that S. 19 would not apply to a case where the suit itself was filed after the commencement of the Act, for in such a case, if the relief open to the defendant under the Act was not set up as a defence to the claim the ordinary rule of res judicata would preclude both the amendment of the decree as well as resistence to the execution of the decree as it stood.

    The amendments introduced by the Amending Act XXIII of 1948 have to be viewed against this background and indeed this is put down in the statement of objects and reasons in the Bill as the reasons for the change introduced into S. 19(2). This Amending Act received the assent of the Governor General on the 12th January 1949 and was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 25th January 1949. S. 10 of the Act XXIII of 1948 enacted:

    “Section 19 of the said Act shall be renumbered as Sub-S. (1) of S. 19 and after that sub-section, the following sub-section shall be added, namely, (2) The provisions of Sub-S. (1) shall also apply to cases where after the commencement of this Act, a Court has passed a decree for the repayment of a debt payable at such commencement.”

    The question which we have to consider is whether the commencement referred to in the words “after the commencement of this Act” and “a debt payable at such commencement” refer to the commencement of the Amending Act, that is, from 25th January 1949, or the commencement of the parent Act, that is, 22nd March 1938, the former being that contended for by the learned Counsel for the appellant. We are clearly of the opinion that this contention should be rejected. The “commencement” referred in Sub-S. (2) is the parent Act, Act IV of 1938.

    In the first place S. 10 of the Amending Act merely directs a new Sub-Section to be added to S. 19 of the parent Act. The newly introduced provision is to be the second Sub-Section of S. 19 and, therefore, Ss, 19(1) and (2) are obviously intended to be read together. If one turns to S. 19(1) it will be seen that it opens with the words “where before the commencement of this Act.” It is only in this context that the words “After the commencement of the Act” which occur in the second Sub-Section have to be understood. If the expression “Before the commencement of the Act” refers to the parent Act, the words “After the commencement of the Act” occurring in the second Sub-Section to S. 19 cannot refer to a different Act or a period subsequent to something other than which is indicated before in Sub-S. (1). The words “at such commencement'’ with which the second Sub-Section ends can refer only to “the commencement of the Act” referred to earlier in the Sub-Section, that is, the antecedent to which the “such” could have relation. The logical result of this would be that a decree to which the provisions of Sub-S. (1) of S. 19 are attracted, would be a decree passed after 22nd March 1938 for the repayment of a debt which was payable on or before 22nd March 1938.

    This construction would appear to be supported by reference to the antecedent state of the law and to the mischief or the evil which the amendment sought to remedy or rectify. Sub-S. 2 of S. 19, if it were read as a rider to Sub-S. 1, would lead to only one result, namely, that the legislature interfered to prevent the plea of res judicata in cases where this Court had held that such a plea would be open. But the qualification introduced was not absolute but conditioned by the debt sued on being one payable at or before the commencement of the Act, 22nd March, 1938.

    Lastly if the construction urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant were upheld the result would be this: S. 19 (1) would continue to apply to decrees passed before 22nd March, 1938 while under Sub-S. (2) decrees passed after January, 1949, in regard to debts payable at the date could be scaled down. The position, therefore, in regard to decrees passed between 22nd March, 1938 and January, 1949 would be left in the same condition in which they were before the Amending Act of 1948 not being covered by either Sub-section. This construction would therefore, lead to this anomaly that cases for which even according to the statement of objects and reasons provision was being made by the amendment were left unprovided for while relief was conferred in respect of other debtors wholly unrelated to the main provisions of the section. This, therefore, is a further and compelling reason why the construction urged by the learned Cousel before us on behalf of the appellant should be rejected. On this construction the appeals ought to fail. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, placed some reliance on the terms of S. 16 of the Amending Act, whose relevant portion we shall now extract:

    “The amendments made by this Act shall apply to the following suits and proceedings, namely:………..(iii) all suits and proceedings in which the decree or order passed has not been executed or satisfied in full before the commencement of this Act.”

    Learned Counsel pointed out that, though the sale had taken place in execution of the decree and that sale had been confirmed, as possession had not been delivered to the purchaser, the terms of S. 16 (iii) of the Amendment Act were satisfied so as to render the amending provisions applicable. But S. 16 (iii) does not enlarge the scope or afford any material for construing the terms of S. 10 of the Amending Act or Sub-S. (2) of S. 19 introduced thereby. If we had reached the conclusion favourable to the appellant on the construction of S. 19 (2), S. 16 (iii) of Act XXIII of 1948 would have been available to him to contend that the relief conferred by the Amending provision was still open to him. S. 16 (iii) has no further effect and therefore does not afford any assistance to the appellant in the present case.

    On the constructioa which we have placed on the terms of S. 19 (2) of the 1938 Act, which incidentally we may note has the approval of another Bench of this Court which decided the case in Lingappa Chettiar v. Chinnaswami Naidu(1) the appellant would not be entitled to any relfef because his promissory note on which a decree was passed was in 1944 and was not, therefore, a debt payable at the “commencement” of the Act” within the last words of Sub-S. (2) of S. 19 of Act IV of 1938. In this view the scope of Ss. 23-A and B and the other objections to the setting aside of the sale raised by the respondent do not fall to be considered.

    The result is that C. M. S. A. No. 80 of 1935 fails and is dismissed and L. P. A. Nos. 48 and 49 of 1957 also fail and are dismissed. The respondents would be entitled to their costs. One consolidated Counsel's fee in the three appeals, Rs. 300.

    V.C.S

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    Govindaswami Goundar v. Ramaswami Goundan And Others
    (Dec 9, 1957)