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  • Madras Civil Supplies (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules
  • Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, is a Central Act, Act IV of 1939.
  • Section 309 of the Constitution of India
  • SECTION 133 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Section 48 (d) (ii-a)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Madras Civil Supplies (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules
  • Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, is a Central Act, Act IV of 1939.
  • Section 309 of the Constitution of India
  • SECTION 133 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
  • Section 48 (d) (ii-a)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two bus-permit holders, Krishnaswami Mudaliar (W.A. No. 56 of 1956) and Kumaraswami (W.A. No. 57 of 1956), had permits to operate specified bus routes between Vellore and Thiruvannamalai. The Regional Transport Officer (RTO), Vellore, extended each permit on 1 December 1953 and 15 January 1954 respectively to cover additional stretches (20 miles for Krishnaswami; 11 miles for Kumaraswami) beyond the original routes.

A third party, Pachia Pillai, challenged those extensions by moving the State Government for revision; the Government dismissed the revision petitions. Pachia Pillai then filed writ petitions Nos. 350 and 351 of 1954 in this Court seeking to quash the orders of the RTO and the Government. Rajagopala Ayyangar J. heard the petitions and, following the decision in W.A. No. 107 of 1955 (Mad) (A), held that the RTO had no jurisdiction to extend the permits and set aside the orders of the RTO and the Government.

Krishnaswami Mudaliar and Kumaraswami then appealed. The appeals were referred to a Full Bench after two Judges (Krishnaswami Nayudu and Ramaswami JJ.) considered that W.A. No. 107 of 1955 required reconsideration. The Full Bench (the present bench) heard the matter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the meaning of the word "subordinate" in Section 44-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and whether the Regional Transport Officer is an officer "subordinate" to the Provincial/State Transport Commissioner within the meaning of that section.
  2. Whether the State Government's delegation by G.O. (G.O. Ms. No. 597 dated 14-2-1953) empowering Regional Transport Officers to exercise powers under Sections 48-A, 51-A and 56-A is valid in the absence of rules made under Section 133-A determining departmental subordination.

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam (for the appellants/for the view described as "administrative subordination")

  • Argued that "subordinate" should be understood as administrative subordination: where no explicit statutory rules exist, the departmental set-up and hierarchy (as reflected in sources like the Madras Half-Yearly Civil List, Madras Financial Code, and Madras Services Manual) should be used to determine who is subordinate to whom.
  • Pointed to documentary material showing the Transport Commissioner designated as head of the Transport department and Regional Transport Officers placed several steps below him; thus, the RTOs are subordinate to the Commissioner in the ordinary departmental sense.
  • Responded to the criticism that this view might permit delegation to very low-ranking officers (e.g., clerks) by arguing it is improper to assume Government will misuse delegated powers; cited Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi to support the proposition that validity of delegation should not be struck down on the basis of speculative abuse.
  • Noted that the G.O. which delegated powers to RTOs contained directions intended to ensure proper exercise of the delegated power.

Advocate-General (argued "functional subordination")

  • Submitted that "subordinate" must mean an officer who can act for, and in the name of, the Transport Commissioner—i.e., an officer who exercises the Commissioner's powers as a deputy or direct assistant, and over whom the Commissioner can exercise direct control.
  • Emphasised the administrative practice where Heads of Departments have powers discharged by gazetted subordinates; the orders made by such subordinates are, in law, the orders of the superior officer.
  • The Advocate-General's functional view limited "subordinate" to officers who have authority to act in the name of the Commissioner rather than to all officers lower in the departmental hierarchy.

Mr. M.K. Nambiar (argued "statutory subordination")

  • Contended that the word "subordinate" in Section 44-A must be understood in the light of Section 133-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (added in 1942), which empowers State Governments to establish a Motor Vehicles department and to make rules to determine the subordination of officers in that department.
  • Argued that because Section 133-A provides for rule-making about departmental subordination, the Madras legislature when introducing Section 44-A intended "subordinate" to be understood as determined under rules framed pursuant to the Act (i.e., statutory subordination), rather than by reference to ad hoc administrative hierarchies or by importing an additional functional limitation into the word.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
W. A. No. 107 of 1955 (Mad) (A) Held that Section 44-A contemplates officers subordinate to the Provincial Transport Commissioner, and that the purported delegation under Section 44-A to the Regional Transport Officer was bad because the RTO was not an officer subordinate to the Commissioner; the delegation was ultra vires. The Single Judge (Rajagopala Ayyangar J.) felt bound by this decision and set aside the RTO's extensions. The Full Bench considered that decision and its reasoning, treated it as a significant precedent on the question of delegation under Section 44-A, and compared its own conclusions with it.
W. P. No. 805 of 1951 (Mad) (B) (Subba Rao J.) Expressed the view that, by a combined reading of Sections 48 and 48-A, conditions attached to a permit can be varied only by the Provincial (State) Transport authority and not by other authorities. This view influenced Government to issue G.O. Ms. No. 527 (14-2-1953) empowering RTOs to exercise certain powers of the State Transport authority. The Full Bench recounted this history as part of the statutory and administrative context.
Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi (Supreme Court) Principle quoted: one should not invalidate the validity of a law on the basis of apprehension that Government may abuse powers; it is improper to start with an assumption of misuse when construing legality. The quotation was used by counsel (Mohan Kumaramangalam) and noticed by the Court in support of the argument that fear of administrative abuse is an insufficient basis to construe "subordinate" narrowly or to invalidate delegation.
L. P. A. No. 200 of 1952 (Mad) (D) Referenced in the opinion as a prior Bench decision with implications for the continued validity of the Government Order (G.O.). The opinion (Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.) stated that there was no justification for continuation in force of the G.O. after the decision in L.P.A. No. 200 of 1952 and so the G.O. ought to be withdrawn.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central statutory question as the meaning of "subordinate" in Section 44-A. Three distinct interpretive approaches were considered and analyzed:

1. Administrative Subordination (favoured by Krishnaswami Nayudu and Ramaswami JJ. and supported by Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam)

  • Premise: where no explicit rules define subordination, one should look to the departmental set-up and published administrative sources (Madras Half-Yearly Civil List, Madras Financial Code, Madras Services Manual) to determine hierarchy.
  • Court noted documentary evidence that the Transport Commissioner is shown as head of the Transport department and that Regional Transport Officers appear several steps below him; accordingly, they could be seen as subordinate in the administrative sense.
  • Objection addressed: critics argued this would permit delegation to very low-level staff (e.g., clerks or peons). Counsel's reply—invoking the Supreme Court decision in Dr. N.B. Khare—was that one should not construe legislation invalid on fears of misuse, and that the G.O. itself contained directions to regulate exercise of delegated power.

2. Functional Subordination (advocated by the Advocate-General)

  • Premise: "subordinate" means only those officers who can properly act for the Transport Commissioner and in his name—effectively deputies or direct assistants authorized to exercise the Commissioner's powers, rather than any officer lower in the ordinary hierarchy.
  • Objections identified by the Court: this view requires importing qualifiers into the statutory phrase "any officer subordinate to him" even though no qualifying words appear in the Act; further, the functional theory relies on administrative practices (e.g., Regulation VII of 1858 for district collectors) that are not spelled out in the Motor Vehicles Act itself.

3. Statutory Subordination (favoured by Mr. M.K. Nambiar and adopted by the Full Bench)

  • Premise: Section 133-A (added to the principal Act in 1942) empowers State Governments to establish a Motor Vehicles department and to make rules regulating departmental subordination. Given Section 133-A existed prior to the insertion of Section 44-A (Madras Act XX of 1948), the legislature must have intended "subordinate" in Section 44-A to be understood as determined by rules made under Section 133-A.
  • Advantages identified by the Court for this approach:
    • It accords with established rules of statutory interpretation—i.e., construing terms in light of the statutory scheme and prior related provisions.
    • It avoids importing additional words or qualifications into the statute (a problem for the functional subordination view).
    • It is flexible and practical, permitting delegation at both the State and regional levels, but only where subordination has been determined by rules properly framed under the Act.
    • It prevents anomalies such as empowering as a delegate someone who is the secretary of a body to vary the conditions of permits originally granted by that body.
  • Conclusion drawn: because no rules had been framed under Section 133-A making the RTO subordinate to the Transport Commissioner, the RTO was not a statutory subordinate. Consequently, the Government Order (G.O. Ms. No. 597 dated 14-2-1953) delegating the State Transport Authority's powers to Regional Transport Officers was invalid.

The Court explicitly rejected the view that mere administrative listing or departmental hierarchy without rules under Section 133-A sufficed to create the statutory subordination required by Section 44-A.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench adopted the "statutory subordination" view and concluded that, as no rules had been framed under Section 133-A making the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner, the delegation of powers to the RTO by Government Order (G.O. Ms. No. 597 dated 14-2-1953) was invalid.

DISPOSAL: The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs (Advocate's fee Rs. 250 — one set in W.A. No. 56 of 1956).

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: the RTO's extensions of the permits were invalidated in consequence of the ruling (the G.O. delegating power to RTOs was held bad) and the appeals were dismissed with costs.
  • Administrative recommendation/direction: the Court noted it remains for the Government to withdraw the G.O. and to frame rules in the manner prescribed under Section 133-A to determine subordinate officers; framing such rules would resolve the statutory uncertainty and permit lawful delegation where appropriate.
  • No broader novel statutory device was created by the Court; rather, the Court interpreted the Act to require that subordination relevant to Section 44-A be determined by rules framed under Section 133-A and disallowed delegation made in the absence of such rule-based subordination.

This summary is strictly derived from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond what the text expressly states.

    S. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar And Anr. v. P.S. Palani Pillai And Anr.

    1. Krishnaswami Mudaliar the appellant in W. A. No. 56 of 1956 had a permit which authorised him to run a bus M. D. J. 971 between Vellore & Thiruvannamalai. On 1st December, 1953 the Regional Transport Officer, Vellore, varied the conditions of the permit which Krishnaswami Mudaliar held so as to enable him to run the bus upto Thanlpedi. In effect this gave him an extended route of 20 miles. Similarly Kumaraswaml the appellant in W. A. No. 57 of 1956 held a permit which enabled him to operate bus No. M. D. J. 1012 between Vellore and Thiruvannamalai.

    On 15th January 1954. the Regional Transport Officer, Vellore, extended the scope of the permit so as to enable the bus to be plied along a further stretch of eleven miles to Thandrampet. Being aggrieved by the extensions which the Regional Transport. Officer had granted to these two individuals, one Pachia Pillai moved the State Government to revise the orders of the Regional Transport Officer. The Government dismissed the revision petitions. Thereupon Pachia Pillai filed two writ petitions Nos. 350 and 351 of 1954 of this Court to quash the orders of the Regional Transport Officer and the Government,

    2. Both the petitions were heard by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. Following the decision of a Bench of this Court in W. A. No. 107 of 1955 (Mad) (A), he held that 'the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to extend the scope of the permits in the manner he had done. He therefore set aside the orders of the Regional Transport Officer and the Government. Krishnaswami Mudaliar and Kumarswami Mudaliar then filed two separate appeals. These came on for hearing before Krishnaswami Naidu and Ramaswami JJ., and they took the view that the decision in W. A. No. 107 of 1955 (Mad) (A), required reconsideration and so referred the appeals to a Full Bench. This is how the matter conies before us.

    3. The Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, is a Central Act, Act IV of 1939. It has been amended In important respects by the legislature of this State and to these reference will presently be made. The principal Act set up three authorities to deal with privately owned transport vehicles and stage carriages, terms which include the buses which the public habitually use. These are the Regional Transport Authority, the Provincial or as is now called the State Transport Authority and the Appellate authority. Each one of them has various powers. Section 48 (d) (ii-a) empowers the Regional Transport Authority to direct that a stage carriage shall be used only on specified routes or in a specified area.

    Under Section 44 (3) the State Transport Authority is given power to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such authority and also to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the Regional Transport authorities in the State. Section 64 empowers the setting up of an authority to hear appeals from the decisions of State Transport authorities and Regional Transport authorities. In 1942, section 133-a was added to the principal Act. The first sub-section thereof empowers State Governments to establish a Motor Vehicles department. The third sub-section, among other things, empowers the State Governments to make rules,

    "to regulate the discharge by officers of the Motor Vehicles department of their functions.... the authorities to which they shall be subordinate, the duties to be performed by them."
    and other matters.

    4. In 1948 the legislature of Madras made some important changes in the Act. It introduced Section 44-A which runs as follows :

    "The Provincial Government may appoint a Provincial Transport Commissioner; and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, may, by notification in the Fort St. George Gazette, authorise such Commissioner or any officer subordinate to him, to exercise and discharge, in lieu of any other authority prescribed by or under this Act, such powers and functions as may be specified in the notification."

    It also introduced Section 48-A which empowers the State Transport authority to vary, cancel or add to the conditions attached to a stage carriage permit in pursuance of Clause (d) of Section 48. Similarly it also introduced Section 51-A which confers similar powers on the State Transport authority in relation to contract carriages. It also introduced Section 64-A which confers a revisional power on. Government in respect of all authorities and officers subordinate to it under the Act.

    5. Presumably in exercise of the powers conferred on them by section 133-a of the principal act the Government of Madras set up a transport department of which the Transport Commissioner is the head. Below him are placed as the half-yearly list of gazetted officers issued by the Government of Madras, shows, the State Transport authority and Deputy Transport Commissioner, Madras, the Secretary, State Transport authority, Madras arid the Regional Transport Officers. These Regional Transport Officers are the Secretaries of the Regional . Transport authorities.

    6. In W. P. No. 805 of 1951 (Mad) (B), Subba Rao J., expressed the view that a combined reading of Sections 48 and 48-A made it clear that the conditions attached to a permit can be varied only by the Provincial Transport authority. He observed:, "When the statute expressly states that a Regional Transport authority can impose a condition, and in the very next Section says that such a condition can be varied by a particular authority, it is impossible to hold that the condition can be varied by another authority." This decision appears to have produced a certain amount of inconvenience to bus operators and so on 14th February 1953 Government issued G.O. Ms, No. 527 Home, department, by which inter alia, they empowered the Regional Transport Officers and the Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Madras, "to exercise the powers and discharge the function of the State Transport authority under Sections 48-A, 51-A and 56-A of the said Act."

    In paragraph 3 of that order they issued certain directions as to the manner in which this power was to be exercised. Section 44-A has already been quoted, and, it will have been noticed that it empowers the State Government notwithstanding anything in the Act to authorise the Transport Commissioner or any officer subordinate to him to exercise and discharge the powers and functions of any authority set up, under the Act. It is - in exercise of the power conferred by an order issued under this section that the Regional Transport Officer, Vellore, extended the routes on which the buses of the appellant's Krishna-swami Mudaliar and Kumaraswami were authorised to ply.

    7. The view taken by Subba Rao J., was not accepted by the Bench which heard the appeal from his decision. They considered that the Regional Transport authority had power to vary the conditions of a permit it had granted and ff we may say so with respect that view is clearly right. But somehow or other the notification which Government had issued on 14th February 1953 in consequence of the decision of Subba Rao J., was not withdrawn. That is why in the present case the Regional Transport Officer extended the permits of the appellants in the manner he did.

    8. In W. A. No. 107 of 1955 (Mad) (A) a Bench of this Court observed :

    Now Section 44-A of the Act refers to a Provincial Transport Commissioner and to officers subordinate to him. It was not disputed that the Regional Transport Officer as an officer created by the Statute was not subordinate to the Provincial Transport Commissioner as such. In our opinion, Section 44-A contemplates officers subordinate to the Provincial Transport Commissioner...., The present appeal car. be disposed of on a similar issue, i.e., that the purported delegation under Section 44-A to the Regional Transport Officer was bad because the Regional Transport Officer is not an officer subordinate to the Provincial Transport Commissioner. The delegation made to the Regional Transport Officer was therefore ultra vires.

    Rajagopala Ayyangar J., felt himself bound by this decision from which it followed that the Regional Transport Officer had no power to effect the variation he did.

    9. On appeal Kumaraswami Nayudu and Ramaswami JJ., observed:

    "It is pointed out that no rules have been framed by the Government on which reliance could be placed to show as to whether the Regional Transport Officers, who are officers of the Motor Vehicles department, are subordinate to any other authority and in the absence of such rules, there is nothing to show that the Regional Transport Officers are subordinate to the Commissioner. There are, no doubt, no rules framed by the Government in this regard.

    But in the constitution of the Motor Vehicles department with the prescribed gradation of officers, such department being a department of the Government, it is not difficult to find as to whether a particular officer is subordinate or superior to another officer in the department. On this aspect, the learned counsel for the appellant referred to the Madras Financial Code, Vol. I, Chap. II and to Appendix I to Vol. II to show that the Transport Commissioner is constituted head of the department of Transport, which is the Motor Vehicles department directed to be constituted under Section 133-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

    The head of the department is defined as any authority specially declared by the Government to be the head of the department. Such a declaration is found in Appendix I in the list of Heads of Departments of the Madras State, & the Transport Commissioner is constituted the head of the department of transport. That the Madras transport service, is one of the State Services is evident from the Madras Civil Supplies (Classification, Control and Appeal) rules framed under the proviso to Section 309 of the Constitution of India & one of such services is Madras Transport service shown as item 30 to Schedule I of the rules.

    In Vol. II of the Madras Services Manual the category of officers is, shown at page 165, where the Regional Transport Officers come within the second category and certain qualifications are prescribed for these officers. Prom the Financial Code, the Madras Services Manual and the Madras Civil List, it will be seen that the Motor Vehicles Department required to be established under Section 133-A of the Act has been so established by the Government of Madras by constituting the Transport department of which the Commissioner is the Head of Department and other officers' including the Regional Transport Officers constituting a different category of officers.

    The head of a department of Government is a person who is the, superior officer having the control of the administration of the department under whom a number of other officers of different categories work, who in the ordinary course of business administration could only be subordinate to the head of the department, unless there is anything to show that any officer of the department is under the direct control of any other departmental head or any other authority constituted by the Government.

    In the present case, the Commissioner being the head of the Department of Transport, the officers who are constituted and form part of the different categories specified in the Civil Services Manual, of which the Regional Transport Officers are officers coming under the second category, must be considered to be under the supervisory control of the head of the department and therefore subordinate to him."

    10. The question we have to decide is what does the word "subordinate" in Section 44-A mean ? Three views were pressed before us. One is that which found favour with Krishnaswami Nayudu and Ramaswami JJ., and which was compendiously described as administrative subordination. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam strongly urged that this view is right. He remarked that the Act itself does not define the word "subordinate" anywhere. Admittedly, we have to deal with a department of Government. Now, where specific rules exist defining the relative superiority or subordination of various officers there is no difficulty. We can then look into the rules and find out who is subordinate to whom.

    But here, there are no explicit rules and where there are no such rules we must look into the set-up of the department, or, in other words the manner in which the official heirarchy is arranged to discover who is subordinate to whom. It is incontrovertible that the head of a department is superior to every one else in that department. In the Madras Half Yearly civil List --see for example the one dated 1-1-1956 -- the Transport Commissioner is shown as the head of the department and the Regional Transport Officers several steps below him. That the Transport Commissioner is the head of that department is made Clear by the entries on pate 1 of the second volume of the Madras Financial. Code.

    See item 28 in that list. Read also entry 30 on page 33 of Vol. I of the Madras Services. Manual, where the Madras Transport service is. shown as a state service. That a Regional Transport Officer is subordinate to the Transport Commissioner is further made clear by the entries on page 165 of Vol. II of the Madras Services Manual. There, the Regional Transport Officers are shown as officers, in category 2.

    11. In criticism of this reasoning, it was pointed out that If it were correct, a clerk or a person in the Transport service would be subordinate to the Transport Commissioner, and, that, therefore, it would be open to the State Government to delegate the powers referred to in that section to a clerk or a peon. Answering this criticism, Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam pointed out that we are not entitled to assume that Government would misuse their powers. The Supreme Court observed in Dr. N.B Khare (Dr.) v. State Of Delhi, (C),

    "Moreover, this whole argument is based on the assumption that the Provincial Government when mak-ing the order will not perform its duty and may abuse the provisions of the section. In my opinion, it is improper to start with such an assumption and decide the legality of an Act on that basis. Abuse of the power given by a law sometimes occurs; but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension."

    12. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam further pointed out that in the very G. O., which they issued empowering the Regional Transport Officers to vary the conditions of a permit, they gave directions intended to ensure a proper exercise of the delegated power. Now, the circumstance that Government did issue such instructions was at once seized upon by the other side to argue that the legislature could not have intended and, therefore, would not have authorised Government to delegate powers to a subordinate to whom such instructions had to be issued.

    It was also pointed out that if the contention of Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam were right, it would be open to Government to delegate to an officer subordinate to the one who granted the original permit the power to vary its conditions and it was further stated that such a situation was reached when the power to vary the conditions of the permit issued by the Regional Transport authority was conferred on the Regional Transport Officer, who is its secretary.

    13. The learned Advocate-General pressed another view which he described as functional subordination. His reasoning was this. Section 44-A was inserted by persons familiar with the working of Government departments. The Collector of a district for example has various powers and duties. Normally he cannot possibly discharge every one of them himself. What hap-pens therefore is that other officers, gazetted sub-ordinates of his act for him. The order that goes out is in law the order of the Collector, but it is actually made by a subordinate of his.

    Similar arrangements exist not merely in the office of a District Collector but in the offices of various Heads of Departments. The subordinate of the State Transport Commissioner referred to in Section 44-A is only such a subordinate of his as can claim to act for him and in his name. The subordinate exercises no powers of his own. He exercises only the powers of the Transport Commissioner. He derives his powers from and through the Transport Commissioner who is metaphorically speaking, a conduit pipe.

    To put it in another way the "subordinate" referred to in Section 44-A must be a deputy of the Commissioner. "Subordinate" includes only an officer appointed to assist the Transport Commissioner in the discharge of his duties, some one over whom the Transport Commissioner can exercise direct control.

    14. There are two objections to this theory. One is that it requires the importation into the statute of words which are not there. The reasoning of the learned Advocate-General requires that the expression "any officer subordinate to him" occurring in Section 44-A should be qualified in certain way. But no qualifying words whatever are to be found in the Act. No doubt, Collectors of districts delegate their powers, to their gazetted subordinates and assistants. But that is by virtue of the express provisions contained in, among other things, Regulation VII of 1858.

    15. Mr. Mohan Kumaramangalam suggested another objection to the view put forward by the learned Advocate-General. If we exclude the State Government for the time being, the Transport authorities set up by the Act are in two tiers; a lower level which might consist of a district or part of a district or of more than one district and a higher level, or the State level. There may be necessity to delegate powers at both these levels. If tho view pressed by the learned Advocate-General were accepted, it would not be possible to effect any delegation at the lower level.

    16. The third view was pressed by Mr. M. K. Nambiar, and, for want of a better label it may be called "Statutory subordination". Section 133-A was introduced by the Central legislature in 1942. That section empowers State Governments to set up a Motor Vehicles department and also to frame rules to determine the subordination of the various officers in that department Section 44-A was introduced by Madras Act XX of 1948, that is to say, the provisions made in Section 133-A were already there when Section 44-A was added to the Act. The Act does not contain any separate definition of the word "subordinate."

    Naturally, no definition was necessary in View of the provision already made in Section 133-A. it must be assumed that the Madras legislature was aware of the existence of Section 133-A when it introduced Section 44-A, and, when it used the word "subordinate" in that section, it must have intended that the word "subordinate" should be understood only in the manner to determine which provision had already been made in the Act.

    17. It is no objection to this view to say that ever, so it leaves the Government to determine who is subordinate to whom and that since Government have already done this when they set up the Transport service, the point raised by Mr. Nambiar is only technical and without substance. "Subordination" can be determined only by rules framed under the Act and before rules can be framed under the Act a particular procedure has to be followed & that procedure affords an opportunity for public criticism. But the procedure by which the Transport service was set up and the question of subordination determined there is different from that laid down for the making of rules under the Act.

    18. Of the three views placed before us we are inclined to prefer the third. It appears to us to be the most rational and the most free from objections. It is in accord with all well established rules Of interpretation of statutes. It does not require as the theory of "functional subordination" seems to require, the introduction of new words into the section. It has the merit of being more flexible and practical since it permits of the transfer or delegation of powers not merely at the state level but at the regional level also.

    It ensures that there will be no transfer or delegation of powers except to officers whose subordination has been determined by rules properly framed under the Act. It also ought to avoid the anomaly that has now occurred of a person in the position of & secretary of a body being empowered to vary the conditions, of a permit granted by that body. We therefore adopt this view.

    19. It was admitted before us that no rules have been framed under the Act making the Regional Transport Officer subordinate to the Transport Commissioner. It follows that under the statute he has not yet become a subordinate of the Transport Commissioner. The delegation of powers made to him by the G. O. MS. NO. 597 dated 14-2-1953 is bad. It means the appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250 -- one set in W. A. No. 56 of 1950.

    Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.

    20. I agree. I only wish to add that at one stage I was inclined to agree with the view taken by the Bench which has referred this appeal. But on further consideration I have come to the view that the opinion of the Referring Bench could at best be only one that meets with administrative convenience and exigencies and cannot be said to be one that accords with the requirements of the provisions of the Statute. It has missed the essential point that the subordinate authority to whom power is delegated should be a subordinate to the Transport Commissioner under the Statute or Rules made, thereunder.

    21. Mr. Mohan Bumaramargalam was not able to point out any proceedings to show that the R. T. A., was made subordinate to the Transport Commissioner under any provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act in order to validate the G. O. delegating power to the R. T..A. as such a statutory subordinate. Further in my opinion there was no more justification for continuation in force of the G. O. after the decision of the Bench of this Court in L. P. A. No. 200 of 1952 (Mad) (D). It is also noteworthy that even the Advocate-General who appeared for the State argued only against the validity of the G. O., far from supporting the same to any extent.

    Therefore in the view we have taken on this reference it only remains for the Government to withdraw the G. O. and frame rules in the manner prescribed determining the Subordinate Officers under Section 133-A and thereby resolve the difficulties that have arisen.

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    Comments

    S. Krishnaswamy Mudaliar And Anr. v. P.S. Palani Pillai And Anr.
    (Apr 18, 1956)