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  • provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. S. 5
  • provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act.
  • Art. 159 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 3 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. S. 5
  • provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act.
  • Art. 159 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 3 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These revision petitions involve the question of whether an application for leave to defend a suit under Order 37, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C) can be entertained if filed after ten days from the date of service of summons. The petitions were initially heard by a single Judge, who referred them to a Division Bench due to conflicting decisions on this question. The defendant had filed an application for leave to defend beyond the ten-day period prescribed by Article 159 of the Limitation Act, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. This application was allowed by the lower court, which was challenged in these revision petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application for leave to defend a suit under Order 37, Rule 3 of the C.P.C can be entertained after the period of ten days from the date of service of summons.
  2. Whether the Court has the power to condone delay in filing such an application beyond the prescribed limitation period under the Limitation Act, particularly under Section 5.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Court had no power to condone the delay in filing the application for leave to defend as Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications under Order 37, Rule 3 of the C.P.C.
  • The application filed beyond ten days should be rejected as barred by limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied on judicial decisions (notably by Mack J. and Govinda Menon J.) which held that the Court may grant leave to defend even if the application was filed after ten days, guided by principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.
  • The delay in filing could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, allowing the application to be entertained despite being out of time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Murahari Rao v. Bapayya The Court's power to grant leave to defend even if application is filed after ten days, based on equity and absence of specific prohibition. The Court rejected this reasoning, holding that no statutory provision allows condoning delay under Order 37, Rule 3 and limitation must be strictly applied.
James Manickam v. Jayanarayana Daga No power in Courts to condone delay in filing application for leave to defend under Order 37, Rule 3; Section 5 Limitation Act not applicable. The Court agreed fully with this precedent and relied on its reasoning to dismiss the delayed application.
Kamalamma v. Ismail Reasoning that no provision exists for extending time under Order 37, Rule 3. The Court referred to this decision as supportive of the conclusion that time cannot be extended.
Srinivasan v. Bhaktavatsalu Naidu The ten-day period under Article 159 is not inflexible; leave to defend may be granted ex debito justitiae even after limitation period. The Court dissented from this view, emphasizing the mandatory nature of limitation provisions and rejecting flexibility in Article 159.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the relevant statutory provisions, particularly Order 37, Rules 2 and 3 of the C.P.C, and Article 159 of the Limitation Act which prescribes a ten-day limitation period for applications for leave to defend. It noted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows condonation of delay for certain applications, does not apply to applications under Order 37, Rule 3. The Court found no other statutory provision empowering it to extend the limitation period in such cases, except in instances involving fraud under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which was not relevant here.

The Court reviewed conflicting judicial decisions. It rejected the reasoning of Mack J. and Govinda Menon J., who allowed condonation based on principles of equity and the absence of a strict statutory bar. The Court emphasized that limitation provisions are mandatory under Section 3 of the Limitation Act and must be strictly enforced. It found the argument that no decree had been passed at the time of the delayed application irrelevant, and held that Order 37, Rule 4 (which allows setting aside decrees) applies only after decree and does not justify condoning delay in filing the application for leave to defend.

Agreeing with the reasoning of Chandra Reddi J. in James Manickam v. Jayanarayana Daga, the Court concluded that the time prescribed under Article 159 is not extendable and the Court lacks power to condone delay in filing an application under Order 37, Rule 3.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that it has no power to condone delay in filing an application for leave to defend under Order 37, Rule 3 of the C.P.C beyond the ten-day period prescribed by Article 159 of the Limitation Act.

As a consequence, the delayed applications filed by the defendant were dismissed with costs in the lower Court, and the revision petitions were allowed. The Court did not pass any order as to costs in the revision petitions themselves. This decision enforces strict adherence to statutory limitation periods for applications under Order 37, Rule 3, and clarifies that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to such applications. No new precedent beyond this interpretation was established.

    Shah Mohamed Khan v. H.N Woodfall.

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by the Chief Justice).

    These revision petitions were first heard by Somasundaram, J. who directed them to be posted before a Division Bench, because of the conflict of decisions on the only question which arises in these petitions, namely, whether an application for leave to defend a suit under O. 37, C.P.C can be entertained after a period of ten days from the date of service of the summons.

    The question appears to us to admit only of one answer. Before dealing with the decisions on the question, the material statutory provisions may be first noticed. Under O. 37, R. 3, C.P.C, the Court shall, upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and defend the suit, after the defendant satisfies the Court by facts disclosed in affidavits that there is prima facie defence. O. 37, R. 2(2) of the Code provides that in any case in which the defend, ant has not obtained such leave, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and that the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree. We are not now concerned with the provision in R. 4 of O. 37, which empowers the Court in special circumstances to set aside the decree and then give leave to the defendant to appear and defend the suit. Art. 159 of Sch. I so the Indian Limitation Act prescribes a period of ten days from the time when the summons is served for an application for leave to appear and defend a suit under O. 37, C.P.C So an application filed after the prescribed period of ten days would be barred by limitation and will have to be rejected under S. 3 of the Limitation Act, unless the period is extended under any of the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. S. 5 is one such Section. It runs thus:

    “Any appeal or application for review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he bad sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

    This section has not been made applicable to an application under O. 37. R. 3 of the Code, Therefore, the Court would have no power to extend the period of the days prescribed by Art. 159. We are not aware of any other provision of law under which the period for filing an application under O. 37. can be extended, except no doubt where fraud is alleged, in which case S. 18 of the Limitation Act would apply.

    In the case before us, the application under O. 37, R. 3 of the Code was admittedly filed out of time. That was why the defendant filed along with it another application (I.A No. 266 of 1953) purporting to be under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay in filing the application. This was allowed. The petitioners' contention is that the Court had no power to condone the delay, as S. 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply. It appears to us impossible to resist this objection.

    So far, we have not referred to the decisions on the question. The first of these is that of Mack, J, in Murahari Rao v. Bapayya(1). The learned judge held that the Court had power to give the defendant leave to defend notwithstanding the fact that he had not made an application for such leave within ten days of the service of summons. The reasoning on which he came to this conclusion may be best set out in his own words. The learned Judge said:

    “It is true that there is no specific provision in O. 37, R. 2, or in the Limitation Act empowering a Court to condone a delay in appearance beyond the ten days prescribed by the summons in Form No. 4. Technicality can be met with technicality, because the default recited in this summons for nonappearance within ten days is that the plaintiff will be entitled after the expiration of this period to obtain a decree with costs. It is common ground that no decree was passed be the Court when the defendant filed his application for leave to defend on the 11th day. Furthermore under O. 87, R. 4, even after decree the Court may, under special circumstances set aside and give leave to the defendant to defend the suit on terms it thinks fit, A fortiori if the Court has passed on decree, it clearly has ample discretion to give the defendant such leave notwithstanding the fact that he has not appeared within ten days of the service of the summons on him in Form No. 1 App. B.”

    The learned Judge finally enunciated a general rule that

    “It is not necessary that every procedural order of the Court should be supported by a specific statutory provision, and when there is neither provision nor prohibition it has to be guided by ordinary principles of common sense, justice, equity and good conscience.”

    The next case in which the same question arose is James Manickam v. Jayanarayait Daga, Chandra Reddi J. held that there was no power in the Courts to condone the delay in filing the application for leave to defend. The decision of Mack J. was cited, but he expressed his respectful disagreement with it.

    After pointing out that O. 37 does not contain any provision for extending the time and that S. 5 of the Limitation Act has not been extended to an application under O. 37, R. 3, he observed:

    “When a period has been fixed for the purpose of doing an act or taking a proceeding under the Statute of Limitations or under any other enactment, Courts do not possess the power to extend the time unless and until such a power is specifically conferred upon them. In this case the Courts have not been invested with such a power. That being so, in my opinion, it is not competent for a Court acting under O. 37, C.P.C to excuse delay in filing an application for leave to appear and defend in a suit under the summary chapter.”

    The learned Judge also referred to certain observations in a decision of the Division Bench in Kamalamma v. Ismail(2), to which we shall refer later. In Srinivasan v. Bhaktavatsalu Naidu(3), Govinda Menon J. followed the decision of Mack J. and held that the period of ten days fixed under Art. 159 of the Limitation Act is not an inflexible one and that in a proper case leave to defend could be granted ex debito justitiae, even though an application for leave was filed after the period prescribed by Art. 159.

    With great respect to the learned Judges, Mack J. and Govinda Menon J. we must express dissent from their view. We shall first take up the reasoning of Mack J. The learned Judge is of the opinion that because no decree was passed by the Court when the defendant filed his application for leave to defend, the application would not be barred, even though filed after the time prescribed. We find it difficult to follow this reasoning. The only question before the Court is whether an application for Condoning the delay in filing an application under O. 37, R. 3, is maintainable, and if so, under what provision. The learned Judge has no answer to this question. Equally, we are unable to see how O. 37, R. 4, has any bearing on this question. That provision refers to a stage after decree. Nor are we able to accept the dictum of Govinda Menon J. that it cannot be said that the period of ten days fixed under Art. 159 of the Limitation Act is an inflexible one. We have never heard of any Article of the Limitation Act being flexible. The learned Judge was inclined to hold that Art. 159 only prescribed the period of ten days when the summons did not specifically fix a date for the hearing, But Art. 159 applies to all applications for leave to appear and defend, and the third column is specific as to the date from which limitation begins to run, namely, when the summons is served. With great deference to the learned Judges, we may say that though the bar of limitation may be technical, nevertheless Courts must apply the statutory provisions imposing such bar. S. 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory, and when an application is filed beyond the time prescribed by the relevant Article, it must be dismissed unless the period can be extended under one or other of the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. In this case, admittedly S. 5 of the Limitation Act which is the only section which could have saved the application from the bar of limitation has no application. The result is that the delay in filing an application under O. 37, R. 3, cannot be condoned. The decision in Kamalamma v. Ismail, to which one of us was a party, was not concerned directly with an application under O. 37, R. 3 of the Code. But the reasoning is that decision proceeded on the assumption that there was no provision for enlargement of the time prescribed for an application under O. 37, R. 3, C.P.C

    We are in entire agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of Chandra Reddi J. in James Manickam v. Jayanarayana Daga, which was apparently not brought to the notice of Govinda Menon J. in Srinivasan v. Bhakthavatsalu Naidu.

    We hold that the Court had no power to condone the delay in filing the application under O. 37, R. 3. The two civil revision petitions are, therefore, allowed and the applications by the defendant are dismissed with costs in the Court below. There will be no order as to costs in the civil revision petitions.

    V.C.S

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    Shah Mohamed Khan v. H.N Woodfall.
    (Mar 18, 1955)