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Case Number

Writ Appeals Nos. 3 and 4 of 1955, against order of Rajagopalan, J. in W.P No. 720 of 1954, D/- 10-1-1955

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: B.V.Viswanatha Aiyar, K.Bhashyam, T.M.Krishnasvami Iyer, T.R.Srinivasan, T.Raghavan, Advocates.

Judges

Rajamannar, C.J
Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.

Acts

provisions of Section 64(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
SECTION 64 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Rule 208(b) of the rules

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

N.S. Motor Service, Salem (second respondent) held permits for two buses operating on the Hosur–Salem route. On 11-3-1953 it applied to vary the permits to extend the buses beyond Salem up to Perundurai. The Central Road Traffic Board handled the application and, under Rule 208(b) framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, issued a notification under Section 57(3) on 31-10-1953 allowing representations until 20-11-1953.

No timely written representations satisfying Section 57(3) were received; some representations were submitted by the appellants out of time but, under Section 57(4), the Central Road Traffic Board could not consider those. The Assistant Secretary, authorised under the rules, rejected the variation application. The second respondent appealed to the Government, and by order dated 18-10-1954 the Government set aside the Board's order and granted the variation.

The two appellants then filed writ petitions under Article 226 (W.P. Nos. 720 and 721 of 1954) seeking certiorari to quash the Government's order. Before the learned single Judge (Rajagopalan, J.) the appellants advanced two principal grounds of challenge: (1) that no appeal lay to the Government against the Board's rejection of the variation application under the Motor Vehicles Act; and (2) that, even if the Government had jurisdiction, it violated principles of natural justice by failing to give notice to the appellants before passing an order adverse to them. The learned Judge dismissed the petitions on the basis that the Government had revisional jurisdiction under Section 64(A) and that the appellants, having not filed timely representations, had no right to be heard by the Government.

The present appeals challenge that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Government had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal or otherwise set aside the Central Road Traffic Board's order rejecting an application for variation of permit conditions under the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether any appeal lay against such an order).
Whether, even if the Government had jurisdiction, the Government's exercise of that jurisdiction was vitiated by failure to give notice to the appellants (operators who would be adversely affected), in violation of the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as recorded)

The principles of natural justice required that notice be given to persons who would be adversely affected by any variation granted to respondent 2; therefore the Government should have issued notice to the appellants before setting aside the Board's order.
Section 57(4)'s bar on considering late representations applies only to the original authority (the Regional Transport Authority / Central Road Traffic Board) and does not extend to an appellate or revisional authority; consequently, appellants who filed representations out of time should have been heard on appeal or revision.
Reliance on Nadar Transports (AIR 1953 Mad 1) to support the proposition that the restriction in Section 57(4) is confined to the original authority and does not extend to the appellate authority.
An analogy with civil appellate/revisional practice: even if a party was ex parte at trial, if the judgment is in his favour an appellate or revisional court must give notice before vacating or interfering with that judgment to his prejudice; by analogy, similar notice should be required here.
Even if appellants were not statutorily entitled to notice merely because they filed late, the Government had actual knowledge (the Board's order showed appellants had objected out of time) of their interests, and that knowledge made notice to them necessary in fairness and by the rules of natural justice.
A separate contention (advanced before the learned Judge and in this appeal) was that no appeal lay to the Government against the Board's order rejecting the variation.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Government's counter-arguments beyond the Government's actions (i.e., that it set aside the Board's order and granted the variation) and the legal positions discussed by the Court in response to the appellants' contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Nadar Transports, Tiruchirapalli v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 1 (Bench: Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan JJ.)	Interpreted Sections of the Motor Vehicles Act (notably Section 64(f) in that case) and observed that the restriction in Section 57(4) about consideration of representations is, in their view, confined to the hearing before the Regional Transport Authority and does not extend to the appellate authority.	The Court in the present opinion considered this decision and rejected the appellants' reliance on it for the proposition that Section 57(4) does not limit the right to be heard at the appellate/revisional stage. The present Court explained that the Nadar Transports Bench was concerned with Section 64(f) and persons who might still be entitled to appeal even if they had not filed representations before the original authority; therefore the passage relied upon does not support the appellants' contention in this case.
Pankaj Kumar v. Commissioner, Burdwan Division, A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 587	Accepted the proposition that, although the Motor Vehicles Act may not expressly provide for notice and hearing by an appellate or revisional authority, the principles of natural justice may require such notice and hearing; absence of these may invalidate the order.	The Court noted this decision but held that it did not directly address whether the appellants in the present case were persons entitled to notice under the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether their out-of-time representations made them parties entitled to notice). The Court treated the decision as not dispositive of the central entitlement question in this case.
An unreported decision of a Bench of this Court (described in the text)	Reportedly held that although the Motor Vehicles Act does not expressly provide for issue of notice/hearing by an appellate or revisional authority, principles of natural justice nonetheless require this and absence may lead to quashing an order.	The Court recorded the existence of such a decision but stated that these authorities did not resolve the specific issue of whether the appellants, who had filed out-of-time representations, were persons entitled to notice under the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in a structured sequence anchored to the statutory scheme and to the facts:

Statutory framework and facts: Section 57(3) prescribes publication and a period (not less than 30 days) for receipt and consideration of representations in connection with applications for stage carriage permits or variations. Section 57(4) provides that no representation shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and a copy furnished to the applicant.
Application of the statutory bar: The appellants did not file representations within the time fixed (20-11-1953); they filed out-of-time representations which could not be considered by the Central Road Traffic Board under Section 57(4). Consequently the Board treated the application as unopposed and rejected the variation.
Appellants' contention on extension of S.57(4) to appellate/revisional stage: The appellants argued that Section 57(4)'s bar is confined to the original authority and does not prevent appellants from being heard on appeal/revision; they relied on Nadar Transports. The Court examined that authority and distinguished it: Nadar Transports construed Section 64(f) and held that a person who had not filed timely representations might still be entitled to appeal; it did not, in the Court's view, support the broader proposition that every person who would be affected must be heard at the appellate stage irrespective of the time limit in Section 57(3)/(4).
Nature of proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act: The Court emphasised that proceedings under the Act are not adversarial disputes between private parties in the ordinary sense; the Transport Authority acts to consider public interest. Section 57(3) provides for notice to the interested public; Section 57(4) imposes the limitation that persons who do not take the steps required within the prescribed time have no right to be heard before the original authority.
Distinction between being an "objector/party" and mere interest: Filing a representation out of time does not convert a person into a party to the proceedings for all purposes. The Court stated that while natural justice principles require notice to those who were parties to the proceedings (i.e., those who had become such by filing timely representations), it did not follow that appellate or revisional authorities must independently investigate and notify every possibly affected person who had not complied with the statutory procedure. To hold otherwise would, in the Court's view, effectively require re-enactment of Section 57(3) at each appellate or revisional level, which is not warranted.
Relevance of appellate authority's knowledge: The Court rejected the argument that the Government's knowledge of appellants' out-of-time objections made notice to them mandatory. The Court held that actual knowledge by the appellate/revisional authority does not create a right to notice in the absence of the statutory conditions that make a person a party entitled to notice.
Authorities on natural justice in appellate/revisional proceedings: The Court acknowledged decisions (e.g., Pankaj Kumar and an unreported Bench decision) holding that principles of natural justice may require notice at appellate/revisional stages; however, it concluded those decisions did not answer the specific question here—whether the appellants, having failed to file timely representations, were persons entitled to notice under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Jurisdictional/formal objection to Government's order: The appellants contended no appeal lay to the Government and that the Government's order did not disclose that revisional jurisdiction was invoked. The Court found little substance in that objection, observing that the form or caption of an order does not vitiate it if the authority had power to pass the order.
Conclusion of analysis: On the statutory construction and the nature of the proceedings, the Court concluded there was no infirmity in the Government's setting aside the Board's order and granting the variation on the ground advanced by the appellants regarding lack of notice; accordingly, the appeals failed.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED

Holding (direct outcome): The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the Government's order setting aside the Central Road Traffic Board's rejection and granting the variation to N.S. Motor Service. The appeals were dismissed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100).

Immediate consequences for the parties: The Government's order in favour of the second respondent stands; the appellants' writ petitions under Article 226 seeking certiorari to quash that order were dismissed and they were ordered to pay costs.

Broader legal implications: The opinion discusses the proper construction of Sections 57(3) and 57(4) in the Motor Vehicles Act and clarifies that, within the statutory scheme, the right to notice at appellate or revisional stages depends on whether a person has become a party by complying with the statutory requirements (i.e., filing timely representations). The Court rejected the appellants' contention that an appellate/revisional authority must notify all persons who might be adversely affected irrespective of whether they complied with Section 57(3). The opinion does not purport to set out a sweeping new precedent beyond these statutory interpretations; its decision is based on statutory construction and the application of principles of natural justice to the facts described.

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Anjaneya Motor Transport By Partner, S. Srinivasan v. State Of Madras

Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.:— These are appeals from the judgment of Rajagopalan, J. dismissing the applications by the two appellants for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Government setting aside the order of the Transport authority under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

2. The second respondent in both the appeals, N.S Motor Service, Salem, had permits for two buses on the route Hosur to Salem. This operator applied on 11-3-1953 for the variation of the conditions of the permits for these two buses to enable them to be run beyond Salem upto Perundurai. The appellants before us are also operators running their buses in the route from Salem to Perundurai. This application for variation was dealt with by the Central Road Traffic Board, and under Rule 208(b) of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, the procedure applicable to an application for permit is prescribed for applications for variations also. The Board accordingly issued a notification under Section 57(3) of the Act on 31-10-1953 allowing time till 20-11-1953 for the filing of any representations to be considered by them. No representations in writing satisfying the requirements of Section 57(3) of the Act were received by the Central Road Traffic Board within the time limited. The appellants however submitted representations out of time. But as under S. 57(4) these could not be considered by the Central Road Traffic Board the application for variation was treated as unopposed. The Assistant Secretary of the Central Road Traffic Board who had authority delegated to him under the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act considered the second respondent's application and passed an order rejecting the variation applied for. The second respondent thereupon filed an appeal to the Government and the latter by their order dated 18-10-1954 set aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board and granted the variation sought. The two appellants thereupon filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution (W.P Nos. 720 and 721 of 1954) for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Government granting the variation to the N.S Motor Services, Salem. The grounds upon which the order of the Government was challenged before the learned Judge were twofold: (1) The Government had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal by the second respondent because under the Motor Vehicles Act no appeal lay against an order rejecting an application for variation of the conditions of permit. (2) Even if the Government had jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Central Road Traffic Board, the exercise of that jurisdiction was vitiated by the failure of the Government to give notice to the petitioners (appellants here) before they passed an order which affected them adversely. The learned Judge proceeded upon the footing that no appeal lay to the Government but as it was admitted that the Government had revisional jurisdiction under Section 64(A) of the Motor Vehicles Act, there was no insuperable objection in sustaining the validity of the order passed by the Government. The learned Judge also held that as the petitioners before him had not filed representations in time, they had no right to be heard by the Government and that consequently there was no violation of the principles of natural justice in not issuing notice to them before interfering with the order of the Central Road Traffic Board. On this reasoning, the learned Judge dismissed the two writ petitions.

3. Mr. T.M Krishnaswami Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellants, urged that the decision of the learned Judge was wrong on both the points. We shall deal with the two points separately. The first was that the appellants were persons who would be adversely affected by any order for variation in favour of respondent 2 and that the principles of natural justice required that notice should be given to them before an order passed in their favour by the Central Road Traffic Board was interfered with. There is no dispute that the Central Road Traffic Board observed the proper procedure in dealing with the application for variation. The notification was published under S. 57(3) which runs in these terms:

“57(3): On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the authority and shall publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which, the application and any representations received will be considered.”

4. The date within which representations by objectors would be considered was fixed as 20-11-1953, and it is admitted that the appellants did not file any objections or make any representations within that date. Section 57(4) deals with the cases where no such representations have been received. It runs thus:

“57(4): No representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-s. (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed date and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making such representation.”

5. The argument is that on the language of S. 57(4) the disability of having representations or objections being considered is confined to the original authority but that when any appeal or revision is filed from the order of the authority acting under S. 57(3), the inhibition imposed by S. 57(4) does not apply and that persons, who would be adversely affected by any order in appeal or revision, have a right to be heard as to why the order passed, by the original authority should not be confirmed. In this connection reliance is placed on the decision of a Bench of this Court in —‘Nadar Transports, Tiruchrapalli v. State Of Madras’, AIR 1953 Mad 1 (A), consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan JJ.; The following observations of Satyanarayana Rao, J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench at page 3 are particularly relied upon:

“The restriction in S. 57(4) that no representations should be considered by the Regional Transport Authority is confined in our opinion to the hearing before the Regional Transport Authority, and it does not extend to the appellate authority.”

6. From this it is argued that the appellants should be treated as parties to whom notice ought to have been issued and that any order passed without notice to them would be vitiated as contravening the principle of audi alteram partem. The learned Judge in the judgment under appeal has explained this decision to which he was himself a party and we agree with him in his construction of this passage as not supporting the contention of the appellants. The learned Judges in that case were interpreting the provisions of Section 64(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act and they held that a person who had not filed any representations within the time limited under S. 57(3) before the original authority could still be treated as a person opposing the grant of a permit entitled to file an appeal under Section 64(f) of the Act. In the present case we are not concerned with such a situation. It will be time enough to consider when the point does arise, whether S. 64(f) was really intended to vary the effect of S. 57(4) in regard to appeals or whether it had reference to the persons and authorities referred to in Section 50 of the Act.

7. In this connection learned counsel for the appellants urged the analogy of proceedings in civil cases where even though a party is expiate at the trial but the judgment or decree is in his favour, notice has to be issued to him by an appellate or revisional Court before such judgment or decree is vacated or interfered with to his prejudice. In our opinion, the entire argument of the learned counsel proceeds on a misapprehension of the nature of the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. There is here no his between the parties so that in a sense there are no parties at all except the applicant. The Transport authority has to consider whether in the public interest the application that is made to it could be granted or not. There might be other persons providing transport facilities in such an area who might be adversely affected by such an order and who are entitled to make representations that in public interest the application need not or should not, be granted. Section 57(3) makes provision for the interested public being notified and S. 57(4) provides the limitations. If an operator or a person interested does not take steps in time, he has no right to be heard before orders are passed and that is the effect of S. 57(4). But merely because a person files a representation out of time, he does not become in any sense a party to the proceeding. When an appeal or a revision is filed, though there is no statutory provision in that regard the principles or natural justice require that notice should be given to those who were parties to the proceedings. But it is contended by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar, learned counsel for the appellants that such a notice should be given not merely to those who in a sense have made themselves parties to the proceedings by filing representations within the time limited by S. 57(3) but to all those would be adversely affected by the order. To a question by us, as to whether if this view were accepted, any logical distinction could be drawn between persons who had filed objections out of time and other parties who though equally interested had not filed any representations, as regards the necessity for notice and hearing, Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar stated that no such distinction could be drawn. According to him it was the duty of the appellate or revisional authority to make an enquiry as to the persons likely to be affected by any order which they might pass and deal with the appeal or revision before it after notice to and hearing such parties. In other words, the argument is that the duty cast upon the appellate or revisional authority is more extensive than even that laid down by S. 57(3). In his attempt to circumscribe the scope of S. 57(4) to the original authority, learned counsel is really attempting to enact provision similar to S. 57(3) at each stage of an appeal or a revision which is certainly not warranted by any rule of construction.

8. The next contention of learned counsel for the appellants was that even if there was no obligation upon the Government to issue notice and hear all parties who might be adversely affected, there was an obligation to notify and hear those who to their knowledge would be adversely affected by their order and that as, in the present case, the very order of the Central Road Traffic Board showed that the appellants had objected to the variation, though out of time, the Government had knowledge of their interests and that in these circumstances the order passed by the Government was vitiated as contravening the principles of natural justice. We are however unable to appreciate this argument because the knowledge of the revisional or appellate authority as to the existence of a person whose rights may be affected has really no bearing upon the right of such person to notice. One thing is clear, that if a person is entitled to notice because he has become so to speak statutorily a party to the proceeding by filing representation within the time limited by S. 57(3) he is entitled to notice and hearing whether the Government have knowledge of his existence or not. It, therefore, logically follows that the knowledge of the appellate or revisional authority does not determine the right of party to notice or hearing but that the latter condition is really dependent upon whether he is a party to the proceeding who would be adversely affected by the order.

9. In this connection reliance is placed upon the decision in Pankaj Kumar v. Commissioner, Burdwan Division, A.I.R 1953 Cal. 587 (B) and of an up-reported decision of a Bench of this Court holding that though the Motor Vehicles Act does not in terms provide for the issue of a notice and hearing by an appellate or revisional authority, the principles of natural justice require this and that in their absence an order passed by it would be quashed.

10. But these decisions do not really bear upon the question as to whether the appellants are the persons who are entitled to the notice under the Motor Vehicles Act.

11. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention that the order of the Government il vitiated for want of notice to the appellants.

12. The other contention that was urged was that no appeal lay to the Government against the order of the Central Road Traffic Board passed through its Secretary refusing the variation, and that the order of the Government did not disclose that their revisional jurisdiction was invoked or that they intended to exercise such revisional powers. We do not consider that there is much substance in this objection because if the authority had the power to pass the order such an order could not be held to be vatiated by the caption given to it.

13. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs in one. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.

D.H.Z

14. Appeals dismissed.

Anjaneya Motor Transport By Partner, S. Srinivasan v. State Of Madras

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as recorded)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Anjaneya Motor Transport By Partner, S. Srinivasan v. State Of Madras

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