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Case Number

Writ Petition No. 555 of 1952.

Attorney(S)

Messrs. Alladi Kuppuswami and S. Gopalan for Petr.
The Special Government Pleader and Mr. T.M Ramasmanti Aiyar for Respts.

Judges

Rajagopalan, J.

Acts

Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act,
Section 3(2)(d) of Madras Act I of 1908
Section 3(2)(d) of Act I of 1908.
Section 3(2)(d).

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Estates Abolition Tribunal constituted under Madras Act XXVI of 1948. The Tribunal had reversed the Settlement Officer's decision in proceedings under that Act. The Settlement Officer had held that the lands held by the petitioner in Esanamatam village, Tirunelveli District, did not constitute an "estate." On appeal to the Tribunal, a majority of two members held that the lands did constitute an estate; one member dissented. The Tribunal's majority described the inam lands (Inam Esanamatam) as consisting of five isolated hamlets, scattered wet blocks, and having a single karnam maintaining one set of accounts.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the inam lands held by the petitioner constituted an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act (as incorporated by Madras Act XXVI of 1948), which requires that the original grant have been of a whole village.
Whether this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should interfere with the Tribunal's finding (particularly where alternative remedies such as a suit might be available) — i.e., the permissibility of quashing a Tribunal finding on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Position

The Settlement Officer had earlier held that the area in question did not constitute an estate; the petitioner sought quashing of the Tribunal's reversal of that finding.
The petitioner relied on extracts from the Inam Fair Register (Exhibits A-1, A-2, A-3) and other documentary material (Exhibit A-4) to show that the original grants were of parts of the village (hamlets, cultivable blocks, a tope for samadhi) and not of a whole village as required by Section 3(2)(d).
The petitioner relied on the presumption that holdings recorded at the commencement of Inam proceedings reflect the original grants (presumption of lawful origin) to infer that the grants were not grants of an entire village.

Respondents-Ryots' Arguments

Learned Counsel for the respondents-ryots contended it was possible that the entire area was originally granted as a village and that subsequently separate grants were made for the purposes recorded in Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3.
They relied on the authority of Venkatanarasayya and Ors. v. The State of Madras (1952) 2 M.L.J. 194 to argue that this Court should not interfere under Article 226 where other remedies (such as a suit) are available.

Government Representation

The Government was a party to the proceedings, but the learned Government Pleader stated his instructions were to allow the question to be argued between the petitioner and the respondents-ryots.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Venkatanarasayya and Ors. v. The State of Madras (1952) 2 M.L.J. 194	The respondents-ryots cited it for the proposition that this Court should not exercise its Article 226 jurisdiction to interfere where an alternative remedy (a suit) exists.	The Court rejected the absolute application of that proposition in this case, holding that Venkatanarasayya did not establish that Article 226 could never be invoked where a suit remedy exists; the Court held that an error apparent on the face of the record can be rectified in exercise of Article 226 and that the Court has in practice examined such matters and decided on whether a village was an estate under Section 3(2)(d).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a step-by-step application of statutory requirement, evidence, and legal presumption as follows:

Statutory requirement: The Court identified the essential legal requirement under Section 3(2)(d) of Madras Act I of 1908 (as incorporated into Madras Act XXVI of 1948) — to hold that land constituted an "estate" the original grant must have been of a whole village.
Absence of original grants: The original grant documents were not produced. The Court therefore examined the extracts of the Inam Fair Register produced in evidence and marked Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3, and other documentary material (Exhibit A-4).
Content of Exhibits:
- Exhibit A-1 (and Exhibit A-4 as to confirmation) showed a confirmed inam grant of 1761.36 acres dry land and 129.38 acres wet land (with poromboke), of which 1651.36 acres were cultivable, and that this extent lay in five named hamlets; the grant was subject to a quit rent of Rs. 21-3-5. The Tribunal itself described these five as isolated hamlets.
- Exhibit A-2 showed an inam (Pattam Esanamatam) of 76.16 acres of wet cultivable land (7.59 acres single crop and 68.57 acres double crop), held on pattam tenure with a commuted rent (pattam jodi) of Rs. 839-9-9; no poromboke was included. The rent was fixed in terms of wet seed kotta and was commuted from grain to money.
- Exhibit A-3 showed a grant of 1.66 cents (a tope) for use as a samadhi for burial of the priests of the Matam; this was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner.
Presumption of lawful origin: The Court applied the ordinary presumption that what was held on inam tenure at the commencement of the Inam proceedings was what was originally granted (i.e., the presumption of lawful origin).
Inference from the evidence: From the content of the exhibits and the presumption of lawful origin, the Court inferred that the three grants were separate in purpose and tenure (quit rent grant for hamlets, pattam grant for cultivable wet blocks, and a tope for samadhi) and that none of these grants, individually or collectively, constituted a grant of a whole village within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d).
- The five units described in Exhibit A-1 were explicitly styled as "hamlets" and not as a whole village; there was no evidence they ever constituted a whole village at the time of the original grant.
- The exclusion of poromboke from the pattam grant in Exhibit A-2 was inconsistent with a grant of an entire village.
- Exhibit A-3's grant of a tope for samadhi could not possibly have been a grant of a whole village.
Evaluation of the Tribunal's decision: The Court found that the Tribunal's majority had concluded, on no real evidence, that the three grants together constituted a village and thus an estate. The Court characterized that conclusion as wrong and as an error apparent on the face of the record.
On the question of jurisdiction under Article 226: The Court considered the respondents' reliance on Venkatanarasayya and rejected the submission that the existence of alternative remedies (such as a suit) precludes exercise of Article 226 in all circumstances. The Court stated that where an error is apparent on the face of the record, Article 226 may be invoked to rectify it, and noted that in practice the Court had examined similar cases to decide whether a given village was an estate under Section 3(2)(d).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal is quashed and the rule nisi is made absolute.

Direct consequences for the parties:

The Tribunal's order holding that the inam grants constituted an estate is set aside.
The petitioner is entitled to costs from respondents 3 to 8; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 100.

Broader implications articulated in the opinion:

The Court rejected the proposition that Article 226 can never be exercised where an alternative remedy (such as a suit) exists; the Court held that it may rectify an error apparent on the face of the record even when other remedies are available.
The opinion applied the presumption that holdings recorded at the commencement of the Inam proceedings reflect the original grants and used that presumption to determine whether the grants met the statutory requirement of being grants of a whole village under Section 3(2)(d).

Costs and formal order: The petitioner will recover costs from respondents 3 to 8 and is awarded counsel fee of Rs. 100, as ordered in the opinion.

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The Thiruvaduthurai Mutt. Inaradar Of Esana Madam Village. Tirunelveli Taluk v. The Estates Abolition Tribunal, Madurai And Others.

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of the Estates Abolition Tribunal constituted under Madras Act XXVI of 1948, reversing the orders of the Settlement Officer in proceedings under that Act. The Settlement Officer held that the area of the lands held by the petitioner in Esanamatam village in Tirunelveli District did not constitute an estate. On appeal to the Tribunal, a majority consisting of two of the members held that it was an estate. The other member held that it was not an estate.

2. The opening paragraph of the Judgment of the majority of the Estates Abolition Tribunal ran:

Inam Esanamatam consists of (I) 5 isolated hamlets in rain-fed areas with wet and dry lands; (a) isolated wet blocks in and out of Tirunelveli Municipal Limits in four villages in the Tambraparni area. There is one karnam for all the bits maintaining one set of accounts.

One should have thought that such a finding by itself should have sufficed to negative the contention put forward by the ryots before the Tribunal, that all these together constituted an estate as defined by Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, which has been incorporated into the definition by Act XXVI of 1948.

3. What had to be established before it could be held that the inam lands in the possession of the petitioner constituted an estate as defined by Section 3(2)(d) of Madras Act I of 1908 was that the grant in the first instance had been of a whole village. The original grant itself was not forthcoming. The terms of the original grant or grants had to be gathered from the extracts of the Inam Fair Register which were produced in evidence and marked as Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3.

4. From Exhibits A-1, A-2 and A-3 it should be clear that at least during the proceedings of the Inam Settlement in 1860 and afterwards the lands held by the petitioner's predecessors in title constituted only parts of the village of Esanamatam. Under title deed No. 271 (Exhibit A-4) what was confirmed as an inam grant was 1761.36 acres of dry lands and 129.38 acres of wet land, besides poromboke. This inam grant was subject to payment of an annual quit rent of Rs. 21-3-5. Exhibit A-1 is the extract from the Inam Fair Register relating to this grant, and that showed that out of the total extent of 1761.36 acres 1651.36 acres were cultivable lands and the rest poromboke. This extent of 1761.36 acres lay in five hamlets named in Exhibit A-1 itself. As I have already pointed out, the Tribunal itself found that these five were isolated hamlets in Esanamatam village.

5. Exhibit A-2 showed that 7.59 acres of single crop wet land and 68.57 acres of double crop wet land, making up a total of 76.16 acres, constituted an inam known as Pattam Esanamatam, which grant was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner. The grant was subject to a payment of what was styled as pattam jodi of Rs. 839-9-9 per year.

6. Exhibit A-3 showed that what was granted in inam was an extent of I.66 cents which was a tope, and that tope was used as a "samadhi", for the burial of the priests of the Matam. It was that grant that was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner.

7. Whatever was held on inam tenure at the commencement of the proceedings by the Inam Commissioner was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner. With reference to the holdings at the commencement of the Inam proceedings, the ordinary presumption of lawful origin should prevail. It should therefore be held that what was held before the Inam Settlement was what was originally granted.

8. From a perusal of the entries in Exhibit A-3, under which the original grant of 1.66 cents of land, for the samadhi, was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner, it should be fairly obvious that the grant could never have been of a whole village within the meaning of 'estate' in Section 3(2)(d) of Act I of 1908.

9. Under Exhibit A-I lands in five isolated hamlets were recognised as being held on inam tenure, subject to payment of a quit rent of Rs. 21-3-5; and it was this grant that was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner. It was the entire extent including poromboke in each of these five named hamlets that was held on inam tenure. But still these five units were styled only as hamlets, not constituting either individually or together a whole village at any time. If what was originally granted was only five isolated hamlets in a village, obviously the grant could not have been of a whole village. There was nothing in the evidence on record to show that these five hamlets constituted a whole village at the time of the original grant or even that each hamlet constituted a whole village at the time of the original grant.

10. With reference to Exhibit A-2 it is clear that what was granted in inam, that is what was held on inam tenure, was only cultivable land. That land was granted on pattam tenure, that is at a favourable rent. The rent was originally payable in grain up to the inam settlement. It was commuted into money, and the amount fixed was Rs. 839-9-9. As I said, only cultivable land was held on pattam tenure, and no poromboke was included. The rent itself was fixed not for the whole area as such, but in terms of each wet seed kotta, that is, at three kottas of grain for a wet seed kotta. It was the commuted value of the grain that was fixed as the rent payable, viz., Rs. 839-9-9, in column 13 of Exhibit A-2. No poromboke, as I have already indicated, was included in the area granted or held on inam tenure. The only possible inference seems to be that what was granted and what was held was a definite extent of cultivable land and that grant was on a favourable rent. In the judgment of the majority of the Tribunal, it was pointed out that even this extent lay in scattered blocks. No doubt in Exhibit A-2 the heading referred to this inam as a pattam village. The recitals in column 21 were:

This is a pattam village. The assessment of the village was given in grain and now commuted into money.

Obviously, the reference is to the tenure, the Pattam tenure and what was granted and held as inam was referred to as pattam village, to distinguish that block from the lands referred to in Exhibit A-I, that is on quit rent or "Kattukuthagai". Even the exclusion of the poromboke and the grant of only the cultivable land should be sufficient to show that what was granted and what was held as inam could not have been a whole village. The exclusion of the poromboke, in my opinion, seems to be totally inconsistent with any inference that what was granted was a whole village.

11. From Exhibits A-I, A-2 and A-3, it should be clear that the purpose of each inam grant was different. Column 8 of Exhibit A-I showed that grant was for the support of the Mutt at Tiruvaduthurai. Column 8 of Exhibit A-2 also showed that grant was for the support of that Mutt; but it has to be read with column 14 of Exhibit A-2, which indicated that the grant was for the Maheswara Pooja in the Thiruvaduthurai matam. Column 8 of Exhibit A-3 ran "Tope inam for the object of burying the priests of the Matam at Esanamatam" and that was reiterated in column 16 "for the special object of burying the priests of the Matam."

12. The original grants themselves were not produced during the Inam Settlement. No records earlier than fasli 1212 were produced either. In this state it should be fairly obvious that there was nothing in the evidence on record to show that the three grants for three different purposes were simultaneous. No doubt the grantee in each case was the same. Learned Counsel for the respondents-ryots contended that it was possible that the entire area was granted originally as a village, and that subsequently other grants were made with these three different purposes referred to in Exhibits A-I, A-2 and A-3. There was really no basis on the evidence on record to warrant such an argument and if the presumption of lawful origin, which I have referred to, is to prevail, it should be clear that there were three inams for three different purposes, held on three different tenures. If each was a separate grant, obviously the three grants together could not constitute the grant of a whole village within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d). Nor is there anything to indicate that each grant by itself constituted a whole village as defined by Section 3(2)(d). Neither individually nor collectively could any of these grants be termed a grant of the whole village within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d). It therefore follows that the decision of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, that these three grants constituted a village, and therefore constituted an estate as defined by Section 3(2)(d) is wrong and has to be set aside.

13. Learned Counsel for the ryots-respondents referred to the decision in Venkatanarasayya and Ors. v. The Slate of Madras (1952) 2 M.L.J. 194, and urged that this Court should not interfere with the finding of the Estate Abolition Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, because the petitioner had other remedies open to him and he could file a suit to establish his claim. I am, however, unable to look upon the decision referred to as authority for the position which the learned Counsel took up, that under no circumstances, where the remedy of a suit is available, could this Court invoke or exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In fact, in practice during the last few years, this Court has examined the cases that came up before it in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution and, with reference to the evidence made available to the Tribunal and decided that a given village was an estate or not as defined by Section 3(2)(d). In this case, the majority of the Estate Abolition Tribunal decided that the three grants together constituted an estate on no evidence at all, at least on no real evidence. Such an error apparent on the face of the record can be rectified in exercise of the powers vested in this Court by Article 226 of the Constitution.

14. Though the Government was a party to the proceedings, the learned Government Pleader represented that his instructions were to let the question at issue be argued by the petitioner on the one hand and the respondents-ryots on the other.

15. The petition is allowed. The order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal is quashed and the rule nisi is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from respondents 3 to 8. Counsel's fee Rs. 100.

The Thiruvaduthurai ... v. The Estates Abolitio...