AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • English Companies Act. 1862 (25 and 26 Vict. Ch. 89). In Ex. A.2, the Article of Association
  • Indian Act, 1882 and Article 51 of Table A of the English Act of 1862,
  • Indian Companies Act. 1882 and the Articles of Association
  • S. 80 of the English Stamp Act (1891, 54 55 Victoria Chap. 39
  • provisions of the Contract Act or the Sale of Goods Act
  • provisions of Article 88 of the Articles
  • provisions of the Contract Act; S. 208
  • Companies Acts 12th Edn., pages 324
  • Art. 94 of the Articles, the rule
  • Art. 48 of the Indian Stamp Act
  • S. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act
  • S. 203 of the Contract Act.
  • S. 204 of the Contract Act.
  • Indian Companies Act, 1882,
  • Art. 52 of the Indian Act
  • Art. 52 of the Stamp Act
  • Art. 48 of the Stamp Act
  • S. 36 of the Stamp Act
  • S. 35 of the Stamp Act.
  • S. 31 of the Stamp Act
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT 1899
  • S. 5 of the Stamp Act
  • Indian Companies Act;
  • SALE OF GOODS ACT
  • Stamp Act of 1879,
  • Stamp Act of 1891,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • English Companies Act. 1862 (25 and 26 Vict. Ch. 89). In Ex. A.2, the Article of Association
  • Indian Act, 1882 and Article 51 of Table A of the English Act of 1862,
  • Indian Companies Act. 1882 and the Articles of Association
  • S. 80 of the English Stamp Act (1891, 54 55 Victoria Chap. 39
  • provisions of the Contract Act or the Sale of Goods Act
  • provisions of Article 88 of the Articles
  • provisions of the Contract Act; S. 208
  • Companies Acts 12th Edn., pages 324
  • Art. 94 of the Articles, the rule
  • Art. 48 of the Indian Stamp Act
  • S. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act
  • S. 203 of the Contract Act.
  • S. 204 of the Contract Act.
  • Indian Companies Act, 1882,
  • Art. 52 of the Indian Act
  • Art. 52 of the Stamp Act
  • Art. 48 of the Stamp Act
  • S. 36 of the Stamp Act
  • S. 35 of the Stamp Act.
  • S. 31 of the Stamp Act
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT 1899
  • S. 5 of the Stamp Act
  • Indian Companies Act;
  • SALE OF GOODS ACT
  • Stamp Act of 1879,
  • Stamp Act of 1891,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a long-standing dispute between two rival groups of shareholders of Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd., Coimbatore, each vying for control over the company's management. The two factions, led by Sathappa Chettiar (plaintiffs' group) and the A.L.A.R family (defendants' group), have been in conflict since at least 1931, seriously affecting the company's business. The appeal focuses on events starting from the 1948 annual general meeting held on 30th September 1948, where several resolutions were passed amidst contested voting procedures and proxy disputes.

The A.L.A.R group increased their voting strength by splitting shares and registering approximately 450 new shareholders prior to the meeting. The meeting was chaired by Palaniappa Gounder (fifth defendant), and objections were raised regarding the validity of proxies and voting rights of shareholders owning less than five shares. These objections were overruled, and the resolutions were approved by a poll, resulting in the A.L.A.R group gaining control and unseating the plaintiffs as directors.

Subsequently, two shareholders filed a representative suit challenging the legality of the resolutions and the authority of the newly elected and co-opted directors. The trial court dismissed the suit, but on appeal, the High Court set aside the dismissal and directed a fresh poll to be held under specified conditions, including that the fifth defendant should not preside when his co-option was under consideration.

Before the fresh poll, disputes arose regarding the disclosure of shareholder addresses, validity of revocations of proxies, and the chairmanship of the meeting. The second poll was held on 5th September 1949, with a new chairman elected after the fifth defendant declined to preside. The chairman rejected certain proxy revocations and declared the resolutions carried, unseating the plaintiffs again.

The plaintiffs then instituted the present suit challenging the validity of the second poll on three grounds: the chairman’s right to decline presiding and the election of another chairman, rejection of proxy revocations, and invalid exclusion of certain proxies. The trial court dismissed the suit, leading to this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the fifth defendant (chairman) was bound to preside at the second poll or could validly decline and allow the shareholders to elect another chairman.
  2. Whether the chairman was justified in rejecting the revocations of proxies submitted by the plaintiffs' group.
  3. Whether the chairman was justified in rejecting proxies on the ground of insufficient stamp duty.
  4. Whether the proxies could be treated as valid for voting at the adjourned meeting or whether the instrument constituted a general power of attorney requiring a higher stamp duty.
  5. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to costs awarded separately to multiple defendants despite the commonality of issues.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Plaintiffs)

  • The fifth defendant had no right to decline presiding at the second poll and shareholders had no authority to elect another chairman.
  • The revocations of proxies obtained by the plaintiffs should have been accepted and not rejected.
  • The proxies were valid and properly stamped; votes cast under those proxies should not have been excluded.
  • The proxies should be treated as specific to the meeting of 30th September 1948 and any adjournment, not as general powers of attorney.
  • The costs awarded separately to different defendants were unjustified due to the common interest in the suit.

Respondents' Arguments (Defendants)

  • The chairman was obliged to preside at the poll and could not decline his role.
  • The power of revocation of proxies does not exist unless expressly conferred by the Articles; therefore, revocations were invalid.
  • The proxies were insufficiently stamped as general powers of attorney under the Indian Stamp Act and thus invalid.
  • The plaintiffs’ contention regarding separate costs was not addressed explicitly in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Dwelling Society v. Syhes Chairman cannot stop or dissolve meeting at will; shareholders may elect another chairman if chairman leaves. Supported the court's conclusion that the fifth defendant could decline to preside and shareholders could elect another chairman.
Chatesby v. Burnett Chairman leaving the chair allows shareholders to elect a new chairman to continue business. Reinforced the principle that the meeting continues and shareholders may elect a chairman if the original chairman declines.
Srinivasan v. Watrap Subramania Aiyar Poll is a continuation of the meeting; the meeting continues until poll results are declared. Held that the second poll was continuation of the original meeting, allowing election of a new chairman when the original declined.
Harben v. Phillips Voting by proxy is contractual and subject to conditions in the Articles; proxies not complying with conditions should be rejected. Supported the contractual nature of proxy voting and the necessity to follow Article conditions strictly.
Cousins v. International Brick Co. Proxy is an agent of the shareholder; revocation of proxy is governed by contract law and is implied unless excluded. Established that shareholders have the right to revoke proxies unless Articles expressly exclude revocation.
Spiller v. Mayo Development Co. Ltd. Proxy votes valid notwithstanding revocation unless intimation received before meeting; revocation governed by Articles and contract law. Applied to determine the validity and timing of proxy revocation in this case.
Wall v. Exchange Investment Corporation Ltd. Chairman’s rulings on emergent questions at meetings are binding unless vitiated by fraud or misconduct. Used to support the finality of the chairman’s decisions unless proven otherwise.
Maynard v. The Consolidated Kent Collieries Corporation Ltd. Documents not properly stamped may be refused for registration; parties entitled to valid, enforceable documents. Distinguished from proxies, as the chairman is not enforcing rights but only recognizing votes under the Articles.
Kenneth Matheson v. Alexander Ross Instruments chargeable with duty cannot be split to admit unstamped parts; entire instrument must be properly stamped. Held that proxies could not be dissected into specific and general powers for stamping purposes.
Ram Rattan v. Paratna Nand S. 35 of Indian Stamp Act prohibits admission of unstamped documents for any purpose; no collateral use allowed. Confirmed that unstamped parts of documents cannot be used even for collateral purposes, rejecting appellants’ argument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed whether the fifth defendant was compelled to preside at the second poll. It held that under Article 78 of the Articles of Association, the chairman presides only if willing, and there is no legal compulsion to do so. The court relied on precedent to affirm that shareholders may elect another chairman if the original chairman declines, especially as the second poll was a continuation of the original meeting.

Regarding the revocation of proxies, the court analyzed the contractual nature of proxy voting, emphasizing that the relationship between shareholder and proxy is an agency governed by contract law (Contract Act). The court rejected the respondents' contention that revocation must be expressly provided by the Articles, holding that the general law of contracts implies a right to revoke unless expressly excluded. The court found no exclusion of revocation in the Articles of Association and concluded that the rejection of revocations by the chairman was incorrect.

On the question of rejection of proxies on grounds of insufficient stamp duty, the court examined the form of the proxies, the applicable provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, and the Articles of Association. It found that the proxies conformed to the form prescribed by the Articles and were stamped according to the law as amended. The court held that the chairman had no authority to reject proxies that complied with the Articles, even if the stamp duty was arguably insufficient, especially since the plaintiffs had offered to pay any additional stamp duty and penalty. The chairman’s refusal to allow the proxies was deemed unfair and improper.

The court also rejected the respondents' reliance on cases involving transfers of shares or sale deeds, distinguishing those from proxies, which do not confer property rights but only voting rights. It further analyzed the language of the proxy instrument and concluded, with some hesitation, that the proxies were intended as specific powers to vote at the meeting of 30th September 1948 or any adjournment thereof and thus properly stamped.

Finally, the court found no justification for the trial court’s order awarding separate costs to each defendant, noting the commonality of issues and interests among defendants.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The court held that:

  • The fifth defendant was entitled to decline presiding at the second poll, and shareholders could elect another chairman.
  • The rejection of the revocations of proxies by the chairman was not justified.
  • The rejection of proxies on the ground of insufficient stamp duty was improper, as the proxies complied with the Articles and the plaintiffs offered to pay any additional duty.
  • The resolutions passed at the second poll must be considered defeated when the excluded votes are properly accounted for.
  • The plaintiffs are entitled to declarations that the resolutions are illegal and void, and a permanent injunction restraining the company and defendants from acting on those resolutions.
  • The order for separate costs to multiple defendants was unjustified and set aside.

The direct effect of this decision is to restore the plaintiffs’ position and invalidate the contested resolutions and elections. No new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles on proxy voting, agency law, and company meeting procedure was established.

    S. Rm. S.T Narayanan Chettiar And Another v. The Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd., And Others.

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by Satyanarayana Rao J.):

    This appeal relates to a dispute between two rival groups of shareholders of Kaleeswarar Mills, Ltd., Coimbatore, each attempting to obtain control over the management of the company. For this purpose, these two factions have engaged there selves in a battle of wits for a long time with the result that the business of the company has been seriously affected. For the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary to advert to the incessant quarrels between the two groups since 1931. It would be sufficient to start from 1948. The two factions are led by Sathappa Chettiar on the one hand who represents the plaintiffs' group and A.L.A.R family consisting of three brothers of whom the eldest, Kalairaja Chettiar is the leader. The annual meeting of the company, which is the first defendant in the case, for the year ending 1947 was held on 30th September 1948. The agenda paper for that meeting contained four subjects:

    1. to receive and adopt the directors' report and the audited profit and loss account for the year ended 31st December 1947 and the audited balance sheet as at 31st December 1947;

    2. to elect directors in the place of the two directors who retired by rotation;

    3. to appoint an auditor or auditors and to fix his or their remuneration;

    4. to approve the co-option of Messrs. P.K Palaniappa Gounder and A.L.A.R Arunachalam Chettiar.

    The company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, in or about 1906. Its main object was to manufacture cotton goods. Among the signatories to the memorandum of association are included the legal luminaries of the Madras Bar at the time, viz., Sir V. Bhashyam Aiyangar, P.R Sundaram Aiyar, V. Krishnaswami Aiyar and S. Srinivasa Ayyangar besides business magnates. The articles of association of the company excluded the application of Table A in the first schedule to the Indian Companies Act; but the regulations framed were modelled more or less on the regulations contained in Table A. The capital of the company, which then consisted of nine lakhs of rupees, was divided into 9000 shares of Rs. 100 each. Sathappa Chettiar's group owned in 1948 as many as 3450 shares while the A.L.A.R group owned only 2300 shares. Before the general body meeting of September 1948, however, the A.L.A.R group increased their voting capacity by splitting their shares and transferring single shares to various individuals. About 450 single shares were registered with that end in view in the name of 450 individuals who were not members before.

    The proceedings of the 30th September 1948 (Ex. A.2 in A.S No. 29 of 1949) show that Palaniappa Gounder, the present fifth defendant, who was the Chairman of the Board of Directors entitled to preside at every general meeting under Art. 78, presided at that meeting and disposed of the various objections raised at that meeting. Before the subjects on the agenda were considered, objection was taken on behalf of A.L.A.R group that proxies filed on behalf of the plaintiffs' group were not valid as they were not given particularly for that meeting but they were general in language. The objection was answered on behalf of the plaintiffs' group by Mr. Lakshmanan, the present second plaintiff, stating that the proxies were intended only for that meeting which was made clear from the date given in the proxies. On this the Chairman ruled that the proxies were valid. Mr. Lakshmanan also seems to have objected to the validity of about 49 revocations of proxies filed by the opponents but the Chairman overruled that objection. The most important objection that had to be considered, however, raised by the second plaintiff was that shareholders owning less than five shares were not entitled to vote in view of Art. 88 which provided that every shareholder not disqualified shall have one vote in respect of every five shares. After due consideration, the Chairman overruled this objection. The subjects which were on the agenda were taken up for consideration and were put to vote one after the other. On a show of hands, the sense of the meeting was in favour of the resolutions and at each time a poll was demanded and on a poll, 859 votes were cast in favour of the resolutions and 703 votes against. At the end of each poll, the plaintiffs' party demanded a further poll which is styled under the Articles, as a “poll of the whole company”; but this was rejected. The result, therefore, of the poll at this meeting was that the A.L.A.R group were successful and the plaintiffs' party lost. The two plaintiffs in the present suit, who were the sitting directors, were unseated and in their place, defendants 6 and 7 were elected and the co-option of the 4th and 5th defendants was approved.

    Two of the shareholders thereafter filed on the 7th October 1948 a representative suit on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the shareholders of Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd., (O.S No. 325 of 1948, Sub Court, Coimbatore) to declare that the resolutions passed at the general body meeting were illegal and void and that the newly elected and co-opted directors were not entitled to act. There were various objections to the resolutions passed at that meeting which were considered by the learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit. He dismissed the suit over, ruling the contentions of the plaintiffs in that action. There was an appeal to this Court against that decision in A.S No. 29 of 1949 and in that appeal, the plaintiffs confined their objections to the resolutions to three grounds: firstly, that persons who owned less than five shares were allowed to vote when the poll was taken which was contrary to the provisions of the articles of association; secondly, the demand for a poll of the whole company should have been allowed by the Chairman; thirdly, that Palaniappa Gounder, the present fifth defendant, was not competent to act as Chairman of the meeting as the confirmation of his co-option as a director was one of the subjects comprised in the agenda for that meeting. On the first of the three questions there was a difference of opinion between Horwill J. and Raghava Rao J. who heard the appeal in the first instance, the former holding that every shareholder even if he owned less than five shares was entitled to vote but if a shareholder owned five or more shares, he would be entitled to one vote in respect of every five shares. In other words, a shareholder having between 5 and 9 shares will have only one vote and those having between 10 and 14 shares two votes and so on; but a person holding less than five shares would be entitled to one vote. This view, however, was not shared by Raghava Rao J. As there was a difference of opinion on this point, the case was laid before a third Judge, Viswanatha Sastry J. who agreed with Horwill J. On the other two questions, both the learned Judges concurred. The second poll is no doubt a unique feature of this company, but according to the learned Judges such a poll should be taken if demanded in the manner provided by the articles of association. A poll of the whole company was probably intended, as observed by Horwill j.

    “to afford an opportunity, where a consider able number remain dissatisfied after the show of hands and polls are taken, for the whole company, including those sot present in person or by proxy at the meeting, to express their opinion on the matter.”

    On the third question also, both the learned Judges were unanimous in holding that it was an elementary principle of justice that a person should not preside while the meeting is considering a question which personally affects him. The result was that the learned Judges directed that before the decisions on the various resolutions in which a second poll was demanded can be considered finally, there should be another poll at the registered office of the company at such time as the fifth defendant should direct and that he should vacate the chair when a resolution relating to his co-option is to be taken up for consideration. The decree of the High Court (Ex. A.4) directed, after setting aside the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit:

    1. that before the decisions on the various resolutions in which the second poll was demanded can be considered final, a fresh poll shall be held at the registered office of the company at such time as the fourth defendant (the present fifth defendant) shall direct;

    2. that the fourth defendant (the present fifth defendant) should not preside when the question of his co-option is in question;

    3. that at the poll to be held in pursuance of clause (1) supra, each member will be entitled to vote, the number of votes being calculated according to the provisions of Article 88 of the Articles of Association.

    The plaintiff's party were anxious to know the addresses of some of the shareholders comprised in the newly added 450 members with a view to canvass their support for the second poll. Their complaint was that particulars regarding the shareholders so added were not given in the register as required by Ss. 31 and 32 and form E of the third schedule to the Indian Companies Act. There was some correspondence between Sathappa Chettiar and Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd. on this point but there was no sign of getting the required information. On the 29th August 1949 three of the directors of the plaintiffs' party sent notices calling for a meeting of the directors to be held at the registered office of the company on the 6th September 1949 at 10 am to consider the matters on which they required information and also to waive under Art. 94 of the Articles, the rule relating to deposit of proxies for the purpose of poll. On the same day the fifth defendant published a notice, Ex. A.8, to the shareholders of the company intimating that the second poll of the annual general body meeting held on the 30th September 1948 would be taken on Monday the 5th September 1949 commencing from 3 pm at the registered office of the said company. The plaintiffs' party sent a circular to the shareholders newly added, Ex. A.12, and obtained revocations of the proxies. On the 4th September 1949 Ex. A.11 was addressed to the fifth defendant, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, by four people of the plaintiffs' group in which they impeached the bona fides of the Chairman and intimated that they lost their confidence in him to act impartially as Chairman, at the meeting for conducting the second poll. They also anticipated that the Chairman had made up his mind to summarily reject all revocations obtained by the plaintiff's group. Some of these revocations have been marked as Ex. B.3 series. It is agreed before us that the total revocations covered proxies in respect of 230 votes which were obtained by the plaintiffs and which would Have the effect of cancelling the proxies already obtained and desposited by the defendants' group before the meeting of the 30th September 1948. On the 5th September 1949 at 3 pm the shareholders assembled at the registered office of the company and the revocation forms were handed over to the Chairman. The Chairman, the fifth defendant, then decided that he did not intend to preside at the meeting fur two reasons; firstly, because the High Court had directed that he should not preside at the second poll when the subject of his co-option would be under consideration and secondly because he had received a communication from some shareholders, apparently referring to Ex. A.11, in which advice was given to him as to how he should give his rulings. He requested the members to choose a Chairman to take the poll. The names of two directors were suggested, Messrs. Alagappa Chettiar, the third defendant and K. Srinivasa Ayyar. The former belongs to the A.L.A.R, group and the latter to the plaintiffs' group. The plaintiffs did not then object that the Chairman had no right to decline to preside at the poll. On the contrary, they accepted the position that the Chairman was entitled to decline to preside and to put up a candidate of their own for the chairmanship. The plaintiffs' candidate Srinivasa Ayyar was defeated by a large majority and Alagappa Chettiar was elected Chairman by the shareholders. Then the proceedings continued and Arunachala Ayyar and Narayanan Chettiar were appointed scrutineers. The revocations received that day were rejected as unacceptable. The first plaintiff objected that the revocations filed before 30th September 1948 numbering 49 should not be accepted as they were not stamped; but his objection was overruled. At about 10 pm, one of the scrutineers who belonged to the defendants' group filed a memo before the Chairman of the meeting raising three objections. The second of it was that the proxies filed by Narayanan Chettiar, Lakshmanan Chettiar and Ramanathan Chettiar (plaintiffs' group) for the meeting of the 30th September 1948 were not properly stamped as they were not proxies but were powers of attorney and should have been stamped as such. The other scrutineer was however of the view that the objections of Arunachala Aiyar were untenable. The Chairman adjourned this question for decision being given before 10 am, the next day. The poll was then taken on all the resolutions which resulted in securing 793 votes in favour of the resolutions and 767 against. On the next day, 6th September 1949, the Chairman gave his ruling that the proxies were invalid and they should be excluded. Consequently, 661 votes cast against the resolutions were excluded as a result of which the number of votes against the resolutions were reduced from 767 to 106. There were therefore 793 votes in favour of the resolutions and 106 against. The plaintiffs, therefore, lost in this poll and the election and co-option of directors was upheld and the two plaintiffs were unseated.

    The unseated directors instituted the suit which has given raise to this appeal objecting to the poll taken on three grounds: firstly, Palaniappa Gounder the fifth defendant had no right to decline to preside at the poll and that the shareholders had no right to elect the third defendant as Chairman; secondly, that the revocations should not have been rejected and thirdly, that the proxies were valid and the votes recorded under those proxies should not have been excluded. The first defendant to the suit is the company, the fourth and fifth defendants are the co-opted directors, the sixth and seventh defendants the newly elected directors, the third defendant is the Chairman who presided at the poll and the second defendant is Kalairaja Chettiar, the leader of the defendants' group. In the lower Court, the parties did not lead any oral evidence and contented themselves by filing documents. The trial Court rejected the contentions of the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal.

    The same questions have again been argued elaborately before us. The first question for consideration is whether the fifth defendant was bound to preside at the poll. On this point we have no hesitation in agreeing with the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that the fifth defendant cannot be compelled to continue to act as Chairman notwithstanding the fact that his bona fides were questioned earlier by the plaintiffs and this Court directed, at any rate, that to far as one of the subjects was concerned, he should not preside at the poll. The argument before us on behalf of the plaintiffs by the learned Advocate was that the decision of the High Court precluded the Chairman from declining to preside at the poll. No doubt, the judgment of the High Court and the decree proceeded on the assumption that the Chairman of the Board of Directors would continue to preside even at the poll as the poll was nothing but a continuation of the meeting of the 30th September, 1948 The decree directed that he should fix the time for the second poll. This was done by him and there is no other indication in the judgment preventing him from having the right recognised by Art. 78. That Article provides that the Chairman of the Board of Directors should preside only if he is willing. There is nothing in law to compel a man to do that which he is not willing to do. Express power is recognised in the Article itself to give up the right if he so chooses. The Chairman of the meeting is not entitled to stop the meeting at his own will and pleasure. If a meeting is called for a particular purpose of the company, undoubtedly, a person should preside at that meeting and invariably the constitution of the company provides for the same. It is not open to the Chairman to stop the meeting and dissolve it before the business of the meeting is finished. It is the privilege and the right of the share holders assembled at the meeting to decide whether they should continue the business of the meeting on that day or adjourn it for a subsequent date. If the Chairman unjustly and without the consent of the shareholders stops the meeting and declares it dissolved, it is perfectly within the powers of the meeting to elect a Chairman and conduct the business remaining unfinished; but there is no authority in support of the proposition that a Chairman is not entitled to give up his right to preside at a meeting. There is no direct authority on the question hut Art. 78 itself recognises that the chairman of the Board Directors on preside ever the meeting only it he is willing. That it is not open to a chairman of the meeting to stop the meeting or adjourn it at his sweet will and pleasure has been decided by Chitty, J. in National Dwelling Society v. Syhes (1). Chatesby v. Burnett(2) is an instance in which also the Chairman of the meeting declared that the business was closed and left the chair and the hall thereupon the shareholders elected another to the Chair and carried on the business of the meeting. The second poll also is undoubtedly a part of the meeting and the contention of the appellants that it was not open to the share-holders to elect another Chairman, in our opinion, proceeds on a wrong hypothesis. In support of the contention, a passage in the judgment of Curgenven, J. in Srinivasan v. Watrap Subramania Aiyar(3) was relied on by the appellants where the learned Judge observed:

    “The original meeting in law continues until the chairman has earned out the directions given to him by the shareholders to take a poll. It is a notional meeting, not dependent for its existence and continuity upon the shareholders being actually in session and business being transacted. The actual process of holding the poll is not a meeting at all. It differs in several of its features turn any meeting of shareholders”

    These observations of the learned Judge have to be taken in relation to the facts of that case. In that case, the Chairman of the meeting directed, when a poll was demanded on a resolution, that it should be taken on a subsequent day between 4 and 6 pm and appointed the company manager, one Mr. Church, as returning officer for the purpose of taking it. The poll however, was not taken on the 20th as for some reason Mr. Church was unable to attend to the poll. The question that had to be considered was whether the process of holding the poll was a detached portion of the general meeting or was, at any rate, a meeting within the meaning of the articles of association. This point became material as it was contended that when the Commissioner, Mr. Church was absent to take the poll, it was open to the shareholders assembled to have elected a new Chariman for the meeting and as they did not do so, the meeting was at an end. In answer to these objections, it was pointed out that the original meeting continued in law until the Chairman had carried out the direction given to him by the shareholders to take a poll. The actual process of holding the poll was not a meeting at all though the result of the poll formed part of the meeting at which the poll was demanded. The meeting therefore did not come to an end until the result of the poll was ascertained in the manner provided by the Articles. The original meeting continued therefore for the purpose of taking the poll until the poll was closed. For this position, the decisions in Harben v. Phillips (4), The Queen v. Wimbledon Local Board (5), Show v. Tati Concessions Ltd.(6) and Spiller v. Mayo Development Co. Ltd.(7) were relied on. The decision in Srinivasan v. Watrap Subramania Aiyar 8 in our opoinion, far from supporting the contention of the appellants, is against them. The meeting of the shareholders on the 5th September 1949 was a continuation of the meeting and it was open to the shere-holders to elect a Chairman when the fifth defendant declined to preside at that meeting. The Chairman so elected was not like the Commissioner, Mr. Church in the casein Srinivasan v. Watrap Subramania Aiyar . His function was not merely to supervise the recording of the votes. He was entitled to exercise all the functions of a Chairman at the meeting, for these reasons we think that the objections of the appellants on this point are not well founded and must be rejected.

    The next point that has to be considered is whether the Chairman was justified in rejecting the revocations. Until recently, both in England and in India, a member had no right to vote by proxy unless the Article provided for such a right as common law did not recognise voting by proxy The Article, however, generally conferred such a right subject to such conditions and limitations as are prescribed there under. This right has now been recognised by the statute both in England from 1947 now enacted as S. 136 of the Act of 1948 and by S. 79 of the Indian Companies Act, as amended in 1936. As the Articles generally recognised a right to vote by proxy, it is a contractual right as the Articles of Association undoubtedly constituted a contract between the company on the one side and the members on the other. Independently of the contract, therefore, until the statute altered it there was no right of voting by proxy. The reason why the right to vote by proxy was not recognised seems to be that “when persons agreed” as pointed out by Bowen L.J in Harben v. Phillips at page 35 “to act together in the conduct of a business, the way in which that business is to be carried on must depend on each case on the contract, express or implied, which exists between them as to the way of carrying it on.” The decision on every question relating to the business of an incorporated company should essentially be that of the shareholders, having regard to their interest in the company. Unless, therefore, there was a contract between the company and the shareholders, they could not delegate this power of expressing their opinion at a meeting of the company to another. These propositions are so well established as not to require citation of a number of authorities in support of them. It is summarised in Palmer's Company Law, 19th Edn. at page 153. A proxy is defined by Lord Homworth M.R in Cousins v. International Brick Co. as “a person representative of the shareholder who may be described as his agent to any out a course which the shareholder himself has decided upon” and the Lord Justice in the same case defined a proxy as an agent of the shareholder who, as between himself and the principal, was not entitled to act contrary to his in structions in the matter. It cannot therefore be seriously disputed that the relationship brought about between the shareholder and his proxy is that of a principal and agent. The argument of the respondents is that unless the power of revocation is expressly conferred by the Articles under which a right of voting by proxy is recognised, the power of revocation does not exist and that the contract creating the agency is exhaustive of the rights and duties of the proxy. This contention proceeds upon a wrong view of the incidents of a contract of agency. When once the relationship of principal and agent is created by contract, the incidents of that contract of agency are governed and have to be determined by applying the law of contracts. In India such law is to be found in the Contract Act. The argument on behalf of the respondents amounts to this that ail the rights and liabilities which flow from a contract by reason of the application of the general law of contracts do not attach themselves to a contract unless they are enumerated in the contract itself. In other words, if there is a contract of sale of goods unless all the rights and liabilities of the seller and buyer which are to be found in the Sale of Goods Act are specifically enumerated in the contract itself, they have no application. When once there is a contract all the legal incidents of such a contract are governed by the law of contracts whether it is in the form of a statute as in India or is ascertainable from judicial decisions as in England. It will be an intolerable state of affairs if one is obliged to embody in every contract the provisions of the Contract Act or the Sale of Goods Act as the case may be relevant to such a contract. When once the relationship enters the region of contract, the law of contract alone must determine its incidents. On the argument of the respondents, the relationship of agent and principal brought about by the execution of the proxies cannot be terminated even by death though they are forced to concede that such a termination follows and that even when the principal is present in person at the meeting, the right of the proxy to exercise his vote on behalf of the principal must yield to the right of the principal to exercise the vote personally. If so much is conceded, it is difficult to see why the principal should be denied his right to revoke a contract which brought about the relationship, of principal and agent. The Articles might make the proxy irrevocable or impose restrictions or circumscribe the limitations within which the power of revocation should be exercised. But all these are matters within the region of contract between the parties and in the absence of anything to the contrary, there is no reason to exclude the right of revocation which is recognised under S. 203 of the Contract Act. There are other limitations imposed by the Contract Act on the exercise of the power of revocation, e.g if the revocation is made after the authority had been partly exercised, S. 204 of the Act preserves the validity of such acts and obligations and makes the revocation effective only in respect of future acts. If the agency is limited to a period of time and without sufficient cause it is revoked before the expiry of the period under S. 205, the agent is entitled to compensation. The principal is bound to give reasonable notice of revocation as otherwise he would be liable to pay damages to the agent which result from such act of his. As regards third persons, under S. 208 the termination of authority of the agent does not take effect before it becomes known to them so that if third persons are sought to be affected by revocation of the authority of the agent, the principal must give due notice of the same. Termination of the authority by death of the principal is recognised under S. 209. On an examination of the authorities cited at the Bar, it will be seen that the same principles have been applied for the revocation of proxy by a shareholder.

    The subject of revocation of proxy is dealt with by Palmer in his book on Company Law, 19th Edn., page 154 and he summarises the law on the subject in these terms:

    “The appointment of a proxy, unless made irrevocable for valuable consideration, can be revoked the revocation must, however, conform to any provisions in the Articles.

    If the shareholder, after appointing a proxy, himself attends the meeting, he can vote in person. The light of the shareholder to vote in person is paramount to the right of the proxy. The presence of the shareholder does hot avoid the instrument of proxy; but if he rotes before his proxy has voted for him, he impliedly revokes the proxy.

    The death of a shareholder who has appointed a proxy, in the absence of the provisions in the Articles, revokes the authority of the proxy.”

    This summary by the learned author is based on the decisions in Spiller v. Mayo Development Co. Ltd. , Cousins v. International Brick Co. and Knight v. Bulkely . The subject is also discussed and the same principles more or less have been recognised in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 5 pages 364 and 365 where voting by proxy and revocation of proxy are discussed; Halsbury 61 paragraph 108 discusses the subject of proxies; Buckley on Companies Acts 12th Edn., pages 324 and 325; Shackleton on law relating to meetings 1934 Edn., at page 62.

    In Spiller v. Mayo Development Co. Ltd., , one of the Articles provided that

    “a vote given in accordance with the terms of an instrument, of proxy or power of attorney shall be valid not withstanding the previous death of the principal or revocation of the proxy, or power of attorney, or transfer of the share in resp ct of which the vote is given, provided no intimation in writing of the death, revocation, or transfer shall have been received at the office before the meeting.”

    After a poll for the election of a director the scrutineers discovered that a proxy was revoked by the principal before the poll. The votes recorded on the strength of that proxy were excluded from the poll. If such votes were allowed the plaintiff in the action would have been successful in the election as a director and the respondent would have been defeated. The question that had to be decided was whether the exclusion of the votes from the poll by the Chairman was justified. The Article clearly provided that the notice of revocation should be received at the office before the meeting, i.e, before the commencement of the meeting. The revocation in that case that had been received was communicated to the office only before the poll and not before the meeting. The communication therefore was ineffective to make the revocation operative. It was therefore held by Russell, J, that the votes were improperly rejected. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge stated the law in these terms:

    “The matter really turned upon Art. 88, which he had been told was also in common form, but, if so, in his view it was a somewhat unfortunate common form. Omitting for the moment the proviso, it seemed quite clear, upon the construction of that Article, that a vote given by proxy was by contract between the shareholders, to be valid notwithstanding that the shareholder had revoked before the vote was taken, and notwithstanding that this shareholder had revoked the proxy before the vote was given; but that contractual result, which might in certain instances be somewhat starting, could be avoided if the proviso was complied with. It could be avoided apparently if an intimation in writing of the death or revocation was received at the office before the meeting. Two points had been urged by Mr. Gordon Brown on behalf of the plaintiff why these votes should not have been objected to. The first point was there had been in fact no intimation of any revocation at all. In his Lordship's opinion that could not be sustained. The second point was in his view a more formidable one. It was said that no intimation of the revocation was received before the meeting. In his Lordship's opinion, if English language meant anything, the Article required that in order to invalidate the vole, intimation in writing of the revocation must be received at the office before the meeting, and in his view that must mean before the commencement of the meeting. It was well settled that the taking of a poll was not a meeting of the company in the strict sense, but was in law a mere continuation of the meeting at which the poll was directed to be taken, for the particular purpose in question therefore the meeting must be held to have begun on December 15 and to have come to an end at the declaration, of the poll, a week later. The intimation of revocation, however, had been received bet when those two dates. In his opinion it was impossible to say on the true construction of the particular Article, that the proviso has been complied with, namely, that intimation in writing of the revocation had been received before the meeting. In his Lordship's view it was received after the meeting bad commenced; it had been received during the meeting. Accordingly the proviso did not operate, and the original part of the Article must be held to operate, namely, that the vote given by the proxy was valied notwithstanding the revocation of the proxy during the meeting”

    If the Articles lay down the limitations within which a power to vore by proxy can be exercised, it should be strictly observed. This follows from the fact that the right to vote by proxy is founded on contract. For this reason, it was held in Hurben v. Phillips that where the Articles required that the proxy papers should be attested in a particular manner and if this condition is not satisfied, they should be rejected. Mclaren v. Thomson also illustrates the same principle. The Article in that ca:.e required that the instrument appointing a proxy should be deposited at the registered office of the company not less than two clear days before the day of the meeting. The proxies were lodged between the dates of the original meeting and its adjournment. It was held that the adjourned meeting when held was really a continuation of the meeting at which the adjournment took place and as the proxies were not deposited before the date for holding the meeting as required by the Article they were invalid and were therefore rejected. Astbury J. says at page 46:

    “There is no inherent or equitable right in any shareholder to vote by proxy such right, if it exists, must be found in the contract binding the shareholders generally, that is in the company regulations or constitution, and it then exists only in the form and subject to the limitations therein appearing. There is no room for contending that an appointment of a proxy, irregularly made, is within the spirit or equity of any inchoate right so to vote existing in the shareholder; he has either complied with the terms of the contract Upon which alone the right is based or he has not. Prima facie a provision that a proxy must be lodged before the day for holding or before the time for holding a meeting means that it must be lodged before the beginning and not before the end of the gathering.”

    These and similar observations in other decisions were relied on on behalf of the respondents as establishing the proposition that unless the right of revocation is expressly conferned by the Articles, there is no right of revocation the restrictions on the power to vote by proxy are undoubtedly absolute but the power of revocation is an incident of the contract of agency and wherever a power to vote by proxy is conferred, the power of revocation unless excluded under the Articles, exists as the relationship of principal and agent is governed by the law of contracts. The right to vote by proxy and the right or revocation are distinct powers. In Cousins v. International Brick Co. there were two provisions in the Articles of Association, one providing that the instrument appointing a proxy should be deposited at the office not less than 48 hours before the time of holding the meeting at which it should be used and the other regulation that a vote given in accordance with the terms of the instrument of proxy will be valid notwithstanding the previous revocation of the proxy provided no intimation in writing of the revocation shall have been received at the office before the meeting. Some shareholders purported by notice in writing to revoke the proxies given by them previously, while others without giving notice to revoke the proxies voted personally at the meeting. The revocation of the proxies was not in accordance with the Articles of Association as the intimation in writing of the revocation was not received at the office before the meeting. The case therefore was directly governed by the decision in Spiller v. Mayo Development Co. . The further question was whether the shareholders were entitled to vote personally without revoking the proxies given by them. The Court of Appeal accepted the view of Russell, J. on the question whether the revocation was effective; on the second question, it was held that the person by given a proxy was not thereby deprived of exercising the vote personally before the proxy had exercised the vote. Lord Honworth, M.R pointed out in the course of his judgment that it is open to provide by Articles to exclude the right to vote personally when a proxy was given; but if this is not done and there are no clear words taking away the shareholder's personal right to vote after he has put in force the proxy system the personal right remains and the shareholder is entitled to attend and give his vote according to his choice. The proxy is not entitled to prevent him from exercising the vole. Lawrence, L.J and Romer, L.J put it also on the ground that

    “every proxy is subject to up implied condition that it should only be used if the shareholder is unable or finds it inconvenement to attend the meeting. The proxy is merely the agent of the shareholder, and as between himself and his principal is not entitled to act contrary to the instructions of the letter.”

    “A proxy is always subject to an under standing that the shareholder giving it does not elect to gave his vine in person and when he his fact gives a vote in person lie is not revoking the proxy but inking a step which obviates the necessity of the proxy being used at all.” (per Romer, L.J at page 103).

    From these observations it follows that the exercise of a personal vote by the shareholder alter he had adopted the proxy system does not revoke the proxy but only prevents the exercise of the vote by the proxy. The decision in In re Haven Gold Mining Co and Colonial Gold Reef Ltd. v. Free State Hand Ltd. also illustrate the same proposition that the various matters relating to the poll are matters of contract as provided by the Articles. It is unnecessary to deal with those decisions in detail and none of the decisions, therefore, relied on on behalf of the respondents, support the proposition that the shareholder has no right to revoke a proxy once given unless such a power is expressly conferred by the Articles.

    Articles 91 to 97 of the Articles of Association of the first defendant company relate to proxies. None of these Articles exclude the power of revocation nor do they lay down any restrictions as to the manner in which the power of revocation should be exercised as in Spiller v. Mayo Development Co. and Cousins v. International Brick Co. . The power of revocation, therefore, is unfettered and if it is communicated in due time to the company, there is no reason for holding that it does not take effect. The requirement as to notice to the company of the revocation is to be derived from the provisions of the Contract Act; S. 208 which enacts that the termination of the authority of an agent does not take effect so far as third parties are concerned before it becomes known to them.

    The next line of argument adopted by Mr. Rajah Aiyar, learned Advocate for the respondents is based on the language of Art. 96 which states:

    “Any instrument appointing a permanent proxy or attorney to vote may be reg stored with the company once for all awl shall be in force until the same shall be revoked.”

    It was suggested that this Article specifically confers a power of revocation in respect of a permanent proxy or attorney and as express mention of specific power is mace in the case of a permanent proxy, the power of revocation in the case of a specific power must be deemed to have been excluded on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) which has been applied in the construction of written instruments. In the first place the Article does not expressly confer a power of revocation. On the contrary it assumes that the power was existing and therefore lays down that the instrument appointing a permanent proxy will hold good until the same is revoked The maxim, therefore, has no application at all. Further the subject matter of Art. 96 is a permanent proxy and not a specific proxy. If power of revocation of a limited nature is recognized in respect of a specific proxy by any Article then it would be possible to contend that by reason of the express mention of the limited power any other power is excluded. The argument proceeds on a misconstruction of Art. 96 and on a wrong appreciation of the scope of the maxim.

    It is next contended that a proxy can be revoked only before its use and as in the present case, the proxies were used to exercise the vote at the first poll of the same meeting, it is too late to revoke the proxies. In other words, a proxy cannot be revoked between one poll and another and these two polls at the same meeting should be treated as one act and not as a series of acts. The power to revoke an authority given to an agent, after the authority has been part fully exercised, has been recognised by S. 204 of the Contract Act. The revocation cannot have the effect of invalidating acts and obligations already done in the exercise of that authority as an agent. The first poll of the meeting at which the proxies were exercised became final and the effect of revocation of the proxies cannot in any manner affect the declaration of the result of that poll; but the second poll which is styled as the whole company's poll is a different act in a series of acts done at the meeting. There is no reason nor is there any authority in support of the contention that at that point of time a proxy could not be revoked or authority of the agent could not be terminated. On the principle underlying S. 204 of the Contract Act, it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondents.

    Lastly, it is urged that there was no notice by the principal to the agent and therefore the revocation was not valid. There is undoubtedly notice to the third party, i.e, the company, But it is not suggested on behalf of the appellants that there was any notice of revocation to the proxy. The effect of the want of notice to the agent does not invalidate the revocation or the termination of the authority but makes the principal liable for any damage that results to the agent by reason of such want of notice. There is no complaint here by the persons in whose favour the proxies were given that they had suffered any damage nor is it relevant for the purpose of this case. The contention, therefore, that the revocation is invalid on this ground must be rejected.

    From the foregoing discussion it follows that the rejection of the revocations by the Chairman was wrong.

    The next and the more difficult question for decision is whether the rejection of the proxies by the Chairman was justified. The proxies were rejected on the ground that they were insufficiently stamped. According to the respondents, the proxies are in the nature of powers of attorney under Art. 48 of the Indian Stamp Act and should have been stamped as required by that Article and that they were not proxies within the meaning of Art. 52 to justify a stamp of two annas. The first defendant Company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. 1882 and the Articles of Association were modelled on the Articles contained, in Table A of that Act. The Indian Act of 1882 was framed on the lines of the English Companies Act. 1862 (25 and 26 Vict. Ch. 89). In Ex. A.2, the Article of Association of the defendant company, the form of the proxy is provided by Article 97. This form word for word is the same as the form in Art. 51 in Table A of the Indian Act, 1882 and Article 51 of Table A of the English Act of 1862, though there are a few alterations particularly at the end where the words “or, generally as the case may be in the same manner as I myself could vote if personally present provided he be then a member of the company and be entitled or admitted to vote” are found. The addition of the expression generally as the case may be” at the end of the sentence for at any meeting of the company that may be held within the period of ……. From the date hereof, or generally as the case may be) is an innovation. The form also states that the stamp payable is one anna which was the stamp duty payable at that time as it is only in 1923 by an Amending Act that a duty of two annas was made payable in Art. 52 of the Stamp Act.

    The stamp duty fixed under the Articles was presumably on the footing that it was a proxy within the meaning of Art. 52 of the Stamp Act and not a general power of attorney under Art. 48. It must be remembered in this connection that the question whether it is a proxy of the specific meeting or it was a general power was specifically raised at the time of the poll on the 30th September 1948 (Ex. A.2 in A.S No. 29 of 1949) by Arunachala Ayyar and the objection was met by Mr. Lakshmanan on the ground that the proxy objected to was intended only for the meeting of the 30th September 1948 as was clear from the date given in the proxies. No doubt this objection was not based on insufficiency of stamp but if it is held to be a specific power, it follows that the proxy was properly stamped. The then Chairman of the meeting, the fifth defendant, overruled the objection and allowed the proxies as valid. Under the above circumstances, the question that naturally arises is whether the Chairman of the meeting of the 5th September 1949 was entitled to reopen the question.

    As pointed out by the Earl of Selborne, L.C in In re Indian Zoedone Co. the duties of the Chairman who presides at a meeting are:

    “has to receive the poll and declare its result; has prima facie authority to decide all emergent questions which necessarily require decision at the time, his decision of those questions will naturally govern, and property govern the entry of the minute in the books; and, though in no sense conclusive, it through the burden of proof upon the other side, who may say, contrary to the entry in the minute book, following the decision of the Chairman, that the result of the poll was different from that there recorded.”

    If the Chairman in the exercise of his powers comes to a decision whether the votes which are in question shall be disallowed or not and if that decision is not vitiated by fraud or misconduct on the part of the Chairman that decision is binding—see the observations of Pollock M.R in Wall v. Exchange Investment Corporation Ltd. . There is no decided case, however, how far and to what extent a ruling or a decision given by a Chairman on a question raised at one stage of the meeting would bind himself or his successor at a later stage of the same meeting. Art. 82 of Ex. A.2 no doubt provides in the case of resolutions that a declaration given by a Chairman at a meeting that a resolution has been carried there at is conclusive. But there is no provision in the Articles giving finality to the rulings of the Chairman at a meeting. There is no reason, however, to hold that the ruling of a Chairman given at one stage of a meeting is not final and binding on the Chairman or his successor at a later stage, if such a finality is not recognised, the proceedings of the meeting cannot be conducted in an orderly manner and will very often end in confusion and disorder. The Chairman is expected to act impartially uninfluenced by party politics. He has to hold the scales even between the majority and the minority parties and his decision on all the questions must be unbiassed and impartial. It is not suggested that the ruling of the fifth defendant on the 30th September 1948 was vitiated by fraud or misconduct and there is no reason to hold it as not being final. What would have happened if the objection on the ground of insufficiency of stamp was raised in a Court of law and the Court decided at one stage of the suit that the disputed instrument was properly stamped I Under S. 36 of the Stamp Act if the instrument is admitted in evidence overruling the objection concerning stamp duty, such admission cannot be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. No doubt, a Chairman is not a person authorised by law or consent of parties to receive evidence within the meaning of S. 35 of the Stamp Act. But there is no reason for not applying the same principle of finality to the ruling of the Chairman on the nature of the instrument in dispute.

    There is another aspect from which the matter may be considered. The Articles of Association prescribe the form of the proxy by Art. 97 and on the footing that it is a proxy within the meaning of Art. 52 stated that the stamp duty payable was one anna under the law as it then stood and these Articles we are told, were drafted by eminent lawyers of the Madras bar. If a shareholder complies with the requirements of that Article and pays stamp duty of two annas under the law as altered on the footing that it is a proxy and not a general power of attorney, the Chairman has no option but to accept the proxy even if he comes to a conclusion that the stamp duty was not proper. If the proxies confirm to the Articles in all respects they cannot be rejected by the Chairman (See Shackleton, Law of Meetings, page 98). The Articles constitute a contract binding on the company and the members in all matters. The Chairman, therefore, was not entitled to go behind the Articles and to reject the proxies on the ground that they were not duly stamped. In sufficiency of stamp does not affect the validity of the instrument but makes it inadmissible—See Joyman Bewa… v. Easin Sarkar…. , except in the case of instruments requiring one anna stamp. The policy underlying the provisions of the Stamp Act is as far as possible to give an opportunity to the person concerned to make good the stamp except in the case of instruments required to be stamped with one anna. Under S. 35 in the case of instruments insufficiently stamped, the instrument maybe admitted in evidence on payment of penalty and the deficit stamp duty. If an instrument is impounded under S. 33 of the Act, the Collector gives an opportunity to the person concerned to make good the deficit stamp duty and also pay penalty—S. 41. The final authority under the Act to decide the questions relating to stamp duty is the Collector (See S. 31)—who however has the right in case of doubt to refer the matter for the opinion of the chief controlling revenue authority and the chief controlling revenue authority in his turn has the right under S. 57 to refer the matter to the High Court for opinion. All these provisions clearly indicate that the instrument could always be validated by paying the effect stamp duty at a later stage together with penalty and the sole authority vested with the power of finally deciding the question of stamp duty is the Collector acting under S. 31 of the Act. If a person votes or attempts to vote under any proxy not duly stamped he is liable for punishment with a fine which may extend to Rs. 500 under S. 62(1)(c) of the Act. But as indicated In the proviso to S. 43, the intention must be one of evading payment of the proper duty. In the present case, it is difficult if not impossible, to hold that there was an intention on the part of persons holding the proxies to evade the stamp duty as they had acted bona fide and followed the Articles of Association and paid two annas stamp on each proxy. The fifth defendant gave his ruling at the meeting of the 30th September 1948 that it was a specific power. On the 6th September 1949 when the Chairman, the third defendant, gave his ruling that the proxies should be rejected as invalid, the plaintiffs' party filed a memo, Ex. A.13 dated 6th September 1949 in which it was pointed out that the from used by them was the exact one prescribed by Art. 97 and the stamp duty paid was two annas instead of one anna under the altered law. They also offered if if the objection is to be sustained, it would only involve payment of extra stamp duty with penalty which may be fixed by the Collector and that they were prepared to pay it if and when it is decided that it is payable in the present case. Even at that stage, if the Chairman acted fairly and in a judicial manner, it was open to him to have referred the matter to the Collector for decision under S. 31 of the Stamp Act particularly as the plaintiffs' party offered to pay the stamp duty and penalty if so decided by the Collector. The Chairman could have postponed the decision of the result of the poll until the decision of the Collector was obtained if he really was acting in an impartial manner. The objection itself was taken at a very, late stage at about 10 Pm in the night when the votes were being scrutinised by the scrutineers and there was hardly any time for the plaintiffs' party to ascertain the opinion of the Collector and to make good the deficit stamp duty if really such stamp duty was required. The Chairman, in our opinion, acted very unfairly to the minority and was wrong in rejecting the proxies without giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs to make good the deficient stamp duty after ascertaining the opinion of the Collector in the matter.

    The argument most strenuously pressed before us on behalf of the respondents is that a person in the position of a Chairman was not bound to accept a document which was insufficiently stamped In support of this proposition, reliance was strongly placed on the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Maynard v. The Consolidated Kent Collieries Corporation, Ltd., which related to a transfer of shares in a company. The instrument of transfer in that case was Stamped in accordance with the consideration stated in the face of the document but it was discovered that the consideration appearing on the face of the document was far less than what it really is. The directors thereupon refused to register the transfer. An action was brought to recover damages for wrongful refusal of the registration of the transfer. It was decided by the Court of Appeal that it was the bounden duty of the plaintiff in the action who claimed the right to register the transfer to tender a transfer which was right in all respects and which would be available to the directors of the company in a Court of law if it became necessary to enforce the rights under the document against the transferee or if they were called upon to defend themselves against a hostile attack levelled against the transfer on the faith of which they acted. Similarly, if a vendor offers to the purchaser a sale deed not duly stamped, it is argued that he was not bound to accept it. This position regarding the right of a person who would be entitled to claim rights under an instrument cannot be questioned as he is entitled to get from the ether party a deed valid in all respects end enforceable in a Court of law. But does that apply to proxy under which a person is entitled to vole. The company, and much less the Chairman of the meeting, claims no rights of property under the instrument. All that he is entitled to do under the instrument is to exercise the vote. No question of establishing rights in a Court of law under the document or defending the rights on the basis of the document ever arises under the proxy. So long as a shareholder complies with the formalities laid down by the Articles regarding stamp duty on the basis enacted in the Articles, it is the bounden duty of the Chairman to accept the proxy and he is not entitled to reject it. We are not now concerned with a situation similar to the one that came up for consideration in In re Taia Iron & steel Co. Ltd. where the proxies were unstamped. The contention, therefore, that the Chairman was entitled to reject the proxies in the circumstances, on the ground that they were not duly stamped cannot be accepted.

    We may dispose of a contention urged on behalf of the appellants based upon the decision of the House of Lords in the well known case of Kenneth Matheson v. Alexander Ross . The argument was based upon the assumption that the proxy contains two powers one a specific power to vote at the meeting of the 30th September 1948 and the other a general power to vote at any other meeting. It is argued that the two can be separated and that the Chairman should have allowed the proxies as valid to the extent of voting at the specific meeting of the 30th September 1948 which was adjourned to 5th September 1949. There was a judicial conflict of opinion regarding the applicability of the principle of that decision under the Indian Stamp Act having regard to the language of S. 35 of the Act. Under S. 35, no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or bye any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. Notwithstanding the clear language that the instrument shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose whatever, some decisions have taken the view that the instrument could be used for what is styled as a collateral purpose. This conflict, however, has now been set at rest by the Judicial Committee in Ram Rattan v. Paratna Nand . Sir John Beaumont observed at page 296 as follows:

    “As already noted, S. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act enacts that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Mr. Rewcastle as part of his argument for the respondent adopted the note on the words ‘for any purpose’ in S. 36 contained in the 4th edition of Siy Dinshaw Mullah's book on the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. He pointed out that the words ‘for any purpose’ first appeared in India in the Stamp Act of 1879, and in England in the Stamp Act of 1891, and that under the earlier Acts there were decisions in both countries that an unstamped document might be admitted in evidence for a collateral purpose, that is, to prove some matter other than the transaction recorded in the instrument and he submitted that these cases applied even under the later Acts. Their ordships do not take this view. A document admitted in purpose of of Some collateral matter is admitted in evidence for that purpose, and the statute enacts that it shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Their Lordships see no reason why the words ‘for any purpose’ in the Indian Act of 1979 should not be given their natural meaning and effect. Such words may well have been inserted by the Legislature in order to get rid of the difficulties surrounding the question of what amounted to a collateral purpose.”

    It must be remembered that the decision of the House of Lords was pronounced before the English Stamp Act of 1891. It is, therefore, impossible for the appellants to maintain that the document could be split up in the manner contended for. Especially in a Court of law it would not have been permissible to so dissect the instrument into two parts and use the unobjectionable part in evidence. Under S. 5 of the Stamp Act an instrument which comprises or relates to several distinct matters is chargeable with the aggregate amount of the duties with which separate instruments, each comprising or relating to one of such matters would be chargeable under this Act. If therefore the proxy contains the specific power as well as the general power, it would be admissible only if the aggregate amount of the duties in respect of two such separate instruments is paid, as under the charging section, S. 3, the instrument should be charged with the cuty indicated in the schedule. Of course the schedule must be taken along with the sections in order to determine the proper stamp duty. Under S. 6 if an instrument falls within the several descriptions of Schland the duties are different, it should be chargeable only with the highest of such duties.

    Whether the proxies are general powers of attorney within the meaning of Art. 48 of the Stamp Act or specific powers under Art. 52 is a difficult question and does not seem to us as easy to decide as the Chairman the third defendant, thought. One specimen from of proxy seems to have been marked for identification; but as we did not find it in the records sent to this Court, we called for the proxy forms and we find that they are similar in language as in Art. 97 of Ex. A.2 Fur easy reference the language in the form is quoted herein;

    “Every proxy shall be in the following form, or shall contain words to the following effect.

    (stamp 1 anna) “The Kaleeswarnr Mills Limited,” Coimbatore I of being a member of “The Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd.”, and entitled to vote, do hereby appoint of as my attorney or substitute to vote for me and on my behalf at the (Ordinary or Extraordiuary, as the case may be) General Meeting of the company to be held on the day of and at any acjournment thereof for at any meeting of the company, that may be held within the period of from the date hereof, or generally as the case may be) in the same manner as I myself could vote if personally present provided he be then a member of the company and be entitled or admitted to vote. As witness my hand this day of signed by the said in the presence of

    It consists of two parts: “do hereby appoint as my attorney or substitute to vote for me and on my behalf at the (Ordinary or Extraordinary, as the case may be) General Meeting of the company to be held on the 30th September 1948 and at any adjournment thereof.” The second part is “(or at any meeting of the company, that may be held within the period of one year from the date hereof, or generally as the case may be).” It is not disputed that so far as the first part is concerned, notwithstanding the Words, “Ordinary or Extraordinary” within brackets, it authorises the person only to vote at the meeting of the 30th September 1948 or at any adjournment thereof. The words “as the case may be” clearly indicate that the word “or” in the expression, “Ordinary or Extraordinary” is disjunctive and if the instrument had stopped with this clause, it is not disputed that the instrument was duly stamped. The trouble arises by the existence of the second clause. It is argued that the word “or” occurring at the beginning of the expression “or at any meeting of the company” is not disjunctive but is used as meaning “and”. Having regard to the context, we are not inclined to accept the interpretation that the word “or”in the context means “and”. It is a coordinating particle indicating an alternative.

    The question then is even if “or” is disjunctive, whether the expression “at any meeting of the company that may be held within the period of one year from the date hereof or generally as the case may be” means only at any one meeting of the company or at all the meetings of the company that may be held within a period of one year; There is also the question as to the meaning to be given to the expression “generally as the case may be.” The construction suggested on behalf of the respondents is that it means at any meeting of the company within a period of one year or generally without any limitation as to time. The meaning of the expression, to our mind, is clear and it cannot be said that the contention urged on behalf of the respondents is unreasonable.

    Even then does the word “any” mean all the meetings or at any one meeting of the company. If the latter, the object of the instrument is undoubtedly to give an option to the person concerned to vote either at the meeting of the 30th or at any other one meeting of the company. If the former, it means the person is entitled to vote either at the meeting of the 30th or its adjournment or at his option at all the meetings of the company to be held within one year or without any limitation as to time. If the latter construction is to be adopted, undoubtedly as it gives a power in the alternative, in the first instance, specifically and in the second instance, in the alternative generally, it would fall within S. 5 of the Stamp Act and require to be stamped in accordance with it or at any rate under S. 6 and the stamp duty will be one rupee in the latter case. If, on the other hand, it is confined to any one meeting of the company, the stamp duty paid is proper. The decisions under the English Act are of no assistance as the language is not similar. S. 80 of the English Stamp Act (1891, 54 55 Victoria Chap. 39 requires that every letter or power of attorney for the purpose of appointing a proxy to vote at a meeting, and every voting paper, hereby respectively charged with the duty of one penny, is to specify the day upon which the meeting at which it is intended to be used, is to be held, and is to be available only at the meeting so specified, and any adjournment thereof and the first schedule to that Act referring to letter or power of attorney and commission, factory, mandate or other instrument in the nature thereof for the sole purpose of appointing or authorising a proxy to vote at any one meeting at which votes may be given by proxy, whether the number of persons named in such instrument be one or more, the duty payable is one penny. In other cases, it is ten shillings. The Act both in the section and in the schedule requires that it should be for the sole purpose of voting at any one meeting and the day upon which the meeting is to be held is also to be specified. The language of Art. 52 of the Indian Act is “proxy empowering any person to vote at any one election of the members of a district or local board, or of a body of municipal commissioners, or at any one meeting of (a) members of an incorporated company or other body corporate whose stock or funds is or are divided into share's and transferable” (The rest of it is omitted as being irrelevant). It need not be for the sole purpose of voting at one meeting, but it must be sufficiently clear that the proxy is intended to exercise the vote at any one meeting of the company. If, therefore, on a fair reading of the instrument, it is possible to come to the conclusion that it is intended to authorise the person to vote at any one meeting, though the power is given in the alternative as “at the meeting of the 30th September or at any other meeting,” the stamp duty payable would be two annas. That there is some indication that the parties intended that the sole object of the proxy is to enable the person to vote at any one meeting may be inferred to some extent from the fact that they fixed the stamp duty as one anna in the Articles of Association and the proxy holders also sent a covering letter (dated 25-9-1948, page 140 Vol. I along with the proxies that they were intended to be used at the meeting of 30th September 1948. The word “any” as pointed out in Websters dictionary has also the meaning of one of three or more and in the Oxford dictionary, its meaning is given as “an indeterminate derivative of one, or rather of its weakened adjectival from a, an, in which the idea of unity is subordinated to that of indifference as to the particular one or ones that may be selected.” (Vol. I page 378); so that on a fair reading of the instrument, we have come to the conclusion, though with hesitation, that the instrument is a proxy within the meaning of Art. 52 and the proper stamp duty payable is two annas. No doubt, as pointed by learned Counsel for the respondents, in some context “any” may be reed as “or” as in the case of The Isle of Wight Railway Co., v. The ourdin , relied on in Strouds Judicial Dictionary Vol. I page 92. We have to consider the context in which the word is used and interpret it and no invariable rule can be laid down. We felt some difficulty in deciding whether assuming that the proxy is a general power of attorney, the clauses in Art. 48 of the Stamp Act apply to the present case the clauses which have to be considered are clauses (d), (e) and (g) of Art. 48. As pointed out in Donoughs Indian Stamp Law, 9th Edn., at page 707, clause (g) has to be read with clause (e). When so read, it means that if there are more than ten persons authorised to act jointly or severally in more than one transaction or generally, then stamp duty payable is according to the number of persons and it is one rupee to each person authorised. Clause (d) applies when the authority is given to not more than five persons and relates to more than one transaction or generally. In Referred Case No. 15 of 1905 cited in the stamp Manual, this Court decided that a document of the present description would fall under clause (g). We do not see any reason to differ from that view as otherwise a power of attorney in favour of one person in respect of more than one transaction would escape stamp duty altogether.

    Lastly, Mr. Gopalaratnam, learned Counsel for the appellants, argued that in any event the direction of the lower Court that the plaintiffs should pay separate sets of costs to the first defendant, second defendant, third defendant, fifth defendant end defendants 4 and 7 is not justifiable. The learned Judge did not give any reasons in his judgment for allowing separate sets of costs to each of the defendants. They had no separate interest in the suit and the questions that were considered were common questions. Merely because the defendants chose to engage separate Advocates, that will not justify the course adopted by the learned Subordinate Judge. We think that this direction regarding costs is not justified.

    Our conclusion in the result is that the rejection of the revocations affecting 230 votes and of the proxies relating to 661 votes was not justified. The defendants' party, according to the Chairman, after these exclusions obtained 793 votes in favour of the resolutions while the plaintiffs' party obtained only 106. If the excluded proxies are added, the votes in favour of the plaintiffs' party will be 767, i.e, 106 plus 661 while the votes obtained in favour of the resolution by the defendants' party would be 793 minus 230 leaving a balance of 563. The resolutions therefore must be taken to have been defeated. It follows from this result that the plaintiffs are entitled to the declarations asked for and they are also entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the first defendant company from giving effect to the said resolutions and defendants 4 to 7 from acting as directors of the first defendant company. The appeal therefore must be allowed and the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit must be set aside and there should be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs as prayer for with costs here and in the Court below.

    V.C.S

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    S. Rm. S.T Narayanan Chettiar And Another v. The Kaleeswarar Mills Ltd., And Others.
    (Sep 7, 1950)