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  • S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act
  • S. 205(2) of the Constitution Act
  • S. 213 of the Constitution Act
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
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  • S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act
  • S. 205(2) of the Constitution Act
  • S. 213 of the Constitution Act
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Revision Petition: Whether the Government is a Necessary Party

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arises from O.S. No. 193 of 1948, a suit instituted seeking (a) a declaration that resumption proceedings and the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Erode, and the District Collector, Coimbatore, relating to the suit property were null and void and would not affect the plaintiff's right, title and enjoyment of the suit lands; and alternatively (b) a declaration that the inam in the suit land was only of the melwaram and could alone be resumed and regranted to the defendant under S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act.

The defendant had applied to the RDO under S. 44-B for resumption, alleging the land was a service inam and that the plaintiff was his lessee under a long lease exceeding five years (claimed to make the lease void as against resumption). The RDO initially dismissed the defendant's application for want of proof of a lease exceeding five years. On appeal the District Collector remanded the matter; on remand a different RDO decided in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff then appealed, and that appeal was dismissed on 5-2-1948.

One of the preliminary issues tried was whether the Government is a necessary party to the suit. The lower Court held that the Government was a necessary party; the plaintiff sought revision of that holding, giving rise to the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government is a necessary party to the suit (i.e., whether the suit cannot be effectually and completely adjudicated in the Government's absence).
  2. Whether Section 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act is ultra vires the Madras (Provincial) Legislature.
  3. Whether the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Collector (resumption orders) are void and without jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff challenged the resumption orders as void, illegal and ultra vires, contending the Revenue Authorities had no jurisdiction to take up or decide the question of resumption.
  • The plaintiff contended that S. 44-B is ultra vires the Provincial Legislature because it purported to affect title perfected by the law of limitation, a subject reserved for the Central Government.
  • The plaintiff sought a declaration that the inam related only to the melwaram and that resumption and regrant could only be with respect to the melwaram under S. 44-B.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant argued that the issues framed (whether S. 44-B is ultra vires and whether the Revenue Officers' orders are void) raise questions about the competency of the Madras Legislature and challenge orders passed by Revenue authorities; such questions could not be gone into in the absence of the Government.
  • In essence, the defendant maintained that because the validity of the statute enacted by the Provincial Legislature and the legality of administrative/resumption orders were in issue, the Government was a necessary party to the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum (Federal Court) Interpreted S. 205 of the Government of India Act: where constitutional questions arise in litigation between private parties, the Government (or Advocate General) has a special interest; if added as a party in the High Court, the Advocate General or Government can appeal under the provisions enabling "any party" to appeal to the Federal Court (S. 205(2) of the Constitution Act). The court cited this decision to explain the special position of the Government in constitutional challenges to legislation and to show that where Government/Advocate General is a party in the High Court, they may have a right of appeal. The court distinguished the present case because the Government had not sought to be added as a party.
Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Board of Commissioners, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Held that a third party (Secretary of State) who had no cause of action alleged against him and no relief claimed could not be added as a necessary or proper party. Interpreted the phrase in Order 1, Rule 10(2) — "all questions involved in the suit" — as referring to questions between the parties and concluded addition of a party should be ordered only if without that party the Court cannot effectually and completely adjudicate all questions. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the addition of the Government should be ordered only if the Court is satisfied that in the absence of that party it cannot effectually and completely adjudicate and settle the questions in the suit. This authority was used to limit when Government may be made a party.
Secretary of State v. Murugesa (cited) Venkatasubba Rao, J. did not wholly accept the narrow interpretation that "all questions involved in the suit" refer only to questions between parties; observed that questions needing adjudication need not necessarily be only between parties to the suit. The court noted this authority but ultimately agreed with the Mahant decision's practical test: addition of a party should be ordered only if the Court cannot effectually and completely adjudicate and settle all questions in that party's absence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the decisive inquiry narrowly: whether, on the plaint and the issues raised, the Government is a necessary party "without whose presence there cannot be a complete and effective adjudication" of the matters in controversy.

On the ultra vires issue (whether S. 44-B is ultra vires the Madras Legislature), the court reasoned that the Government's presence was not necessary to enable the Court to decide the constitutional question. The court rejected the lower-court's apprehension that in the absence of the Government a collusive suit might obtain a declaration that an enactment is ultra vires and later rely on that declaration; the court said that even if collusion were suggested, courts should not and would not become parties to such collusion. When the validity of an enactment is in question, the court explained, it must apply its own mind to the legal arguments presented by counsel and decide the question of law; that process does not in itself require the Government to be a party.

The court then considered the Federal Court decision in United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum, which recognizes the Government's special interest and procedural position when constitutional questions arise. The court observed, however, that in the present case the Government had not sought to be added as a party and that it was the defendant who sought to compel the plaintiff to add the Government. The court emphasized that ordinarily the Government should not be ordered to be made a party unless the Court is convinced that the Government is a necessary party.

Relying on Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu, the court adopted the practical test that a party should only be ordered to be added if, in the absence of that party, the Court cannot effectually and completely adjudicate and settle the questions in the suit. Applying that test to the second issue — whether the Collector's order of resumption was void for lack of jurisdiction — the court held that the Government was not necessary because no relief was sought against the Government and the only question was whether the Collector had acted within the statutory powers conferred by S. 44-B. The court found that where the court is only being asked to determine whether an authority acted without jurisdiction, the Government's absence does not prevent effective adjudication.

The court also observed that the Government is nonetheless a proper party in the sense that it has some interest in resumption proceedings or in the validity of enactments, but the distinction between "proper" and "necessary" was important: the plaintiff, as dominus litis, could not be compelled to add the Government unless the Government was necessary. The court declined to express an opinion on whether notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code would be required if the Government were added as a defendant, but noted the plaintiff's reasonable apprehension about that point and held it was therefore improper to compel addition of the Government when it was not necessary.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The revision petition was allowed. The court held that, on the facts and issues as framed in the suit, the Government is not a necessary party to adjudicate the questions raised (including whether S. 44-B is ultra vires and whether the Revenue Officers acted without jurisdiction).

Implications:

  • The direct consequence for the parties is that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to add the Government as a party to the suit because the Government is not necessary for the effectual and complete adjudication of the questions before the court.
  • The court emphasized the limiting principle that addition of the Government (or any third party) should be ordered only where the Court is satisfied that without that party it cannot effectually and completely adjudicate and settle all questions in the suit.
  • The opinion did not purport to decide or lay down any novel or sweeping precedent beyond applying the established test for when a third party (including the Government) must be added; no broader statutory or constitutional rule beyond the reasoning stated was announced.

Result: The petition is allowed with costs.

N.R.R

    Doraiswami Goundan v. Subramania Mudaliar.

    JUDGMENT

    The question for decision in this revision petition is whether the Government is a necessary party to the suit.

    The suit, O.S No. 193 of 1948 was instituted for a declaration that the resumption proceedings and the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Erode, and the District Collector, Coimbatore, with reference to the suit property were null and void and that they would not affect the plaintiff's right, title and enjoyment of the suit lands, or alternatively for declaring that the inam in the suit land was only of the melwaram and that it could alone be resumed and regranted to the defendant. The suit was contested and one of the issues which was tried as a preliminary issue is “Whether the Government is a necessary party to the suit.” The lower Court held that Government was a necessary party and hence this revision petition by the plaintiff.

    The plaintiff's case is that the defendant applied to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Erode, under S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act for resumption of the suit land on the ground that it was a service inam granted to his forefathers and the reason for the resumption was that the plaintiff was his lessee for many years under a long lease exceeding five years and therefore it was void in law. The Revenue Divisional Officer did not accept the evidence on behalf of the defendant and dismissed his application for resumption as there had been no proof of lease for a period exceeding five years, the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Revenue Authorities for resumption under S. 44-B being either an alienation or a lease for over 5 years. On appeal the District Collector of Coimbatore remanded the case for fresh disposal and after remand, a new Revenue Divisional Officer, who heard the case, held in favour of the defendant. As against that order the plaintiff filed an appeal which was dismissed on 5-2-1948.

    The case of the plaintiff was (1) that the order was void, illegal and ultra vires and the Revenue Authorities had absolutely no jurisdiction to take up the question of resumption or decide it and (2) that S. 44-B is ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature since it affected or purported to affect the title perfected by the law of limitation which is to be dealt with by the Central Government. He also asked for a declaration that the inam was in respect of only the melwaram and that it could only be resumed and regranted to the defendant, under S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act.

    The defendant contended that the two issues framed in the case, namely, “whether S. 44-B is ultra vires of the Madras Legislature” and “whether the orders passed by the Revenue Officers are void and without jurisdiction?” raise the question of the competency of the Madras Legislature to enact S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act and question the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Collector, they cannot be gone into in the absence of the Government.

    The learned Judge after referring to the decisions cited on either side observed that “in the absence of the Provincial Government, a declaration is sought for that S. 44-B is ultra vires of the powers of the Madras Legislature as it infringes on the powers of the Central Legislature and it is not difficult to contemplate a case of two parties filing a collusive suit getting declaration of title without making the real person vitally interested a party to those proceedings and then to rely upon that as the sheet anchor in subsequent proceedings which may be some years hence”, that it was but elementary justice that a person whose act is questioned should be made a party to those proceedings, that the powers of the local legislature were challenged and that in such circumstances it seemed that the contention of the plaintiff that the Government was not a necessary party was hardly of any force.

    The point that has to be determined is whether on the plaint as framed and the issues raised in the case, the Government is a necessary party without whose presence there cannot be a complete and effective adjudication of the matters that are in controversy. In so far as the first of the issues is concerned, viz., “Whether S. 44-B is ultra vires of the Madras Legislature”, I do not see how the presence of the Government is necessary to enable the Court to decide on hearing the Counsel of the parties as to whether the enactment is ultra vires of the powers of the legislature. The learned Judge contemplated the instance of a collusive suit between two parties and a decision obtained from the Court that a particular enactment is ultra vires of the powers of the legislature. However much collusion may be suggested Between parties, I do not think Courts could become parties to such collusion. In a case where the validity of a legislative enactment is in question as to whether it is ultra vires of the powers of the Legislature which brought it into being, any Court will have to decide on the question of law argued by the Counsel applying its own mind to see the correctness or otherwise of the contention and the apprehensions of the lower Court are therefore baseless and unfounded.

    In a decision of the Federal Court, i.e, The United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum(1), Sulaiman and Varadachariar, JJ. (Gwyer, C.J, doubting) observed as follows:

    “S. 205 of the Government of India Act is principally concernd with the determination of constitutional questions though arising in a litigation between private parties. The Government stands in a peculiar situation; it has no doubt pecuniary or proprietary interests in one sense, but in another aspect it is also the custodian and the protector of the interests of the public and the question of the legality of a statute is one in which it has a special interest. It is undesirable to place the Government in the embarrassing position, that while it must deem itself bound by an opinion expressed by the High Court as to the invalidity of the statute, it must find ways of persuading private parties formally to file an appeal, if it desires to have the constitutional question brought up before the Federal Court. The procedure under S. 213 of the Constitution Act may not be found appropriate when the question of the legality of a statute has actually been put in issue before a Court of law in a litigation between private parties. Accordingly where either the Advocate General or the Government has been added as a party to the proceedings in the High Court, though the private parties do not appeal, the Advocate General or the Government has a right to prefer an appeal to the Federal Court as ‘any party’ under S. 205(2) of the Constitution Act the language of which is different from that of S. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code.”

    The question that had to be decided there was, whether an Act of the Legislature of the United Provinces was within the competence of the Legislature which enacted it. The Advocate General having already been made a party in the High Court, he was held to be coming within the words “any party” under S. 205(2) of the Constitution Act and was therefore held to be competent to maintain the appeal.

    In this case, however, it must be noted that the Government has not asked that it should be added as a party. It is the defendant who is compelling the plaintiff to make the Government a party and unless the Court is satisfied that Government is a necessary party, ordinarily an order making Government a party should not be made. In Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Board Of Commissioners, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, which was a suit filed by the head of a Hindu religious institution against the Board of Commissioners for a declaration that the said Act was invalid and ultra vires and for an injunction restraining the defendant from doing certain acts, the Secretary of State for India in Council applied to be added as a party defendant. The application having been opposed by the plaintiff, it was held that “as there was no cause of action alleged in the plaint against the Secretary of State and no relief claimed against him, he was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit and hence could not be added as party defendant.” In the interpretation of the words “all questions involved in the suit” in O. 1, R. 10(2), Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. held that the expression could only refer to questions as between the parties to the suit and should not be regarded as absolute but only as relative. The phrase “to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle”, according to the learned Judge, would seem really to indicate that the addition of the party should be ordered only if in the opinion of the Court in the absence of the party it cannot effectually and completely adjudicate and settle all the questions.

    This decision was cited by Venkatasubba Rao, J. in Secretary of State v. Murugesa(2), where the learned Judge did not agree with the narrow interpretation put by Srinivasa Aiyangar J., of the words “all questions involved in the suit” meaning only as questions as between parties to the suit and not in which third parties are interested. The questions that arise for adjudication need not however necessarily be between parties to the suit as observed by Venkatasubba Rao, J. But I agree with the observation made in Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Board Of Commissioners, Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, that the addition of a party should be ordered only if in the absence of that party, the Court cannot effectually and completely adjudicate and settle all questions in the suit.

    No relief is asked against the Government and the Court is only considering an order passed by an authority constitued under the Endowments Act, in this case the Collector, whose order is attacked as being one without jurisdiction which is raised by the second issue in the suit. It is again for the Court to find whether the Collector, who ordered the resumption proceedings, had acted within the powers conferred on him under S. 44-B of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. It cannot be stated that the Government is a necessary party in such cases where the only question that the Court has to go into is whether the order is void by reason of the authority who exercised it having acted without jurisdiction. As pointed out already no relief is asked against the Government and the plaintiff being generally dominus litus, he cannot be compelled to add the Government as a party, if the Government is not a necessary party. It cannot be said however, the Government is not a proper party since it is impossible to contend that the Government has absolutely no interest either in resumption proceedings or as to the decision of the question whether a particular enactment is uttr vires.

    It is also pointed out that further objections may be raised as to there having been no notice under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code, if the suit is to be maintainable against the Government after it is added as a party. However, I do not think it necessary to give any opinion as to whether notice would be necessary under S. 80 in such cases but in view also of the reasonable apprehension of the plaintiff in this regard, it will not be proper that he should be compelled to make the Government a party since Government is not a necessary party to the suit.

    In the result, the petition is allowed with costs.

    N.R.R

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    Doraiswami Goundan v. Subramania Mudaliar.
    (Jan 25, 1950)