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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerned the division of property of Sankarapandiam Pillai among his grandsons. The three plaintiffs were sons of Subbasamia Pillai; the first defendant was the son of Narayanaswamia Pillai. Sankarapandiam Pillai had previously taken a one-third share of family property; he died in 1923. A later son by a second wife died in 1925 and the widow in 1943. The three plaintiffs claimed three shares—each one-fourth—of Sankarapandiam Pillai's property, and the plaintiffs agreed that the first defendant was entitled to the remaining one-fourth. These claims were the subject-matter of the suit.

Procedurally, after pleadings closed issues were framed. A preliminary issue raised whether the suit was maintainable because the plaint was signed only by the third plaintiff, who held a power of attorney from the other two plaintiffs. The first defendant contended that the power of attorney did not authorize the third plaintiff to institute suits on behalf of his brothers; consequently, the defendant argued the suit was only by the third plaintiff, making the value fall within the District Munsif's jurisdiction rather than the Subordinate Judge's Court.

Relevant interlocutory applications and steps included:

  • I.A. No. 367 of 1944 (filed 22 November 1944) alleged the third plaintiff held a power of attorney authorising him to conduct all proceedings on behalf of his two brothers; that application was granted.
  • On 28 March 1945 the plaintiffs applied for permission for the first and second plaintiffs to ratify proceedings taken by the third plaintiff; they offered to sign the plaint. That application was dismissed as unnecessary when the preliminary issue was decided.
  • The preliminary issue was tried and decided on 18 July 1945 in favour of the plaintiffs: it was held the power of attorney included authority to institute suits on behalf of the other two plaintiffs.
  • The first defendant presented a civil revision petition against that order (presented 31 July 1945) but later withdrew it and it was dismissed.
  • The suit was posted for trial before the Additional Subordinate Judge on 2 August 1945. The first defendant applied for an adjournment to seek a stay from the High Court on his pending civil revision; the application was refused, his counsel withdrew for lack of instructions, and the trial proceeded in his absence. A decree was entered for the plaintiffs.
  • The present appeal challenged (1) the refusal to adjourn the trial and (2) the finding on the preliminary issue about the scope of the power of attorney.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Additional Subordinate Judge erred in dismissing the first defendant's application for an adjournment of the trial (filed on 2 August 1945) pending an attempt to obtain a stay from the High Court in respect of a civil revision petition.
  2. Whether the preliminary finding (dated 18 July 1945) that the power of attorney held by the third plaintiff authorised him to institute and conduct proceedings for and on behalf of the first and second plaintiffs was correct (and, relatedly, whether the absence of signatures of the first and second plaintiffs on the plaint rendered the suit not maintainable or affected jurisdiction).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The third plaintiff held a power of attorney from the first and second plaintiffs authorising him to conduct all proceedings on their behalf; I.A. No. 367 of 1944 to that effect was presented with the plaint and granted.
  • When questioned about signatures, the plaintiffs later offered (in an application dated 28 March 1945) to have the first and second plaintiffs sign the plaint to ratify proceedings; that application was rendered unnecessary after the preliminary finding in their favour.

First Defendant's Arguments

  • The power of attorney did not authorise the third plaintiff to institute suits on behalf of the other two plaintiffs; therefore the suit should be treated as one brought only by the third plaintiff.
  • If the suit were only by the third plaintiff, the value of his single share would fall within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif rather than the Subordinate Judge; consequently the Subordinate Judge's Court lacked jurisdiction.
  • On 2 August 1945 the first defendant applied (through counsel) for an adjournment so that an order for stay of the suit could be obtained from the High Court in respect of the civil revision petition; the defendant relied on the pendency of that revision and sought an adjournment of the trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohinimohan Das v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das Principle that a plaint signed and verified by one co-plaintiff only does not prevent other named co-plaintiffs from being treated as plaintiffs where the suit was filed with their knowledge; absence of a co-plaintiff's signature is immaterial to their being a party. The Chief Justice quoted the case to support the proposition that omission of a co-plaintiff's signature, where the suit was filed with his knowledge and authority, is not a defect affecting the merits or jurisdiction and can be cured.
Basdeo v. John Smidt Decision that a defect in the signature of a plaint or absence of signature, where the suit was filed with the plaintiff's knowledge and authority, may be cured by amendment and is not a ground for interference on appeal; references S.578 of the old Code (corresponding to S.99 of the 1908 Code). Relied on to show that absence of signature is a curable formal defect and not a basis to disturb a decree; the Court used it (and the corresponding Code provisions) to conclude the objection was a high technicality devoid of merit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two points raised on appeal sequentially.

1. Adjournment application (discretionary refusal)

- The Court observed that refusal or grant of an adjournment is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be properly exercised. Here the Additional Subordinate Judge exercised that discretion in refusing the adjournment and the Chief Justice found no reason to interfere.
- The Court noted that the first defendant had prior knowledge of the trial date (2 August 1945) and therefore ought to have instructed counsel to appear and to defend or have been personally present. The defendant apparently chose to rely on the result of a civil revision petition to obtain an adjournment rather than taking steps to be represented at trial.
- The Court found no satisfactory explanation for the defendant's absence—characterising it as a deliberate decision to abstain from Court despite being apprised of the hearing date—and concluded that there was no justification for setting aside the refusal to adjourn or remanding the case for rehearing.

2. Effect of absence of signatures / power of attorney

- The Court analysed Order 6, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which requires pleadings to be signed by the party and his pleader, but permits a pleading to be signed where a party, by reason of absence or other good cause, is unable to sign, by any person duly authorised by him). The Chief Justice noted this provision corresponds to Section 578 of the old Code (1882).

- The Court relied on precedent (Mohinimohan and Basdeo) and the commentary in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure to state that the omission of a co-plaintiff's signature, where the suit was brought with his knowledge and authority, is immaterial and is a curable defect which should be corrected in the interests of justice rather than used to defeat the suit. The Court expressly subscribed to Mulla's observations that an appellate court should order amendment rather than dismissing or interfering with the lower court's decree solely on that ground.

- The Chief Justice characterised the defendant's objection as one of "high technicality and devoid of all merits," and held that the curing of any defect falls within Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the provision preventing reversal or remand on account of errors, defects or irregularities not affecting merits or jurisdiction).

- The Court noted that an earlier order of 22 November 1944 (granting the third plaintiff permission to conduct all proceedings on behalf of the other two) remained unchallenged and in force; accordingly, it was unnecessary to decide the contested question of construction of the power of attorney. Nevertheless, as an additional protective measure (ex abundanti cautela), the Court directed that the first and second plaintiffs should sign the plaint within one month and that the amendment be carried out in the Subordinate Judge's Court. Non-compliance would be reported to the Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences and immediate implications:

  • The refusal by the Additional Subordinate Judge to grant an adjournment on 2 August 1945 is upheld; there is no remand for rehearing.
  • The preliminary finding that the third plaintiff was authorised (by power of attorney and by the earlier I.A. order) to institute and conduct proceedings for and on behalf of the first and second plaintiffs is sustained insofar as the court declined to allow the objection to defeat the plaintiffs' case.
  • As a precautionary measure the Court ordered that the first and second plaintiffs sign the plaint within one month and the necessary amendment be made in the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin; failure to comply is to be reported to this Court.

Broader precedent or legal innovation: The opinion applies established authorities and Code provisions to hold that the absence of co-plaintiffs' signatures on a plaint—where the suit was filed with their knowledge and authority—is a curable formal defect. The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying existing case law and procedural provisions.

Judge Yahya Ali J. concurred with the Chief Justice's conclusions.

Source: The opinion text provided.

    Subbiah Pillai Alias S.S.M Subramania Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pillai And Others.

    The Chief Justice:—The three plaintiffs and the first defendant are first cousins, being grandsons of one Sankarapandiam Pillai; the plaintiffs are the sons of Subbasamia Pillai and the first defendant is the son of Narayanaswamia Pillai, who were sons of the parties' grandfather. Sankarapandiam Pillai married a second time in 1915. Previously, there was an arrangement in the family regarding the division of the property belonging to it and Sankarapandiam Pillai took a one third share. He died in 1923. A son by the second wife, Subbiah Pillai, died in 1925. The widow's death took place in 1943. The three plaintiffs claimed three shares, each one-fourth, in Sankarapandiam Pillai's property, agreeing that the first defendant was entitled to the remaining one-fourth share. The plaintiffs' claims were the subject-matter of the suit. It is unnecessary to refer to the second and third defendants.

    After the pleadings were closed, issues were framed, the first issue being as follows.

    “Whether the suit is not maintainable for the reason that all the plaintiffs have not signed the plaint but the third plaintiff has signed under a power?”

    The third plaintiff held a power of attorney from his two brothers, the other two plaintiffs, and he alone signed the plaint. The defendant's contention, arising out of that circumstance, is the following: the power of attorney does not authorise the third plaintiff to institute suits on behalf of the other two plaintiffs; consequently the suit, instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, can be treated only as a suit by the third plaintiff and the sole relief to which he is entitled is a one-fourth share in his grandfather's estate; the value of that share is such that the suit would fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Munsif of Tuticorin and not within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court; consequently that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

    The above issue was tried as a preliminary issue on the 18th July 1945 when it was held that the power of attorney, although not happily worded, did include authority for the third plaintiff to institute suits for and on behalf of the other two plaintiffs and, consequently, the objection raised by the first defendant fell to the ground.

    It is convenient to go back in the order of date and to refer to an application, I.A No. 367 of 1944, filed by the plaintiffs at the same time as the presentation of the plaint in the suit on the 22nd November 1944. In that application, it was alleged that the third plaintiff held a power of attorney from the first and second plaintiffs authorising him to conduct all proceedings on their behalf in the capacity of their agent. That application was granted. Later, on the 28th March 1945, the plaintiffs instituted a further application praying that permission may be given to enable the first and second plaintiffs to ratify the proceedings taken by the third plaintiff on their behalf. In the affidavit supporting that application it is stated that the suit, in which the plaint is signed by the third plaintiff, is one instituted on behalf of all the plaintiffs and, in paragraph 8, an offer was made by the first and second plaintiffs to sign the plaint. That application came for disposal on the same day as the trial of the preliminary issue on 18th July 1945, and, in the light of the finding on the issue, the application was dismissed as being unnecessary. The first defendant presented a civil revision petition against the order recording the finding upon the effect of the power of attorney and the correctness of the third plaintiff instituting the suit on behalf of himself and the other plaintiffs. That was presented on the 31st July 1945 and subsequently it has been withdrawn and dismissed; but no point arises out of the dismissal.

    The suit was posted for trial before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge on the 2nd August 1945; it was known some time previous to the 2nd August that the suit would be heard on that date. Upon it being called on for trial, an application was presented by an Advocate appearing on behalf of the first defendant asking for an adjournment until an order for stay of the suit could be obtained from the High Court in respect of the civil revision petition. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, having heard the application, refused to accept it and it was dismissed. Thereupon the Advocate appearing for the first defendant reported that he had no instructions and withdrew, and the suit was tried in his and his client's absence and a decree was passed in plaintiffs' favour.

    In the present appeal two points arise: (1) challenging the correctness of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the application for adjournment and (2) against the finding on the preliminary issue relating to the effect of the power of attorney, that it authorised the third plaintiff to institute and conduct proceedings for and on behalf of the first and second plaintiffs.

    In regard to the first point it was conceded that the first defendant was aware, sometime before that the suit was posted for trial to the 2nd August 1945, that that was the date upon which the hearing would take place, and that ordinarily the first defendant should have instructed his Counsel to appear and to defend the suit; he also should have been present himself. It would seem that he preferred to rely upon the result of the presentation of the civil revision petition to obtain the indulgence of the Court by the grant of an adjournment. There was no reason whatever for his absence, save a deliberate intention to abstain from the Court when previously he had been apprised that the hearing would take place.

    Refusal or grant of an application for adjournment is a matter of discretion, which discretion, of course, must judicially and properly be exercised. There is nothing here which warrants interference with the dismissal of the application by the learned Subordinate Judge. It was urged that the first defendant should be afforded an opportunity of presenting his case to the Court and a decision being obtained in light of the evidence and other matters sought to be put forward on behalf of the first defendant. That was well appreciated at the time when no step was taken in that behalf and what could have been done on 2nd August 1945: No reason has been forthcoming to explain his failure to do so. In my view there is nothing justifying interference with the learned Additional Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the application for an adjournment. It follows that there is no occasion to remand the suit back to the trial Judge for rehearing.

    In regard to the second point. At the outset it has to be observed that it is devoid of any merits. At the highest there was a failure to follow the strict provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. O. 6, R. 14, provides that every pleading shall be signed by the party and his pleader if any, provided that, where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. That provision corresponds to the provisions of S. 578 of the Code of 1882.

    In Mohinimohan Das v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das (1), one of the three plaintiffs had not signed the plaint. In reference to that omission their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed at page 582 of the report as follows:

    “In the first place it was said that the plaints were signed and verified by Mohini Mohan alone. But that is immaterial. There is no rule providing that a person named as a co-plaintiff is not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signs and verifies the plaint.”

    Later at page 583, it is observed, further, that,

    “Their Lordships think that Khatter Mohun, as well as Gobind Rani, became a party, as plaintiff, on the 2nd November 1883, and that the suits therefore are not barred by lapse of time.”

    Basdeo v. John Smidt (2), is a decision to a like effect where it was held that a defect in the signature of the plaint or the absence of signature, where it appears that the suit was in fact filed with the knowledge and by the authority of the plaintiff named therein, may be cured by amendment at any stage of the suit and is not a ground for interference in appeal. Those two decisions were given at the time when the Code of 1882 was in force. In Basdeo's case reference is made to S. 578 of the old Code which corresponds to S. 99 of the Code of 1908. That section enacts that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. The result of the above decisions by the Judicial Committee and the High Court at Allahabad is that where a plaintiff has not signed a plaint, filed with his knowledge and consent, it is an omission which can be cured and, indeed, should be corrected in the interests of justice. Regarding O. 6, R. 14 of the Code, the commentary in the late Sir Dinsha Fardunji Mulla's work on the Code of Civil Procedure refers to the two cases cited above and then adds this:

    “If the defect is not discovered until the case comes on for hearing before an appellate Court the appellate Court may order the amendment to be made in that Court. The appellate Court ought not to dismiss the suit or interfere with the decree of the lower Court merely because the plaint has not been signed. The omission to sign or verify a plaint is not such a defect as could affect the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court.”

    With respect I subscribe fully to the observations in Sir Dinsha Fardunji Mulla's work.

    Considerable argument was addressed to us relating to the effect and extent of the authority given to the third plaintiff by the power-of-attorney issued to him by his two brothers. In light of the conclusion at which I have arrived and the direction which will be given, it is unnecessary to consider whether the interpretation and construction placed upon the power by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge were correct. The objection raised in respect of the absence of the signatures of the first and second plaintiffs is one of high technicality and devoid of all merits, and the curing of any defect, which there may be, comes within the provisions of S. 99 of the Code.

    It may well be that the direction which I propose to give in a moment may not be required, in the light of the order which was made on the 22nd November 1944 by which the third plaintiff was permitted to conduct all proceedings on behalf of the other two plaintiffs. It is unnecessary to consider whether that order should or should not have been made. It was made and it still stands not having been set aside or challenged. Nevertheless, it seems by way ex abunanti cautela, that the first and second plaintiffs should sign the plaint. There is abundant authority for this Court to give that direction and there will be an order for them to sign the plaint within one month and the amendment of the pleading will be carried out in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin. If this direction is not followed then the matter will be reported to this Court forthwith.

    The result of the appeal is that it will be dismissed with costs.

    Yahya Ali J.:—I agree.

    N.R.R

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    Subbiah Pillai Alias S.S.M Subramania Pillai v. Sankarapandiam Pillai And Others.
    (Dec 18, 1947)