JUDGMENT: (Per G.S Patel, J.)

1. On 11th January 2013, a Division Bench of this Court passed a detailed order in this writ petition. The facts were briefly set out. Some of the documents were considered. The Court arrived at a prima-facie conclusion of non-compliance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in D.K Basu v. State of West Bengal 1997 1 SCC 416 in matters of illegal detention. The Division Bench directed the Principal District Judge, Pune, to nominate any Judicial Magistrate, First Class (not one dealing with any of pending cases in this matter) to hold an enquiry. The Judicial Magistrate was required to call for the record from the police, to allow the petitioner to adduce documentary and oral evidence and to issue witness summonses to the witnesses concerned. The police authorities, too, were allowed to lead evidence. The Judicial Magistrate was required to enquire into the petitioner's allegations and, in particular, the allegations that the petitioner was illegally detained by the police from 25 to 30 January 2012. The Judicial Magistrate was required to submit a sealed report before 30 April 2013, and was also to forward the papers placed before him and the evidence led before him in this enquiry. The petition was then to be placed for final hearing after receipt of the report.

2. On 3rd September 2013, the Judicial Magistrate's report dated 5 August 2013 was placed before us. With the assistance of the learned advocates for the parties, we perused it. We found that the State was attempting to accept the report only in part. We noted that the petition sought a public law remedy claiming compensation for his illegal detention, and that the Judicial Magistrate's report, submitted pursuant to the earlier directions, was that there was, in fact, such an illegal detention. We placed the matter of final orders on 17 September 2013. That is how the petition came to be taken up for final hearing.

3. In the meantime, the State Government filed Civil Application (L) No. 399 of 2013, seeking a quashing of the Judicial Magistrate's enquiry report.

4. We took up both the petition and the civil application for hearing and final disposal.

5. In these circumstances, Rule in the writ petition. The respondents waive service. By consent, the writ petition and the civil application are both taken up for hearing and final disposal.

6. The petitioner alleges that on 25 January 2012, the 3 and 4 respondents took him into custody. This, he says, was illegal. He was not produced before a Judicial Magistrate till five days later, on 30 January 2012. He also says that on the day following his arrest — which he says is entirely illegal — he was severely assaulted by the 3 and 4 respondents who tried to extract a confession from him. The petitioner's family visited the Crime Branch Unit No. 3 repeatedly from 27 to 29 January 2012. They were told on 27 January 2012 that the petitioner would be produced in court the following day. On that day, they were told he would be produced before court on the next day. On 30 January 2012, the petitioner's family made a representation to the 2nd respondent (the Commissioner of Police) and to the Principal District Judge at Pune. On 29 January 2012, the petitioner was taken to Sassoon Hospital for a medical check. He was then kept in the Lashkar lock-up at Pune and was only produced before the Judicial Magistrate on 30 January 2012.

7. The petitioner relies on affidavits of his family members as evidence of their repeated visits. He has also placed on record, after the petition was allowed to be amended, extracts of the relevant register from the Police Commissioner's office and these are said to show his family members' visits to that office since the entries in that register record the names of the petitioners' family members. The police, for their part, have filed affidavits disputing the petitioner's contentions.

8. These are, broadly, the facts on which this court directed a judicial enquiry. There is also a discussion in this court's order of 11 January 2013 regarding the station diary, but as that forms a part of the enquiry report, we will turn to that while considering the report itself.

9. The controversy before us is now considerably narrowed by the report dated 5 August 2013 of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at Pune. We must, before we consider the report itself, commend the learned JMFC, Shri Deepak L. Bhagwat, for his painstaking, careful and meticulous handling of what was undoubtedly an extremely sensitive and contentious matter. We will discuss his conclusions later in this judgment.

10. On 2 April 2013, the learned JMFC informed the parties of the scope of the enquiry entrusted to him and of the points that fell for determination. Parties were allowed to lead evidence. The petitioner examined seven witnesses. These were: (1) his father; (2) his mother; (3) his sister; (4) Assistant Sub-Inspector Shankar; (5) the petitioner's other sister; (6) the petitioner himself; and (7) Police Head Constable Aum. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Mahadeo B. Tambade, was examined as court witness and was cross-examined by both parties. The 1st and 2 respondents closed their evidence without examining any witnesses. The 3 and 4 Respondents mounted their defence separately. They examined three witnesses: (1) the 4 respondent; (2) the 3 respondent; and (3) the Police Inspector of Swargate Police Station, one Babasaheb Koli. Documentary evidence was also produced and entered in evidence.

11. The learned JMFC framed two points for determination, and answered them as follows:

1. Whether the petitioner Sagar Balu Ubhe was illegally detained from 25 January 2012 till 30 January 2012?

In the Affirmative

2. Whether there is compliance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as regards as the arrest as well as the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of D.K Basu v. State of West Bengal, Cri. Writ Petition 592/1987, decided on 18-12-1996?

In the Negative.

12. The petitioner's case in the enquiry was that on 25 January 2012, he and his sister Nanda (who he examined as witness) went to the Pushpak bakery in Pune on Sinhagad road near his house. The petitioner moved to the side of the road to relieve himself. The 3 and 4 respondents came down the road in a vehicle. There was other police staff present as well. The petitioner was bundled into the car and taken to the Crime Branch, Unit No. 2 at the Police Commissioner's office. The petitioner was made to sit in a room. A few minutes later, the 3 and 4 respondents came in, along with others, and began assaulting the petitioner. He was beaten with wooden rods or sticks and belts. The next morning, he was beaten again. The police asked him about the location of vehicles and guns. The petitioner asked the police to inform his family. They did not. He was assaulted repeatedly on 27 and 28 January 2012. On 29 January 2012, at about 5:00 pm, he was taken to the Sassoon Hospital, ostensibly for an examination, but the police did not permit the doctor to examine him. They only obtained the doctor's signature on some chit or document. The petitioner was then brought back to the Crime Branch, Unit II and later carried to the Lashkar Police Station. On 30 January 2012, the petitioner was produced in court. His advocate was not permitted to take his signature. He was threatened and warned not to make any complaint to the court. For that reason, the petitioner made no complaint. The court discharged him. The police, however, did not release him but handed him over to the custody of the Yerawada Police.

13. In his report, the learned JMFC noted that the respondents' attempts to make capital of the petitioner's failure to mention the bakery was a matter of no consequence, particularly since the petitioner's pleading was that he was outside his house when he was picked up. Equally irrelevant was the suggestion that if the petitioner had not had occasion previously to visit the Police Commissioner's office and the crime branch unit, he could not possibly have known their location; the learned JMFC quite correctly assessed this as inconsequential.

14. The petitioner's other family members who deposed supported his case. They deposed that they made enquiries with the Dattawadi Police Station, the Bund Garden Police Station and finally at the Police Commissioner's office, entering through Gate No. 3. They learned that the petitioner was indeed incarcerated there. They were not allowed to meet him. They then attended court on 27 January, hoping that the petitioner would be produced on that day. He was not. They went back to the Commissioner's office. This process of waiting in court and then returning to the Commissioner's office was repeated on 28 and 29 January 2012.

15. On 30 January 2012, the petitioner's father, Balu, filed a complaint with the Principal District Judge, Pune and the Commissioner of Police. The Principal District Judge directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate to act in urgency. The Chief Judicial Magistrate received the complaint at 5:25 pm on 30 January 2012. She conducted an enquiry. In the enquiry before the learned JMFC, the respondents contended that since the petitioner had been produced after 2:00 pm in court and the complaint was filed after 5:00 pm, it was evident that the complaint was false for it followed the petitioner's production before a court. The learned JMFC considered the material and found, among other things from its language and form, that the complaint was drafted by an advocate, a process that would undoubtedly have taken some time and had, therefore, preceded the petitioner's production in court. In any event, at about 5:00 pm, the petitioner was handed over to the custody of the Yerawada Police and, as such, there was nothing that could be said to be untoward about the complaint filed by the petitioner's father, its timing or its form. The learned JMFC also noted that on 30 January 2012, other members of the petitioner's family filed affidavits, based on legal advice received. There are also some discrepancies in these affidavits but, in our view, the learned JMFC was correct in seeing these are immaterial and fully explicable.

16. There is then the matter of the entries in the register at Gate No. 3 of the Police Commissioner's office. The petitioner's family members claimed to have made repeated visits to this office through this gate. The entries were marked in evidence. Balu, the petitioner's father, admitted that he had made an incorrect statement saying that he had signed the register. He said he believed he had done so; the entries do not show his signature. The entries made by the petitioner's sister, Kunda alias Rupali, were affirmed by her in her testimony. The learned JMFC correctly held that there was not much to be made about the fact that she sometimes used her maiden name and at other times her name changed after marriage. The signature of the petitioner's younger brother, Rahul, was also identified. Paras 27, 35 and 36 of the report are, in our view, remarkable for several reasons. Not only does the learned JMFC correctly assess the evidentiary value to be attached to Balu's testimony, and to that of the other family members, but he does so with sensitivity, understanding and an uncommon breadth of mind, finding that these discrepancies are minor and insufficient to displace the documentary evidence of those entries that were proved and established. The notion that the petitioner's family members sent others to the Police Commissioner's office, masquerading as the petitioner's family, and so as to “procure” entries is, in our view, utterly absurd. This seems more an argument of desperation. Several entries show the names of the petitioner's sisters, brother, and parents. The reason for the visit is shown as “Sagar Ubhe”, i.e, the petitioner. Dates are noted, as are times. The visits were, as the report notes, consistent and daily from the 26 to the 29 of January 2012. The learned JMFC rightly noted that this itself is eloquent testimony of the petitioner's family having been told that the petitioner had been brought to, and kept at, the Crime Branch Unit No. 2 attached to the Police Commissioner's office; and that this material strengthens the petitioner's case. We have no reason to differ from this view. The contrary view would, in our understanding, be merely incoherent and incapable of acceptance. As the learned JMFC noted, when considering the evidence of persons who are not well educated — the petitioners' parents are both illiterate — it is neither fair nor just to demand the kind of exactitude and precision one may seek from those who might well be expected to know better. These are simple, direct folk who found themselves in a situation of extreme anxiety and stress. Minor inconsistencies ought not to be allowed to dislodge their testimony altogether.

17. What is the case of the police? They claim that the arrest was not on 25 January 2012 at all. It was made on 29 January 2012, four days later. The petitioner was arrested because he was found to be in possession of a motor cycle with the registration number MH-12-VC-3748, suspected to be stolen, and later found to be the one registered as MH-12-AJ-6968. The petitioner was therefore arrested by the police head constable Kolpe of the Crime Branch at 5:30 pm. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 claimed that they received information about this stolen motor cycle and, therefore, they went to the Pune Station area with Kolpe and others. There they apprehended the petitioner with the motor cycle in question at about 4:30 pm. He could not explain how he came to be in possession of it. At this, Kolpe seized the vehicle and the petitioner was taken to the Crime Branch where, at 5:30 pm, he was arrested under section 41(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”).

18. It is at this stage that the narrative takes a curious and, as we shall see, dark turn. Police Head Constable Aum, then the ASI at the Bund Garden Police Station, deposed that Kolpe lodged a report under section 41(1)(d) of the CrPC. An entry was made in the Station Diary. A carbon copy of the diary was produced in evidence, as was a copy of Kolpe's report. Aum produced the original arrest register, and the relevant extract was marked in evidence. Now there is a visible difference in the ink in writing FIR No. 22 on the arrest/court surrender form. This discrepancy is also noted in this court's order dated 11 January 2013, to which we have referred earlier, and by which the enquiry was directed to be made.

19. The extract of the arrest register was marked in evidence. The relevant entry is Sr. No. 73. The date and time of arrest are shown as 29-01-2012/17-30 (or 5:30 pm). The learned JMFC found clear evidence of tampering. There is scoring and overwriting on the date 29. The entries before and after the one in question show no sign of any such over-writing or scoring. They are written with assurance and fluency. The learned JMFC found that the numeral ‘9’ had been tampered with and altered. Now this material must be contrasted with the evidence of the petitioner and his family. No doubt there are inconsistencies in that evidence, but these are immaterial and not unexpected given the petitioner's and his family's background, education and the fact that they found themselves in a nerve-wracking situation of extreme anxiety. Allowance could be made for them for all these reasons. The same simply cannot be said for the police officials. They are expected to perform their duties in accordance with the rigour of their training and the requirements of their official functions. Maintaining the integrity and accuracy of official records is of paramount importance. Unexplained overwriting and scoring indicates tampering with official records. Indeed, there should never be any such over-writing or scoring out. When, in addition, the reasons given fall far short of the standards of credibility we are entitled to expect from the police, then the evidentiary assessment must tilt against the police. The learned JMFC found that the respondents' version was unworthy of credence as to the time and date of the petitioner's arrest. He concluded that he had, in fact, been apprehended and detained on 25 January 2012. Before us, there was nothing whatever to indicate that the learned JMFC was in error in his appreciation of this material.

20. The only answer to this issue of scoring out seems to be that it was a genuine mistake and an error. Mrs. Kantharia, learned APP, points out that the previous entry (No. 73) was dated 28 January 2012. There is no dispute that the succeeding entry, No. 74, pertained to the petitioner. Therefore, she submits, it could only have been made on 29 and not before. In our view, given the scope of the enquiry, that submission raises more questions than it answers. It is also a strawman argument in that it proceeds on a hypothesis never propounded by anyone, viz., that the petitioner was formally arrested on 25 January 2012, i.e, that there was an official record of his arrest on that day. This is nobody's case. The petitioner's specific case is that he was illegally detained from 25 January 2012 and not produced before a court till 30 January 2012. We fail to understand how a seasoned police officer could make such an egregious error in recording the date or, indeed, for that matter, why such a scoring out or over-writing was necessary at all and only for the entry in question. Surely if it was the case that such mistakes are not uncommon, evidence could have been produced of similar corrections or over-writing and which are innocuous. There is no such evidence at all. Indeed, it seems to us that the learned JMFC was entirely correct in concluding that the illegal detention began on 25 January 2012. All that seems to have happened is that since the petitioner was being produced on 30 January 2012, and since by that time the petitioner's family had already made repeated visits to the Police Commissioner's office and the Crime Branch, an entry was caused to be made in the register in question as if to show that the petitioner's arrest was only on 29 January 2012. It was very likely for this reason that the correct date of 25 January 2012 was scored out and over-written with the date of 29.

21. What was the role of respondents nos. 3 and 4, the two police officers named? The evidence of Waghmare, respondent no. 4, showed that on 25 January 2012, from 1:30 pm to 9:00 pm, he was on duty in a protest prevention vehicle in relation to the Chief Minister's visit. He was on duty till about 8:00 pm. He produced a copy of his daily movement log. His evidence was corroborated. 25 January 2012 was also the day when a State Transport bus driver, due to severe mental illness, went on a rampage and killed and injured several people in the Swargate area. This required additional police detail during the Chief Minister's visit. Respondent No. 3, Gutkule, deposed that he was on duty at the Crime Branch at 9:30 am. At about 10:30 am he rushed to the Swargate Police Station in regard to the State Transport bus driver's case. He was there for the rest of the day, till about 6:00 pm, when he began patrolling the jurisdiction of the Sahakarnagar Police Station. He went off-duty at 10:00 pm and returned home. He, too, produced his daily movement log.

22. Now there is also some evidence of the 3 and 4 respondents being acquainted with the petitioner and his family. Proceedings under section 107 and Chapter VIII of the CrPC had been taken by them against the petitioner. There were also charges of theft and housebreaking. There were, in addition, proceedings against other members of the petitioner's family. There is no doubt that there have been several prosecutions lodged against the petitioner and his family, as also some externment proceedings. Whether these were all at the instance of the 3 and 4 respondents is immaterial, for there seems little doubt that the petitioner, his family and the 3 and 4 respondents were acquainted with each other, and there was clearly a great deal of hostility inter-se. That, along with the unchallenged and uncontroverted testimony of the 3 and 4 respondents as to their movements on the day in question, only puts them out of the frame in the matter of the petitioner being apprehended on 25 January 2012 and his further detention thereafter; it does not materially alter the fact or illegality of that detention.

23. For these reasons, the learned JMFC answered the first point in the affirmative. The enquiry report then contains a discussion about the events after the petitioner's discharge on 30 January 2012 and his subsequent re-arrest by the Yerawada police. It is not, in our view, to discuss this aspect of the matter further except to note that here again we are in agreement with the report and find the reasoning flawless.

24. The question then remained as to compliance with the requirements of the CrPC, specifically Sections 50, 50A, 56 and 57, and the guidelines in D.K Basu. That the petitioner was discharged by the court on 30 January 2012 is not in dispute. He was, however, not released. He was taken into custody by the Yerawada Police. This, too, is undisputed. In short, as soon as the court discharged the petitioner, the police promptly handed him over to their counterparts of the Yerawada Police, who arrested him at 5:30 pm on the very day of his discharge and under the same section 41(1)(d) of the CrPC. That detention is also illegal.

25. Sections 50 and 50A of the CrPC embody salutary provisions for the protection of those arrested. Whenever a person is arrested without a warrant, the arresting police officer or person must inform the arrested person of the full particulars of offence for which he is arrested and the grounds for that arrest. Where the arrest is in respect of a non-bailable offence, the accused must be informed of his right to be released on bail so that he may arrange for sureties to stand for him. An arrested person is also entitled, as a matter of right, to have the information relating to his arrest and the place where he is being held communicated to a friend, relative or other person named by the accused. The accused's rights must be told to him as soon as he is brought to the police station, and a record is to be maintained of every such arrest. A Magistrate before whom the arrested person is produced must satisfy himself that the accused has been informed of his rights and the records have been maintained. Section 56 requires that a person arrested without a warrant be taken without unnecessary delay before a Magistrate who has jurisdiction or before the officer in charge of a police station; and Section 57 specifically forbids any police officer from detaining in custody a person arrested without a warrant for an unreasonable period, and, in any case, absent a special order of a Magistrate under section 167, for more than 24 hours. These are provisions very similar in nature, though not as expansive in scope, as those firmly established in criminal jurisprudence everywhere, perhaps most notably in Miranda v. Arizona.2 We do not, yet, follow the rigour and inflexibility of Miranda; but the provisions of our CrPC are no less demanding within their own sphere of influence. They admit of no exception, except that made by special statute. Any transgression of these provisions renders the State liable to a civil remedy.

26. In D.K Basu, a letter to the Chief Justice of India was treated as a writ petition. The Supreme Court examined the matter of coercive custodial interrogation, incarceration beyond permissible limits, atrocities and custodial death. A “custodial jurisprudence” came to be enunciated, and the Supreme Court evolved guidelines for awarding compensation to the victims. In doing so, it formulated several general guidelines. Two of these are material for our purposes, as noted by the learned JMFC:

3. A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person know to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.

5. The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.

27. In the present case, we are satisfied that both these guidelines were violated, as were the statutory provisions of the CrPC. The petitioner was not allowed to contact his family. His family was not informed of his arrest and detention till 29 January 2012. He does not appear to have been told that he was entitled as a matter of right to have someone informed of his arrest. That he himself asked that his family be informed is irrelevant; he had to be informed of this right, and that seems never to have been done, very possibly for the reason that the respondents totally deny arresting him on 25 January 2012 at all. We have found no substance whatever in the respondents' contention that the arrest was not till 29 January 2012. The absence of evidence of the involvement of respondents nos. 3 and 4 does not alter this position. As we have noted, there is no explanation at all for the apparent manipulation of the records as to the date of the petitioner's arrest. Following D. K. Basu, we must, therefore, hold that the detention of the petitioner from 25 January 2012 to 30 January 2012 was entirely illegal, as was his subsequent arrest by the Yerawada police.

28. The principles evolved in D.K Basu have been followed ever since: Mehboob Batch v. State,3 Haricharan v. State of MP,4 and Sube Singh v. State of Haryana 2006 3 SCC 178 among them. But D.K Basu also enunciated the principle of monetary or pecuniary compensation as an appropriate and “indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the right to life of a citizen by public servants.” The State is vicariously liable for their acts. The objective is to provide a balm for State-inflicted wounds, not to punish the transgressor or offender. In this case, once the infringement of right to liberty has been established, it remains to determine the quantum of appropriate compensation. In S.P.S Rathore v. State of Haryana,6 while following

D.K Basu, the Supreme Court held that compensation can be awarded, but this is not jurisdiction that a court should lightly exercise under either Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The courts have consistently permitted monetary compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right, the Supreme Court held in S.P.S Rathore, noting a very large number of cases where this principle has been followed.7 No particular amount has been sought as compensation in the prayers in this writ petition, and, in our view, rightly, for this is a matter ever in the discretion of the court. That some compensation must be ordered to be paid is, in our view, an inescapable conclusion. What are the considerations we should bear in mind while assessing the quantum? The petitioner's antecedents are, we believe, entirely irrelevant and cannot be a mitigating circumstance in favour of the respondent; every person is entitled to the protection of the law, even every recidivist. Should compensation be adjusted according to the social station of the victim? We think not. The only gauge, as we see it, is an assessment of the conduct of the public servants. Where we find their conduct wanting, compensation must follow without regard to the status of the victim. Having regard to the facts of the case, the nature of the testimony and the conduct of the parties, it is our view that an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs is just compensation payable to the petitioner by the 1 respondent. In our view, this cannot be said to be an exorbitant sum, bearing in mind that the State Government has resisted and opposed the enquiry and has not once, but twice applied before us to have the enquiry report quashed. A very considerable amount of judicial time has been thus expended on this matter in one forum or the other. Even otherwise, by present-day standards, we do not think that the compensation we have in mind can at all be considered to be unreasonably high. Needless to add, this amount of compensation is entirely without prejudice to the civil remedies, if any, available to the petitioner.

29. Prayers (a), (b), (c-1) and (d) of the petition do not survive. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (c). The 1 respondent is directed to pay an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to the petitioner as compensation for his illegal detention from 25 January 2012 to 30 January 2012 within 8 weeks from today. The Civil Application for quashing of the enquiry report is dismissed.

30. At this stage the learned counsel for the Respondents seeks stay of the operation of this order. In view of our observations regarding the conduct of the Respondents, and, equally, the fact that we have granted 8 weeks' time to pay the compensation amount, the request for stay is rejected.