Kamani Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhuwaneshwar Refineries Pvt. Ltd.

ORDER

1. The Plaintiff is an existing Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956, engaged inter alia in the business of manufacturing and marketing edible oils of all kinds. The Plaintiff has through its predecessor KAMANI OILS been using the trade mark KAMANI in respect of edible oils, vegetable oils and fats and other like goods since the last nearly five decades.

2. The Defendant is an existing Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956, engaged inter alia in the business of manufacturing and marketing refined edible oil.

3. The Plaintiff has filed the present Suit against the Defendant for a perpetual order and injunction restraining the Defendant from infringing the registered trade mark of the Plaintiff ‘RISO’, and also from passing off their goods/products as those of the Plaintiff by using the mark ‘RISO-LITE’, or any other mark deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's registered mark. By the present Notice of Motion, the Plaintiff has sought a temporary injunction against the Defendant from manufacturing and marketing its rice bran oil by using the mark ‘RISO-LITE’. The Plaintiff has previously obtained an ex-parte ad-interim order on 03.12.13, whereby the Defendant was restrained from using the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’ pending the hearing and final disposal of the Suit. Vide an order dated 13.12.13, this Court had granted leave under Clause XIV of the Letters Patent for the joinder of the cause of action for passing off along with the cause of action for infringement.

4. According to the Plaintiff, they are the successors-in-title of the registered trade mark KAMANI which is used in respect of their edible oils since the year 1964. The Plaintiff has stated that over the years it has been involved in conducting its own research and development and it has to its credit a fully equipped application centre at Khopoli which offers custom made products for specific requirements viz. chocolate making, baking, frying, ice cream etc. The Plaintiff also deals in specialty oils which have a health-conscious customer base in niche markets across India. The Plaintiff has been manufacturing and marketing its rice bran oil under the trade mark ‘RISO’ which is described by the Plaintiff as “The World's Healthiest” edible oil or the “Healthy Heart Oil” having unique properties with neutraceutical values and is rich in oryzanol being a natural anti-oxidant which helps reduce cholesterol and triglycerides, is stable with good fry-life having a nut-like flavour and is one of the closest to the American Heart Association (AHA) recommendations. The Plaintiff has submitted that the said trade mark ‘RISO’, was honestly and independently conceived and adopted by the Plaintiff in April 2011, and has been continuously used by the Plaintiff since July 2011. The label of the trade mark ‘RISO’ has been annexed at Exhibit A to the Plaint.

5. The Plaintiff has stated that within a short span of time since its launch, its rice bran oil bearing the trade mark ‘RISO’ proved to be an instant hit with the masses and the consumers, so much so that the said trade mark ‘RISO’ was voted the “Product of the Year” 2013, in the cooking medium and edible oil category in a survey conducted by Nielson. The copies of correspondence and material evidencing the said award are annexed at Exhibit G to the Plaint. The Plaintiff further states that since its launch in the year 2011, the said mark ‘RISO’ has been widely used and extensively publicized and promoted through various mediums of publicity. The Plaintiff has further submitted that the trade mark ‘RISO’ has become very well-known and popular and has acquired tremendous reputation and goodwill which is owned by the Plaintiff. It is stated by the Plaintiff that in the edible oil business, the trade mark ‘RISO’ is solely and exclusively associated with the Plaintiff and none else, and thus statutory and valuable common law rights have come to be vested in favour of the Plaintiff with respect to the trade mark ‘RISO’.

6. It is submitted by the Plaintiff that it has acquired registration of the trade mark ‘RISO’ (label) on 27.07.12 and thus is the registered proprietor of the trade mark ‘RISO’ bearing registration No. 2371530 in Class 29. The said registration is valid, subsisting and in force. The Plaintiff has annexed a copy of its Registration Certificate at Exhibit B to the Plaint.

7. The Plaintiff has furnished its sales figures and advertisement expenditure for the said trade mark along with copies of sales invoices and newspaper advertisement cut outs in support of its case for passing off. It is submitted that the registration of the trade mark ‘RISO’ dates back to 27.07.12 and the use thereof by the Plaintiff to July 2011. The Plaintiff has submitted that though the registration granted for ‘RISO’ is with respect to the label, it makes no difference as the word ‘RISO’ is the leading and essential feature in the said label and that ‘RISO’ will be the word spoken by a consumer while buying the said goods of the Plaintiff. It is submitted that the Defendant is using the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’, which is a deceptively similar mark to the Plaintiff's trade mark ‘RISO’. It is further submitted that the Defendant is using the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’ in relation to identical goods which are covered under the Plaintiff's aforementioned registration.

8. It is submitted by the Plaintiff that sometime in November, 2013, the Plaintiff came to know about the Defendant having commenced the sale of its rice bran oil bearing the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’ in Akola, Maharashtra, and the Plaintiff had accordingly on 15.11.13 effected a purchase of the Defendant's goods bearing such impugned mark under an invoice from a retailer in Akola. Copy of the said invoice of such purchase made is annexed at Exhibit H to the Plaint. Also annexed at Exhibit H1 to the Plaint are coloured photographs of the Defendant's bottle depicting the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’ under which the Defendant is marketing and selling its rice bran oil. The Plaintiff has stated that on a perusal of the Defendant's product bearing the impugned mark, it can be seen that the Defendant has mentioned the letters TM next to the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’ representing that the Defendant has applied for registration of the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’. Upon investigating the matter by conducting a search of the records of the Trade Marks Registry, the Plaintiff found that the Defendant had filed an application for registration of the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’ being application No. 2401261 dated 24.09.12 in Class 29, a copy of which is annexed at Exhibit I to the Plaint. The Plaintiff has further stated that on perusing the said application dated 24.09.12, it is clear that the said Defendant has claimed proposed use of the said mark, thereby implying that the Defendant is a very recent entrant and has commenced use of the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’ much after the use of the Plaintiff's registered trade mark ‘RISO’.

9. The Learned Advocate appearing for the Plaintiff therefore submitted that the Defendants mark ‘RISO-LITE’ is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’ and is used in respect of identical goods. The Plaintiff contended that the whole of the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’ is subsumed in the Defendant's mark ‘RISO-LITE’. The only addition is the word “LITE” which is descriptive and which could be misunderstood to mean oil which is a healthy variant of the product ‘RISO’ that is light in nature and low on cholesterol, as the word “LITE” is a generic word of common usage in the edible oil trade, symbolic of the oil being light in nature and low on cholesterol. The Learned Advocate appearing for the Plaintiff also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Indchemie Health Specialties Pvt. Ltd. v. Naxpar Labs Pvt. Ltd. 2002 24 PTC 341 BOM DB wherein it was held that merely because the words are different, it makes no difference since the possibility of confusion remains. It is therefore submitted that merely because the Defendant is using the suffix “LITE”, the possibility of confusion is not eliminated.

10. On behalf of the Defendant the following contentions were raised:

i) that the word ‘RISO’ means ‘Rice’ in Italian language. It is a common prefix in earlier marks registered in respect of same or similar goods under Registration Nos. 1321808, 1572368, 1721912. The disclaimer, i.e “Registration of this Trade Mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the Descriptive Matters” was imposed upon the Plaintiff's alleged Registration No. 2371530. The Defendant further contended that the Registration No. 2371530 is a composite label, where ‘RISO’ is one of the elements written in a special and particular manner and the Plaintiff is entitled to claim infringement if the whole of the Plaintiff's registered label mark is adopted or when such a mark is deceptively similar to that of the Plaintiff's registered label mark. The Plaintiff does not have a separate registration for the word ‘RISO’ per se, and the Defendant's label is neither identical with nor deceptively similar to the label of the Plaintiff and is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.

ii) that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. AIR 1995 S.C 558 held that where a distinctive label is registered as a whole, such registration cannot possibly give any exclusive statutory right to the proprietor of the trade mark to the use of any particular word or name contained therein, apart from the mark as a whole. In view of the disclaimer condition, the Plaintiff's claim that the alleged registration confers upon them proprietorship and right to exclusive use of the descriptive and common element ‘RISO’ is baseless and devoid of merit.

iii) that the Plaintiff has not honestly and independently conceived and adopted the Trade Mark ‘RISO’ and that ‘RISO’ is in fact a common prefix in earlier marks registered in respect of same or similar goods (i.e ‘RISO’LA and ‘RISO’NA) as stated above by the Defendant. The Defendant relied on the judgement of the Division Bench of this Court in M/S. J.K Sons v. 1. M/S. Parksons Games & Sports 2011 47 PTC 443 Bom. DB to show that having borrowed a mark from an earlier registered mark or marks, itself constitutes infringement and that the Plaintiff is not entitled to seek relief against infringement or passing-off against the Defendants when the Plaintiff itself has committed the act of infringement.

iv) that the Defendant's label has no resemblance to and is neither identical nor deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's label mark and is not likely to deceive or cause confusion. The Defendant has placed reliance on the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories AIR 1965 S.C 980 where it was held that in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the use of Defendant's label mark is infringing the Plaintiff's label mark, the Court must compare the marks as a whole and not consider certain elements of the rival label marks in isolation.

v) that it must be presumed that the Plaintiff had knowledge about the earlier registered marks of “‘RISO’NA” and “‘RISO’LA” in respect of similar goods and therefore the Plaintiff cannot claim to have honestly adopted and conceived the said mark ‘RISO’.

vi) The balance of convenience is in favour of the Defendant.

11. In the light of the above it is submitted on behalf of the Defendant that the Notice of Motion deserves to be dismissed.

12. The Plaintiff has in rejoinder contended the following:

i) that the said trade mark of the Plaintiff- ‘RISO’ has been derived from the words Rice Bran Specialty Oil in April 2011. The Plaintiff denies that it had knowledge about ‘RISO’ being an Italian word meaning ‘Rice’ in English. The Plaintiff has stated that the Defendant itself has filed an application for the Registration of the impugned Trade Mark before the Registrar of Trade Marks and hence it cannot argue that the same is generic/descriptive. The Plaintiff relied on the following judgments wherein it has been held that when the Defendant itself applies for registration of a trade mark, it cannot argue subsequently that the same is descriptive/generic.

a) Automated Electric Limited v. R.K Dhawan 1999 PTC 19 81

b) Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science and Culture.6

c) Ultra Tech Cement limited v. Alaknanda Cement Pvt. Ltd. In Notice of Motion No. 1183 of 2009 in Suit No. 743 of 2009

d) Pidilite Industries ltd. v. Jubliant Agri & Consumers Products Limited. In Notice of Motion No. L 1717 of 2013 in Suit No. L. 752 of 2013

(ii) that the argument/contention of the Defendant that there is a disclaimer on the word ‘RISO’ in the Plaintiff's trade mark is incorrect as the disclaimer condition clearly does not include the word ‘RISO’, since the same was not mentioned in the advertisement published in the Trade Marks Journal and that if, apart from the descriptive words, ‘RISO’ was also to be disclaimed then there would be no registrable feature left in the Plaintiff's mark. The Plaintiff also submitted, without prejudice to the contention that there is no disclaimer on the word ‘RISO’, that even if it had been disclaimed, it would hardly alter the situation. The Plaintiff submitted that a proprietor of a disclaimed word can still maintain an action for passing off and in support of this contention, the Plaintiff has relied on the Judgments of Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. (supra) and Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Girnar Food & Beverages (P) Ltd. 2005 30 PTC

(iii) that the Defendant's contention that the Plaintiff has adopted ‘RISO’ from earlier registered trade marks ‘RISO’NA and ‘RISO’LA is unfounded. The Plaintiff has contended that the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’ is distinct and different from the said earlier trade marks. The Plaintiff states that the said trade marks are not in use in relation to the goods for which the Plaintiff's trade mark is being used and there is no evidence produced by the Defendant to show whether or not such prior registrations are in open use in the trade, what are the goods in respect thereof, extent of use etc. Except for making a bald assertion, the Defendant has failed to prove the use of the trade mark by the earlier registrants of ‘RISO’NA or ‘RISO’LA. The Plaintiff submitted that the said earlier trade marks are not in use in relation to the goods for which the Plaintiff's trade mark is being used, and that the mere presence of a mark on the Register does not prove its use. The Plaintiff has in support of this contention placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrilla Food Products Ltd. AIR 1960 S.C 142, The Plaintiff has submitted that the present action does not concern any proprietor of the earlier marks, but is an action purely between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The Plaintiff has relied on the judgment passed in P.M Diesels Ltd. v. S.M Diesels.. 1993 PTC 75 in support of this submission.

(iv) that there were no inconsistencies as alleged by the Defendant or otherwise in the registration applications made as regards the use of its trade mark ‘RISO’. The Plaintiff stated that the Defendant has adopted the impugned trade mark with full knowledge of the Plaintiff's registered and prior use of the distinctive trade mark ‘RISO’. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant has neither explained nor justified the adoption of its impugned mark, nor has it averred how and from where such a mark was conceived and adopted. The Plaintiff has relied on the judgment in the case of Bal Pharma Ltd.… v. Centaur Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.… 2002 24 PTC 226 where it was held that the Defendant ought to have conducted a search and if however he had taken a search and had come to know that the mark was the property of another person, then he cannot be heard to complain/assert that his adoption was honest.

13. I have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the case-laws cited by them. The first issue which needs to be considered is as to whether the Defendant's mark ‘RISO-LITE’ is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’.

14. The Defendant has submitted that the mark of the Defendant is distinct and different from that of the Plaintiff and there is no similarity whatsoever in the rival marks. According to the Defendant, the marks ‘RISO’ and ‘RISO-LITE’ are very different from each other. The Defendant has emphasized that the two rival marks are neither identical with nor deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's mark and that the said marks are distinguishable. The Plaintiff has denied and disputed the aforestated contentions of the Defendant and has submitted that applying the aforesaid test and considering the Defendant's mark as a whole, it is apparent that the Defendant's mark is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's mark.

15. The labels used by the Plaintiff and the Defendant are reproduced hereunder:

Plaintiff's label

Defendant's label

From the aforesaid labels it is clear that not only is the word ‘RISO’ a common feature in both the above labels, but the most prominent and most emphasized part in the labels are the words ‘RISO’ and ‘RISO-LITE’.

16. This Court in the case of Indchemie Health Specialties Pvt. Ltd. v. Naxpar Labs Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held in paragraph 8 of the Judgment:

“8. …………… the respondents mark “Cherish” is deceptively similar to the Appellants mark “Cheri”. If we compare the words “Cheri’ and “Cherish” they are structurally and visually similar as well as aurally similar and easily give rise to deception and confusion. It would be highly improbable to expect an ordinary person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection to notice the difference in the meaning of two words “Cheri” and “Cherish”, as there is great deal of similarity in the phonetics of these two words. This phonetic similarity taken in conjunction with the fact that there is also a similarity in the products undoubtedly confuses an ordinary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection and who may even be an illiterate. This is all the more manifest because the entire mark of the Appellants is incorporated in the mark of the Respondents. Therefore the Respondents mark “Cherish” is deceptively similar to the Appellants mark “Cheri” and is likely to deceive or cause confusion. Merely because the words are different it makes no difference since possibility of confusion remains.”

17. As submitted by the Plaintiff, the said trademark of the Plaintiff has been derived from the words Rice Bran Specialty Oil in April 2011. As correctly submitted by the Plaintiff, the Defendant's mark ‘RISO-LITE’ only has the suffix “LITE” to the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’. Such a suffix “LITE” could be used to mean light in terms of a healthy edible oil with low cholesterol. It is very likely that the Defendant's product with the mark ‘RISO-LITE’ will be commonly misunderstood as a healthier version of the Plaintiff's product with the mark ‘RISO’. Visually and structurally both the marks are similar in a manner which is likely to deceive the consumer.

18. Applying the aforesaid tests and considering both the rival marks as a whole, and for the reasons set out hereinabove, I am prima facie satisfied that the Defendant's mark ‘RISO-LITE’ is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's mark ‘RISO’.

19. The Defendant has contended that the Plaintiff has not honestly adopted and conceived the said mark ‘RISO’ since there were other marks already using the word ‘RISO’ existing in the market, namely “‘RISO’NA” and “‘RISO’LA” and thus submitted that the Plaintiff is not entitled to seek the relief against infringement/passing off when the Plaintiff itself has committed the act of infringement. The Defendant relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M/S. J.K Sons v. 1. M/S. Parksons Games & Sports, (supra) which held:

“But when the owner of a trade mark applies for an injunction to restrain the defendants from injuring his property by making false representations to the public, it becomes essential that the Plaintiff should not in his trade mark, or in his business connected with it, be himself guilty of any false or misleading representation; for, if, the Plaintiff makes any material false statement in connection with the property he seeks to protect, he loses, and very justly, his right to claim the assistance of a Court of Equity…. Thus the ratio would apply irrespective of the fact that the third party whose mark has been infringed by the Plaintiffs has not taken any action against the Plaintiff. Even on principle this must be so. The basis of the ratio is to deny an infringer a right based on the mark or work which infringes the mark or work of another. That being so, it matters not in an action against another whether or not the proprietor has taken any action against the Plaintiff.”

However, the Hon'ble Division Bench has in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said decision categorically held that once a party denies the allegation that they have infringed the mark of a third party, the party alleging such infringement is required to produce some evidence in support of its contention. In that case, the Appellant (Original Defendant) failed to produce any evidence save and except the statement that, “it is undisputed and/or a matter of common public knowledge that “State Express 555” is a globally renowned, reputed and well known name/mark. The “State Express 555” mark, packaging and/or carton is globally well known, renowned and/or has transborder reputation. To dispute the ownership of the “State Express 555” intellectual property, is to say the least, dishonest and fallacious”. The Division Bench therefore did not accept the contention of the Appellant (Original Defendant) that the Plaintiffs have infringed the trademark of a third party and are therefore themselves guilty of infringement. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said judgment which are relevant are therefore reproduced hereunder:

“14. The learned single Judge has however not held anything to the contrary. He has, with respect, rightly come to the conclusion that the appellants had not established the case on facts in this regard. It was necessary for the appellants to establish that the third party was in fact the proprietor of the mark 555 and that the respondents had infringed the same.

The respondents in their affidavit in rejoinder denied the allegations that they had infringed the mark of State Express 555. This denial therefore required the appellants to produce some evidence in support of this contention. However, in the affidavit in sur rejoinder, the appellants merely alleged:- “firstly, it is undisputed and/or a matter of common public knowledge that “State Express 555”, is a globally renowned, reputed and well known name/mark. The “State Express 555” mark, packaging and/or carton is globally well known, renowned and/or has transborder reputation. To dispute the ownership of the “State Express 555” intellectual property, is to say the least, dishonest and fallacious.” No material in support of theses allegations was produced even in the sur-rejoinder. The matter did not end there. The respondents in their sur sur rejoinder expressly stated that save and except bald words which were allegedly not true to the personal knowledge of the deponent of the sur rejoinder filed on behalf of the appellants, no material whatsoever had been produced to show the goodwill, reputation in India prior to 1976. The appellants were therefore, once again put to notice in this regard. They did not avail of the opportunity of adducing evidence in support of their contention.

15. In paragraph 4.1 of the affidavit in reply, it is merely alleged that the respondents are neither the proprietors, nor the owners of the said cartons; that the respondents' cartons are nothing but a slavish flagrant imitation and copy of the carton of the globally renowned cigarette ; that the respondents' cartons are not artistic works and do not contain any originality and that therefore, no action can lie at the instance of the respondents. The copies of the relevant cartons/packets of the State Express 555 are annexed to the affidavit. There are no averments, much less is there any evidence, to indicate that the respondents' marks/cartons/labels are an imitation of the mark State Express 555. It is significant to note that there is no evidence whatsoever to the effect that the third party has used the mark 555 or created the labels/cartons or marks prior to the creation of and use by the respondents of these marks/labels and cartons which may have persuaded the Court to come to the conclusion that the respondents had infringed the mark. Even assuming that we are entitled to do so, we are reluctant to rely upon our personal knowledge, if any we may have in this regard. The appellants ought to have adduced evidence in respect of their case that the respondents had themselves infringed the mark 555 which belongs to another. We are not inclined therefore to interfere with the conclusions of the learned single Judge in this regard”.

In the present case no evidence whatsoever has been adduced by the Defendant to illustrate the use of ‘RISONA’ or ‘RISOLA or that the ‘RISONA’ label is similar or deceptively similar to ‘RISOLA’.

20. However, the Plaintiff has rightly relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrilla Food Products Ltd. (supra), which held that:

“The series of marks containing the common element or elements therefore only assist the applicant when these marks are in extensive use in the market. The onus of proving such user is of course on the Applicant, who wants to rely on those marks… Now of course the presence of a mark in the register does not prove its user at all. It is possible that the mark may have been registered but not used. It is not permissible to draw any inference as to their user from the presence of the marks on the register.”

21. In view of the aforesaid arguments, the Defendant in the present case has not been able to show that the prior marks “‘RISO’NA” or “‘RISOLA” have actually been used or that they have a reputation or market of their own, which the Plaintiff by their mark of ‘RISO’ is infringing upon. Therefore, I am not inclined to agree with the Defendant in respect of this contention.

22. The Defendant has also contended that the Registrar of Trade Marks had imposed a disclaimer on the registration of the Plaintiff's mark viz., “registration of this trade mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the descriptive matters”. However, the Plaintiff has contended that the said disclaimer does not restrict their rights to the exclusive usage of the word ‘RISO’ and the proprietor of a disclaimed word can still maintain an action for passing off whilst placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit (supra), wherein it was held that:

“The disclaimer is only for the purposes of the Act. It does not affect the rights of the proprietor except such as arise out of registration. That is to say, the special advantages which the Act gives to the proprietor by reason of the registration of his trade mark do not extend to the parts or matters which he disclaims……….. Disclaimer does not affect those rights in any way.”

23. The Plaintiff has prima facie already proved that the said mark ‘RISO’ was honestly and concurrently adopted by them. The Defendant's argument that the word ‘RISO’ means rice in Italian and hence the same is descriptive in nature, in my opinion does not hold good. It is true that certain words are often borrowed from a foreign language and commonly used in India. However, ‘RISO’ is not one such word which is commonly used in India, and cannot be held as descriptive in the Indian context. Therefore, there is a possibility that people buying these products may not be well versed with the Italian meaning of the word ‘RISO’ and therefore it cannot be said that the said mark ‘RISO’ is descriptive in nature. Thus I am of the prima facie view that the said disclaimer on the registration of the Plaintiff's mark does not apply to the word ‘RISO’ in the present case.

24. The case laws relied upon by the Defendant do not assist them in advancing their case any further.

25. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, interim relief is granted in terms of prayer clauses (a) & (b) of the Notice of Motion, which are reproduced hereunder:

“(a) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant by themselves, their directors, their servants, agents, assignees and all those connected with them in their business be restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from manufacturing, marketing, selling, advertising and/or using in any manner whatsoever the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’, in relation to their rice bran oil and/or other like edible oils, or any mark identical with and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's registered trade mark ‘RISO’, for such use thereof by the Defendant amounts to infringement of the Plaintiff's trade mark ‘RISO’ registered under No. 2371530 in Class 29;

b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant by themselves, their directors, their servants, agents, assignees and all those connected with them in their business be restrained by an order and injunction of this Hon'ble Court from manufacturing, marketing, selling, advertising and/or using in any manner whatsoever the impugned mark ‘RISO-LITE’, in relation to their rice bran oil and/or other like edible oils, or any mark identical with and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's distinctive and prior used trade mark ‘RISO’, for such use thereof by the Defendant amounts to passing off their goods and business or enable others to pass off the Defendant's business and goods as and for those of the Plaintiff or in some way connected therewith”.

21. The above Notice of Motion is accordingly disposed of. The hearing of the Suit is expedited. The Defendants shall file their Written Statement on or before 9th June, 2014. Place the Suit for framing of issues on 13 June, 2014.