The School Tribunal, Amravati, by its judgment and order dated 7-7-2001, has dismissed Appeal No. 201 of 1992-A filed under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (“MEPS Act”), by the petitioner challenging his oral termination dated 29-9-2012 from service as an Assistant Teacher in the School run by the respondent No. 1-Society.
2. The School Tribunal has recorded the finding that the appointment of the petitioner was made on temporary year to year basis and it was terminated by an order dated 28-5-1992 and after termination, the petitioner has worked only for 10 days occasionally. It has been held that the appointment of the petitioner was to teach Standards IXth and Xth which were not recognized and hence, he was not entitled to the benefit of section 5(1) and (2) of the MEPS Act to treat his appointment on 24-6-1991 as on probation.
3. The undisputed factual position is as under:
The petitioner was initially appointed by an order dated 3-10-1989 as an untrained teacher w.e.f 5-10-1989. By another order dated 17-7-1990, the petitioner was appointed on purely temporary basis up to the end of academic session from 17-7-1990. In the meeting of the School Committee, held on 22-6-1991, Resolution No. 2 was passed, which reads as under;
“It is resolved that from amongst the candidates who appeared for personal interview for the post of Asstt. Teachers advertised in “Lok Doot”, Marathi Daily, Yavatmal, Dated 11th June, 1991, Shri Abdul Rafique s/o. Abdul Hamid, Yavatmal, be appointed as a Assistant Teacher with effect from 24-6-1991 in the Scale of T1400-40-1600-50-1650-EB-50-1960-EB-50-2250-EB-50-2300-60-2600.
His appointment is temporary, until further orders. He is B., Sc. B. Ed.
Proposed by: Md. Murtaza
Seconded by: Shri Ikramul Haque.
Resolution passed unanimously.”
Pursuant to the said resolution, the petitioner was issued an order of appointment dated 24-6-1991, containing clauses (2) and (3) as under:
“2. Your appointment is purely temporary until further orders from 24-6-1991 to until further orders. After expiry of the above period, your services will stand terminated without any notice.
3. The terms of your employment and conditions of service shall be as laid down in the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, and the Rules made thereunder.”
4. The aforesaid appointment of the petitioner was approved by the Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal, by his order dated 3-12-1991. In the last column of “tenure of appointment”, it is stated that it is from 24-6-1991 until further orders (25% quota of Graduate Teachers). Thereafter, the petitioner was terminated from service by an order in writing dated 28-5-1992. There is no reason stated in the order of termination except making reference to the order of appointment and the order of approval.
5. The petitioner claims that in spite of termination order dated 28-5-1992, he was permitted to work on the post till 29-9-1992. It was his stand that on 1-10-1992, the respondent No. 4-Ku. Sabha Nasreen d/o Abdul Samad Answari, was appointed in place of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, preferred an Appeal No. 201 of 1992-A, alleging that the respondents have orally terminated his services w.e.f 1-10-1992. The approval to the appointment of respondent No. 4 was also granted by the Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal, on 26-3-1992 and it is made subject to the result of the appeal filed by the present petitioner, which was pending before the School Tribunal.
6. To deal with findings of the School Tribunal, I have gone through the reply filed by the Management before the School Tribunal. It is not the case of the management that the petitioner was appointed to teach Standards IXth and Xth which was not then recognized. The specific stand taken by the Management before the School Tribunal and even in response to the present petition is as under:
“The answering respondents No. 1 to 3 submit that, the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher on 24-6-1991 purely on temporary basis in accordance with the resolution dt. 22-6-1991 of the School Committee, for Middle School (Class Vth to VIIIth)”
In view of this, the School Tribunal has committed an error in holding that the appointment of the petitioner was to teach Standards IXth and Xth which were not recognized on the date of appointment of the petitioner on 24-6-1991. Undisputedly, the classes of Standards Vth to VIIIth to which the petitioner was teaching, were recognized. Hence, the School Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal.
7. It is urged by Shri Thakkar, the learned counsel appearing for respondent-Management, that the petitioner was not possessing qualifications for being appointed as an Assistant Teacher to teach Middle School Classes from Standards Vth to VIIIth. According to him, the qualifications prescribed for appointment as an Assistant Teacher in the Middle School are S.S C., and D. Ed. He submits that the petitioner had obtained the Bachelor Degree in Science (B. Sc. Biology) and had obtained training qualification of B. Ed. on 14-6-1991. He submits that the petitioner was not possessing the qualification of D. Ed., and relying upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in case of Jayashree Sunil Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2000 (3) Mh. L.J 605, he has urged that B. Ed. qualification cannot be treated as equivalent to D. Ed qualification and the petitioner possessing B. Ed. qualification is not qualified to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Primary School.
8. The proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid judgment cannot be disputed. It is, however, not the stand taken in the reply filed by the respondent-Management before the School Tribunal that the petitioner was appointed to a post which required the qualification of S.S.C, D. Ed. and the petitioner was not qualified for being appointed as an Assistant Teacher to teach Middle School Classes as he was not possessing the qualification of D. Ed.
9. Shri Ateeque, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has invited my attention to the Government Circular dated 17-1-2001, which clearly states that out of four posts of Assistant Teacher in the Middle Schools teaching Standards Vth to VIIth, three posts are required to be filled in by the candidates possessing S.S C/H.S S.C, and D. Ed., whereas one post is required to be filled in by the candidate possessing graduate qualification and B. Ed., which is a training qualification. The petitioner was appointed to one post of teacher possessing qualification of B. Sc., B. Ed., which the petitioner had at the time of appointment. This fact is amply proved from the approval granted in the 25% quota of graduate teachers by the Education Officer on 3-12-1991 to the appointment of the petitioner. It is, therefore, held that the petitioner was qualified for appointment to the post.
10. The next question is whether the appointment of the petitioner by an order dated 24-6-1991 is to be treated as one on probation in terms of provisions of sub-section (2) of section 5 of MEPS Act. It is urged by Shri Thakkar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Management that the appointment on temporary basis can be made even in a permanent vacancy and such a discretion of the management is not taken away by the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the MEPS Act. For this proposition, he has relied upon the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in case of Ramkrishna Chauhan v. Seth D.M High School, reported in 2013 (2) Mh. L.J 713.
11. The main contentions are based upon the decision of the Full Bench in Ramkrushna Chauhan's case, cited supra, and hence the questions, which fall for consideration in this writ petition, are what is the ratio and what is not the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench. The Full Bench has considered the following question which was referred to it.
“Would it be open to the School Tribunal to hold that an employee would be deemed to be on probation within the meaning of section 5(2) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, on the ground that the appointment was made in a clear and permanent vacancy, notwithstanding the fact that the letter of appointment specifically stipulated that the appointment has been made in a temporary capacity?”
The question has been answered by the Full Bench in the negative, which is apparent from para 28 of the decision. It has been held that it is not open to the School Tribunal to assume as of fact that the appointment made against a clear and permanent vacancy is deemed to be on probation, within the meaning of section 5(2) of the MEPS Act and the School Tribunal cannot disregard the terms and conditions of the letter of appointment, if it is expressly provides that the appointment is on temporary basis, for a limited term.
12. The ratio decidendi of the decision has to be found out only on reading the entire decision and not only a part of it. In case of any doubt arising from reading the decision, it can be resolved by assuming that the decision was delivered consistently with the provisions of law and therefore, the course of procedure in departure from or not in conformity with the statutory provisions cannot be said to have been intended or laid down by the Court unless it has been so stated specifically. The doubt can be resolved by looking into the other parts of the decision and not by reading a line here and there from the decision.
13. After going through the observations made in various paragraphs of the decision of the Full Bench, what is the ratio and what is not the ratio of the said decision, is summarized as under:
(i) A conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 5 of the MEPS Act shows that ordinarily when the selection process is commenced and the person duly found qualified is available and found suitable, the Management is under obligation to appoint him on probation to fill in the permanent vacancy.
(ii) The provision of sub-section (2) of section 5 of the MEPS Act is enabling and cannot be construed as creating a legal fiction to treat every appointment in a permanent vacancy as on probation or as taking away the implicit power of the Management to make a contractual or temporary appointment even in a permanent vacancy.
(iii) There is nothing in the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 5 of MEPS Act to indicate that every appointment in relation to a permanent vacancy must be deemed to have been made on probation for a period of two years irrespective of the fact that the appointment is made on temporary basis or for a fixed period.
(iv) If an order of appointment is on temporary basis or for a fixed period, it is not open for the School Tribunal to assume that the employee was deemed to be appointed on probation.
(v) An appointment on temporary basis in a permanent vacancy should be by way of an interim arrangement and exception where a person is found qualified but not suitable.
(vi) The Management cannot be permitted to take cover under the pretext of successively rejecting the candidates in the selection process on the ground of unsuitability and keeping on appointing the same person or different persons on contractual or temporary basis for a limited period in a permanent vacancy.
(vii) If the Management wants to appoint a duly qualified person selected in the manner prescribed to be appointed on temporary basis in a permanent vacancy, it must contemporaneously record its subjective satisfaction or tangible reasons as to why the candidate selected need to be appointed on temporary basis, so that the appropriate authority or the court of law can consider the challenge to the appointment on temporary basis instead of on probation.
(viii) The question as to whether an appointment on temporary basis or for a fixed period in a permanent vacancy is to be considered as on probation, is a question of fact to be pleaded and proved in appropriate proceedings on case to case basis and it will be open to record a finding of the colourable exercise of power against the Management, and an appropriate direction can be issued in such case.
(ix) It is not the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench in Ramkrushna Chauhan's case that under no circumstances, the appointment made on temporary basis in a permanent vacancy can be treated as an appointment made on probation.
14. It is not possible to accept the contention that the ratio at serial Nos. (ii), (iii) and (iv) and the observations made in paras 18, 24, and 28 of the said decision are inconsistent or contradictory with the ratio at serial Nos. (i) and (v) to (viii) above and the observations made in the other parts of the decision. It cannot be assumed that while laying down the law in paragraphs 18, 24 and 28, the Full Bench was ignorant or was not aware as to the observations made in other parts of the decision or of the other provisions of law. On the contrary, the observations made in several parts of the decision have to be construed as consistent with each other and also with the provisions of law.
15. The object of the MEPS Act is to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of employees with a view to providing security and stability of service to enable them to discharge their duties towards the pupils effectively and efficiently. The precarious conditions of the employees in a private school prevailing prior to coming into force of the said Act, and the object of bringing into force of the said Act have been very succinctly and aptly highlighted by Dr. D.Y Chandrachud, J. (as he then was the Judge of this Court) in his judgment in the case of Matoshri Ramabai Ambedkar Vidyarthi Vasatigruh Trust v. Bharat D. Hambir, reported in 2009 (2) Mh. L.J 121, in para 5A therein as under:
“5A. Of late, there is a growing tendency of managements of private schools to appoint temporary employees from year to year, even though the vacancy is permanent and an adequate work load is available. This leads to grave uncertainty for teachers and places them at the mercy of the managements. The temporary appointment of a teacher who questions unethical practices of the management is promptly terminated. He or she who questions is cast away. Those who turn a blind eye or worse, become willing participants in a pattern of exploitation, are retained. This is a perversion of what was intended by the State legislation enacted in 1977. Placing teachers in a state of eternal uncertainty is destructive of the cause of education. In numerous cases before this Court, the grievance is that teachers of aided institutions are being subjected to extortionate demands by unscrupulous managements. Education has become a business and managements of private schools, with notable exceptions, are becoming pirates in the high seas of education. The interpretation of section 5 of the Act must be purposive-one that would attain the statutory object and not lead to a negation of statutory intent. Once a permanent vacancy arises, a management is duty bound statutorily to fill it up by appointing a duly qualified candidate on probation. The vacancy must be advertised to allow equal opportunity to eligible candidates. A regular process of selection must be held. A duly qualified candidate has to be appointed. Temporary appointments can by definition be made when the vacancy is temporary. In such cases, the exigencies of education require that students must be imparted education and a vacancy even for a short period will cause serious hardship. But temporary appointments are an exception. Making temporary appointments the rule is to give a tool of subversion to the hands of unethical managements. Temporary appointments, followed as a practice become a tool of subversion because they perpetuate a regime of uncertainty about service, place the teacher in a position of perpetual fear and deprive teacher of the stability needed to contribute to the process of moulding young minds. This Court must emphasise with all the authority at its command that a subversion of statutory intent should not be allowed. The Court will not allow itself to be a mute by stander to the growing trend of a lack of ethics in the management of private schools. Judicial intervention is warranted in order to preserve the statutory intent.”
16. In the light of the aforesaid purpose of the MEPS Act, the provisions of section 5 therein, need to be seen. The same are, therefore, reproduced below:
“5. Certain obligations of Management of Private Schools.— (1) The Management shall, as soon as possible, fill in, in the manner prescribed every permanent vacancy in a private school by the appointment of a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy:
Provided that unless such vacancy is to be filled in by promotion, the management shall, before proceeding to fill such vacancy, ascertain from the Educational Inspector, Greater Bombay, the Education Officer, Zilla Parishad or, as the case may be, the Director or the officer designated by the Director in respect of schools imparting technical, vocational, art or special education, whether there is any suitable person available on the list of surplus persons maintained by him, for absorption in other schools; and in the event of such person being available, the Management shall appoint that person in such vacancy.
(2) Every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy except Shikshan Sevak shall be on probation for a period of two years. Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5), he shall on completion of this probation period of two years, be deemed to have been confirmed. Provided that, every person appointed as Shikshan Sevak shall be on probation for a period of three years.
(2A) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4), Shikshan Sevak shall, on completion of the probation period of three years, be deemed to have been appointed and confirmed as a teacher.
(3) If in the opinion of the Management, the work or behaviour of any probationer, during the period of his probation, is not satisfactory, the Management may terminate his services at any time during the said period after giving him one month's notice or salary or honorarium of one month in lieu of notice.
(4) If the services of any probationer are terminated under subsection (3) and he is reappointed by the Management in the same school or any other school belonging to it within a period of one year from the date on which his services were terminated, then the period of probation undergone by him previously shall be taken into consideration in calculating the required period of probation for the purposes of subsection (2).
(4A) Nothing in sub-section (2), (3) or (4) shall apply to a person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy by promotion or by absorption as provided under the proviso to sub-section (1).
(5) The Management may fill in every temporary vacancy by appointing a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy. The order of appointment shall be drawn up in the form prescribed in that behalf, and shall state the period of appointment of such person.”
17. Sub-section (1) of section 5 does not speak to the nature of appointment to be made whether temporary or for a fixed period or on probation or on permanent basis. It does not create an obligation to appoint a person on probation if he is appointed to fill in the permanent vacancy. Sub-section (2) therein creates an obligation to appoint a person on probation for a period of two years in a permanent vacancy. This provision is held by the Full Bench to be enabling and it does not take away the implicit power of the Management to make appointment on temporary basis or for a fixed period even in a permanent vacancy. The Management may have several good reasons for making an appointment on temporary basis in a permanent vacancy, including that the post is reserved for a candidate belonging to a backward class category and no suitable candidate from such category is available, or that the Management wants to have a wider choice of the candidate, which is not available. Hence, the power under sub-section (2) of section 5 is held to be discretionary.
18. The exercise of discretion under sub-section (2) of section 5 has to be by keeping in view the object of enactment and the exigencies of the administration. If the exercise of discretion is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or is a colourable exercise of power to defeat the protection in service granted by the statutory provisions, then the Court is empowered even to invoke the principles of “lifting of veil” to find out the real reason of making an appointment on temporary basis, and if the action is not found to be bona fide, an appropriate direction can be issued to provide protection in service by treating the appointment on probation, even if it is shown to be on temporary basis or for a fixed period. This is the view propounded by the Full Bench, which is in conformity with the object and the provisions of the MEPS Act. The ratio of the decision of the Full Bench cannot be construed as creating absolute bar to the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal under section 9 of the meps act, to consider and decide the question as to whether in the given facts and circumstances of the case, an order of appointment on temporary basis or for a fixed period in a permanent vacancy cannot be treated as one on probation and the employee is entitled to protection in service, in a challenge to the order of termination. The question of law framed in para 2 of the judgment of the Full Bench answered in the negative in para 28 therein and the connected observations made in paras 18 and 24, therefore, need to be construed in this fashion. Any other interpretation will be contrary to the object and the purpose of the Act and the provisions of section 5, and shall be in dilution of the ratio of the decision.
19. section 5 of the meps act makes a clear distinction between the appointment in the permanent and temporary vacancies. Sub-section (2) deals with the appointment to be made in a permanent vacancy, whereas sub-section (5) deals with the appointment to be made in a temporary vacancy. If the appointment is found to be made in a temporary vacancy, obviously the presumption would be that it is a temporary appointment or for a fixed period. But there is no presumption that every appointment in a permanent vacancy should be deemed to be on probation for a period of two years, as stipulated in sub-section (2). If the appointment is on a temporary basis or for a fixed period, then the School Tribunal shall not assume that it is an appointment on probation. This, however, does not mean that under no circumstances the appointment on temporary basis or for a fixed period can be treated as an appointment on probation as per sub-section (2) of section 5. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a given case, the School Tribunal may hold that though the order of appointment shows that it is on temporary basis or for a fixed period in a permanent vacancy, it should be treated as one on probation and it cannot be held that the School Tribunal has no jurisdiction to record any such finding and to issue the consequential directions to the Management or to grant any such declaration.
20. The Full Bench of this Court has considered two decisions of the Apex Court-(i) in the case of Hindustan Education Society v. SK. Kaleem SK. Gulam Nabi, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 152; and (ii) in the case of Bharatiya Gramin Punarrachana Sanstha v. Vijay Kumar, reported in 2003 (1) Mh. LJ. 563. In para 26 of its decision, the Full Bench has held that section 5 of the meps act was considered in both these decisions. In the case of Hindustan Education Society, the appointment was against clear vacancy, but on temporary basis for a limited period of 11 months. The Court has held that it cannot be treated to be appointment on probation. In the case of Bharatiya Gramin Punarrachana Sanstha, the Apex Court was considering the question of appointment on purely temporary basis, because of non-availability of reserved candidate to fill in permanent vacancy. In the decision in the case of Bharatiya Gramin Punarrachana Sanstha, the Apex Court has further held that when the appointment is made on temporary basis, the provision of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the MEPS Act will not be attracted.
21. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Hindustan Education Society and Bharatiya Gramin Punarrachana Sanstha, cited supra, cannot be disputed. However, it was not a case before the Apex Court as regards treating the appointment as on probation, though the order stipulates that it is on temporary basis or for a fixed period. The question of enforcement of obligation under sub-section (2) of section 5 in a case where there was compliance of subsection (1) of section 5 of the MEPS Act and no further explanation was offered by the Management to make an appointment on temporary basis, was not involved. The question of jurisdiction of the School Tribunal under section 9 of the meps act to consider and decide the question as regards treating the appointment made on temporary basis or for a fixed period in a permanent vacancy, as one on probation in the given facts and circumstances of the case, was also not involved. Hence, both the said decisions cannot be considered to be an authority for the proposition involved in the present case. The power of the Management to appoint a person on temporary basis in a permanent vacancy, cannot be disputed, but the power of the School Tribunal under section 9 of the meps act to find out as to whether such appointment should be treated as one on probation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be questioned.
22. It is the burden of an employee to come before the School Tribunal with a definite case that he was selected and appointed to fill in the permanent vacancy and he was duly qualified for being appointed in a post in question. It is for the employee to make out a case for lifting of veil, or arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious exercise of discretion by the employer in making an appointment on temporary basis or for a fixed period in a permanent vacancy to defeat the object and purpose of the Act, that is to provide security and stability in the employment. In such a case, the burden will shift upon the Management, which will have to point out the valid and tangible reasons to make such appointment and to justify the action by producing the relevant material on record. If the School Tribunal is not satisfied about the genuineness and validity of such reasons and material, it will have a jurisdiction to pass all such orders as are necessary to protect and provide security and stability to the employee concerned to attain the object of enactment.
23. Coming to the facts of the present case, undisputedly, at the time of initial appointment on 5-10-1989, the petitioner was not possessing the training qualification of B. Ed. and was merely holding the graduate degree of B. Sc. in Biology. Even on the date of making second appointment on 17-7-1990, the petitioner was not possessing the qualification of B. Ed. Hence, the appointment of the petitioner though was made on both these occasions by following the procedure prescribed for filling in the permanent vacancy as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 5 of the MEPS Act, the same cannot be treated as one on probation.
24. The resolution of the Management produced on record, passed on 22-6-1991, reproduced in para 3 of this judgment, clearly shows that the appointment of the petitioner was after issuing an advertisement and holding the interviews. The petitioner was found to be fully qualified and it was resolved to appoint him on temporary basis until further orders as against the earlier orders for fixed period on temporary basis. It was pursuant to this, the resolution that the petitioner was appointed by an order dated 24-6-1991 on temporary basis until further orders. It was not the case of the Management before the School Tribunal that the appointment of the petitioner was made in a temporary vacancy as contemplated by sub-section (5) of section 5 of the MEPS Act, or that it was an appointment for a fixed period, as contemplated by sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the MEPS Rules. The appointment of the petitioner was made in a permanent vacancy. The petitioner was fully qualified for being appointed in 25% quota of graduate teachers to teach Standards Vth to VUIth, which are the Middle School Classes. In view of this, it has to be held that there was compliance of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the meps act.
25. Once the appointment is held to be in compliance of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the MEPS Act, the question, which remains is about enforcement of statutory obligation under sub-section (2) of section 5, unless the Management satisfies the Court with tangible reasons supported by contemporaneous record and the valid and genuine reasons for making appointment on temporary basis. There is no tangible reason given by the Management in its reply to appoint the petitioner on temporary basis until further orders by an order dated 24-6-1991. There was no situation to make an appointment on temporary basis in a permanent vacancy. The order of appointment dated 24-6-1991 though states that it is “on temporary basis until further orders”, it needs to be construed as one on probation w.e.f 24-6-1991. In such a situation, if the petitioner has joined the post in response to such order of appointment, no estoppel can operate against a statute. The Management has not come forward with a case that the termination of the petitioner is in exercise of the powers of the Management conferred by sub-section (3) of section 5 of MEPS Act. In view of this, the order of termination, which is without any reason, cannot be sustained. The tribunal has, therefore, committed an error in upholding the order of termination.
26. So far as the question of backwages is concerned, there is ample material placed on record by the Management to show that the petitioner was gainfully employed. This fact is not disputed by the petitioner. At any rate, there is no pleading and proof in respect of gainful employment by the petitioner. The petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to any backwages. The claim for backwages is, therefore, rejected.
27. Shri Joharapurkar, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 submits that the respondent No. 4 was not appointed in place of the vacancy caused due to the termination of services of the petitioner and therefore, his position cannot be disturbed. This question does not at all fall for consideration of this Court in the present petition and if the services of the respondent No. 4 are terminated as a consequence of this judgment, it is open for the respondent No. 4 to agitate her grievance in appropriate forum.
28. In view of above, the writ petition is allowed. The judgment and order dated 7-7-2011 passed by the School Tribunal, Amravati, in Appeal No. 201 of 1992-A is hereby quashed and set aside. Appeal No. 201 of 1992-A filed by the petitioner is allowed to the extent of setting aside his termination as an Assistant Teacher w.e.f 28-5-1992 and the respondent-Management is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within a period of 30 days from today. The petitioner shall be treated as continuous in service. The claim of the petitioner for backwages is rejected.
29. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs.
Rule made absolute.
Comments