1. These petitions were placed before the learned Single Judge on 4th July, 2011 and he directed issuance of notice for final disposal at the admission stage itself. Accordingly, the petitions have been heard and are placed for judgment today.

2. Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent rule made returnable forthwith. Heard parties.

3. The petitioner in the first petition has challenged the order dated 23rd March, 2011 passed in Revision Application No. 67 of 2010 and prayed that the order of the Co-operative Court No. II below Exh.81 dated 11th November, 2010 in Dispute No. 254 of 2006 be restored. Exhibit 81 was an application made by the respondent - original opponent in this dispute praying that the subject dispute and another Dispute No. 92 of 2010 be consolidated and tried together. The said application was contested by the petitioner and after hearing both sides, the learned Judge Co-operative Court No. II, Pune by his order dated 11th November, 2010 rejected the same. Aggrieved and dis with this rejection, the respondent original opponent preferred Revision Application No. 67 of 2010, which revision application has been allowed by the impugned order and the learned President of the Co-operative Appellate Court has directed that Dispute No. 254 of 2006 and Dispute No. 92 of 2010 be consolidated for joint trial.

4. The facts leading to the writ petition are that the petitioners filed a dispute in the Co-operative Court Pune against the respondents. It was stated that there was a loan which was sanctioned in their favour by the respondents. The loan facilities are listed in the dispute application and, thereafter, it is stated that on account of certain RBI norms and guidelines a request was made to re schedule the loan and, thereafter, to settle the accounts on the basis of One Time Settlement proposal. That having not been accepted, according to the petitioner, the bank is not settling the loan account but resorting to measures to recover sums which are not due and payable. In these circumstances, a declaration was claimed that the total liability of the petitioner does not exceed Rs. 861.84 lakhs and that in view of the said payment, the petitioner is no longer a defaulter and, therefore, a No Dues Certificate be forwarded to the petitioner - original disputant.

5. This dispute was filed on 29th December, 2006. The respondent bank filed its written statement opposing the same and while denying the contents thereof, pointed out that the petitioner is a defaulter and having failed to repay the dues it cannot force the bank to accept any proposal for settlement. There is no violation of the RBI guidelines and for all these reasons the dispute be dismissed.

6. The written statement was filed on 23rd March, 2007. On perusal of the pleadings, the learned Judge of the Co-operative Court framed Issues (Exh60) Thereafter, directions were given for trial. The trial proceeded inasmuch as oral evidence of the witness was recorded. The matter was proceeding but it is the case of the petitioner that an apolication was made by the respondent before the Co-operative Court on 17th April, 2010 stating therein that the respondent bank has also filed a dispute in the same Court being Dispute No. 92 of 2010, seeking a money decree and enforcement of the mortgage in their favour. It is, therefore, desirable and in the interest of justice to avoid conflicting judgments and decisions that both disputes be tried together. It is stated that Bank's dispute is filed on 15th April, 2010 whereas this application was made on 17th April, 2010. Upon this application, a reply was filed by the petitioner denying that there is any necessity of consolidating the proceedings in the interest of justice. It was pointed out that the dispute filed by the petitioner is part heard and cross-examination of bank's witness will be concluded. Once the matter is ripe for cross-examination so also arguments, then, this is not the stage for entertaining such an application. Accepting this objection of the petitioner, the Co-operative Court dismissed this application on 26th April, 2010. A copy of this order is annexed as Annexure “J” to the first petition.

7. It was pointed out that taking advantage of some observations in this order, the respondent bank once again made an application seeking identical reliefs on 31st July, 2010 and an objection being raised thereto by the petitioner principally on the ground of maintainability and res judicata that the learned Judge passed an order thereon dismissing it. That order of the learned Judge has been passed on 11th November, 2010.

8. It is then urged that the respondent bank, had filed a revision application before Maharashtra State Appellate Court against rejection of their earlier application for consolidation vide order dated 27th August, 2010. This revision application dated 6th September, 2010 was registered as Revision Application No. 50 of 2010. Upon this revision application, notice was issued to the petitioner and they objected to the same. The learned Member of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court by order dated 7th September, 2010 held that he is not inclined to interfere with the order of the lower-Court. However, respondent was given opportunity to move the trial Court on the same ground of clubbing two disputes and if such an application is made before the lower Court, the trial Court was to decide the same along with application made for stay of the dispute filed by the respondent bank. Incidentally, it must be stated that the petitioner preferred an application for stay of the trial of the dispute being Dispute No. 92 of 2010 instituted by the respondent-bank.

9. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the Revisional Court, a third application was filed by the respondent-bank and the same came to be rejected on 11th November, 2010 by the Co-operative Court No. 2. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with that order, the respondent bank preferred a revision application being Revision Application No. 67 of 2010 before the Maharashtra State Appellate Court. The Judge, Co-operative Court No. 2 having also allowed petitioner's application under section 10 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, for stay of Dispute No. 92 of 2010 by the order delivered on the same date, respondent bank challenged that order as well by filing Revision Application No. 70 of 2010. Since both matters were between the same parties and more or less identical arguments were canvassed, both revision applications were dealt with and decided by a common order on 31st December, 2010. Aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the order made on those revision applications, the present petitioners filed writ petition in this Court being W.P No. 1256 of 2011. That petition was placed a the learned Single Judge (V.M Kanade, J.) of this Court and on 25th February 2011, the said petition was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the M.S Appellate Court. Accordingly, the President, Maharashtra State Appellate Court heard both revisions and by the impugned order, the same having been allowed that this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed.

10. Mr. Kumbhakoni, learned Counsel appearing for petitioner submitted that the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court has allowed the revision applications erroneously. The decision is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. The learned President ought to have appreciated that the respondent bank made three applications seeking identical reliefs. Once all three applications were dealt with and rejected by reasoned order, there was no necessity to allow the revision application. A revision application is allowed only if the orders of the Court below are vitiated by any error apparent or perversity. Scrutiny of the records of the trial Court by the Revisional Court while deciding revision applications does not give it unlimited and unrestricted powers and that too, to re-appreciate and re-appraise all materials. Once it is undisputed that consolidation was attempted by the respondent on three occasions and which failed and the dispute filed by the petitioner proceeded and was ripe for arguments, then, there was no occasion for the revisional Court to have interfered with such orders. The Revisional Court was in error in taking assistance of the provisions of section 10 of Civil Procedure Code. Once the revisional Court was of the opinion that section 10 could not have been invoked by the petitioner to seek stay of the dispute filed by the respondent bank, then, the analogy applied for consolidating the suits is something which is impermissible in law. If disputes involve a common issue-and between same parties and, there was a necessity to consolidate them, then, by the same logic, learned Judge should have granted the relief prayed under section 10. For all these reasons and in the light of the legal principles, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. According to Mr. Kumkhakoni, the learned Judge should have appreciated that a dispute before Co-operative Court has to be tried like a suit and to that limited extent the Civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted. The trial of a dispute filed under section 91 of MCS Act, 1960 is on par with and by the same procedure of a suit before the Civil Court. In such circumstances, either both powers viz., for consolidation and stay of suits were available for the Court below or by the logic and reasoning of the learned President both could not have been invoked. For all these reasons, these orders should be set aside.

11. On the other hand, Mr. Tembe, learned Counsel appearing for respondents submitted that both revision applications have been rightly allowed by the learned Judge. He submitted that there was no question of any bar of res judicata being invoked in such cases. The first application itself was rejected by the clarification that it would be open for the respondent to file fresh application seeking relief of consolidation of proceedings. Equally, when the second application was rejected, the matter was carried before the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court by its order dated 7th September, 2010 gave liberty to the respondent bank to file another application seeking identical reliefs. In the light of the clarifications in the trial Court's order, so also that of the revisional Court, it was open for the respondents to file fresh application seeking consolidation of both suits and merely because, the trial had proceeded in the petitioner's dispute, was no bar for consolidation. The law does not postulate that in one suit the trial having commenced and reached the stage of arguments that the application for consolidation must be rejected only on that ground. The Court below does not dispute that there are more or less common issues and common evidence so also arguments. If that is so and it does not rule out the possibility of conflicting judgments, then, all the more the relief prayed has been rightly granted by the revisional Court. The Court has stepped in to correct, obvious and apparent error of law and discretion exercised by the trial Court was not in terms therewith, the rejection of the application by the trial Court was improper and illegal and therefore, the revisional Court was well within its power to interfere with such an order.

12. Equally, according to Mr. Tembe, the lower Appellate Court was in no error in reversing the judgment of the trial Court on the application invoking section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code to seek stay of trial of the dispute of the respondent bank filed against the petitioner. Firstly, the Court below has applied the same principles as has been applied by the Supreme Court. Further, it has been very clearly held by this Court in Balkrishna v. Jalgaon People Co-operative Bank, reported in 1998 (2) Mh.L.J 147 that a dispute filed in the Co-operative Court and a civil suit before a Civil Court are not identical proceedings. The disputes are filed under section 91 of MCS Act, 1960 and the Co-operative Court has discretion to refer such disputes to the Civil Court for bring tried as civil suit in certain cases and, therefore, the dispute before the Co-operative Court cannot be equated with a civil suit filed before the Civil Court. If this is the applicable principle, then, section 10 could not have been invoked at all. Apart therefrom, assuming that section 10 of Civil Procedure Code was applicable, the provisions of the same are mandatory and unless and until, all conditions stated therein are satisfied, the Court has no power to grant stay in terms thereof. In the instant case, the important ingredients and conditions of the said provisions have not been satisfied and the lower Appellate Court was, therefore, right in reversing the order of the trial Court staying the trial of the dispute filed by the respondent-bank viz., Dispute No. 92 of 2010. For all these reasons these petitions have no merits and they be dismissed.

13. For properly appreciating the rival contentions, a reference will have to be made to the provisions that have been invoked in this case. First of all, it is well settled that by referring to section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, which empower a Civil Court to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process that consolidation of suits can be ordered. The inherent power to do justice and to make all such orders in furtherance thereof permit a Court to consolidate the proceedings before it. Similarly, the Civil Court in terms of Order II, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code has discretionary power to order separate trials or to make such other order as may be expedient in the interest of justice. As far as power to consolidate the proceedings are concerned, there is not much disagreement between the parties that the inherent powers of the Co-operative Court could have been invoked by the respondent-bank and to seek consolidation of both disputes. The argument is that such powers were invoked on more than one occasion and the relief seeking consolidation of disputes was denied. Once, it was denied by the Co-operative Court by rejecting three applications, then, revisional Court committed an error apparent in reversing these concurrent orders and allowing the application for consolidation of disputes. The revisional Court has ignored the factual position that the dispute filed by the petitioner against the respondent-bank was filed in the year 2006 and its trial had more or less concluded. The matter was ripe for arguments and at such a stage the relief should not have been granted.

14. To find out as to whether there is any substance in these objections of the petitioners, it will be necessary to scrutinise the contents of the applications that have been made. The first application that was made seeking consolidation is dated 17th April, 2010. On that application an order was passed on 26th April, 2010 (below Exh.70). In para 3 of the order the trial Court observes that the record indicates that evidence of the petitioner disputant in Dispute No. 254 of 2006 is over and the witness of respondent-bank is in witness box. There is every possibility that the dispute will come to an end within a month or two, whereas the dispute filed by the bank being Dispute No. 92 of 2010 is a recent one and at that time the reply and written statement of the petitioner therein was awaited. Thus, one is freshly instituted dispute and the other is long pending. Therefore, at this stage the order of trying and deciding both disputes will definitely have adverse impact on progress of Dispute No. 254 of 2006, yet, the trial Court observed that possibility of conflicting decisions in the dispute cannot be overlooked and, therefore, it issued a direction to expedite the hearing of Dispute No. 92 of 2010 so that it can make up the stages that are to be made up in terms of the procedural provisions and if a necessity arises for applying for common judgment, that can also be done. Therefore, the order must be seen in this perspective. It rejects the application of the respondent-bank made at that stage. The second application that was made by the respondent-bank pointed out that the earlier application was rejected but what has happened is that the respondent-bank stated in its fresh application filed on 31st July, 2010 that it had led its evidence and it does not want to lead further evidence. It has also filed evidence close purshis on 31st July, 2010. Therefore, it would be appropriate to club the Dispute No. 254 of 2006 and Dispute No. 92 of 2010 to avoid conflicting decisions. In paras 5 and 6 of this application, this is what is stated:—

“5. The Opponent bank further states that, the present disputant is opponent in Dispute No. 92 of 2010, in which the present disputant has filed the application under section 10 of Civil Procedure Code to stay the said Dispute No. 92 of 2010. The said application also has been replied by the opponent bank who is a disputant in the said dispute No. 92 of 2010 Thus, the disputant herein admits that, the issues involved in the present dispute and in Dispute No. 92 of 2010 are one and the same and therefore as per judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court, and High Courts, if any parties to the suit prefers the application for stay of suit under section 10 and if the issues involved in both the suits are same, parties are same then, it would not be incorrect on the part of the Court, to club the both suits together and answer issues involved in both suits by common judgment and order. In the view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court and in the view of the factual and legal position, it is desirable in the interest of justice to club both the matters together and to dispose of the same by common judgment.”

“6. The opponent bank further states that no harm and/loss will be caused to the disputant herein if the present application is allowed. In fact the same will result to decide the present dispute and Dispute No. 92 of 2010 on merits and by common judgment and order.”

15. This application was also opposed by the petitioners and apart from invoking the plea of res judicata and lack of bona fides, they pointed out that the present stage is inappropriate to apply for clubbing both disputes. It denied that the subject-matter is one and the same and there is likelihood of conflicting judgments. Therefore, it contended that the application be dismissed.

16. On this application (Exh.75), the learned Judge held that though main parties to the disputes are same, the subject-matter of them concern the loan account of petitioner disputant. Both disputes arise of out different cause of action and reliefs claimed therein are also different. The application seeking stay of suit under section 10 seems to have been referred in para 5 of the order dated 27th August, 2010. However, that is not relevant for the present purpose because, the learned Judge in para 4 of this order states that the progress is that the Dispute No. 254 of 2006 is ready for final argument and Dispute No. 92 of 2010 is at the stage of hearing on interim application and further, there is an application for stay of that dispute filed by the petitioners. Therefore, the subsequent dispute will take time to be ready for trial and hearing. In these circumstances, there is no remarkable difference in the stages and, therefore, the application does not deserve to be granted. By this reasoning, he proceeded to dismiss the application preferred by respondent-Bank on 27th August, 2010.

17. The Revisional Court had before it all three orders and the challenge thereto by the respondent-bank. The learned President heard both sides extensively but going by the arguments canvassed, he rendered a finding that undoubtedly, there is similarity in matter in issue in both disputes. The monetary liability towards loan facility enjoyed by the petitioner bank is essentially to be determined in both disputes. While declining to apply section 10 of Civil Procedure Code to grant relief in favour of petitioner, the learned President observed that the consolidation of both disputes would be in the interest of justice. The inherent powers of the Court to consolidate the matters in the interest of justice in which the parties and matters in issue are substantially the same, permit it to grant the relief. The inherent powers are intended to do justice and that is how he invoked them and applied the same by observing that the matter in issue in the previous dispute is directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent dispute between the same parties. In these circumstances, the possibility of conflicting judgments cannot be avoided. Further, to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings and delaying the trials, it would be desirable to consolidate them.

18. The conclusion of the learned Judge that consolidation of both disputes to avoid multiplicity and conflicting decisions, is certainly a germane and relevant consideration. The learned President found that there is no propriety to allow separate trials one after another in respect of the same matter in issue and there is a possibility of duplication of evidence and wasting of precious judicial time, both of which are germane and relevant considerations, in the peculiar facts of this case. If the bank is seeking to recover the amount advanced as loan to the petitioner and has filed a dispute for a money decree and to enforce the mortgage created in its favour whereas the petitioner states that in respect of the same facilities accounts were suspensed but they have been repaid and the bank is refusing to extend the benefit of RBI circulars and policies or agree to one time settlement, then, in my view, the tests that have been applied by the learned President to the facts of this case are apposite and appropriate. Mere technicalities should not defeat the ends of justice. If the bank was given specific liberty in the previous orders to apply for consolidation of disputes and despite noting that one matter which was filed earlier is ripe for arguments, such a liberty was reserved, then, going by some hyper-technicalities, the relief of consolidation should not have been denied. It is not as if there was any dispute between the parties with regard to the similarities of dispute. There was no dispute with regard to this and that other relevant tests viz., avoidance of conflicting decisions and judgments. If there was no such dispute and all that was put in issue was the stage at which such reliefs can be granted, then, I do not see how the learned President has committed any error apparent in allowing the revision applications consolidating the disputes. The learned President has gone by the contents of the applications made by the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction and power of the trial Court under section 10 of Civil Procedure Code to grant relief of conslidation of both disputes. There, the specific argument of the petitioner was that all ingredients of section 10 have been satisfied. If there is common elements as far as parties and issues in both matters and the only objection was on the ground of res judicata and lack of bona fides on the part of respondent-bank, then, the Revisional Court was justified in going into the record and finding out whether the case in that behalf has been made good by the petitioners. If the petitioner fails to make good that case, going by the clear wording of the trial Court's order and that of the revisional Court dated 7th September 2010, then, the objection on the ground of res judicata has been rightly overruled. While, it may be true that the principle should be applied to different stages of the same proceedings, yet, going by the liberty given by the trial Court to make the application while not denying the possibility of conflicting judgments and decisions, there is no perversity committed by the revisional Court in interfering with the concurrent orders. The concurrent orders have been interfered with in the exercise of revisional powers to enabling doing so and by applying correct legal principles in the peculiar facts of this case. The criticism of the revisional Court's approach by Mr. Kumbhakoni has, therefore, no substance.

19. Reliance placed by Mr. Kumbhakoni on the decisions reported in 2003(4) Mh.L.J 196 : 2003 (6) BCR 153, Murlidhar Datoba Nimanka v. Harish Balkrushna Latane, would go to show that the judgment reiterates the principle that Co-operative Courts do not enjoy powers under section 38 and 39 of Civil Procedure Code in the light of the powers conferred by section 95 of the mcs act. further section 95(4) deal with powers of Co-operative Court to pass interlocutory orders as may appear just and convenient to prevent justice being defeated during the pendency of proceedings. However, the learned Single Judge of this Court set aside the order of the Co-operative Court passed under Order 39, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code striking out the defence of the petitioner before this Court, by holding that this provision is inapplicable. There is no dispute with this proposition of law that all powers of Civil Court are not conferred on the Co-operative Court. Sections 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95 themselves make this position clear. As far as section 91 is concerned, that is a provision which is part of Chapter IX entitled “settlement of disputes”.

Sub-section (1) thereof opens with non obstante clause and if all other conditions as stipulated in the provision are satisfied, then, the dispute must go before the Co-operative Court. That is as far as competency of Co-operative Court. While that may be so, but section 92 throws light on the Intention of Law Makers and the Legislature with reference to sections 91 and 91A provides that the limitation would be, notwithstanding, anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 but subject to the specific provisions in the MCS Act. At the same time, section 93 providing for transfer of disputes from one Co-operative Court to another and suspension of proceedings in certain cases, makes the position clear and if any reference is needed, sub-section (2) of the said provision is an answer. The procedure for settlement of dispute and powers of Co-operative Court is set out in section 94 and limited powers that are conferred on Civil Court by Civil Procedure Code have been conferred on the Co-operative Court. It is well settled that Civil Procedure Code is partly procedural and partly substantive. It is not as if the Co-operative Court becomes a Civil Court by virtue of sections 94 and 95. If that be so, then, it was unnecessary to make provisions for attachment before the award and an interlocutory order vide section 95. Similarly, section 96 speaks about the decision of Co-operative Court. Section 97 provides for an appeal. If section 97 had not been worded in the manner in which it is so worded, then, interlocutory orders of the Co-operative Court would not have become appealable. Legislature, therefore, was conscious of the fact that a Civil Court which tries a civil suit and renders both, an order and decree, which are capable of being challenged in appeals, makes a separate provision for appeal from order and appeal from decrees. Accordingly, while engrafting some of these aspects into MCS Act, the Legislature provided for remedy of appeals to challenge both orders. Similarly, as far as recovery of monies are concerned, section 98 makes the aspect clear that orders passed by the authorities or the Co-operative Court shall, if not carried out, be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and shall be executed in the same manner as decree of such Court. Therefore, at separate stages, the applicability of Civil Procedure Code albeit to a limited extent has been provided in the MCS Act. If that be the intent and purpose and if these provisions are read with the MCS Rules, then, it is absolutely clear that such of the provisions which enable the Co-operative Court to inherently exercise its powers to do justice have been engrafted and included. Their applicability is not in any manner ruled out. However, when it comes to section 10 of Civil Procedure Code, it is more than clear that one cannot lose sight of the fact that section 10 cannot be invoked by applying the tests as if the proceedings before the Co-operative Court filed by way of disputes are akin to a suit in a Civil Court. The Civil Procedure Code itself makes it clear in Part I that Courts subject to the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Prior thereto sections 3 to 5 speak about applicability of Civil Procedure Code to proceedings before other Courts. The proceedings may be civil in nature but that does not mean that the Court tiying them is a Civil Court and the proceedings are a “suit” within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code. A right to bring in a suit is an inherent right vested in the litigant and, therefore, while clarifying as to what would be the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try suits in section 9 read with the explanation, it would at once become clear by section 10 that the Court, which is a Civil Court, is mandated not to proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties or between parties, under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed or in any Court beyond the limits of India, established or continued:by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction or before the Supreme Court. The sweep of power under section 10 can by no means be read into the MCS Act and particularly section 91 to 98 thereof. The Civil Court's power-to stay trial of subsequently instituted suits is thus available to the Civil Court. It is not specifically conferred on the Co-operative Court. That apart, in the peculiar facts of the present case, the learned Judge was in no error in rejecting the application. He has applied the principle laid down in a decision reported in 2005(2) Mh.LJ (SC) 1 : (2005) 2 SCC 256 : AIR 2005 SC 242, National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. Parameshwara. The Supreme Court while outlining the object of section 10 has observed that it is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between same parties in respect of the same matter in issue and that emphasising of res judicata relied upon by Mr. Kumbhakoni has been applied. While so applying the Supreme Court further clarifies that section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both the suits is identical and at the same time it holds that this section applies to the suits instituted in Civil Court and cannot apply to any other proceeding. Having so clarified, this decision rather supports the view taken by me that section 10 has no applicability to the proceedings before the Co-operative Court. Similarly, this very decision states that the inherent power under section 151 cannot be utilised as substitute for section 10 to grant relief of stay of the suit. Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code has to be invoked so as to meet the ends of justice and wherever it is found necessary so to do or to prevent abuse of the process of Court, these powers can be by no stretch of imagination authorise the Co-operative Court to grant relief as prayed by the petitioner herein. In such circumstances, the Co-operative Court was in complete error in staying the trial of Dispute No. 92 of 2010 filed by the respondent-bank when it was not so empowered under section 10. Recourse to section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to grant said relief was clearly impermissible. Therefore, that order has been rightly reversed by the Revisional Court. It has stepped in precisely to correct the errors apparent on the face of the record. In these circumstances, the criticism that the revisional Court has re-appreciated and/or re-appraised the factual materials to grant the relief is not well founded. The revisional Court has corrected the patent error of law and allowed the revision applications preferred by respondent-bank. However, all that the revisional Court did is to take assistance of the observations of the trial Court while granting relief of stay of subsequently instituted dispute to consolidate both matters. That was to avoid conflicting decisions and protraction and delaying the trials. It saves judicial time so that there is no duplicity of evidence. In such circumstances, inherent powers exercised to consolidate both suits has also rightly been exercised by the Revisional Court.

20. In the light of the above discussion, there is no merit in both petitions and they accordingly fail. Rule is discharged in both petitions but without any costs.

21. In the light of the fact that the common order in both the revision applications has been upheld and the petitions have been dismissed, needless to clarify that both disputes shall stand consolidated for trial and will now proceed in accordance with law. The trial Court to which the same are assigned shall endeavour to dispose them off as expeditiously as possible and within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Petitions dismissed.