Ferdino I. Rebello, J.:— Rule. By consent of parties heard forthwith.
2. The petitioner had filed a complaint against respondent No. 2 for deficiency of service on 20th March, 2008 and had also applied for interim relief. By way of an interim order on 24th March, 2008 the learned Consumer Redressal Forum was pleased to pass the following order:—
“No cause is shown by Opponent. Hence the application is allowed. The Opponent shall not disconnect the mobile connection till the decision of this Complaint”.
3. In spite of this order restraining the respondent No. 2 from disconnecting the mobile connection, according to the petitioner, it was disconnected, whereas according to the respondent No. 2 due to oversight in respect of one of the numbers bearing No. 9820376241 the outcall facility was barred as the system was showing continuous dues against that number. The same was rectified on 26th September, 2008 on receiving the order dated 24th September, 2008. The order dated 24th September, 2008 came to be passed on an application moved by the petitioner for attachment for failure to comply with the order dated 24th March, 2008. A show cause notice was issued to respondent No. 2 on 26th September, 2008 on which date according to the respondent No. 2 they had complied with the direction. 5. It is necessary for us to refer to the subsequent proceedings arising from this order. The State Commission by its order dated 27th April, 2009 held that the order cannot be said to be illegal as on the face of it, as it was passed considering breach of the order passed by the Forum below and as the order stands complied with there is no propriety to allow the impugned order to stand and accordingly set aside the order dated 24th September, 2008. Against that order the petitioner had filed a Writ Petition before this Court being Writ Petition No. 564 of 2009, which was dismissed on 6th January, 2010 for non-prosecution.
6. Petitioner simultaneously had also filed an application under section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which hereinafter shall be known as the Act. That application came to be heard by the Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum. By order dated 24th September, 2008 the Forum took the view that a complaint would not be maintainable against an interim order passed under section 25 of the Consumer Protection Act. The petitioner preferred a Revision before the State Commission, which by its order dated 7th January, 2009 confirmed the view taken by the District Consumer Forum and held that no complaint would be maintainable under section 27 on the ground that section 25 provides a specific provision for enforcement of interim orders. The application, therefore, under section 27, it held was not maintainable. It is this order which is the subject matter of challenge before this Court.
7. The respondent No. 2 has filed an affidavit of Jitesh Dhingra. One of the contentions raised is that the petitioner has an efficacious remedy available before the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act and consequently this Court ought not to entertain this petition in the exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, it is submitted that the respondent No. 2 has complied with the order and as such the cause of action no longer survives and on this count also this Court ought not to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction. Lastly, it is set out that the view taken by the District Forum and the State Commission is the only possible view considering the expression “interim orders” which are not specifically included in section 27 of the Act. The provision being penal should be strictly construed.
8. With that we may gainfully refer to the two relevant provisions of Consumer Protection Act which are sections 25 and 27 as they stood when the Act was enacted, and which read as follows:
“25. Enforcement of orders by the Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission. — Every order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, may be enforced by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission as the case may be, in the same manner as if it were a decree or order made by a Court in a suit pending therein and it shall be lawful for the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission to send, in the event of its inability to execute it, such order to the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
(a) in the case of an order against a company, the registered office of the company is situated, or
(b) in the case of an order against any other person, the place where the person concerned voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, is situated, and thereupon, the Court to which the order is so sent, shall execute the order as if it were a decree or order sent to it for execution.
27. Penalties. — Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made 2[or the complainant] fails or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person 2[or complainant] shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both:
PROVIDED that the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the circumstances of any case so require, impose a sentence of imprisonment or fine, or both, for a term lesser than minimum term and the amount lesser than the minimum amount, specified in this section.”
9. The sections as they now stand, pursuant to the Amendment of the act by act 62 of 2002 and other amendments read as under:
“25. Enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission. — (1) Where an interim order made under this Act, is not complied with, the District Forum or the State Commissioner or the National Commission, as the case may be, may order the property of the person, not complying with such order to be attached.
(2) No attachment made under sub-section (1) shall remain in force for more than three months at the end of which, if the non-compliance continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds thereof, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may award such damages as it thinks fit to the complainant and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto.
(3) Where any amount is due from any person under an order made by a District Forum, State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, the person entitled to the amount may make an application to the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, and such District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission may issue a certificate for the said amount to the Collector of the district (by whatever name called) and the Collector shall proceed to recover the amount in the same manner as arrears of land revenue.”
“27. Penalties. — (1) Where a trader or a person against whom a complaint is made [or the complainant] fails or omits to comply with any order made by the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, such trader or person [or complainant] shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both:
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, shall have the power of a Judicial Magistrate of the first for the trial of offences under this Act, and on such conferment of powers, the District Forum or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, on whom the powers are so conferred, shall be deemed to be a Judicial Magistrate of the first class for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(3) All offences under this Act may be tried summarily by the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission, as the case may be.”
10. Before we answer the main questions, we may first deal with the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that as a Revision is available before the National Commission, this Court ought not to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction. Section 21(b) on which reliance is placed, reads as under:
“21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity”
Thus from the clear and literal language of Section 21(b) the revisional jurisdiction can only be if a consumer dispute is pending before or has been decided by the State Commission. In other words the National Commission would have no jurisdiction if the order is passed in exercise of the Appellate power or Revisional jurisdiction exercised by the State Commission under section 17(b). The power under Section 21(b) is in respect of a complaint filed before the State Commission. In our opinion, therefore, the first contention as urged is devoid of merit.
11. The issue, however, raised by the petitioner is one of vital importance, as to whether an interim order passed by the District Consumer Forum can be the subject matter of an application under section 27 of the Act. Once the State Commission has taken a view, that a view would be binding on the State Commission unless a larger Bench takes a different view. At any rate, in our opinion, considering the importance of the issue, this would be a fit case to exercise our extra ordinary jurisdiction.
12. The principal question for our consideration is whether under section 27 of the Act, no complaint is maintainable if the order is an interim order and only a final order can be the subject matter of a complaint under section 27 of the Act.
13. Initially when the Act was enacted there was no power to grant any interim relief. Similarly the procedure for enforcement of an order of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission was to enforce it as a decree by the aforesaid forums and on their inability, to execute through the Court exercising jurisdiction to execute decrees as set out in this section. The section as now substituted apart from conferring power to grant interim relief has provided for enforcement of that interim order under section 25(1) and (2). Similarly, the procedure for recovery of the amount pursuant to the final order passed by the above forums, is to recover it as arrears of land revenue on a certificate being issued by the respective Forums. The amendment has also introduced section 13(3-B) whereby power was conferred on the District Forum to pass interim orders. Similarly, by virtue of section 18 the provision of section 13(3-B) conferring power to grant interim orders was also made applicable to the State Commission.
By referring to these provisions, it is sought to be contended that there is a distinction between the expression “interim order” and “order”. As section 27 uses the expression “order” and considering the penal character of the provisions, it must be presumed that the Legislature knowingly excluded interim orders from the purview of section 27. It was also sought to be contended that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Vishwabarathi House Building Coop. Society, (2003) 2 SCC 412 where the view was taken that the power under section 27 is the nature of an additional power for execution of the order, considering the subsequent amendment to the Act after the Judgment was delivered, will not apply.
14. We may gainfully refer to the following paragraphs from the judgment in Vishwabarathi House Building Co-op. Society (supra):
“58. Furthermore, section 27 of the Act also confers an additional power upon the Forum and the Commission to execute its order. The said provision is akin to Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act or section 51 read with Order 21, Rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 25 should be read in conjunction with section 27. A Parliamentary statute indisputably can create a tribunal and might say that non-compliance of its order would be punishable by way of imprisonment of fine, which can be in addition to any other mode or recovery.
59. It is well settled that the cardinal principle of interpretation of statute is that Courts or tribunals must be held to possess power to execute their own order.
60. It is also well settled that a statutory Tribunal which has been conferred with the power to adjudicate a dispute and pass necessary order has also the power to implement its order. Further, the Act which is a self-contained Code, even if it has not been specifically spelt out, must be deemed to have conferred upon the Tribunal all powers in order to make its order effective. It is true that this Judgment was delivered before the amending Act 62 of 2002. However, section 27(1) was on the statute book since inception of the Act. At the time the Act was enacted there was no provision for invocation of penalty against an interim order as there was no power conferred to grant interim relief as now provides. As we have noted earlier section 13(3-B) as introduced with effect from 15th March, 2003 for the first time conferred power to grant an interim order.”
15. To understand the issue, let us examine the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Civil Procedure Code as to the effect of disobeying an order passed under Order 39, Rule 1 or Order 39, Rule 2 which confer power to pass interim orders. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider that issue in Tayabhai M. Bagasorwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 443 : AIR 1997 SC 1240. An issue arose whether a party who had disobeyed an interim order and/or flouted the same can be punished if ultimately the Civil Court arrives at a conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The High Court had taken a view that it could not do so. The question for consideration was whether the decision of the High Court meant that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e, for violation and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. The Court observed that if the view was upheld namely that no one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the decision holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it would be subversive of the rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity ad the authority of the Courts. Considering various other judgments it was observed that a party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular cannot be permitted to disobey it. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid or whether it was regular or irregular. Reference was made to the judgment in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, (1952) 2 All E.R 567 where the Court has observed as under:
“It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. ……..”
This followed from the principle that the party against whom an order is passed knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, must apply to the Court to be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed. This is in the nature of obligation and two consequences will in general follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the Court is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. The second is that no application to the Court by such a person will be entertained until he has purged himself of his contempt. The Supreme Court noted that even in United States the law was the same and quoted the following statement by Holmes, J., in United State of America v. John F. Shippetal, (1906) 51 Law Ed. 319 where it was observed as under:
“it has been held, it is true, that orders made by a Court having no jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt: Re Sawyer, (1887) 124 US 200, 31 Law Ed 402, 8 Sup Ct Rep 482; Ex Parte Fisk, (1883-84) 113 US 713, 28 Law Ed 1117, 5 Sup Ct Rep 7224; Ex parte Rowland, (1879-81) 104 US 604, 26 Law Ed 861. But even if the circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Johnson's petition, and if this Court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, this Court, and this Court alone, could decide that such was the law. It and it alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the case was properly before it. On that question, at least, it was its duty to permit argument and to take the time required for such consideration as it might need. See Mansfield, Cand LMR Co. v. Swan, (1883-84) 111 US 379, 387, 28 Law Ed 462, 4 Sup Ct Rep 510. Until its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had authority, from the necessity of the case to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition, just as the State Court was bound to refrain from further proceedings until the same time. Rev Stat 8766; act of March 3, 1893, Chap. 326, 27 Statt. At L. 751, U.S Comp. Stat. 1901 p. 597.”
Thus the Court was of the opinion that interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the Court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is open to the Court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit, put back the party in the position he was on the date of the suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction. Thus a party can be punished under Order 39, Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus it is open to the Legislature in case of breach of interim orders to provide for punishment.
16. To understand what are interlocutory orders let us refer to the judgment in V.C Shukla v. C.B.I, 1980 Supp SCC 92:
“22. The observations of Das, J. clearly show that the effect of non-obstante clause was to supersede the Indian Bar Councils Act and any other Act insofar as they regulate the conditions referred to therein, If we apply this test to the present case then it is manifest that the non-obstante clause would have the effect of overriding and excluding the provisions of the Code. Applying the test laid down by Sastri, C.J, we find that the position may be summed up as follows.—
(1) We should exclude the statute concerned from consideration. In the instant case ‘The Code’;
(2) We should construe the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning instead of referring to the statute which is sought to be excluded.
23. We entirely agree with the approach indicated by Sastri, C.J and which is also binding on us. Let us see what is the effect of interpreting the non-obstante clause according to the test laid down by the decision, referred to above, and particularly the observations of Sastri C.J Let us for the time being forget the provisions of section 397(2) of the Code or the-interpretation put by this Court on the term ‘interlocutory order’ as appearing in the Code because the decisions were based purely on the interpretation of the provisions of the Code. We have, therefore, first to determine the natural meaning of the expression interlocutory order’. To begin with, in order to construe the term ‘interlocutory’, it has to be construed in contradistinction to or in contrast with a final order. We are fortified by a passage appearing in the Supreme Court Practice, 1976 (Vol. I p. 853) where it is said that an interlocutory order is to be contrasted with a final order referring to the decision of Salaman v. Warner. In other words, the words ‘not a final order’ must necessarily mean an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. That this is so was pointed out by Untwalia J, speaking for the Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. as follows:
“Ordinarily and generally the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term ‘final order’.” Thus, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ is to be understood and taken to mean converse of the term ‘final order’. Now, let us see how this term has been defined in the Dictionaries and the text books. In Webster's Third International Dictionary (Vol. II, p. 1170) the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been defined thus:
Not final or definitive; made or done during the progress of an action; INTERMEDIATE PROVISIONAL”.
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition, Vol. 3, p. 1410) defines the interlocutory order thus:—
“‘Interlocutory order’ (Judicature Act 1873 (c. 66), section 25(8) was not confined to an order made between writ and final judgment, but means an order other than final judgment.
“Thus, according to Stroud, interlocutory order means an order other than a final judgment. This was the view taken in the case of Smith v. Cowell and followed in Manchester and Liverpool Bank v. Parkinson. Similarly, the term ‘final order’ has been defined in volume 2 of the same Dictionary (p. 1037) thus:—
“The judgment of a Divisional Court on an appeal from a county Court in an interpleader issue, was a ‘final order” within the old R.S, Ord. 58, Rule 3 (Hughes v. Little, 18 Q.B.D 32); so was an order on further consideration (Cummins v. Herron, 4 Ch. D. 787); unless action was not thereby concluded. But an order under the old R.S.C, Order 25, Rule 3, dismissing an action on a point of law raised by the pleadings was not ‘final” within the old Order 58, Rule 3, because had the decisions been the other way the action would have proceeded.”
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third Edition, Vol. 22, pp. 743-744) describes an interlocutory or final order thus:
“Interlocutory judgment or order: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed ‘interlocutory’. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals
In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed ‘final’.”
At page 743 of the same volume, Blackstone says thus:
“Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action by declaring that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy he sues for …………….. Four different tests for ascertaining the finality of a judgment or order have been suggested: (1) Was the order made upon an application such that a decision in favour of either party would determine the main dispute? (2) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could have been decided? (3) Does the order, as made, determine the dispute? (4) If the order in question is reversed, would the action have to go on.?
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM (Vol. 49 p. 35) defines interlocutory order thus:
“A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both as to the subject matter and the parties as far as the Court has power to dispose of it, while an interlocutory judgment is one which reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination ………. Generally, however, a final judgment is one which disposes of the cause both as to the subject matter and the parties as far as the Court has power to dispose of it, while an interlocutory judgment is one which does not so dispose of the cause, but reserves or leaves some further question or direction for future determination ……… The term “interlocutory judgment” is, however, a convenient one to indicate the determination of steps or proceedings in a cause preliminary to final judgment, and in such sense the term is in constant and general use even in code states.”
(Emphasis ours)
Similarly, Volume 60 of the same series at page 7 seeks to draw a distinction between an interlocutory and a final order thus:
The word “interlocutory”, as applied to rulings and orders by the trial Court, has been variously defined. It refers to all orders, rulings, and decisions made by the trial Court from the inception of an action to its final determination. It means, not that which decides the cause, but that which only settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. An interlocutory order is an order entered pending a cause deciding some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit and collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue….. An intermediate order has been defined as one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment.
24. To sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia J. in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. (supra) clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely with in the ordinary and natural meaning of the term ‘interlocutory order’. As used in section 11(1) of the Act. Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edition, p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:—
An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.
Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable, that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial A at all. This would be the result if the term interlocutory order is interpreted in it natural and logical sense without having resort to Criminal Procedure Code or any other statute. ‘That is to say, if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes, mentioned above, and this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in section 11(1) of the Act.
17. Section 25 makes a provision for execution or enforcement of the orders of the forums. When it uses the expression “interim order and order”, the reasons to distinguish them is because of the nature of execution. In other words an Act having created a right and provided the Forum, has also made provision for execution of its orders in a particular manner. As noted in the judgment of Vishwabarathi House Building Co-op. Society (supra) the provisions pertaining to execution are provided in various legislations. The judgment did not deal with interim orders as at the relevant time the Act did not provide for passing of interim orders, reference to Order 39, Rule 2-A would indicate that the Supreme Court was conscious of that aspect.
18. Section 27 on the other hand is a penal provision which provides for penal consequences for breach or failure to comply with the provisions of any order passed under the Act. In other words apart from conferring powers on the Tribunal to make its orders effective the power to punish is to uphold the rule of law or the Majesty of law. This aspect will have to be borne in mind while considering the expression “any order” in section 27. The two sections, therefore, operate in two different fields, one for enforcement of the order and the second a penal provision for failure to comply with the order.
19. Would, therefore, because there is a provision for enforcement of an interim order under section 25, exclude the application of section 27 on the ground that it does not expressly refer to an interim order. Section 25(1) and (2) provide for enforcement of interim orders by way of attachment. Sub-section (3) deals with enforcement of final orders. Section 25, therefore, has to be seen in the context that it is a provision for enforcement of both interim orders and final orders and it is in that context that the Legislature has chosen to use the two expressions interim order and order, in contradistinction to each other, though both are orders. The procedure for enforcement of the interim order is distinct than for enforcement of a final order. This is so because of the nature of the orders. In that context the distinction in the choice of words for the purpose of section 25 becomes apparent.
20. Unlike section 25, the expression used in section 27 is “any order”. Would that exclude an interim order? The Legislature it is presumed when it amended and introduced section 13(3-B) and conferred power for passing of interim orders under section 13(3-a), must have been well aware that for the first time specific power has been conferred on the forums under the Act to grant interim relief. It also in that context must have been aware of the consequences of the expression “any order” in section 27. Can, therefore, the expression, ‘any order’ include within its sweep of orders which disposes off an application for interim relief or is the expression “any order” limited only to final orders disposing off the proceedings. When section 27 was enacted there was no provision for passing of an interim order. This is one of the reasons for the respondents to contend that it would show that the Legislature by choosing not to amend section 27, has deliberately excluded interim orders from the penal consequences contemplated under section 27.
21. Do interim orders of District Forum, State Commission or National Commission lose their finality in respect of that part of the proceedings if they are challenged and the challenge is not upheld and/or if no appeal is preferred. This will have to be interpreted in the context that such interim orders can also be executed. Once an interim order is passed it must be obeyed. When a party is given notice of the proceeding for hearing of the application for interim relief and the concerned forum an order disposing off those proceedings after hearing both the parties or ex parte, if the respondent had notice of the hearing and did not participate that part of the proceedings stands disposed of. Thus the expression interim order would be the final disposal of the interim proceedings before the forum. It is now settled law that interim orders once passed unless there be subsequent events cannot be varied during the pendency of the complaint or the main proceedings. To that extent there is an element of finality to such orders. Such interim orders passed during the pendency of the proceedings can be executed in terms of section 25. Once these orders are capable of execution under section 25(1) because there is a finality to them and if the object of section 27 is to penalise a trader or a person against whom complaint is made for failure to comply with the order, then why should these orders which can be executed be excluded from the purview of section 27 which provision no doubt is penal in character. If such orders can be enforced by execution then why cannot they be the subject matter of a complaint like the final order. Why must then the expression “any order” in section 27 be classified into orders passed at an interim stage or orders passed at final stage. Was it the intent of the Legislature to exclude a class of orders from the expression ‘any order’. Wherever the legislature prescribes a duty and a penalty for a breach of it, it must be assumed that the duty is prescribed in the interest of the community or some part of it and the penalty is prescribed as a sanction for its performance. In such matters a rational approach and not a technical approach is the mandate of law. In matters pertaining to consumer protection the law must be interpreted in favour of the consumer. Section 27 only provides what Order 39, Rule 2-A provides under the Civil Procedure Code, with a provision for imprisonment if ultimately the offence is proved. No doubt the sentence of imprisonment may be harsh, but that the respondent must suffer for failure to comply with the orders. As the Supreme Court in Viswabharti House Building Co-op. Society (supra) has noted that section 27 is an additional power on the forums to execute its orders. In the matter of interpreting the provisions of section 14(2-A) of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, Chandrachud C.J, said “considering the object and purpose of this provisions which is to ensure the welfare of workers, we find it impossible to hold that the offence is not of a continuing nature” See Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P, (1984) 4 SCC 222. All such orders are equally binding irrespective of the point of time or at a stage of the proceedings when they are made. The Legislature if that be its intention could have while conferring power to grant interim relief could have excluded such ‘interim order’ from the expression ‘any order’.
22. Does the Rule of construction of statutes, exclude such interpretation. Penal and criminal statutes, statutes in derogation of common rights and of the common law, statutory grants, statutes authorizing summary proceedings, and most tax laws are among the enactments usually subject to strict construction. On the other hand, there are many statutes which will be liberally construed. Where this is the case, the meaning of the statute may be extended to matters which come within the spirit or reason of the law or within the evils which the law seeks to suppress or correct, although, of course, the statute can under no circumstances be given a meaning inconsistent with, or contrary to the language used by the legislators. But a liberal construction does not require that words be accorded a forced, strained, or unnatural meaning, or warrant an extension of the statute to the suppression of supposed evils or the effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes not referred nor indicated in any of the terms used. Whether a statute will be given a liberal or a strict construction will depend upon whether the Court thinks a given “determinate” should be included or excluded from the statute's operation, it is a factor of great importance. (See In Crawford's Statutory Construction, Interpretation of laws 1998 Edition).
23. So viewed, in our opinion, merely because the expression “any order” under section 27 specifically does not use the expression interim order, is irrelevant. Section 27 is an additional remedy to ensure that orders passed are not breached and the party who fails to obey the order has to suffer the penal consequences. It is in the nature of deterrence, to ensure that orders, interim or final are complied and that the consumer is entitled to specific relief. As the Supreme Court has observed in Vishwabarathi House Building Co-op. Society (supra), section 27 is another mode of execution of orders. It is no doubt true that the consequences being penal, the provisions must be strictly construed. At the same time Courts normally consider the literal interpretation of the language of the provisions unless that interpretation results in an absurdity or does not reflect the intent of the Legislature. If the object is to penalise for failure to comply with any order, we find no absurdity in applying the literal rule of construction. In Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-op. Bank Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 50:
“10. Before going in search of any external aids of construction, let us look at the language employed by the Legislature because no canon of construction can be said to be more firmly established than this that the Legislature uses appropriate language to manifest its intention.”
The law pertaining to Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as its object and reasons clause would show is meant for better protection of the interest of the consumers and as the statement of objects and reasons to the Amendment Act 2002 would show, that it is meant to provide a simple, inexpensive and speedy justice to the consumers, on complaints against defective goods, deficiency in service and unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice and conferring power of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class on the Consumer Dispute Redressal Agencies with a view to try the offences under the Act. It is a benevolent piece of legislation providing for an alternative system of consumer justice by a summary trial, See Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital, (2000) 7 SCC 668.
24. In our opinion, therefore, to give greater protection to the consumer and to make execution of orders more effective and less expensive which is the object of the Act and to provide for speedy justice, we see no reason as to why the provisions contained in section 27 should be restricted only to final orders. We must also note that earlier there was power to impose lesser punishment in terms of the proviso to section 27 as it then stood. This proviso was omitted by Act 62 of 2002. The object, therefore, is to make the Act more stringent and leave no discretion for imposing lesser punishment than the minimum what is prescribed under section 27. Considering this object, in our opinion, the compliance by traders and other persons would be more effective if we read the benevolent legislation in such a manner so as to avoid delay, making it less burdensome on the consumer and give him speedy redressal of justice in a complaint which a forum finds to be just.
25. We, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that section 27 which uses the expression ‘any order’ must include within its sweep not only final orders, but all orders including interim orders which are also capable of execution under section 25. Section 27 makes no distinction between order and final order, it involves any order. In our opinion, therefore, we cannot agree with the view expressed either by the Consumer Forum or by the State Commission.
26. The impugned orders dated 24th September, 2008 and 7th January, 2009 are quashed and set aside. We make it clear that we have not commented either on the merits of the complaint or its maintainability on the facts of the case and what the forums must consider including mens rea in a trial of an offence for breach of any order passed under section 25 of the Act and leave that point for consideration before the Consumer Forum to whom the matter is remanded for disposal according to law.
27. Rule made absolute as aforesaid. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
Order accordingly.
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