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  • Ss. 5, 28, 30 read with Ss. 26 and 27 of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions, and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.(ii)
  • provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.(d)
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  • Ss. 5, 28, 30 read with Ss. 26 and 27 of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions, and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act),
  • provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.(ii)
  • provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.(d)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from common judgments concerning complaints filed by several appellants (workmen) who claimed to be employed by the respondent (employer). The complainants filed separate complaints before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra Bench at Nagpur under Ss. 5, 28, 30 read with Ss. 26 and 27 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the Act). Their prayers sought declarations of unfair labour practices, directions to cease such practices, retrospective recognition as regular permanent peons (from the date of completion of 240 days of continuous service) and benefits under certain awards.

The employer denied employer-employee relationship, contending that complainants were neither appointed nor employed by it and that any engagement may have been by officers of the respondent in their personal capacity. The Industrial Court heard evidence from both sides and, by common judgment dated 12 February 2000, allowed the complaints, declaring the employer's actions to be unfair labour practices.

The employer filed separate writ petitions. By a common judgment and order dated 27 November 2002, the High Court (Single Judge) made the rule absolute, set aside the Industrial Court's judgment dated 12 February 2000 and dismissed the complaints as not maintainable. The Single Judge relied on certain precedents and concluded that where employer-employee relationship is disputed, the Labour Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the complaints under the MRTU & PULP Act and such matters should be treated as industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The appellants filed Letters Patent Appeals against the Single Judge's order. Those appeals were filed beyond limitation; the appellants' prayer for condonation of delay was initially rejected by this Court, after which the appellants obtained condonation of delay from the Supreme Court by order dated 8 September 2006. The Letters Patent Appeals were admitted by this Court on 12 December 2006, listed before a Division Bench and heard on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether complaints filed under Ss. 5, 28, 30 read with Ss. 26 and 27 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 are maintainable where the employer disputes the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
  2. Whether the Labour Court / Industrial Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints under the MRTU & PULP Act in circumstances where the employer-employee relationship is disputed or whether such disputes should be treated as industrial disputes and referred under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The complainants expressly pleaded that they were employed by the respondent-company as peons, performed duties regularly, and had completed 240 days of continuous service entitling them to permanent status and benefits.
  • The appellants contended that the employer's defence was a plain denial of employment and did not involve an allegation that the complainants were employed through a contractor; therefore, the line of authority relied upon by the Single Judge (cases concerning contract labour) was wrongly applied.
  • Counsel argued that the precedents relied upon by the Single Judge apply when workmen claim to be direct employees despite being engaged through a contractor (i.e., where a sham/camouflage contract is alleged), which is not the case here.
  • Appellants submitted that the direction given by the Single Judge to the State Government to treat the complaints as demands to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal was unnecessary (otiose) because the complaints did not seek abolition of contract labour, a declaration of sham contractual arrangements, absorption into employment, or any demand of that category.
  • Appellants relied on numerous precedents (listed in the opinion) in support of their interpretation of law and its application to the facts.

Respondent / Employer's Arguments

  • The employer urged that the Single Judge's finding that the employer-employee relationship was disputed was unassailable.
  • The employer submitted that the Labour Court under the MRTU & PULP Act, which exercises summary jurisdiction, does not have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the employer-employee relationship is in dispute; therefore the complaints were rightly dismissed as not maintainable.
  • Once complaints under the MRTU & PULP Act were dismissed as not maintainable, the appropriate forum for such matters is the Industrial Disputes Act; the Single Judge's direction to treat the matters as industrial disputes was appropriate.
  • The employer contended that there was no denial of justice warranting interference in Letters Patent Appeals and that the Letters Patent Appeals themselves were not maintainable.
  • The employer relied on several authorities (listed in the opinion) to support its position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
General Labour Union (Red Flag), Bombay v. Ahmadabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Company, Ltd. (1995 — II L.L.J 765) The opinion describes this as one of three Supreme Court decisions whose ratio was relied upon by the Single Judge to hold that Industrial Court lacks jurisdiction where employer-employee relationship is disputed (particularly in cases involving alleged contractor arrangements). The court noted that the Single Judge relied on this decision (and two others) but held that applying the ratio of these three cases to the present facts would be inappropriate because the present case does not involve contract labour or sham contractor arrangements.
Vividh Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels Ltd. (2001 (1) L.L.N 782) The opinion treats this case as one of the three Supreme Court decisions relied upon to support the proposition that where employer-employee relationship is disputed (in the context of alleged contractor arrangements), the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction. The court recorded that the Single Judge relied on this case; however, the Division Bench concluded the ratio was distinguishable on the facts and not applicable to the present cases.
Maharashtra General Kamgar Union / Cipla, Ltd. (2001 (2) L.L.N 19) Listed among the three Supreme Court decisions said to support the principle that Industrial/Labour Court should not assume jurisdiction where employer-employee relationship is disputed in the context of alleged contract labour. The court observed that the Single Judge relied on this authority, but the Division Bench held that its ratio was not applicable to the present cases because the present complaints did not raise issues of contractor arrangements or sham contracts.
Indian Seamless Metal Tubes, Ltd. (Tubes Division), Ahmednagar v. Sunil Rambhau Iwale (2002 (1) L.L.N 216) The opinion records this as a decision of the High Court holding that complaints are not maintainable where employer-employee relationship is disputed and that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction in such circumstances. The court referenced this decision as having been relied upon by the Single Judge and as part of the body of authority holding lack of jurisdiction where the relationship is disputed. The Division Bench considered the decision but found it distinguishable on the facts of the present cases.
Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling S/W. (Private), Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (2002 (1) L.L.N 228) The opinion notes that in this Division Bench decision the complaints were quashed and set aside and the matters directed to be treated as industrial disputes to be referred to Industrial Tribunal (where employer-employee relationship was disputed). The court referred to this decision as an instance where the Division Bench quashed orders of the Industrial Court and directed referral to the Industrial Tribunal; the Single Judge followed similar directions and the Division Bench considered that approach in context of the present appeals.
Cipla, Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Union and Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Indian Smelting and Refining Company, Ltd. (2004 (1) L.L.N 1) The opinion sets out the rule that the authority under MRTU & PULP Act does not have jurisdiction to decide whether workmen are in fact directly employed by the principal-employer where a plea of agency/contract labour is raised; such issues require adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. The court summarized these authorities to explain that when the issue involves determination of whether workmen are directly employed (in the background of contractor/agency pleas), complaints under MRTU & PULP Act are not maintainable; however, the court held these principles not directly applicable in the present cases because contract labour was not in issue.
Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union of Water Front Workers (2001 (4) L.L.N 135) The opinion records the principle that abolition of contract labour in any industry is a statutory function of the appropriate government. The court cited this authority in summarizing the legal position relating to contract labour and the appropriate forum for such matters.
Mahindra and Mahindra, Ltd. v. General Employees' Union (2006 (2) B.L.C 596)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion referenced this decision among others but did not specify how the court applied it to the present case.

Janprabha Offset Works v. Sarva Shramik Sangh, Jalgaon (2007 (4) L.L.N 230)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion listed this case among cited authorities but did not detail its rule or the manner of application in the present judgment.

Shramik Uttarash Sabha v. Raymond Woollen Mills, Ltd. (1995 (1) L.L.N 804)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion mentions this judgment as cited by parties but does not expound the rule or its application here.

S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading, Ltd. (1986 (1) L.L.N 986)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion records the citation but does not describe its substantive role in the decision.

Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (1996 (1) L.L.N 475)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion notes the citation but does not specify how it was applied.

Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra (1957 — I L.L.J 477)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion includes the citation in a list relied upon by counsel but does not elaborate its principle or application.

H.R Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994 (2) L.L.N 1017)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion lists this authority among many cited by counsel; no specific application in the judgment is detailed.

H.H Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior v. Union of India ((1971) 1 S.C.C 85)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion records the citation but does not state the rule or application in context.

Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam ((2001) 7 S.C.C 573)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The judgment is cited in the list of authorities, but the opinion does not describe its usage.

Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdambha Oil Mills ((2002) 3 S.C.C 496)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion includes this citation without detailing its substantive application.

Union of India v. Chajju Ram ((2003) 5 S.C.C 568)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The court's judgment lists this case among citations but does not explain its principle or application here.

R.P. Sawant v. Bajaj Auto Ltd. (2002 (1) L.L.N 891)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion cites this authority but does not state how it informed the decision.

Sri Raj Narain v. Sri Raj Narain (1975 Supp SCC 1 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 2299)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The court recorded the citation among many authorities cited by counsel; no specific application is detailed.

Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1993 (1) L.L.N 623)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion lists this case but does not explain its relevance or application.

M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa (A.I.R 1961 S.C 1107)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion includes the citation; the judgment does not describe its use in reasoning.

Ramesh Chandra Sahu v. N. Padhy, Principal, Khallikote College, Berhampur (A.I.R 1959 Ori 196)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion records the citation but does not state how it was applied.

Kanak Sunder v. Ram Lakhan (A.I.R 1956 Pat. 325)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The case is cited by counsel; the opinion itself does not provide its rule or application.

P.L. Kantharao v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((1995) 2 S.C.C 471)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The opinion lists this authority but does not elaborate its application.

National Textile Corporation (SM) Ltd. v. Devraj Chandrabali Pai (2006 (1) All. M.R 494)

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

The judgment is cited by the employer's counsel; the present opinion does not detail its use.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench undertook a careful review of the admitted facts, the pleadings and the authorities relied upon by the Single Judge and the parties. The key points in the court's reasoning are summarized below in the order reflected in the opinion:

  1. The appeals proceeded on admitted facts: appellants claimed to be employed by the respondent; they filed separate complaints under specified sections of the MRTU & PULP Act seeking declarations and reliefs connected with unfair labour practices and retrospective recognition after completion of 240 days' continuous service. The employer denied the employer-employee relationship, asserting that any engagement may have been by officers in their personal capacity.
  2. The Industrial Court had allowed the complaints on evidence; the Single Judge, however, set aside that judgment on the ground that the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction because the employer-employee relationship was disputed and, relying on a line of decisions (notably three Supreme Court cases and related High Court authorities), held the complaints to be not maintainable and directed that the matters be treated as industrial disputes for reference under the Industrial Disputes Act.
  3. On appeal, the Division Bench examined whether the precedents relied upon by the Single Judge were applicable to the present facts. The Single Judge's reliance was primarily on jurisprudence dealing with cases in which workmen alleged they were directly employed by a company notwithstanding engagement through a contractor (i.e., cases involving alleged sham or camouflage contracts). In those authorities, it was held that the Labour Court/Industrial Court should not assume jurisdiction where the employer-employee relationship is disputed in the context of contractor arrangements.
  4. The Division Bench contrasted that factual matrix with the present cases and observed that the present complaints did not raise issues of contract labour, sham contracting or the need to "lift the veil" of a contractor arrangement. Rather, the employer's case in the present matters was a plain denial of employment; it was not the case of contractor engagement asserted genuinely by the employer.
  5. The court noted that counsel for the parties had not cited decisions exactly on point for the situation where the workmen were not employed through a contractor but the employer simply denied the employer-employee relationship. The court thus considered the legal position concerning contract labour authorities (including Cipla and Sarva Shramik Sangh), and the statutory role of the appropriate government (Steel Authority case), but reasoned that those authorities dealt principally with contract-labour situations and the limited jurisdiction of authorities under the MRTU & PULP Act where agency or contractor issues are in dispute.
  6. Applying that analysis, the Division Bench concluded that applying the ratio of the three Supreme Court decisions (and the line of cases treating complaints as not maintainable where sham contract/contractor issues are present) to the present facts would be inapt and would improperly classify the appellants among a class of workmen to which they do not belong.
  7. Consequently, the court held that the complaints filed by the appellants before the Labour Court were maintainable because the factual situation did not involve contractor arrangements or sham contracts that would oust the Labour Court's jurisdiction under the precedents relied upon by the Single Judge.
  8. Since the Single Judge had allowed the writ petitions on the ground of non-maintainability and had not gone into the merits, the Division Bench considered it appropriate to remit the matters for adjudication on merits. The court directed that the matters be remitted to the learned Single Judge to dispose of on merits and ordered that parties bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench held that the complaints filed by the appellants before the Labour Court under the MRTU & PULP Act were maintainable in the factual circumstances of these cases and therefore allowed the Letters Patent Appeals. The court remitted the matters to the learned Single Judge to decide them on merits and ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Single Judge's order dismissing the complaints as not maintainable was set aside; the appeals were allowed and the matters remitted for fresh consideration on merits. The appellants' complaints will be adjudicated on merits by the Single Judge.
  • Procedure: The Division Bench made clear that because the Single Judge's decision did not deal with the merits, remittal was appropriate so that evidence may be led and the disputes decided on their substantive merits.
  • Broader legal precedent: The opinion concluded that the line of cases concerning contractor arrangements and sham contracts (and the rule that Labour Courts lack jurisdiction where such issues are disputed) are not applicable to every factual contest where the employer-employee relationship is denied. The Division Bench limited the reach of those authorities to their factual contexts; the opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond its factual holding. The judgment primarily clarifies that where there is no allegation of contractor/sham contract, the precedents excluding Labour Court jurisdiction are distinguishable.
  • Costs: Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
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    Fulchand Baburao Gedam, Nagpur v. Lokmat, Proprietors; Lokmat Newspapers, Ltd., Nagpur (Through Its Managing Director)

    Back ground:

    Joshi, J.:— These letters patent appeals arising out of common Judgment and raising common question of law, are being disposed of by this judgment.

    Admitted facts:

    2. The appeals proceed on certain admitted premises, which are narrated as follows:

    (a) The appellants claim to be employed by respondent.

    (b) Appellants filed separate complaints before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra Bench at Nagpur, under Ss. 5, 28, 30 read with Ss. 26 and 27 of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions, and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), with similar prayers in all complaints which are as follows:

    (i) declare that the respondent has engaged in and is still engaging in the unfair labour practices complained of;

    (ii) direct the respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labour practices complained of;

    (iii) direct the respondent to withdraw temporarily during the pendency of these proceedings and also finally the impugned unfair labour practices forthwith and to grant to the complainant the status and all other privileges and benefits that are applicable to regular and permanent peons with retrospective effect and in any case from the date on which the complainant completed 240 days of continuous service;

    (iv) direct the respondent to give to the complainant the benefits as are made applicable through Palekar and Bachhawat Award.

    (c) According to complainants, the employer had engaged in unfair trade practice under item (9), Sch. 4 of MRTU & PULP Act.

    (d) In their respective complaints, the complainants pleaded that each one of them had joined the employment of the respondent-company as a peon on different dates by oral orders, and that they were performing duties in the office of respondent regularly, and had completed continuous service of 240 days and had gained the status of permanent employees under the provisions of Standing Orders and were entitled to all benefits available to permanent employees working in the respondent-company.

    Respondent/employer's plea before Industrial Court

    3. The employer opposed the complaints on following grounds:

    (a) the complainants were neither appointed nor employed by the respondents.

    (b) There was no employer and employee relationship.

    (c) Some officers might have employed the complainants in their personal capacity, and for attending to their requirements, the complainants may be visiting the place of establishment of the respondent.

    4. In the light of aforesaid pleadings, the complainants were heard. The workmen tendered their evidence, and the employer opposed the complaints by recording oral evidence of some of its officers to oppose the complaint and in rebuttal of the evidence of the complainants.

    5. The Industrial Court rendered a common judgment dated 12 February, 2000, thereby allowing the complaints, and declaring the employer's action to be by way of unfair labour practice.

    6. Aggrieved by judgment of Industrial Court, the employer filed separate writ petitions. Writ-petitions were heard and decided by common judgment, and order, dated, 27 November, 2002. By this judgment, the rule was made absolute, and common Judgment, dated 12 February, 2000, was set aside and complaints were dismissed.

    Findings in judgment under appeal

    7. Learned Single Judge recorded the finding as to the maintainability of complaints under MRTP and PULP Act as follows:

    “20. xxx

    In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the contention of Sri Thakur that the ratio of the three cases of the Supreme Court, i.e,

    (1) General Labour Union (Red Flag), Bombay v. Ahmadabad Manufacturing, and Calico Printing Company, Ltd., [1995 — II L.L.J 765].

    (2) Vividh Kamgar Sabha, [2001 (1) L.L.N 782]

    (3) Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, [2001 (2) L.L.N 19],

    is distinguishable and cannot be applied to the case at hand, does not find favour with this Court. Merely because the facts differ as in the three cases, where the employees had approached the Court under the MRTU and PULP Act with a case that actually they are the employees of the company which has engaged them through a Contractor, so as to deprive them of benefits to which they are entitled as employees of the company, whereas in the present case, they have approached the Court on the basis that they have been employed on daily wages by the respondent-company and are continued as such without regularizing their services and giving them all the benefits to which regular employees of the establishment are entitled.

    21. Sri Manohar has placed reliance on the case of Indian Seamless Metal Tubes, Ltd., [2002 (1) L.L.N 216], which is a decision of this High Court in which this question has been examined thoroughly and came to be approved by the Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling S/W. (P) Ltd. v. Narayan Rawal, [2002 (1) L.L.N 216], wherein view taken by another learned Judge of this Court in the very case of Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling S/W.P Ltd. v. Narayan Rawed, [2002 (1) L.L.N 208] (vide supra), have seen repelled and it has been held, that the complaints filed by the Union and the employees are not maintainable as employer-employee relationship is disputed he and Industrial Court has therefore, no jurisdiction to try the complaints. If the Industrial Court or the Labour Court is satisfied that there is no undisputed or indisputable employer/employee relationship, then it cannot assume jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and the complaint will have to be dismissed as not maintainable. In both the cases, i.e, Indian Seamless (vie supra) and also Hindustan Coca Cola Bottlings (cited supra), the Court has relied upon all the three decisions of the Supreme Court commencing from General Labour Union (Red Flag) (vide supra), Vividh Kamgar Sabha (vide supra) and Cipla Ltd., [2001 (2) L.L.N 10] (vide supra), and, therefore, the Division Bench of this Court in Hindustan Coca Cola Bottlings case (vide supra), quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the complaint as not maintainable and referred the matter to the State Government to treat the complaint as industrial dispute and refer the same to Industrial Tribunal within eight weeks with time bound programme to dispose of the reference.

    22. This Court having taken the view that the contentious issue does arise between the parties as regards to very existence of employer-employee relationship, the Industrial Court ought not to have proceeded further with the complaint and decided the same on merits. Probably this situation occurred as the High Court declined to intervene in the matter at an appropriate stage.

    23. As this Court has already come to the conclusion that the decision of the Industrial Court is a nullity and proposes to quash and set aside the impugned orders, the parties would have to undergo a fresh exercise before the Labour Court in the matter and it would be better if this Court does not make any observation and leave it to the parties to lead evidence keeping in mind the principles of law of evidence that the parties are expected to lead best evidence available with them to establish their respective cases.

    24. In the result, this Court quashes and sets aside the impugned orders and dismisses all the complaints by issuing similar directions as in the case of Hindustan Coca Cola Bottlings S/W (Private), Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena, [2002 (1) L.L.N 228], and direct the State Government to treat the complaints as industrial disputes and refer them to the Industrial Tribunals within eight weeks from today. The Industrial Tribunal shall decide the references within six months from the date of the receipt of the same. On the dispute being referred for adjudicating, it would be open for the parties to lead fresh evidence in the matter. This Court further makes it clear that the Labour Court while adjudicating the dispute, would not be influenced by any observations made by the Industrial Court while disposing of the complaints filed by the respondents and would decide the matter on its own merits and in accordance with law.”

    8. Appellants taking exception to the order passed by learned Single Judge, filed above Letters Patent appeals.

    9. The Letters Patent Appeals were filed beyond period of limitation. The prayer for condonation of delay was rejected by this Court. The appellants, therefore, approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by filing separate special leave petitions. Apex Court while allowing appeals by order dated, 8 September, 2006, condoned the delay caused in filing Letters Patent Appeals, and directed the Letters Patent Appeals to be disposed of on merits at an early date.

    10. The Letters Patent Appeals were accordingly, admitted by this Court on 12 December, 2006. Hearing of appeal was delayed due to confusion as to which of the Benches should hear the appeals. Ultimately, the appeals were listed before this Division Bench and were heard on merits.

    Submissions

    11. The submissions of learned advocate Sri Thakur may be summarized as follows:

    (a) This is a case where admittedly the complainants claimed that they were employed by the employer-company and the employer pleaded that the complainants were employed by the officers of the employment in their personal capacity, and as such issue of contract labour was not involved, even remotely.

    (b) The cases which are relied upon to non suit the appellants have been wrongly relied upon, though they do not apply to the issue involved in the case, because learned Single Judge failed to advert to the pleadings of the workmen.

    (c) The judgments relied upon by learned Single Judge, apply only when on facts workmen employed allegedly through contractor claim to be employed directly, or demand absorption in the services of the employer or seek a declaration that contract is sham, bogus or a camouflage.

    (d) According to learned advocate for the appellant, the direction of learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition given to the State Government to consider the complaints of the workmen as the demand or dispute for the purpose of reference, is otiose since demand by the workmen was not for:

    (1) abolition of contract labour,

    (2) declaration that a mechanism of contract is sham and bogus, or

    (3) for abolition of existing contract of labour, or

    (4) any other demand of the same category.

    12. Learned advocate Sri S.D Thakur for the appellants placed reliance on following judgments:

    (1) 1995 — II L.L.J 765, General Labour Union (Red Flag), Bombay v. Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Company, Ltd.,.

    (2) 2001 (1) L.L.N 782, Vividh Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels, Ltd. (vide supra).

    (3) 2001 (2) L.L.N 19, Cipla, Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union (vide supra).

    (4) 2001 (4) L.L.N 135, Steet Authority of India, Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers

    (5) 2004 (1) L.L.N 1, Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Inaian Smelting and Re Fining Company, Ltd.

    (6) 1995 (1) L.L.N 804, Shramik Uttarash Sabha v. Raymond Woollen, Mills, Ltd.

    (7) S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. S.G Chemicals and Dyes Trading, Ltd., [1986 (1) L.L.N 986].

    (8) 1996 (1) L.L.N 475, Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare

    (9) 1957 — I L.L.J 477, Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra

    (10) 1994 (2) L.L.N 1017, H.R Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India), Ltd.

    (11) (1971) 1 S.C.C 85, H.H Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur of Gwalior v. Union of India.

    (12) (2001) 7 S.C.C 573, Hameed Joharan (Dead) v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by Legal Representatives

    (13) (2002) 3 S.C.C 496, Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdambha Oil Mills.

    (14) (2003) 5 S.C.C 568, Union of India v. Chajju Ram (dead) by Legal Representatives.

    (15) 2002 (1) L.L.N 891, R.P Sawant v. Bajaj Auto, Ltd.,

    (16) 1975 Supp SCC 1 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 2299, Sri Raj Narain v. Sri Raj Narain

    (17) 1993 (1) L.L.N 623, Kumari Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh.

    (18) A.I.R 1961 S.C 1107, M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa

    (19) A.I.R 1959 Ori 196, Ramesh Chandra Sahu v. N. Padhy Principal, Khallikote College, Berhampur

    (20) A.I.R 1956 Pat. 325, Kanak Sunder v. Ram Lakhan

    (21) (1995) 2 S.C.C 471, P.L Kantharao v. State of Andhra Pradesh

    (22) 2002 (1) L.L.N 228, Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling S/W. (Private), Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena.

    (23) 1995 (2) L.L.N 59, Gujarat Electricity Board, Thermal Power Station, Ukai, Gujarat v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha

    The Judgments at items (5), (6) and (22) are cited to distinguish how these judgments do not govern the law relied upun by the learned Single Judge, while other Judgments are cited to persuade this Court as to how and in what manner the law shall be interpreted.

    13. Learned advocate Sri Marpakwar for the employer opposed the Letters Patent Appeals, inter alia, on various grounds:

    (a) That the finding of the Single Judge that the employer-employee relationship is under dispute is unassailable.

    (b) The Labour Court which is the authority under MRTU & PULP Act, which enjoys summary jurisdiction and which has a limited scope of exercise of powers does not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaints, and therefore, the complaints, which were wrongly entertained have been rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge by allowing the employer's writ petitions.

    (c) Once the complaints under MRTU & PULP Act, were dismissed as not maintainable, only forum available was under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.

    (d) It was not a case of denial of justice requiring interference in Letters Patent Appeals.

    (e) That the Letters Patent Appeals are not maintainable.

    14. Learned advocate Sri Marpakwar placed reliance on the following judgments.

    (1) 1995 (1) L.L.N 804, Shramik Uttarash Sabha v. Raymond Woollen Mills, Ltd., (vide supra).

    (2) General Labour Union (Red Flag) Bombay v. Ahmedabad Manafacturing and Calico Printing Company, Ltd., (vide supra).

    (3) 2002 (1) L.L.N 228, Hindustan Coca Cola Bottling S/W (Private), Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (vide supra).

    (4) 2002 (1) L.L.N 216, Indian Seamless Metal Tubes, Ltd. (Tubes Division), Ahmednagar v. Sunil Rambhau Iwale (vide supra).

    (5) 2001 (1) L.L.N 782, Vividh Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels, Ltd.,.

    (6) 2001 (2) L.L.N 19, Cipla, Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union (vide supra).

    (7) 2005 (4) L.L.N 1039, Tukaram Tanaji Mandhare v. Raymond Woollen Mills, Ltd., (vide supra).

    (8) 2004 (1) L.L.N 1, Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Indian Smelting and Refining Company, Ltd., (vide supra).

    (9) 2006 (2) B.L.C 596, Mahindra and Mahindra, Ltd. v. General Employees' Union (vide supra).

    (10) 2006 (1) All. M.R 494, National Textile Corporation (SM), Ltd. v. Devraj Chandrabali Pai.

    (11) 2007 (4) L.L.N 230 Janprabha Offset Works v. Sarva Shramik Sangh, Jalgaon, (current issue).

    Analysis:

    15. We have carefully considered the issues involved, and submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties.

    16. It is necessary to note that it was not the complainants' case that:

    (a) they were in fact, employed by a contractor, and that said arrangement was sham and bogus; or

    (b) though they were employed through contractor, they were in fact, rendering the job of regular nature and, therefore, by unveiling the camouflage of the contract labour, they were to be treated as direct employees; or

    (c) they were claiming the abolition of contract labour and absorption in employment.

    17. It is also seen that even it was not the employer's case that the complainants were contractor's employees genuinely employed as such, and therefore, the complaints were not maintainable. The entire case of employer was of plain and simpliciter denial, as it claimed that the workman concerned may have been employed/engaged by its officers in their individual capacities.

    18. The learned advocates for the parties have not cited any decision on the point as to in what manner the situation shall be dealt with if the case before the Court is of such nature where the workmen are not employed through contractor, but the employer has barely denied the employer-employee relationship.

    19. The legal position as to contract labour and their absorption of the workmen in the employment of the principal-employer can be summarised as follows:

    (i) In Cipla, Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Union, [2001 (2) L.L.N 19] (vide supra) and in Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Indian Smelting and Refining Company, Ltd., [2004 (1) L.L.N 1] (vide supra), it has been held, that the authority under MRTU & PULP Act does not have jurisdiction to decide as to whether the workmen are in fact, directly employed by the principal-employer in the background of plea of agency of contract labour and the same is required to be adjudicated under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.

    (ii) Similarly in Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union of Water Front Workers, [2001 (4) L.L.N 135] (vide supra), it has been held, that to abolish contract labour in any industry is the statutory function of appropriate Government.

    20. Perusal of judgment impugned as well as the judgments of learned Single Judge of this Court in—

    (1) Mahindra and Mahindra, Ltd. v. General Employees' Union (vide supra)

    (2) 2007 (4) L.L.N 230, Janprabha Offset Works v. Sarva Shramik Sangh, Jalgaon (vide supra).

    discloses that in these cases in which the employees concerned were employed with canteen contractor, or a contractor, and that it was alleged that the contract was sham and bogus and, therefore, the workmen and were claiming to be employees of company by lifting veil as in case of the workmen in the case of Cipla, Ltd., [2001 (2) L.L.N 19] (vide supra). In case of Cipla Ltd. (vide supra), complainants had claimed that the contract labour be declared to be a sham and bogus device, and demanded a declaration that they be declared as direct employees. This type of prayer in complaint under S. 28 MRTU & PULP Act, was held impermissible. In the complaints filed by the workmen in the present cases such prayer is not made directly or indirectly.

    21. As stated above, issue of contract labour is not involved, directly or indirectly. We, therefore, hold that the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases is not applicable to present cases.

    22. In the backdrop of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that applying ratio laid down in three judgments of the Supreme Court referred to in Para. 19 would amount to including the appellants amongst the class of workmen to which they do not belong.

    23. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the complaints filed by the appellants before the Labour Court were maintainable.

    24. In view of the fact that the learned Single Judge of this Court had allowed the writ petitions on the ground that the complaints were not maintainable, and no findings were given on merits, we seem it appropriate to remit the matters and accordingly, remit the matters to learned Single Judge to dispose of on merits. All the appeals are allowed in aforesaid terms. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the parties to bear their own costs.

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