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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter concerns an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing a criminal complaint (C.C. No. 17/SS/2004) instituted under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against a company (Accused No. 1) and several persons, including the Applicant who is named as Accused No. 2. The Applicant is described in the complaint as the Chairman of the accused company but is not alleged to be the signatory to the cheques. The complaint asserts that accused Nos. 7 and 8 were authorised signatories and vaguely alleges that all accused were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. Paragraph 7 of the complaint alleges that despite receipt of a legal notice the accused failed to make payment within 15 days.

Procedurally, a judgment was pronounced in open Court on 14 December 2004 allowing the applications in question; later, after certain reported decisions were relied upon in other matters heard subsequently, the Court informed the advocates and permitted re-argument. The matters were re-listed for hearing on 23 December 2004. The Applicant had earlier applied for recall of process before the trial court but withdrew that remedy and filed the present petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. The Applicant contends he had resigned as a director with effect from 2 April 2001 (supported by Form No. 32 filed with the Registrar of Companies), a fact disputed by the complainant.

After hearing, the Court concluded that the complaint as filed did not disclose the requisite averments to fasten liability on the Applicant under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and accordingly quashed the criminal complaint insofar as it related to the Applicant (Accused No. 2) only. The Court also ordered that similar applications with identical parties and complaints succeed for the same reasons.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the complaint, read as a whole, contains sufficient averments to show that the Applicant was "in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company" at the relevant time so as to attract liability under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  2. Whether the Court may look into material and documents (including affidavit and documents filed in reply) that do not form part of the complaint and its verification for determining whether the complaint ought to proceed against the Applicant.
  3. Whether Form No. 32 (intimating cessation of directorship) can be relied upon by the Court to quash the complaint where the correctness or effect of that Form is disputed by the complainant.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The Applicant was not the signatory to the cheques and, at the relevant times (presentation of the cheque, dishonour and issuance of legal notice), he had ceased to be a director/chairman of the accused company — he had resigned effective 2 April 2001 and this resignation was accepted by the board on 30 April 2001 and intimated to the Registrar of Companies by filing Form No. 32.
  • Because the Applicant was not in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the relevant time, the complaint cannot proceed against him under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The Applicant had initially sought recall of process in the trial Court but, in view of Apex Court authority, withdrew that remedy and instead sought quashing under section 482 Cr.P.C.

Respondent No. 2 (Complainant)'s Arguments

  • The complainant denied that the Applicant had resigned as a director and relied on documents which, according to the complainant, establish that the Applicant continued to be in charge of the affairs of the accused company even recently, making him liable for the offence.
  • The complainant contended that reading the complaint as a whole discloses material fulfilling the requirements of section 141 and that details establishing the necessary ingredients can be furnished at trial; therefore, the complaint should be allowed to proceed against the Applicant.
  • The complainant placed reliance on documents and an affidavit in reply to show complicity of the Applicant, but the Court was asked (by complainant) to have regard to such material in opposing quashing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and Ors. Referenced as a reported decision relevant to transcription and signing of the earlier pronounced judgment (procedural reference). Court relied on the legal position expounded in this decision to justify informing advocates and permitting re-argument before signing the transcribed judgment.
State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand and Ors. Consideration of the expression "in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of a company" while construing analogous statutory provisions (Drugs and Cosmetics Act). Court cited the decision as authority for the proposition that "in-charge" denotes overall control of day-to-day business, and noted that it referred to G.L. Gupta.
G.L. Gupta v. D.H. Mehta Definition/explanation that "a person in-charge" must mean one in overall control of the day-to-day business; distinction between director, manager and other officers. Court quoted para 6 to support the conclusion that mere directorship is insufficient; the person must have overall control to be vicariously liable under the provision.
K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. Interpretation that a person other than the company can be proceeded against under section 141 only if he was in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of business at the relevant time. Court relied on this authority to emphasize that only those in charge and responsible can be made liable; applied its principle to find that the complaint did not show the Applicant met that threshold.
Katta Sujatha (Smt.) v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. and Anr. Authority for the proposition that complaints must specifically attribute acts to make persons vicariously liable; mere naming in title is insufficient. Court used this decision to support the conclusion that absence of specific averments in the complaint warrants quashing as to the person not specifically implicated.
Monaben Ketanbhai Shah and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. Principles: complaint read as a whole; hypertechnical approach to be avoided; but where ingredients of the offence are lacking the court must discharge the accused; primary responsibility on complainant to make necessary averments. Court relied heavily on this decision to hold that filing of documents later (outside the complaint) is of no consequence and that the complainant must plead facts showing complicity; used it to quash complaint as to the Applicant.
H.M. Dave v. Gitanjali Shah and Anr. High Court authority applying the principle that complaint must contain specific averments to fasten vicarious liability under section 141. Cited as part of supporting High Court jurisprudence aligning with the principle that mere directorship or bald allegations are insufficient; applied as supportive authority.
Chaitan M. Maniar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. High Court case where complaint lacked specific averment about the role of a non-executive director; court quashed complaint (and noted incidental resignation). Court cited it to show factual scenarios where quashing was appropriate; distinguished that it did not establish the proposition that Form 32 alone suffices where the correctness of that form is disputed.
Madanlal Taparia and Anr. v. The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. and Anr. (unreported) Recent, unreported decision on similar subject matter (cited as illustrative jurisprudence). Noted by the Court as a useful recent decision on related issues; no detailed application beyond recognition.
P. Rajarathinam v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. High Court decision in which the complaint (on its facts) did give essential ingredients of section 141; establishes that outcomes depend on factual matrix. Court distinguished this decision on facts and held it of no avail to the present case because here the complaint did not contain the necessary averments.
Sanjeev R. Apte v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. Delhi High Court decision where complaint was read as a whole and the court found necessary ingredients of section 141 were spelt out. Court observed that this decision is of no avail to the complainant on the facts of the present case because the present complaint lacks necessary averments.
Kusum A. Bardeskar and Ors. v. Babulal Tarachand Shah and Anr. High Court decision where there was no dispute about the correctness of Form 32 indicating resignation; used as basis for quashing as against that director. Court distinguished this case: it is not authority for the proposition that Form 32 suffices where resignation is disputed.
Dushyant D. Anjaria v. M/s. Wall Street Finance Ltd. and Anr. High Court decision where the complainant had not specifically denied resignation; the court did not rely solely on Form 32 but also on other facts (co-opted director etc.). Court noted the factual distinctions and held it did not support the proposition that Form 32 alone can be relied upon when disputed.
Saumil Dilip Mehta v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. Division Bench decision that relied on Form 32 where resignation was established to hold the petitioner had ceased to be director and could not be held liable for later liabilities. Court observed that Saumil Mehta does not address the scenario where the correctness of Form 32 is disputed; hence it is not authoritative for the present disputed fact situation.
Bharati N. Wadhwana and Ors. v. Arjun Kishandas Jaisingh and Anr. High Court view that where the fact of resignation (or correctness of Form 32) is disputed, that fact must be proved at trial and cannot be decided on an application for quashing. Court cited this decision to support the proposition that disputed resignation must be established by evidence at trial and cannot be the sole basis for quashing.
V.K. Jain v. Union of India Apex Court dictum that the plea of not participating in the affairs of the company is a defence to be raised at trial and is not, by itself, a ground for quashing prosecution. Court relied on this principle to reject the submission that the complaint ought to be quashed solely because the Applicant pleads non-participation or cessation of directorship (when such facts are disputed).
Om Prakash Berlia and Anr. v. Unit Trust of India and Ors. High Court decision referenced in support of established principle regarding contested resignation and quashing. Cited as part of supporting jurisprudence that disputed factual matters (like resignation) must be proved at trial and are not suitable for summary disposal on quashing applications.
Pandurang Comotim Sancoalcar v. Suresh Prabhakar Prabhu High Court decision (reported 2001 Cri.L.J. 2945) directly on the point that correctness of Form 32, when disputed, must be proved at trial. Court applied this authority to hold that Form 32 cannot be the sole basis for quashing where the complainant disputes the factum of resignation.
Bharat Kumar Modi and Ors. v. Pennar Paterson Securities Ltd. Andhra Pradesh High Court decision directly on the point of disputed resignation and the need for trial to resolve such disputes. Court relied on this decision as directly supporting the proposition that disputed facts regarding resignation must be established at trial rather than on a quashing application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following logical steps, closely following statutory text and precedents cited in the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court first set out the relevant provisions. Section 138 creates the substantive offence for dishonour of cheques. Section 141 provides that where the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed guilty and may be proceeded against; there are provisos concerning knowledge, due diligence and certain nominated directors, and subsection (2) adds liability where the offence is attributable to consent, connivance or neglect of specified officers.
  2. Meaning of "in charge of and responsible": Relying on Apex Court authority (including G.L. Gupta and State of Karnataka as explained in the opinion), the Court held that the expression denotes overall control of the day-to-day business. Mere formal status as a director is not enough; something more must be alleged and established to show that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of company business at the relevant time.
  3. Requirement of pleading: The Court emphasized, following Monaben and related authorities, that the primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint to fasten vicarious liability under section 141. The complaint should, read as a whole, disclose the substance of allegations required by section 141; mere reproduction of the statutory words or bald general statements (for example, naming a person as director or saying “all the accused are in charge of the conduct of business”) are inadequate where they do not set out facts indicating actual control, knowledge, connivance or neglect.
  4. Application to the present complaint: On a fair reading of the complaint as filed, the Court found only the allegations that the Applicant was Chairman and a general assertion that all accused were in charge of and responsible for the company's business. There was no specific allegation that the Applicant was a signatory to the cheques, had knowledge of their issuance, consented or connived, or failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the offence. Paragraph 7's averment regarding non-payment after notice did not, by itself, satisfy section 141's requirements as to the Applicant.
  5. On materials outside the complaint: The Court rejected the complainant's invitation to base the decision on affidavit material or documents filed in reply that are not part of the complaint and verification. The Court followed the authority that documents produced after filing the complaint (such as partnership deed or other materials) cannot be used to supply missing averments in the complaint for purposes of deciding a quashing application.
  6. On Form No. 32 and resignation: The Applicant relied on Form No. 32 (intimating cessation of directorship) to assert he was not a director at the relevant time. The Court carefully reviewed High Court authority on the weight to be given to Form 32: where resignation or Form 32 was not disputed, courts have relied on it to quash complaints. However, where the fact of resignation is disputed by the complainant (as is the position here), the correctness and effect of Form 32 is a matter that must be proved at trial by adducing evidence. The Court cited authorities (including V.K. Jain, Pandurang Sancoalcar, Bharat Kumar Modi and others) to support the proposition that non-participation or cessation of directorship is a defence to be raised at trial and is not, by itself, a ground for summary quashing when disputed.
  7. Conclusion from analysis: Because the complaint as filed did not contain sufficient averments to indicate the Applicant's complicity under section 141, and because the complainant disputed the resignation/form evidence (so that Form 32 could not be accepted at face value on a quashing application), the Court concluded that the complaint could not proceed against the Applicant.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The criminal complaint is quashed insofar as it relates to the Applicant (Accused No. 2) only.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Applicant (Accused No. 2) is discharged from the criminal complaint arising out of C.C. No. 17/SS/2004; the criminal action will not proceed against him. The Court also ordered that other applications with identical parties and complaints succeed for the same reasons.
  • On legal principle: The decision applies existing authorities concerning the interpretation of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act — specifically that mere directorship or a bald averment that a person is “in charge” is insufficient; the complaint must contain factual averments showing actual control, knowledge, connivance or neglect on the part of the person sought to be proceeded against.
  • On evidentiary disputes: The Court reiterated that where the fact of resignation (e.g., as evidenced by Form No. 32) is disputed by the complainant, such disputes must be resolved at trial by evidence and not on a summary quashing application. The opinion does not purport to create new law but applies established precedent to the facts at hand.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Vijay Mallya v. State Of Maharashtra And Anr.

    1. Judgment was pronounced in open Court in the presence of the Counsel appearing for the parties on 14th December 2004 allowing the applications. This matter was the leading matter amongst the group of matters listed on that date for hearing. After the matter was heard and judgment was pronounced, in the following matters, which were heard later on, certain argument was canvassed relying on the reported decisions. As those decisions were not brought to my notice at the hearing of the present applications, I thought it appropriate to inform the Advocates appearing in the present applications about the said decisions and also permit them to reargue the matter. I adopted this course as the judgment which was pronounced in open Court on 14th December 2004 was transcribed later on and yet to be signed, in view of the legal position expounded by the Apex Court in in the case of Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and Ors. The Advocates were accordingly informed, who made themselves available in Chamber at 4.45 p.m. today. They agreed that the judgment, which was pronounced in open Court on 14th December 2004, need not be signed and they would reargue the matters, if placed for hearing tomorrow. Accordingly, the matters are placed for hearing on 23rd December 2004 as agreed. Ordered accordingly.

    23rd December 2004

    1. Heard Counsel for the parties. This application is filed for quashing of criminal proceedings instituted by the Respondent No. for offence punishable under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the accused Company, being C.C. No. 17/SS/2004 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Bhoiwada at Dadar, Mumbai. The Applicant has been named as accused No. 2 on the assertion that he is the Chairman of accused No. 1 Company. It is not the complainants case that the Applicant was the signatory to the cheques in question. Whereas, the complaint asserts that accused Nos. 7 and 8 are the authorised signatories of accused No. 1 Company and are Vice-President (Finance) and General Manager (F.M.A.) respectively of accused No. 1 Company. It is further vaguely asserted that all the accused are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of accused No. 1 Company. This is the only allegation on the basis of which the Applicant has been named as accused No. for the alleged offence committed by the accused Company. Besides the allegations referred to above, the only other allegation in the complaint which needs to be adverted to can be discerned from para 7 wherein the complainant states that inspite of receipt of the legal notice sent to the accused, they failed and neglected to make the payment within 15 days from the receipt of the notice or till the date of the filing of the complaint in relation to the dishonoured cheque.

    2. The Applicant initially approached for recall of process before the trial Court upon receipt of the summons in relation to the said complaint. However, in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court, as recall remedy was unavailable, the Applicant has withdrawn the said application and, instead, preferred the present application for quashing of the said criminal action under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure insofar as the Applicant is concerned.

    3. According to the Applicant, the cheque in question was issued at a time when the Applicant was a Director/Non-Executive Chairman of the accused Company. It was a post-dated cheque in respect of loan facility extended by the Respondent No. 2 Complainant to the accused Company. According to the Applicant, he has resigned on and from 2nd April 2001 as a Director of the accused Company and that resignation has been accepted by the Board of Directors of the accused Company vide Resolution dated 30th April 2001 with effect from 2nd April 2001. It is the Applicants case that the factum of resignation of the Applicant as Director of the accused Company has been intimated by submitting Form No. 32 to the Registrar of Companies. In other words, it is contended that when the cheque was actually presented and dishonoured and on the date when legal notice was sent, the Applicant was not concerned with the accused Company, much less as its Director in charge of the affairs of the Company, so as to make him liable in respect of the alleged offence committed by the accused Company. It is also the case of the Applicant that even on a fair reading of the complaint as a whole, there is no allegation so as to indicate the complicity of the Applicant in relation to the offence committed by the accused Company. It is submitted that even on this count, the complaint cannot proceed against the Applicant.

    4. On the other hand, Respondent No. 2 has filed reply affidavit opposing this application. In the affidavit, the Respondent No. 2 Complainant has denied that the Applicant had resigned as Director, as alleged. Besides, reliance is placed on documents to contend that the said documents would clearly establish the position that the Applicant continues to be in charge of the affairs of the accused Company even till recently; and if it is so, would be liable for offence committed by the accused Company. Insofar as the deficiency of allegations so as to indicate the complicity of the Applicant in respect of offence committed by the accused Company is concerned, according to the Respondent No. 2, if the complaint is read as a whole, necessary ingredients so as to indicate the complicity of the Applicant in respect of the offence committed by the accused Company, as is required by section 141 of the Act, are spelt out. According to the Respondent No. 2, the details to establish the said ingredients can be furnished at the trial and the complaint as filed will have to proceed even against the Applicant herein.

    5. After considering the rival submissions, and going through the relevant records, the first question that needs to be addressed is : What is the purport of section 141 of the Act ? Section 138 of the Act postulates that where any cheque drawn by a "person" on account maintained by him with the banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, which is legally enforceable debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. The proviso to section 138 of the Act provides for three exceptions so as to extricate the person from the liability arising under section 138. Insofar as the offence under section 138 of the Act committed by a company, it is provided that "every person", who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. There are two provisos to section 141(1) of the Act. It would be apposite to reproduce section 141, as amended, in its entirety, which reads thus:

    " 141. Offences by companies.-- (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person, who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

    Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

    Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

    Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, -

    (a) company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and

    (b) director, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."

    On plain language of this provision, it is seen that even if a person is the director of the company, who is being proceeded for offence under section 138 of the Act, by itself, cannot be made liable by virtue of section 141. Something more is required to be alleged and established against that person even if he is a director. The person should be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. The expression "in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company" has been considered by the Apex Court while construing provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, in the case of State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand and Ors., , which, in turn, has referred to its earlier decision in the case of G.L. Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, . In para 6 of the decision in Guptas case (supra), which has been extracted in para 7 of the decision in State of Karnatakas case (supra), the Apex Court has observed thus :

    "What then does the expression a person in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the affairs of a company means? It will be noticed that the word company includes a firm or other association, and the same test may apply to a director in-charge and a partner of a firm in-charge of a business. It seems to us that in the context a person in-charge must mean that the person should be in overall control of the day to day business of the company or firm. This inference follows from the wording of Section 23-C(2). It mentions director, who may be a party to the policy being followed by a company and yet not be in-charge of the business of the company. Further it mentions manager, who usually is in charge of the business but not in overall charge. Similarly the other officers may be in charge of only some part of business."

    It, therefore, follows that merely being a director of a company cannot be the basis to proceed against that person for the offence committed by the company. He should be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. Besides, the offence committed by the company must have been committed with his knowledge or that he had failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. In addition, it has to be established that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of that person or is attributable to any neglect on his part, whether he is director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, so as to make him liable for being proceeded against and punished for the offence committed by the company. The Apex Court had occasion to consider these aspects as can be noted from the decision in the case of K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., . In para 8 of this decision, the Apex Court has observed that from the perusal of section 141, it is evident that in a case where a company committed offence under section 138, then, not only the company, but also every person, who, at the time when the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the conduct of the business of the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It is further observed that it follows that a person, other than the company, can be proceeded against under those provisions only if that person was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the relevant time. In the case of Katta Sujatha (Smt.) v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. and Anr., , the Apex Court noted that the complaint did not specifically attribute any particular act done by the appellant before it. On that basis, the Court proceeded to examine the matter and found that the appellant was in no way involved in any of the transactions referred to in the complaint and it was not stated that the appellant was in charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm in terms of section 141 of the Act, nor was there any other allegation against the appellant that she had connived with any other partner in the matter of issue of cheque. On that finding, the Court proceeded to quash the complaint insofar as the appellant before it, who was partner of the partnership firm, which had committed the offence under section 138 of the Act. Even in the case of Monaben Ketanbhai Shah and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., , the Apex Court observed as follows :

    " 3. Section 138 of the Act makes dishonour of the cheque an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine or both. Section 141 relates to offences by the company. It provides that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Thus, vicarious liability has been fastened on those who are in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. For the purpose of Section 141, a firm comes within the ambit of a company.

    4. It is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section 141 verbatim in the complaint since the complaint is required to be read as a whole. If the substance of the allegations made in the complaint the requirements of Section 141, the complaint has to proceed and is required to be tried with. It is also true that in construing a complaint, a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted so as to quash the same. The laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions resulting in enactment of Sections 138 and 141 has to be borne in mind. These provisions create a statutory presumption of dishonesty, exposing a person to criminal liability if payment is not made within the statutory period even after issue of notice. It is also true that the power of quashing is required to be exercised very sparingly and where, read as a whole, actual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, it should not be quashed. All the same, it is also to be remembered that it is the duty of the court to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the complaint as correct and construing the allegations made therein liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the offence are altogether lacking. The present case falls in this category as would be evident from the facts noticed hereinafter."

    The Apex Court then went on to consider the averments in the complaint and noted that there are no averments in the complaint that the appellants have taken active interest in the business except stating in the title that they are partners of the firm. In para 6, the Apex Court has observed thus :

    "6. From the above, it is evident that in the complaint there are no averments against the appellants except stating in the title that they are partners of the firm. Learned counsel for the respondent complainants contended that a copy of the partnership deed was also filed which would show that the appellants were active in the business. No such document was filed with the complaint or made part thereof. The filing of the partnership deed later is of no consequence for determining the point in issue. Section 141 does not make all partners liable for the offence. The criminal liability has been fastened on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm; they may be ladies and others who may not know anything about the business of the firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint."

    The decision of the Apex Court in Monabens case (supra) is not only an authority on the requirements of section 141 of the Act, but also about the necessity of the requisite averments to be made in the complaint so as to indicate the complicity of a person for making him liable for offence committed by the company or the partnership firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable and also to establish those facts. In the case of Katta Sujatha (supra), the Apex Court quashed the criminal complaint insofar as the appellant before it was concerned, as no specific allegation attributing any particular act done by the appellant was stated in the complaint as filed. Similar was the approach adopted in K.P.G.Nairs case (supra). In other words, the requirements of section 141 of the Act indicating the complicity of the person in respect of offence committed by the company or the partnership firm will have to be clearly spelt out in the complaint. Mere reproduction of the language of the section is not enough. Same principle has been adopted even by our High Court in the cases of H.M. Dave v. Gitanjali Shah and Anr. reported in 1998 (4) LJ 830; and Chaitan M. Maniar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 1035. It may be useful to refer to the recent unreported decision in the case of Madanlal Taparia and Anr. v. The Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. and Anr. in Criminal Writ Petition No. 2241 of 2004 decided on December 14, 2004.

    6. That brings me to the question as to whether in the present case, the averments in the complaint are sufficient to indicate the complicity of the Applicant in the commission of offence committed by the accused Company. As mentioned earlier, even on a fair reading of the complaint as a whole, what can be discerned is that the Applicant, accused No. 2, is the Chairman of accused No. 1 Company and further that all the accused are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the accused No. 1 Company. This, by no standards, is sufficient to indicate the complicity of the Applicant herein in relation to the offence committed by the accused Company. It is relevant to note that it is common ground that the Applicant was not the signatory to the cheques in question. In similar fact situation, the Apex Court in the case of K.P.G. Nair (supra) observed that the words of section 141 need not be incorporated in the complaint as magic words but substance of the allegations read as a whole should answer and fulfil the requirements of the ingredients of the said provision for being proceeded against for an offence which the accused is alleged to have committed. Similar approach was adopted by the Apex Court in the case of Katta Sujatha (supra), where the complaint did not specifically attribute any particular act done by the appellant before it. Even in the case of Monaben (supra), the Apex Court observed that there was no allegation in the complaint that the appellants have taken active interest in the business. It is further observed that the primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable as there can be no presumption of criminal liability that other partner knows about the transaction. In the present case, there is no specific assertion in the complaint as filed that the Applicant herein had knowledge about the issuance of cheque and in particular that he was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company at the time when the offence was committed or that the offence was committed with his consent or connivance or attributable to any neglect on his part. In other words, no material facts have been provided in the complaint as filed with regard to the requirements of section 141 of the Act so as to make the Applicant herein liable for the offence committed by the Accused Company. Even the allegation contained in para 7 of the complaint that inspite of receipt of the legal notice sent to the accused, they have failed and neglected to make the payment within 15 days from the receipt of notice or till the date of the filing of the complaint towards dishonoured cheque, taken as it is, does not fulfil the requirements of section 141 of the Act, so as to make the Applicant liable for the offence committed by the accused Company.

    7. To get over this position, Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 had placed reliance on the decision of our High Court in the case of P. Rajarathinam v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 2001 (105) Company Cases 625. The conclusion reached in that decision is on the basis of the fact situation of that case. In that case, the Court has observed that on reading the complaint as a whole, it was not a case of bald statement regarding the role of the directors. In that case, the Court has recorded a finding that on reading the complaint as a whole, and the verification statement, the complainant has specifically given the essential ingredients of section 141 of the Act. That decision will be of no avail to the fact situation of the present case, which, in fact, would be governed by the principle enunciated in the decisions already referred to earlier.

    8. Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 then placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd., reported in 2000 (99) Company Cases 519. Reliance placed on this judgment is ill-advised, for this judgment has been reversed by the Apex Court in the decision . Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of Sanjeev R. Apte v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors., reported in 2002 (4) Crimes 328. Even this decision will be of no avail to the Respondent No. 2 having regard to the fact situation of the present case. In this case, the Court has on reading the complaint as a whole found as of fact that necessary ingredients of section 141 were spelt out from the complaint as filed. On this basis, the Delhi High Court distinguished the Supreme Court judgment in K.P.G. Nairs case (supra) as can be seen from the discussion in para 11 of this decision. Whereas, I have already taken the view that the present case is squarely covered by the principles in the decisions already referred to earlier.

    9. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 complainant, in addition to the allegations in the complaint, placed emphasis on the averments in the affidavit in reply and the documents accompanying thereto, to contend that there is enough material to indicate the complicity of the Applicant in relation to the offence committed by the accused Company. However, it is not possible to look into the materials which do not form part of the complaint as filed and the verification statement. In other words, whether the complaint as filed should proceed against the Applicant will have to be determined on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and not on the basis of the materials, which do not form part of the complaint as filed, or, the verification statement. This legal position is well-settled. In the case of Monaben (supra), the Apex Court had occasion to observe that filing of the partnership deed later on is of no consequence for determining the point in issue, as can be seen from the observations in para 6 of the said decision. Accordingly, it is not necessary to elaborate on the materials, which are now relied on by the Respondent No. 2 for the first time before this Court.

    10. In view of the above discussion, I have no hesitation in taking the view that the complaint as filed does not indicate the complicity of the Applicant in relation to the offence committed by the accused Company, as is required by section 141 of the Act; and if it is so, the complaint cannot be allowed to proceed against the Applicant herein.

    11. That takes me to the last aspect, which was streneously canvassed before me on behalf of the Applicant. According to the Applicant, the Applicant had already resigned as director of the accused company on the date when the cheque was presented and dishonoured and the legal notice issued. To establish this fact, reliance was placed on Form No. 32 submitted to the Registrar of Companies intimating that the Applicant had ceased to be the director of the company with effect from 2nd April 2001. In other words, it was submitted that no offence is made out as against the Applicant who was not the director on the relevant date when the offence is alleged to have been committed by the accused Company. This submission, however, clearly overlooks that the factum whether the Applicant continued to be the director of the accused Company on the relevant date is a matter for trial to be established on adduction of evidence in that behalf. However, according to the Counsel for the Applicant, Form No. 32 by itself is sufficient to establish that fact and the Court can proceed to quash the complaint on that basis. To buttress this submission, reliance was placed on the decisions of our High Court reported in 1998 (4) LJ 654 in the case of Kusum A. Bardeskar and Ors. v. Babulal Tarachand Shah and Anr.; 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 701 in the case of Dushyant D. Anjaria v. M/s. Wall Street Finance Ltd. and Anr.; 2004 (2) Mh.L.J. 1035 in the case of Chaitan M. Maniar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.; (2002) 2 Mh.L.J. 36 (Division Bench) in the case of Saumil Dilip Mehta v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.; and 1998 (4) LJ 830 in the case of H.M. Dave v. Gitanjali Shah and Anr. In my opinion, however, none of these decisions are authority on the proposition which is canvassed before me. In the case of Kusum Bardeskar (supra), it appears that there was no dispute at least about the resignation of petitioner No. 2 as director of the company. The correctness of Form No. 32 was not put in issue. It is on that basis the Court proceeded to quash the criminal action only against the petitioner No. 2 therein relying on Form No. 32. In the case of Dushyant Anjaria (supra), it is seen that the complainant had not specifically denied in their reply about the averment made in the petition in para 2 of the application that the applicant had tendered his resignation as director of the company on 2-12-1992. This position can be discerned from the observations made in para 8 of the decision. It is on that basis the Court proceeded to consider the case before it. In any case the Court has not rested its decision only on the basis of Form No. 32, but went on to further observe that the petitioner before it was a co-opted additional director whose term was to come to an end on 30th April 1992 and his tenure could not have exceeded beyond that date, whereas the cheque in question was of a later date. On that basis, the Court proceeded to quash the criminal action against the said petitioner. In the case of Chaitan M. Maniar (supra), the Court essentially quashed the complaint on the findings that there was no specific averment in the complaint about the role played by the petitioner therein who was the non-executive director of the accused Company; Moreover, no legal notice was served on the petitioner. The Court has incidentally referred to the fact that the petitioner had already resigned before issuance of the cheque in question. In other words, it is not an authority on the proposition that even when the correctness of Form No. 32 is put in issue, the Court can proceed to quash the complaint solely relying on that document. In the case of Saumil Mehta (supra), indeed, the Division Bench of this Court proceeded to decide the issue before it relying on Form No. 32 to hold that the petitioner had tendered his resignation and ceased to be director, for which reason, could not be made liable for the liability incurred by the company after the date of acceptance of his resignation. However, the Court had no occasion to consider the proposition as to whether the factum of resignation will have to be established at the trial when disputed, as is the situation in the present case. Even the case of H.M. Dave (supra) is not an authority on the proposition that even when the correctness of Form No. 32 is put in issue, the Court can proceed on the assumption that the petitioner before it had ceased to be a director on the relevant date. Whereas, in cases where the factum of resignation or for that matter thecorrectness of Form No. 32 is in dispute, that fact will necessarily have to be proved at the trial by adducing evidence in that regard, is the view taken in the decision reported in 1999 (3) Mh.L.J. 853 in the case of Bharati N. Wadhwana and Ors. v. Arjun Kishandas Jaisingh and Anr. Similar is the view taken by this Court in the case of P. Rajarathinam v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in 2001 (105) Company Cases 632 (at page 637- last paragraph). It will be useful to advert to the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of V.K. Jain v. Union of India . In para 1, the Apex Court observed that the plea that the Petitioner was not participating in the affairs of the company, which issued the cheques is a defence, which he can adopt in the prosecutions and cannot be a ground for quashing prosecutions. It will be also useful to refer to the decision of our High Court in the case , Om Prakash Berlia and Anr. v. Unit Trust of India and Ors., and more importantly on the decision of our High Court in the case of Pandurang Comotim Sancoalcar v. Suresh Prabhakar Prabhu reported in 2001 Cri.L.J. 2945 (see paras 46 and 56) and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 1999 (3) ALL MR (JOURNAL) 5, in the case of Bharat Kumar Modi and Ors. v. Pennar Paterson Securities Ltd., Hyderabad and Ors., which are directly on the point in issue. Applying the principle deduced from the abovesaid decisions, I am not inclined to accept the argument of the Applicant that the complaint ought to be quashed solely relying on Form No. 32, which would indicate that the Applicant had ceased to be the director of the accused Company at the relevant time, for the complainant in the present case is disputing the factum of resignation in the reply filed before this Court. In such a case, the accused will have to establish the factum of resignation at the trial by adduction of evidence in that behalf.

    12. Be that as it may, as I have already taken the view that the complaint as filed does not indicate the complicity of the Applicant in relation to the offence committed by the accused Company as required by section 141 of the Act: Therefore, the complaint cannot be allowed to proceed as against the Applicant herein.

    13. Accordingly, this Criminal Application ought to succeed in terms of prayer clause (a) and (b). The criminal action is quashed insofar as the Applicant herein - Accused No. 2 only. Ordered accordingly.

    14. It is agreed that for the reasons recorded in order in Criminal Application No. 4827 of 2004, these applications ought to succeed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b), as the parties are common and the contents of the complaints, as filed, are also identical. Ordered accordingly.

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