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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.P. Devadhar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions were filed by ICICI Bank Ltd. challenging two notices dated 17-10-2002 issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to Anagram Finance Ltd. (relating to assessment years 1996-1997 and 1997-1998). Anagram Finance Ltd. had been a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and was assessed under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad. Anagram Finance Ltd. merged with ICICI Ltd. with effect from 1-4-1998. ICICI Ltd. informed the Income Tax Authorities at Ahmedabad of the merger by a letter dated 27-11-2001 and requested transfer of pending cases to the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 3(1), Mumbai. Subsequently ICICI Ltd. merged with ICICI Bank Ltd. with effect from 30-3-2002. Despite the authorities having been informed that Anagram Finance Ltd. had ceased to exist, notices dated 17-10-2002 were issued in the name of Anagram Finance Ltd. The petitions raise challenges to the validity of those notices. By consent of the parties the petitions were taken up for final hearing before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether notices dated 17-10-2002 issued under section 148 to Anagram Finance Ltd., a company which had ceased to exist with effect from 1-4-1998, are valid in law.
  2. Assuming the notices in the name of Anagram Finance Ltd. are valid, whether reopening of the assessments beyond the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment years is valid in the absence of material showing that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment (i.e., whether conditions in section 147 permitting reopening beyond four years are satisfied).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (ICICI Bank Ltd.) Arguments

  • Notices issued to a non-existent company (Anagram Finance Ltd.) are in contravention of the conditions precedent required by section 148 and render proceedings under section 148 ab initio void.
  • Section 292B was enacted to save purely technical irregularities and cannot cure a fundamental infirmity such as issuing a notice to a dead/non-existent person.
  • Filing returns pursuant to the impugned notices does not amount to waiver of objections to the validity of those notices; invalid notices cannot be validated by consent or compliance.
  • On merits, the assessee disclosed all material facts in the return, including that it was a finance company and that depreciation had been claimed at different rates; the assessing officer had considered and dealt with depreciation claims (and disallowed a large sum), so there was no failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts such as would justify reopening beyond four years.
  • Even if higher depreciation was allowed in error, that would at most amount to excess relief rather than failure to disclose material facts.
  • Authorities relied upon (as cited in the opinion) to support these contentions included P.N. Sasikumar v. C.I.T (170 I.T.R. 80), C.I.T, Lucknow v. Smt. Phoolmati Devi (144 I.T.R. 954), Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (144 I.T.R. 29), Gajendra Kumar Banthia v. Union of India (222 I.T.R. 632), C.I.T v. Bibhuti Bhusan Mallick (89 I.T.R. 317), Shaikh Abdul Kadar v. I.T.O (34 I.T.R. 451), C.I.T, Andhra Pradesh v. K. Adinarayan Murthy (65 I.T.R. 607), and Supreme Court decisions (Dhubri v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust AIR 1975 SC 2065 and Y. Narayan Chetty v. I.T.O, Nellore 35 I.T.R. 388).

Respondents' (Revenue) Arguments

  • Issuance of notices in the name of Anagram Finance Ltd., which had merged, is at most an irregularity and not an illegality, and such irregularity is saved by section 292B of the Income Tax Act.
  • The notices were addressed "Anagram Finance Ltd. C/o. ICICI Bank Ltd." and were in fact received by ICICI Bank Ltd.; therefore, the notices reached the appropriate entity and were effective in substance.
  • Pursuant to the notices the petitioners filed returns on 15-11-2002, and thus cannot challenge the notices as invalid.
  • On the merits, the assessing officer found that depreciation on leased vehicles was claimed at 40% instead of 20%, resulting in excess depreciation having been allowed; this constitutes failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, rendering reopening under sections 147/148 proper.
  • Authorities relied upon by respondents included C.I.T v. Devidayal and Sons (68 I.T.R. 425), Nand Kishore Sita Ram v. C.I.T (67 I.T.R. 349), First Additional ITO, Kozhikode v. Mrs. Suseela Sadanandan (57 I.T.R. 167), Shewaram D. Bhatia v. C.I.T (82 I.T.R. 638), Manilal Raghavji Kothari v. C.I.T (156 I.T.R. 561), Mansa Ram and Sons v. C.I.T (192 I.T.R. 171) and Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. v. BCIT (265 I.T.R. 114, Bom).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.N. Sasikumar v. C.I.T., 170 I.T.R. 80 Authority cited for the proposition that initiation of proceedings by notice to a non-existent person may be invalid. Cited by petitioners; the Court recorded the citation but did not decide the first issue (validity of notices to a non-existent company) because it was unnecessary to decide after deciding the second issue.
C.I.T., Lucknow v. Smt. Phoolmati Devi, 144 I.T.R. 954 (All.) Authority cited supporting petitioners' contention that notice to a non-existent person is impermissible. Cited by petitioners; the Court noted the reliance but did not rule on that issue as it was not necessary to decide it.
Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 144 I.T.R. 29 (All.) Authority cited in relation to validity of notices and requirements for proceeding under section 148. Cited by petitioners; the Court recorded the citation and did not adjudicate the first issue on notice validity.
Gajendra Kumar Banthia v. Union of India, 222 I.T.R. 632 (Cal.) Cited by petitioners regarding validity of issuance of notices. Cited by petitioners; Court did not decide the first issue and thus did not apply the precedent to resolve it.
C.I.T. v. Bibhuti Bhusan Mallick, 89 I.T.R. 317 Cited by petitioners in support of the proposition that issuance of notice to a non-existent person is a fundamental infirmity. Cited by petitioners; Court did not rule on the first issue so the precedent was not applied to dispose of that question.
Shaikh Abdul Kadar v. I.T.O., 34 I.T.R. 451 Cited by petitioners on validity of notices and procedural defects. Cited by petitioners; Court recorded the citation but did not decide that issue.
C.I.T., Andhra Pradesh v. K. Adinarayan Murthy, 65 I.T.R. 607 (S.C.) Supreme Court authority cited by petitioners concerning validity of notices/procedural requirements. Cited by petitioners; Court did not reach the first issue and therefore did not apply this precedent to decide it.
Supdt. of Taxes, Dhubri v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust, AIR 1975 SC 2065 Supreme Court authority cited by petitioners for the principle that validity of notices cannot be waived by compliance. Cited by petitioners; Court noted the authority in support of petitioners' submission that filing returns does not validate an otherwise invalid notice.
Y. Narayan Chetty v. I.T.O., Nellore, 35 I.T.R. 388 (SC) Supreme Court authority relied on petitioners for the same principle on waiver/consent and validity. Cited by petitioners; Court recorded the citation but the immediate decision turned on the second issue (reopening beyond four years).
IPCA Laboratories v. DCIT, 251 I.T.R. 416 Authority holding that reopening after 4 years is permissible only if failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts has occurred. Adopted by the Court: relied upon to hold that reopening beyond four years requires failure to disclose material facts; applied to quash the impugned notices which were issued beyond four years.
Bhor Industries v. C.I.T., 183 C.T.R. 248 Authority supporting the principle that reopening after four years requires failure to disclose material facts. Adopted by the Court and applied in conclusion that there was no failure to disclose and reopening beyond four years was invalid.
C.I.T. v. Devidayal and Sons, 68 I.T.R. 425 (Bom.) Authority cited by respondents for the proposition that notice to a dissolved firm served on a partner may be valid if returned/accepted. Cited by respondents; Court noted the reliance but did not need to decide the first issue (validity of notices to non-existent company) after deciding the second issue.
Nand Kishore Sita Ram v. C.I.T., (1968) 67 I.T.R. 349 (All.) Cited by respondents in support of substantial compliance/validity where notice reaches intended recipient. Cited by respondents; Court recorded the citation but did not decide the first issue on notice validity.
First Additional ITO, Kozhikode v. Mrs. Suseela Sadanandan, 57 I.T.R. 167 (SC) Supreme Court authority cited by respondents on validity of notices and substantial compliance. Cited by respondents; Court noted the reference but did not rule on the first issue.
Shewaram D. Bhatia v. C.I.T., 82 I.T.R. 638 (Bom.) Cited by respondents on substantial compliance and service principles. Cited by respondents; Court did not need to determine the first issue and so did not apply this precedent to that question.
Manilal Raghavji Kothari v. C.I.T., 156 I.T.R. 561 (Pat.) Cited by respondents in support of their submissions on notice/service issues. Cited by respondents; Court recorded the citation but did not decide the first issue.
Mansa Ram and Sons v. C.I.T., 192 I.T.R. 171 (All.) Cited by respondents on questions of notice/service and substantial compliance. Cited by respondents; Court recorded the citation but it was not necessary to decide the first issue.
Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. v. BCIT, 2003 (4) Mh. L.J. 806 : 265 I.T.R. 114 (Bom.) Decision held that a finance company leasing vehicles does not constitute user for business of running them on hire and thus not entitled to higher rate of depreciation; relied on by Revenue. The Court held that the ratio in that decision is not relevant to the specific legal issue before it (which was whether there was failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts); the Court therefore did not treat that precedent as supporting the revenue on the second issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified two central issues (validity of notices addressed to a non-existent company and validity of reopening beyond four years absent failure to disclose material facts) and elected to consider the second issue first.

On the second issue the Court examined the "reasons recorded" for reopening and found that the assessing officer's conclusion of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts was based solely on the ground that the assessee had claimed depreciation at 40% on leased vehicles instead of 20%. The Court then inspected the original assessment orders passed under section 143(3) and observed:

  • The assessing officer had noted that the assessee was a finance company and had claimed depreciation at different rates, including 40% on leased vehicles.
  • The assessing officer had scrutinized documents, concluded that depreciation at 40% for certain items was proper, and disallowed other depreciation claims (including items claimed at 100%). Thus the grant of 40% depreciation on leased vehicles had been a conscious decision in the final assessment.
  • Given that an assessing officer had already reached a considered view allowing 40% depreciation on the available material, another assessing officer later concluding the allowance should have been 20% would amount to a change of opinion rather than proof that the assessee failed to disclose material facts.

The Court articulated the legal principle under section 147: concluded assessments can be reopened beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year only where there is a failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The Court emphasized that the rate at which depreciation should be claimed is a matter of legal inference from disclosed material facts; an erroneous legal inference does not mean there was a failure to disclose material facts.

The Court relied upon earlier decisions (specifically IPCA Laboratories and Bhor Industries) to reinforce that reopening beyond four years is permissible only upon a true failure to disclose material facts, and read the explanation to section 147 with section 148 in this light. The Court also examined the Revenue's reliance on Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. and concluded that the ratio in that case (about whether a finance company leasing vehicles constitutes running on hire) dealt with a different issue and was not relevant to the question whether there was a failure to disclose material facts justifying reopening beyond four years.

Since the Court concluded there was no failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts on the record, it held that the impugned notices issued beyond the four-year period were in contravention of the statutory provisions and liable to be quashed. Because of this resolution on the second issue, the Court expressly stated it was unnecessary to decide the first issue concerning validity of notices issued in the name of a non-existent company.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed and set aside the impugned notices dated 17-10-2002. Rule made absolute in terms of the prayer clause (a) in both petitions, with no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The reassessment notices dated 17-10-2002 under section 148 issued to Anagram Finance Ltd. (relating to assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98) have been quashed and set aside; there is no order as to costs.
  • Scope of decision: The Court's decision was founded on the absence of any failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment, and on authority that reopening beyond four years requires such failure. The Court did not decide the separate question whether notices addressed to a non-existent company are independently invalid because that issue was rendered unnecessary by the disposition on the second issue.
  • Precedential note: The Court applied the principle from IPCA Laboratories and Bhor Industries concerning limits on reopening assessments after four years but did not adopt the Kotak Mahindra ratio relied on by the Revenue because it was factually and legally distinct from the central issue before the Court.
  • No broader novel precedent: The Court's order addressed the facts and legal principles as applied; it did not announce a new rule beyond application of established principles (i.e., reopening beyond four years requires failure to disclose material facts).

Order accordingly.

    Icici Bank Ltd. v. K.J Rao And Another

    J.P Devadhar, J.:— Rule, returnable forthwith. By the consent of the parties, both the petitions are taken up for final hearing.

    2. In these two petitions, the ICICI Bank Ltd. has challenged the notices both dated 17-10-2002 (relating to the assessment years 1996-1997 and 1997-1998) issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Income Tax Authorities at Ahmedabad to Anagram Finance Ltd. The said Anagram Finance Ltd. was a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and was assessed to tax under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad. With effect from 1-4-1998, the said Anagram Finance Ltd. merged with ICICI Ltd. It is not in dispute that by a letter dated 27-11-2001, ICICI Ltd. had informed the Income Tax Authorities at Ahmedabad about the merger of Anagram Finance Ltd. with ICICI Ltd. and had requested to transfer all pending cases of the erstwhile Anagram Finance Ltd. to the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 3(1), Mumbai under whose jurisdiction ICICI Ltd. was assessed. Thereafter, the ICICI Ltd. merged with ICICI Bank Ltd. with effect from 30th March, 2002. Thus, the fact that Anagram Finance Ltd. had ceased to exist with effect from 1-4-1998 was made known to the Income Tax Authorities at Ahmedabad by ICICI Ltd. vide letter dated 27-11-2001.

    3. In spite of the knowledge about the non existence of Anagram Finance Ltd., the impugned notices, both dated 17-10-2002 have been issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the I.T Act’ for short) to Anagram Finance Ltd. for the purpose of reopening the assessments for the assessment year 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. The validity of these notices are challenged in the present petitions by ICICI Bank Ltd. mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it is contended that the notices issued to a non existent Company namely, Anagram Finance Ltd. is in contravention of the conditions precedent required to be fulfilled before initiating proceedings under section 148 of the i.t act and secondly, it is contended that even on merits, there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all materials facts and, therefore, the notices issued to the assessee beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year are liable to be quashed and set aside.

    4. The Revenue in its affidavit-in-reply to the petition stated that issuance of notices in the name of Anagram Finance Ltd., which had merged with ICICI Ltd. on 1-4-1998 is at the highest a mere irregularity and not an illegality and as such the said irregularity is saved under section 292B of the I.T Act. It is further stated that the ICICI has in fact filed returns on 15-11-2002 pursuant to the said notices dated 17-10-2002 and, therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that the notices are invalid. As regards the merits of the case, it is stated that the assessments for AY 96-97 and 97-98 have been reopened because it was noticed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax that depreciation on leased vehicles in the relevant assessment year were claimed by the assessee at 40% instead of 20%, as a result whereof excess depreciation has been allowed to the assessee and, therefore, there is reason to believe that the assessee has failed to furnish fully and truly all materials facts. Thus, according to the Revenue, the proceedings for reopening of the assessments have been initiated in consonance with the provisions of sections 147 and 148 of the i.t act.

    5. Ms. A. Vissanji, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted before us that when the Income Tax Authorities at Ahmedabad were aware of the fact that Anagram Finance Ltd. had ceased to exist with effect from 1-4-1998, notices under section 148 of i.t act could not have been issued in the name of Anagram Finance Limited, a non existent company. She submitted that issuance of notices to a non existent Company renders the initiation of proceedings under section 148 of the i.t act ab initio void. She submitted that the provisions of section 292b of the i.t act were enacted to save purely technical obligations without substantially coming in the way of the validity of the assessment proceedings. She submitted that issue of a valid notice is a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under section 148 of the Income Tax Act and if the notice is invalid or is not served on the proper person in accordance with law, then the assessment will be illegal and without jurisdiction. She submitted that failure to issue notice or issuing notices in the name of a dead person is a fundamental infirmity and such a fundamental infirmity cannot be called as a technical infirmity or mere irregularity and such vital infirmity cannot be cured or obliterated by relying on section 292B of the I.T Act. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the Judgment of the Kerala High Court in the case of P.N Sasikumar v. C.I.T, 170 I.T.R 80, decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of C.I.T, Lucknow v. Smt. Phoolmati Devi, 144 I.T.R 954 (All.), Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 144 I.T.R 29 (All), decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gajendra Kumar Banthia v. Union of India, 222 I.T.R 632 (Cal.), and C.I.T v. Bibhuti Bhusan Mallick, 89 I.T.R 317, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shaikh Abdul Kadar v. I.T.O, Sagar 34 I.T.R 451 and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of C.I.T, Andhra Pradesh v. K. Adinarayan Murthy, 65 I.T.R 607 (S.C).

    6. Learned Counsel for petitioners further submitted that merely because the petitioners pursuant to the impugned notices have filed their returns under protest does not mean that the petitioners have waived their objections to the validity of the notices issued under section 148 of the i.t act. It was submitted that the notices which are otherwise invalid cannot be validated by consent of parties. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Supdt. of Taxes, Dhubri v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust, AIR 1975 SC 2065 and Y. Narayan Chetty v. I.T.O, Nellore, 35 I.T.R 388 (SC).

    7. As regards the merits of the case, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the assessee had disclosed in its return of income all material facts regarding the claim for depreciation. It was submitted that in the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment, nowhere it is stated that there is any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts relevant for the purpose of assessment. It was submitted that the fact that the assessee was a financial Company was disclosed in the return of income. In fact, the list of the parties to whom the vehicles were leased by the assessee were also before the assessing officer at the time of assessment and from the said list it could be seen that depreciation at different rates were claimed by the assessee (See pages 101 to 128 of the petition) for different categories and in the assessment order passed under section 143(3) of the I.T Act, the assessing officer had extensively dealt with the claim for depreciation and after careful consideration has in fact disallowed the depreciation to the extent of Rs. 4,72,72,472/-. It was accordingly submitted that there was full and complete disclosure made by the assessee and by no stretch of imagination, the claim for higher rate of rebate can be said to be a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all materials facts. It was submitted that even assuming that on the leased vehicles, 40% depreciation was wrongly claimed and wrongly allowed by the assessing officer, then it may be a case of granting excess relief and not a case of any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. It was submitted that if there is no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, then the reassessment proceedings beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year, cannot be initiated under section 147/148 of the I.T Act. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of IPCA Laboratories v. DCIT, 251 I.T.R 416 and Bhor Industries v. C.I.T, 183 C.T.R 248.

    8. Mr. Desai, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand submitted that issuing notices under section 148 of the i.t act to Anagram Finance Ltd. at the highest can be said to be a mere irregularity and not an illegality and such an irregularity is saved by the provision of section 292b of the i.t act. He submitted that though notices were issued to Anagram Finance Ltd., it was shown as “C/o. ICICI Bank Ltd.” and in fact the notice has been received by the ICICI Bank Ltd. Therefore the notices impugned in these petitions may not be held to be invalid as in substance and in effect the same are in conformity and in accordance to the intent and purpose of sections 147 and 148 of the i.t act. He submitted that the notices addressed to Anagram Finance Limited C/o. ICICI Bank Ltd. may be treated as a clerical error which does not have any adverse effect. He submitted that pursuant to the notices dated 17-10-2002, the petitioners have filed the returns of income and, therefore, in the facts of the present case, issuance of notices in the name of Anagram Finance Ltd. should be treated as procedural irregularity curable under section 292B of the I.T Act. In this connection, he relied upon the Judgment of this Court in the case of C.I.T v. Devidayal and Sons, 68 I.T.R 425 (Bom.), wherein it was held that the notice for reassessment of a dissolved firm in respect of pre-dissolution period issued in the name of the firm and served on one of the partners was held to be valid and proper and it was further held that the notice to the firm though not addressed to the partner will not render it invalid, if in fact, it is served on the partner and accepted by him and return of the firm has been submitted in pursuance thereof. He submitted that in the present case, notices for initiating reassessment proceedings in the case of Anagram Finance Ltd. were required to be served on ICICI Bank Ltd. and in fact the notices have been served upon the ICICI Bank Ltd. and therefore, there being substantial compliance, it may be held that the notices issued are valid and proper. In support of the aforesaid submissions, he relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Nand Kishore Sita Ram v. C.I.T (1968) 67 I.T.R 349 (All.), decision of the Apex Court in the case of First Additional Income Tax Officer, Kozhikode v. Mrs. Suseela Sadanandan, 57 I.T.R 167 (SC), decision of this Court in the case of Shewaram D. Bhatia v. C.I.T, 82 I.T.R 638 (Bom.), decision of the Patna High Court in the case Manilal Raghavji Kothari v. C.I.T, 156 I.T.R 561 (Pat.) and the decision of Mansa Ram and sons v. C.I.T, 192 I.T.R 171 (All.).

    9. As regards the merits of the case, Mr. Desai submitted that for the assessment years in question, the assessee had claimed depreciation on leased vehicles at higher rate of 40% as against the allowable depreciation at the rate of 20% which resulted in allowing excess depreciation in the sum of Rs. 10,89,84,585/-. He submitted that the action of the assessee in claiming higher depreciation though not eligible amounts to failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. On account of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the i.t act for which notices have been rightly issued by the assessing officer. Accordingly, it was submitted that there is no infirmity in the notices issued under section 148 of the i.t act and there is no merit in the Writ Petitions filed to challenge the impugned notices.

    10. We have heard Counsel on both sides. Basically, two issues arise in these two petitions. Firstly, whether the notices both dated 17-10-2002 issued under section 148 of the i.t act to Anagram Finance Ltd. a company which had ceased to exist with effect from 1st April, 1998 are valid in law. Secondly, assuming that the notices issued in the name of Anagram Finance Limited are valid, in the absence of any material on record to show that there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment, whether the reopening of the assessments beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years are valid?

    11. Let us take the second issue for consideration first. From the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment, it is seen that the assessing officer arrived at the conclusion that there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts solely on the ground that the assessee had claimed in its return of income depreciation at 40% on leased vehicles instead of depreciation at 20%. On perusal of the assessment orders passed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, it is seen that the assessing officer had taken note of the fact that the assessee is a finance Company and the fact that the assessee had claimed depreciation at different rates for different vehicles, including depreciation on leased vehicles at 40%. The assessing officer after scrutinizing the documents furnished by the assessee and on investigation found that the depreciation claimed on items at 40% was proper and found that the depreciation on items claimed at 100% was not proper. Thus, the grant of depreciation at 40% on leased vehicles is a conscious decision taken by the assessing officer at the time of final assessment. Therefore, on the same set of facts if another assessing officer arrives at the conclusion that under the Income Tax Act the depreciation on leased vehicles is allowable at 20% and not at 40% then it is only a change of opinion and it has nothing to do with the disclosure of material facts on the part of the assessee. Assuming that the depreciation allowable on leased vehicles was 20% and there was excess relief granted, even then, it cannot be a case of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly material facts. In such circumstances, if the proceedings were initiated within 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years, then, the case would have been altogether different. In the present case, admittedly, notices for reopening of the assessments under section 148 of the i.t act have been issued beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years.

    12. Under section 147 of the i.t act, concluded assessments can be reopened beyond a period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years only if there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. Having furnished all material facts even if an assessee erroneously claims higher depreciation, it will not be a case of failure to disclose fully and truly all materials facts. At what rate the depreciation is to be claimed is a matter of legal inference to be drawn from the material facts. If the legal inference drawn from the materials facts is erroneous it cannot be said that there is failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. In the present case, on the material facts disclosed, the assessee had claimed depreciation at 40% and the same was allowed by the assessing officer. It is not the case of the revenue that the facts disclosed by the assessee were incorrect or that there were any other facts which were material for the assessment which have not been disclosed by the assessee. Under the circumstances, if there is no failure to disclose material facts, then, even if there is excess relief granted, the assessments cannot be reopened beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years. This Court in the case of IPCA Laboratories Ltd. (supra) and in the case of Bhor Industries (supra) has held that notice for reopening of the assessment cannot be issued after a period of 4 years unless the escapement of income is on account of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. It has been further held that the explanation to section 147 of the i.t act has to be read with section 148 of the i.t act in its entirety. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, in the present case, there being no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, the impugned notices issued beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years are liable to be held to have been issued in contravention of the provision of the Income Tax Act.

    13. On behalf of the Revenue, reliance was placed on a recent decision of this Court in the case of Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. v. BCIT, 2003 (4) Mh. L.J 806 : 265 I.T.R 114 (Bom.). In that case, it has been held that a Finance Company leasing vehicles to a customer does not constitute user for business of running them on hire and therefore, not entitled to higher rate of depreciation. The ratio laid down therein is not relevant herein because the issue raised in that case was altogether different. The issue raised and considered in that case was whether a finance company leasing vehicles to its customers constitute the business of running the vehicles on hire, where as, in the present case, the issue involved is whether there was any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decision does not support the contention of the revenue in the present case.

    14. In the light of our decision on the second issue it is not necessary for us to deal with the first issue namely, whether the notices issued in the name of a non existent company are valid, or not.

    15. In this view of the matter, we quash and set aside the impugned notices both dated 17th October, 2002. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) in both the petitions with no order as to costs.

    Order accordingly.
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    Icici Bank Ltd. v. K.J Rao And Another
    (Feb 11, 2004)