The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.H Marlapalle, J.— The Government of Maharashtra had, by notice under S. 32(2) of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (for short, “the Industrial Development Act”) sought to acquire agricultural lands from four different villages in Jalgaon district, namely, Manyar Khede, Kusumba Khurd, Khedi Buzark and Mehrun for the proposed Jalgaon industrial area and the said notice was issued on 25-9-1980.
2. An award under S. 33 came to be passed by the Collector, Jalgaon on 30-5-1998 and it was a common award for all the pieces of land under acquisition from these four villages. At the instance of some of the landowners, references were made under S. 34(1) of the Industrial Development Act, for enhancement of compensation and these references, listed separately from time to time, were decided in the month of January 2001 by the court below and the compensation payable was enhanced to Rs. 35,000 per hectare. Though the present appellant i.e Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation is a creation of the Industrial Development Act and an undertaking of the State of Maharashtra, it was not impleaded as a necessary party either before the Collector while passing the award under S. 33 or before the court below in the reference under S. 34 of the Industrial Development Act.
3. A group of other appeals arising from the common award dated 30-5-1986 and separate awards passed by the Reference Court came to be decided by a common judgment dated 28-8-2001, by a Single Bench of this Court (Vagyaji, J.). These appeals were registered as First Appeals Nos. 172 to 233 of 2001. This Court, by placing reliance on the decision in Agra Development Authority v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2001 2 SCC 646 held that the common award passed by the Collector under S. 33 of the Industrial Development Act, on 30-5-1986 as well as the individual awards passed by the court below under S. 34(1) of the said Act, were vitiated on account of the failure to implead the present appellant as a necessary party and offer it an opportunity of hearing to contest the claims made for compensation or for enhanced compensation, as the case may be. The law laid down in Agra Development Authority has been reiterated in Abdul Rasak v. Kerala Water Authority 2002 3 SCC 228.
4. This group of first appeals, came to be listed before another Single Bench (A.B Naik, J.) of this Court and by order dated 26-8-2002, a point for consideration by the Division Bench was framed regarding the maintainability of these appeals under S. 96 CPC against the award passed by the court below under S. 34(1) of the Industrial Development Act. The scheme of the Industrial Development Act, on all the relevant issues raised in this reference has been duly considered by another Division Bench of this Court (Pendse and Tipnis, JJ.) in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant AIR 1991 Bom 245. S. 34(1) of the Industrial Development Act states that any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may, within sixty days from the date of such decision, insofar as it affects him, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by him for determination of the court as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, and when any such application is made, the provisions of Part III of the said Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to further proceedings in respect thereof and, therefore, when such a reference is made, it would be treated to be a reference under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, before the court as defined in the said Act. An award passed in such a reference would be a decree of the court in terms of S. 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. A Division Bench of this Court, in Chandrakant case therefore, held that the award passed under S. 34(1) of the Industrial Development Act by the Court, being a decree within the meaning of S. 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, can be challenged by filing an appeal under S. 96 CPC. We are in respectful agreement with the view so recorded in Chandrakant case and, therefore, these appeals filed by the appellant Corporation are maintainable.
5. Initially, S. 34 of the Industrial Development Act, read as under:
“34. (1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may, within sixty days from the date of such decision, insofar as it affects him, appeal if the land acquired is situate in Greater Bombay to the City Civil Court, and elsewhere to the District Court. (hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as ‘the Court’)
(2) The decision of the Court on such appeal, and subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final.”
The same was subsequently amended by the Maharashtra Legislature vide Maharashtra Industrial Development (Amendment) Act, 1974. The amendment received assent of the President on 17-6-1975 and the amended provisions of S. 34 read thus:
“34. (1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may, within sixty days from the date of such decision, insofar as it affects him, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Court as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, and when any such application is made, the provisions of Part III of the said Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to further proceedings in respect thereof.
(2) The decision of the Court on such reference, and subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final.”
6. As per the old scheme of S. 34, the proceedings before the court were by way of an appeal against the decision of the Collector in determining the amount of compensation, whereas in the amended provision, the said proceedings are in the nature of a reference and, therefore, the decision of the Reference Court shall be an award within the meaning of S. 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
7. We conclude that these appeals are maintainable under S. 96 CPC and the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 34 of the Industrial Development Act, in any way, do not hamper the remedy of an appeal under S. 96 CPC.
8. Now, coming to the legality of the award impugned in these appeals, we have noted that the common award dated 30-5-1986 passed by the Collector has already been quashed and set aside by the Single Bench of this Court (Vagyani, J.) on 28-8-2001 and we are informed that all the parties concerned including the respondents in these three appeals, as well as the appellant Corporation have been served with the notices by the Collector, for fresh determination of compensation payable to the landowners under S. 33 of the Industrial Development Act. We deem it appropriate to follow the same view taken by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 28-8-2001 in these appeals as well, without, however, making it as a precedence in future appeals.
9. In the result, we allow these appeals and quash and set aside the impugned awards passed by the court below in Reference No. 174 of 1990 (impugned in First Appeal No. 478 of 2002), Reference No. 170 of 1990 (impugned in First Appeal No. 481 of 2002) and Reference No. 10 of 1988 (impugned in First Appeal No. 483 of 2002). As the common award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 30-5-1986 has already been quashed and set aside, we direct the respective parties to appear before the Collector, who shall proceed afresh for determining the compensation payable to the respective landowners (respondents in these appeals) under S. 33 of the Industrial Development Act. We further direct that the Collector shall complete these de novo proceedings as expeditiously as possible and in any case, within a period of six months from today, after giving an opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned. Civil applications do not survive.