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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Department referred a question under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act concerning the Assessment Year 1979–1980. The issue arose from the sale of a property by the assessee, Citibank, a non-resident company engaged in banking business in India. The assessee purchased land in New Delhi in 1975 and constructed a bungalow on it. In 1978, the entire property was sold for Rs. 30,00,000, with the consideration allocated among land, building, and fixtures. The assessee reported capital gains bifurcated as short term capital gain from the building and long term capital gain from the land. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected this bifurcation, treating the entire gain as short term capital gain. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the AO's decision. On appeal, the Tribunal held that land and building are distinct assets, with gains from land being long term capital gains and gains from building being short term capital gains. The Department challenged the Tribunal’s decision through a Reference to the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the surplus realized on sale of land should be treated as long term capital gains and the surplus on sale of building as short term capital gains?

Arguments of the Parties

Department's Arguments

  • After construction of the building, the house property became an inseparable single asset.
  • The property should be considered as one unit, making it impossible to bifurcate capital gains between land and building.
  • The Tribunal’s view allowing separate treatment of land and building gains was incorrect in law.

Assessee's Arguments

  • Indian law recognizes separate ownership of land and building, allowing bifurcation of capital gains accordingly.
  • Relied on Supreme Court judgment in C.I.T v. Alps Theatre (65 ITR 377) supporting separate treatment.
  • Relied on Madras High Court judgment in C.I.T v. Dr. Ramachandra Rao (236 ITR 51) to support the distinction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.I.T v. Alps Theatre (65 ITR 377, SC) Depreciation under Income-tax Act is not allowable on cost of land, only on the building superstructure. Confirmed that depreciation applies solely to the building, supporting the distinction between land and building for capital gains computation.
C.I.T v. Dr. Ramachandra Rao (236 ITR 51, Madras HC) Land remains a separate capital asset even after construction of building; long term capital asset character is retained if held beyond prescribed period. Supported the Court’s view that land and building gains must be treated separately, affirming long term capital gain treatment for land.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the provisions of the Income-tax Act, particularly sections 32, 45, 48, 50, and 43(6). It noted that depreciation is allowed only on buildings and not on land, as established in the Alps Theatre case. Section 50 relates to depreciable assets and thus applies only to the superstructure (building), not the land. The charging section 45 and computation provisions under sections 48 and 50 form an integrated code for capital gains. Without applying the computation provisions, the charge under section 45 cannot stand. This necessitates bifurcation between land and building for capital gains computation. The Court rejected the Department’s argument that the property is a single inseparable asset, holding that land and building are distinct capital assets. The Court further relied on the Madras High Court’s ruling in Dr. Ramachandra Rao that land retains its character as a long term capital asset even after construction of a building if held for the prescribed period. Consequently, gains from sale of land are long term capital gains, while gains from sale of building are short term capital gains.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference question in the affirmative, ruling in favor of the assessee and against the Department. It held that the surplus from sale of land is to be treated as long term capital gains and the surplus from sale of building as short term capital gains.

Implications: This decision clarifies that for capital gains tax purposes, land and building are distinct assets, allowing separate treatment of gains arising from each. The ruling directly affects the parties by overturning the Department’s view and endorsing the Tribunal’s bifurcation approach. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond confirming existing principles.

    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Citibank N.A.

    S.H Kapadia, J.:— For the Assessment Year 1979–1980, the Department has come by way of Reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act for our opinion on the question quoted hereinbelow:

    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the surplus realised on the sale of land shall be treated as long term capital gains and the surplus on sale of building shall be treated as short term capital gain?”

    FACTS:

    2. Sometime during the Accounting Year ending December 1975, the assessee purchased a plot of land admeasuring 3930 sq. yards. at Friends Colony, New Delhi. In the next year, the assessee started construction of a bungalow as a residence for the assessee's Manager in New Delhi. On 7-8-1978, the assessee sold the entire property for Rs. 30,00,000/-. In the Conveyance the price was allocated as follows: for the land, it was Rs. 14,00,000/-; for the building, it was Rs. 9,00,000/- and Rs. 7,00,000/- was for the Air Conditioning Plant, equipment, installations and fixtures. The total consideration was Rs. 30,00,000/-. At this stage, it may be mentioned that out of the total area admeasuring 3930 sq. yards, the built up area occupied by the bungalow/building was 1235 sq. yards.

    3. The assessee — Citibank is a non-resident company engaged in Banking business in India. On 29-6-1979, it submitted its Return of Income of Rs. 5,05,08,610/-. On 21-9-1981, the assessee submitted a revised Return showing a total income of Rs. 5,03,03,660/-. As per Annexure-C filed with the Return of Income, the assessee bank had returned a short term capital gain or Rs. 26,242/- on sale of house property and a long term capital gain of Rs. 4,87,913/- on sale of land. This working was not accepted by the AO, who took the view that the house property had been constructed on the land and, therefore, the gain arising on transfer resulted in short term capital gains. According to the AO, the entire gain arising to the assessee on the transfer represented short term capital gain and, accordingly, the AO computed short term capital gain at Rs. 5,14,155/-. Being aggrieved by the decision of the AO, the assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals), who substantially confirmed the Assessment Order. Being aggrieved, the matter was carried in appeal to the Tribunal by the assessee, which took the view that in the present case land was a distinct and separate capital asset vis-a-vis the building; that the land was a long term capital asset; that in India, the principle “dual ownership” was applicable; that for the purposes of computation of capital gains, land and building were two separate and distinct assets and, therefore, profits arising from sale of land was required to be considered as long term capital gain whereas, profits arising from sale of building was required to be considered as short term capital gain. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the matter has come by way of Reference at the behest of the Department.

    ARGUMENTS:

    4. Mr. R.V Desai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Department argued that after the construction of the building on the land, the house property became an inseparable asset. That, after construction of the building on the land, the house property became a new asset. That, it was not possible to bifurcate the capital gains as relatable to building separately or land separately and since the apportionment was not possible, the view of the Tribunal was not correct in law. According to the learned counsel for the Department, the land and building are not sold separately but as one unit and, therefore, it is not possible to bifurcate the building and land as two separate units.

    5. Mr. Mistry, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee on the other hand contended that the Indian Law recognizes separate ownership of land and building and, therefore, it is possible to separate capital gains in two; one relating to land and another relating to the building. Mr. Mistry placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of C.I.T v. Alps Theatre reported in 65 ITR 377 (SC). He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of C.I.T v. Dr. Ramachandra Rao reported in 236 ITR 51.

    FINDINGS:

    6. Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, inter alia, lays down that in respect of depreciation of buildings, machinery, plant or furniture owned by the assessee and used for the purposes of business or profession, the assessee is entitled to deduction. In this case, we are concerned with the Assessment Year 1979–1980. Under section 32(1)(ii), the assessee was entitled to deduction for depreciation in case of buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, etc. That deduction was to consist of a certain percentage on the written down value. Therefore, under section 32, the assessee was entitled to depreciation only in respect of the buildings and not the land. In the case of C.I.T v. Alps Theatre (supra), it has been held that depreciation under the Income-tax Act was not allowable on the cost of the land on which the building is erected but only on the cost of the superstructure. In that matter, the assessee carried on the business as exhibitor of films. The ITO initiated proceedings under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 on the ground that in the original assessment depreciation was wrongly allowed on the entire cost of Rs. 85,091/- shown as cost of the building which included Rs. 12,000/- as cost of land. By order dated 22-2-1959, the I.T.O recomputed the depreciation excluding the cost of land. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC), who upheld the order of ITC. The assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal which came to the conclusion that it is not possible to conceive of a building without a bottom. That, the word “building” included the land upon which the superstructure was constructed and, therefore, it was wrong on the part of the Department to exclude the value of the land upon which the superstructure was constructed. This finding of the Tribunal has been reversed by the Supreme Court which took the view that depreciation under section 10(2)(vi) was not allowable on the cost of the land on which the building was erected. That, depreciation was allowable only on the cost of the superstructure. Hence, the assessee failed. Therefore, depreciation under section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was allowable only on the cost of the superstructure and not on the cost of the land. Section 50 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as it stood at the relevant time, relates to special provision for computing cost of acquisition in the case of depreciable assets. Since land is not a depreciable asset, section 50 will not apply to the site on which the building is erected. Section 50, therefore, provides for determination of the cost of acquisition of a depreciable asset which in the present case is a superstructure on the site. Section 50 refers to the provisions of section 48 which in term deals with mode of computation and deductions in respect of the income chargeable under the head “Capital Gains”. Section 48 states that such income shall be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration received, the expenditure incurred wholly in connection with such transfer and the cost of acquisition of the capital asset as also the cost of improvement thereto. Section 43(6) defines the expression “Written Down Value” to mean actual cost to the assessee less depreciation actually allowed to him under the Act in case of asset acquired before the previous year. Therefore, one has to read section 50 which provides for determination of cost of the acquisition of the asset along with section 43(6) and section 48 of the Act. Therefore, to sum up, section 48 read with section 50 provides for computation of income chargeable under the head “Capital Gains” whereas, section 45 is the charging section and it states, inter alia, that any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset shall be chargeable to Income-tax under the head “Capital Gains”. It is well settled that in the matter of capital gains, the charging section 45 and the computation provisions under sections 48 and 50, constitute one integrated code. That, the character of computation provisions bear direct relationship to the nature of the charge under section 45 of the Income-tax Act. This point is important to decide the point at issue in this case because, without the computation provisions, the charge by itself under section 45 cannot stand. Hence, bifurcation is necessary between the site and the building for the purposes of capital gains. Therefore, profits arising from sale of site is required to be treated separately from profits arising from sale of building. Now. In the present case, the assessee received Rs. 14,00,000/- for land under the above Conveyance as against the cost of Rs. 9,20,530/- resulting in the capital gain of Rs. 4,79,470/-. According to the Department, this working is correct [see page 82 of the paper book] However, according to the Department, since land was a part of the superstructure, the said amount of Rs. 4,79,470/- was not a long term capital gain but it was to be treated as short term capital gain. This is the only issue which arises in this case. As stated above this view of the Department is erroneous for two reasons. Firstly, under section 32(1), no depreciation is admissible for land [see judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Alps Treatre (supra)]. Secondly, the Department can assess the Company to short term capital gains only qua depreciable assets which in the present case is the superstructure erected on the site [see section 41(2) of the Income-tax Act as it stood at the relevant time]. For both the above reasons, we hold that in the present case, on sale of land married to the building vide Conveyance dated 7-8-1978, the gain which accrued to the assessee was long term capital gain and the Department was wrong in treating such gain as short term capital gain. Our view is supported by the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of C.I.T v. Dr. Ramchandra Rao reported in 236 ITR 51, which has taken the view that if the lands are held by the assessee for a period more than the period prescribed under section 2(42-A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, viz. 36 months then, it is not possible to say that by construction of the building thereon, the land which was a long term capital asset ceases to be such long term capital asset. This is because, the land is an independent and identifiable capital asset, and it continues to remain so even after construction of the building thereon. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the Madras High Court in the above Judgment.

    CONCLUSION:

    8. Accordingly, we answer the above question in the Affirmative i.e in favour of the Assessee and against the Department.

    9. Accordingly, the Reference is disposed of with no order as to costs.

    Answer in affirmative in favour of assessee.
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    Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Citibank N.A.
    (Apr 23, 2003)