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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a suit on 24 August 2001 seeking specific performance of an agreement dated 26 March 2001 for the purchase of various plots of land from the defendant. He also filed Notice of Motion No. 2069 of 2001 for interlocutory reliefs customary in suits for specific performance. In the defendant's affidavit in reply the defendant disclosed a memorandum of understanding (M.O.U.) dated 8 August 2001, by which the defendant and a third party (the respondent) agreed to sell and transfer the suit property to the respondent.

Thereafter the plaintiff moved a Chamber Summons to amend the plaint to implead the respondent and to seek a declaration that the M.O.U. dated 8 August 2001 is illegal, unenforceable and not binding on him, alleging the M.O.U. to be collusive and fabricated. The respondent, through counsel Mr. Shah, opposed the Chamber Summons. The Court heard competing submissions and delivered the order summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff may amend the plaint to implead the respondent and seek a declaration that the subsequent M.O.U. dated 8 August 2001 is illegal, unenforceable and not binding on the plaintiff.
  2. Whether the respondent is a necessary or proper party to the suit for specific performance, given the defendant's subsequent agreement with the respondent.
  3. Whether permitting the proposed amendment would introduce a new cause of action or otherwise alter the real matter in controversy in a manner proscribed by Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The M.O.U. dated 8 August 2001 is invalid and not binding on the plaintiff because it was executed during the subsistence of the plaintiff's earlier agreement dated 26 March 2001.
  • The M.O.U. is collusive and fabricated and therefore cannot confer any right in the suit property upon the respondent.
  • Amendment to implead the respondent is necessary to obtain complete and effectual relief in respect of the plaintiff's continuing cause of action (the agreement dated 26 March 2001).

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Shah)

  • The respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit for specific performance.
  • The proposed amendment would introduce a new cause of action and therefore should not be permitted under the provisions governing amendments (relying on Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and authorities such as Kanda v. Waghu).
  • Relied specifically on the Supreme Court judgment in Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra (1995) 3 SCC 147 to support the contention that the respondent need not be impleaded where the subsequent transferee is not a party to the original agreement and no relief was being sought against him in the original pleadings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra, (1995) 3 SCC 147 Contains a discussion whether a person who obtained an independent declaration of interest in property (not party to agreement) is a necessary or proper party in a suit for specific performance; held respondent was not a necessary or proper party in the facts of that case. The Court distinguished this authority on facts: in Anil Singh the plaintiff sought only specific performance and did not seek other declarations against the subsequent purchaser. The Court held Anil Singh's ratio applies only where the plaintiff merely seeks to add a subsequent purchaser without challenging the sale in his favour; it was therefore not a bar to the present amendment.
Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand, AIR 1954 SC 75 Held the proper form of decree where a vendor has dealt with the property subsequently is to direct specific performance between vendor and plaintiff and to direct the subsequent transferee to join in conveyance so as to pass on the title. The Court relied on Durga Prasad as establishing that a subsequent purchaser may be made a party and that the decree can be moulded to compel the subsequent transferee to join in conveyance; this supported allowing the amendment and seeking reliefs against the respondent.
Kafiladdin v. Samirddin, AIR 1931 Cal. 67 Calcutta High Court decision adopting the practice of compelling subsequent transferees to join in conveying title to the plaintiff (followed in Durga Prasad). Cited as authority showing historical and precedential support for directing subsequent transferees to cooperate in passing title; used to bolster the proposition in Durga Prasad.
R.C. Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabbarwal, (1970) 3 SCC 140 Followed the principle in Durga Prasad regarding decrees and subsequent transferees. Referred to as part of a line of Supreme Court decisions affirming the approach in Durga Prasad; used to demonstrate consistency of jurisprudence.
Dwarka Prasad Singh v. Harikant Prasad Singh, (1973) 1 SCC 179 Followed the Durga Prasad approach. Referred to as supporting authority in the line of cases that permit remedial moulding of decrees involving subsequent transferees.
Kanda v. Waghu, AIR 1950 PC 68 Privy Council holding that under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC a court should not allow an amendment which alters the real matter in controversy between the parties. The Court considered this authority and applied its principle as a test: it asked whether the amendment would alter the real matter in controversy and concluded it would not, because the plaintiff's core dispute (his original agreement) remained the real matter in controversy.
Shikharchand v. D.J.P. Karini Sabha, (1974) 1 SCC 675 : AIR 1974 SC 1178 Confirmed that a court may take notice of events occurring after institution of suit and mould relief where subsequent events render original relief inappropriate or where consideration of subsequent events is necessary to shorten litigation or to do complete justice. The Court applied this principle to justify permitting the amendment: subsequent events (the M.O.U.) justified taking notice and moulding relief to do complete justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
Rai Charan v. Biswanath, AIR 1915 Cal. 103 Illustrative precedent cited in Shikharchand regarding taking notice of subsequent events to afford appropriate relief. Referred to through Shikharchand as part of the legal foundation allowing courts to consider events after institution to mould relief; used to support the present decision.
Velammal v. C. Gounder, AIR 1971 Madras 470 Applied the rule that courts may mould decrees according to circumstances at time of decree where subsequent events enlarge or change parties' rights. Cited as an example where a change in circumstances (death of spouse) required a different form of relief; used to illustrate the accepted flexibility of courts in taking subsequent events into account.
In re Sundaram Ayer, AIR 1963 Madras 217 (Full Bench) Expounded that the general rule to determine rights as on commencement of lis is not inflexible and must yield where subsequent events render failure to consider them a cause of grave injustice; recognized court's discretion to adjust rights on subsequent events. Relied upon to reinforce the strength of allowing amendments where defendants had not disclosed subsequent agreements and where subsequent events could affect substantial justice.
Potter v. Sanders, (1846) 67 ER 1057 (English authority) and Fry on Specific Performance (textbook) English practice and commentary on directing subsequent transferees to join in conveyance to pass title. Referred to in Durga Prasad and noted by the Court as part of the authority supporting the remedial approach to decrees involving subsequent transferees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, applying statutory provisions and precedent to the facts disclosed:

  1. Distinction from Anil Kumar Singh: The Court first analysed the decision in Anil Kumar Singh and found it distinguishable. In Anil Singh the plaintiff sought only a decree for specific performance even after impleading a subsequent purchaser; no declaration was sought against that purchaser. By contrast, in the present application the plaintiff sought, in addition to impleading the respondent, a declaration that the subsequent M.O.U. dated 8 August 2001 is illegal and not binding on him. Thus Anil Singh's ratio was held to be limited to cases where the plaintiff merely seeks to add a subsequent purchaser without seeking reliefs against him.
  2. Permissibility of joining subsequent purchasers: The Court observed a long line of authorities (including Durga Prasad and subsequent Supreme Court decisions) that permit adding a subsequent purchaser and moulding relief so as to obtain an effective decree. The proper form of decree described in Durga Prasad — directing specific performance between vendor and plaintiff and directing the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance to pass whatever title he has — was treated as authoritative and applicable.
  3. Test under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC: The Court accepted Mr. Shah's reliance on Kanda v. Waghu as articulating the principle that an amendment which alters the real matter in controversy should not be permitted. The Court applied that test and concluded that the proposed amendment did not alter the real matter in controversy: the core dispute remained the plaintiff's agreement of 26 March 2001 and the plaintiff sought reliefs to obtain complete and effectual enforcement of that right.
  4. Consideration of subsequent events and equity: The Court cited Shikharchand and other authorities (including Madras High Court decisions) confirming that courts may and should take notice of events occurring after institution of suit where necessary to shorten litigation or to do complete justice. The Court emphasised that since the defendant had not disclosed the subsequent M.O.U. before filing the suit, it would be inequitable and improper to deny leave to amend. The option suggested by Mr. Shah — first obtaining a decree and thereafter suing the respondent — was rejected as leading to multiplicity and being contrary to law.
  5. Conclusion on necessity and the nature of amendment: Having considered authorities and equitable considerations, the Court held that adding the respondent and seeking declarations against the M.O.U. were necessary consequences of the defendant's conduct and that the amendment did not change the fundamental character of the suit or substitute a different cause of action or subject matter.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Chamber Summons was made absolute in terms of prayer (a).

Practical consequences and directions given by the Court:

  • The defendant and the respondent were directed to pay the costs of the Chamber Summons fixed at Rs. 1,500/- each.
  • At the request of Mr. Shah the order of allowance was stayed until 1 February 2003.
  • The amendment was ordered to be carried out within six weeks after the stay period expired (i.e., six weeks after 1 February 2003, as per the order's terms).
  • Parties were directed to act on an ordinary copy of the order duly authenticated by the Chamber Registrar/C.S. of the Court.

Implications for precedent and broader law: The opinion applied and distinguished existing Supreme Court authorities and relied on established principles permitting courts to take subsequent events into account and to mould reliefs in suits for specific performance. The judgment did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; it applied existing authorities to the facts and allowed the amendment to avoid multiplicity and to do complete justice between the parties.

Order accordingly.

    Haroon Rashid Nizamuddin Umatiya v. Jivatlal Purtapshi

    1. The plaintiff seeks to amend the plaint by impleading the respondent and seeking a declaration that an agreement entered into between the respondent and the defendant dated 8th August, 2001 is illegal, unenforceable and not binding on him.

    2. The suit was filed on 24th August, 2001, for specific performance in respect of an agreement dated 26th March, 2001 by which the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant various plots of land. The plaintiff filed Notice of Motion No. 2069 of 2001 for the usual interlocutory reliefs in a suit for specific performance. The defendant in his affidavit in reply disclosed the M.O.U dated 8th August, 2001, by which they agreed to sell and transfer the suit property to the respondent. The plaintiff therefore filed the present Chamber Summons.

    3. The plaintiff contends that the M.O.U dated 8th August, 2001 is not valid and binding on him, as it was made invalidly and during the subsistence of his agreement dated 26th March, 2001. The plaintiff has further alleged that the M.O.U dated 8th August, 2001 is a collusive and fabricated document and as such cannot confer any right in the suit property upon the respondent.

    4. Mr. Shah, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent opposed the Chamber Summons on two grounds viz. that the respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party and that the amendment seeks to introduce a new cause of action.

    5. In support of his first submission, Mr. Shah, relied upon on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra Alias Gadasa Guru, (1995) 3 SCC 147. In that case the original plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of a contract by which he agreed to purchase land from the defendant. The plaintiff having died, his son came on record as a legal representative. He sought leave to amend the plaint by impleading the respondent on the basis that the defendant had colluded with his sons and his wife and obtained a collusive decree under the U.P Zimindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Under the decree, the defendant and his said family members became co-sharers of the property. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 8 and 10 held as follows:—

    “8. The question is whether the person who has got his interest in the property declared by an independent decree but not a party to the agreement of sale, is a necessary and proper party to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The question before the court in a suit for the specific performance is whether the vendor had executed the document and whether the conditions prescribed in the provisions of the Specific Relief Act have been complied with for granting the relief of specific performance.

    10. ……………….. The petitioner therein was not claiming this legal status nor through the respondent. In Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand, in a suit for specific performance the subsequent purchaser was held to be a necessary party. In this case the petitioner is merely seeking the specific performance of the agreement of sale. Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, provides that except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by “any party thereto”, and under section 16, though discretionary, created personal bars to relief under given circumstances enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) therein. Therefore, based on the fact situation, the court would mould the relief. The respondent is neither a necessary nor a proper party to adjudicate upon the dispute arising in the suit so as to render an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute involved in this suit.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    6. The judgment of the Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable from the case before me. It must be noticed immediately that in Anil Singh's case, while the respondent was sought to be impleaded as a defendant, nothing further was sought to be done in respect of the plaint. No further declarations or reliefs were claimed. The only relief which the plaintiff continued to seek even after impleading the respondent was a decree for specific performance of the agreement for sale.

    In the application before me, the plaintiff, in addition to impleading the respondent has also sought a decree against the defendant and the respondent for a declaration that the subsequent MOU dated 8th August, 2001 is illegal and not binding on the plaintiff.

    7. Indeed Anil Singh's case itself indicates that it is permissible, in a suit for specific performance to add a subsequent purchaser and seek relief against him. This course has been adopted throughout. The only point at issue in a long line of judgments had been the nature of the decree that the plaintiff ought to seek or be granted in the event of the defendant having entered into an agreement with another party in respect of the property which is the subject matter of the suit. This controversy was resolved by the Supreme Court in Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand, AIR 1954 SC 75. In paragraph 42, the Supreme Court held thus:—

    “42. In our opinion, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor, all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. This was the course followed by the Calcutta High Court in - Kafiladdin v. Samirddin, AIR 1931 Cal. 67 (C) and appears to be the English practice. See Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn. Page 90, paragraph 207, also - Potter v. Sanders, (1846) 67 ER 1057 (D). We direct accordingly”.

    8. Durga Prasad's case was referred to in Anil Singh's without any reservation. It has been followed by the Supreme Court in R.C Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabbarwal in (1970) 3 SCC 140 and in Dwarka Prasad Singh v. Harikant Prasad Singh, (1973) 1 SCC 179.

    9. It is thus clear that there is no question of the subsequent purchaser not being a necessary or a proper party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement. A plaintiff may choose to adopt independent proceedings against a subsequent purchaser simultaneously or later. But that would not disentitle the plaintiff from joining a subsequent purchaser in a suit for specific performance. Indeed it would be appropriate in most cases to bring a composite suit. It would avoid multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary additional expenses.

    It is clear therefore that the ratio in Anil Singh's case is applicable only in cases where the plaintiff merely seeks to add the subsequent purchaser as a defendant without challenging the sale in his favour or seeking any other reliefs against him.

    10. In support of his submission that the amendment ought not to be allowed as it seeks to introduce a new cause of action Mr. Shah relied upon a judgment of the Privy Council in Kanda v. Waghu, AIR 1950 PC 68. In paragraph 12 of the judgment the Privy Council held that it would not be open to a Court under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code to allow an amendment which altered the real matter in controversy between the parties.

    11. The question therefore is whether the proposed amendment alters the real matter in controversy. It does not. In view of the defendant having entered into an agreement subsequent to the plaintiff's agreement, the plaintiff has sought to obtain complete and effectual relief qua his agreement which continues to be the real matter in controversy. This he seeks to do by adding the respondent as a defendant and seeking certain reliefs qua the alleged subsequent agreement. If the plaintiff succeeds it will be open to the Court not only to grant the reliefs specifically sought in the amendment but, either in exercise of its power under the omnibus prayer “(i) such other and further reliefs as the nature and circumstances as the case may require and (be) deemed, just and necessary ………” or even otherwise decree the suit in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Durga Prasad's case. The amendment is a necessary consequence of the defendant and the respondent's conduct. There is no change in the fundamental character of the suit. The basic foundation on which the suit was filed remains the same. Nor does the amendment seek to substitute an existing cause of action or the subject matter of the suit.

    12. As I have already held, it would have been open for the plaintiff, in view of the long line of cases including the judgment of the Supreme Court in Durga Prasad's case to seek such reliefs in the plaint as filed. The plaintiff was however not aware of the subsequent agreement dated 8th November, 2001 when the suit was filed on 24th November, 2001. It would be inequitable and improper then to deny the plaintiff leave to amend. I have no hesitation in rejecting Mr. Shah's submission that the plaintiff must in these circumstances first obtain a decree in this suit and thereafter file a suit against the respondent on the basis thereof. Such a course would not only be contrary to law and result in multiplicity of proceedings but would make a mockery of the process of law.

    13. The Supreme Court in Shikharchand v. D.J.P Karini Sabha, (1974) 1 SCC 675 : AIR 1974 SC 1178, held:—

    “11. ………. Ordinarily, a suit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court including a court of appeal to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (1) by - reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation, or (3) to do complete justice between the parties (See Rai Charan v. Biswanath AIR 1915 Cal. 103)”.

    14. In the present case there is greater reason to allow the amendment. The reliefs claimed in the plaint have not even become inappropriate. The amendment ought to be allowed to do complete justice, to shorten the litigation and to ensure that the decree which may be passed would be effective. If not, while the decree presently prayed for will not become inappropriate it certainly would be inadequate, ineffective and force the plaintiff to file further proceedings as suggested by Mr. Shah. Thus the amendment ought to be allowed to do complete justice between the parties.

    15. In Velammal v. C. Gounder, AIR 1971 Madras 470, the suit as originally filed was one for maintenance, the cause of action being the plaintiff's husband's neglect to maintain her. The husband subsequently expired, as a result of which the plaintiff's right had enlarged giving rise to a claim for partition and separate possession of a half share as and from the date of the death of her husband. A learned single Judge of Madras High Court held as under:—

    “2. …….. Ordinarily the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of the institution of the suit. But where it is shown that the original relief claimed has by reason of the subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate or that it is necessary to have a decision of the court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten the litigation or to do complete justice between the parties, it is incumbent upon the court to take note of the altered circumstances which happened subsequent to the filing of the suit, and mould its decree according to the circumstances at the time the decree is made”.

    16. A full Bench of Madras High Court In re, Sundaram Ayer, AIR 1963 Madras 217 held as under:—

    “4. Broadly and generally stated, the rule is that the rights of parties have to be determined and pronounced upon as on the date of commencement of the ‘lis’ before the court. This is not however a stubborn or inflexible rule and it has to give way in instances where, unless the subsequent events are considered and taken into account, grave injustice would result or the decision of the court would become a mockery. A spouse applies for restitution of conjugal rights. During the pendency of the proceedings, the marriage is dissolved by a decree of competent court. The court dealing with the restitutional application is bound to have regard to the altered circumstances. A landlord sues to evict his tenant on the ground of forfeiture of lease. Before the suit is tried, the term of the lease expires. The court can take notice of this circumstances and grant relief. It would be pedantry to multiply instances. The discretion of the court, under its inherent powers, to adjust the rights of parties on the basis of events happening after the starting of the action, is well recognised and accepted as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. In some cases, it is almost the duty of the court to advert to subsequent events brought to its notice lest it should fail to do substantial justice between the parties”.

    17. I am in respectful agreement with the judgments of the Madras High Court. I would add that the case to allow an amendment where the defendants had not disclosed a subsequent agreement entered into by them before the filing of the suit is stronger.

    18. The Chamber Summons is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The defendant and the respondent shall pay to the plaintiff the costs of this Chamber Summons fixed at Rs. 1500/- each. At the request of Mr. Shah the order is stayed till 1st February 2003. The amendment shall be carried out within six weeks thereafter.

    Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order, duly authenticated by the Chamber Registrar/C.S of this Court.

    Order accordingly.
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    Haroon Rashid Nizamuddin Umatiya v. Jivatlal Purtapshi
    (Dec 16, 2002)