Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

By an office order dated 5-5-1989 respondent No. 2 reverted the petitioner from the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on the ground that the promotion of the petitioner to Assistant Engineer (Civil) by order dated 23-9-1987 was wrongful because the post was reserved for backward class (B.C.) communities and the petitioner did not belong to that quota. The petitioner challenged the reversion order by filing the present writ petition.

Material factual assertions recorded in the petition (and accepted by the Court for the purposes of decision) include: the petitioner was originally resident of Sawargaon, post Pandhurna, District Chhindwara, State of Madhya Pradesh; he received his primary through higher secondary education in Madhya Pradesh (higher secondary passed in 1975 at Pandhurna); he was appointed as Junior Engineer (C) on 26-3-1981 and posted at Chandrapur; he was confirmed in that employment and recommended on 23-9-1987 for promotion to Assistant Engineer (Civil), on which post he began working until reverted on 5-5-1989.

The petitioner claims membership of the Halba tribe and produced a caste certificate (Exh. C) issued by the Tahsildar, Saunsar (Chhindwara) certifying residence in Sawargaon and that Halba is included among Scheduled Tribes. The central factual dispute before the Court was whether the petitioner, being originally from Madhya Pradesh and migrated to Maharashtra for employment, could claim the status and benefits of Scheduled Tribe for the State of Maharashtra.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who is a member of a tribe specified as a Scheduled Tribe in his State of origin (here, Halba in Madhya Pradesh) but who has migrated to another State (Maharashtra) is entitled to claim Scheduled Tribe status and associated benefits in the State of migration.
  2. Whether the employer (respondent No. 2) could determine the petitioner's entitlement to Scheduled Tribe benefits (and act to rectify a promotion) or whether that determination required prior adjudication by the Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims (the "Scrutiny Committee").

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the petitioner initially urged that the petitioner was born in Maharashtra (an oral contention the Court noted was not reflected in the writ petition itself).
  • Counsel contended that the question whether the petitioner was a migrant from Madhya Pradesh was not open to be decided by the employer; that determination could only be made by the Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims (the Scrutiny Committee), and unless the Scrutiny Committee determined that the petitioner was not a Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra the reversion could not be ordered.
  • Counsel relied on several authorities: Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development; Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad; and the Division Bench order in Shri Needish Ashwin v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 1562/2000).

Respondent No. 2's Arguments

  • Respondent's counsel submitted that the petitioner is a migrant to the State of Maharashtra and therefore not entitled to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe benefits in Maharashtra in view of a Government of Maharashtra circular dated 10-5-1990 which excludes migrants from entitlement.
  • Respondent relied on the Apex Court judgment in Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College (1990) and the five-Judge decision in Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra v. Union of India (1994), contending that those authorities support the proposition that migration does not carry Scheduled Tribe status across States for purposes of State-linked benefits.
  • On this basis, respondent maintained that the reversion order dated 5-5-1989 was legal and proper because the petitioner could not legitimately occupy a post reserved for backward-class quota in Maharashtra by claiming ST status as a migrant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development, (1994) 6 SCC 241 Guidelines to be followed for issuance of social status certificates, their scrutiny and their approval (paragraph 13 of that report). The Court held this authority did not assist the petitioner because the present question concerned entitlement to ST benefits in Maharashtra by a migrant in the face of the Government circular of 10-5-1990; the Kumari Madhuri Patil guidelines on certificate issuance were not determinative of the migration issue.
Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, 2000 (1) Supreme 38 Principles on the concepts of domicile and residence (and interpretation of expressions such as "ordinarily reside" and "ordinarily resident") in the context of statutory forms and instructions. The Court found Dudh Nath Prasad to have little relevance to the present controversy because that case concerned meaning of "ordinarily reside" in the context of examination instructions and form proformas, whereas the present dispute related to entitlement to ST benefits when a person is originally resident of another State and later resides in Maharashtra due to employment.
Shri Needish Ashwin v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 1562/2000) — Division Bench order dated Oct 19, 2000 Whether the Caste Scrutiny Committee was justified in rejecting a caste claim merely because the claimant had migrated from another State (the matter in that case involved "Hindu Mahyavanshi" and remand to the Scrutiny Committee). The Court held reliance on that order was misplaced because the facts and legal focus differed; the Needish Ashwin matter was remanded to the Scrutiny Committee on its particular facts and thus did not support the petitioner's position here.
Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College, (1990) 3 SCC 130 Construction of Articles 341 and 342: persons belonging to a caste/tribe specified as Scheduled Caste/Tribe in relation to one State do not automatically carry the protective classification and associated privileges to another State upon migration; interpretation favors State-specific application of the Schedule. The Court relied on Merri Chandra as a principal authority, adopting its reasoning that the petitioner (a migrant from Madhya Pradesh) could not claim the benefits of Scheduled Tribe status in Maharashtra merely because a tribe bearing the same nomenclature is scheduled in Maharashtra; this formed the core of the Court's decision to uphold the reversion order.
Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 244 Affirmed the Merri Chandra position: specification of a caste/tribe as Scheduled in a State depends on disadvantages suffered in that State; migration does not automatically entitle a person to claim SC/ST privileges in the State to which they migrate. The Court treated this five-Judge authority as affirming Merri Chandra and relied on it to conclude that the petitioner was not entitled to ST privileges in Maharashtra as a migrant from Madhya Pradesh; it also supported the validity of the State circular dated 10-5-1990.
Kum Manju Singh v. Dean, B.J. Medical College; Ghanshyam Kisan Borikar v. L.D. Engineering College (High Court decisions cited in Merri Chandra) Taken by some High Courts to mean that classification made by one State could entitle a member of that caste/tribe to benefits under the Constitution irrespective of State of residence. These authorities were identified in Merri Chandra as taking an opposite view to the view ultimately adopted by the Apex Court; they were considered when discussing competing judicial approaches but the Court in the present matter followed the Apex Court's contrary conclusion restricting State-specific applicability.
P.M. Muni Reddy v. Karnataka Public Service Commission (High Court decision cited in Merri Chandra) High Court view supporting the proposition that classification by one State may entitle benefits irrespective of State of residence. Noted as part of the judicial landscape in Merri Chandra; the present Court did not adopt this view but followed the Apex Court's restrictive approach.
K. Appa Rao v. Director of Posts & Telegraphs, Orissa (High Court of Orissa decision cited in Merri Chandra) High Court view that benefits of Scheduled status are available only in the State in respect of which the caste/tribe is specified. Referenced as consistent with the view ultimately adopted by the Apex Court; supported the Court's application that migration does not carry ST status across States.
M.S. Malathi v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division (Full Bench of Bombay High Court cited in Merri Chandra) Full Bench view that Scheduled status is State-specific; benefits available only in the State where the caste/tribe is specified. Noted in Merri Chandra as part of the authorities holding that Scheduled status is State-specific; the present Court followed the Apex Court's endorsement of that approach.
V.B. Singh v. State of Punjab (Punjab & Haryana High Court decision cited in Merri Chandra) High Court view consistent with the principle that Scheduled status benefits are limited to the State in which the caste/tribe is specified. Listed among authorities adopting the State-specific approach; the Court relied on the Apex Court's affirmation of that approach to resolve the dispute against the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in these principal steps (as recorded in the opinion):

  1. Fact-finding: The Court examined the petition and noted the petitioner's own averments that he was originally resident of Sawargaon, Pandhurna, District Chhindwara, Madhya Pradesh, that he obtained his schooling and higher secondary education in Madhya Pradesh (higher secondary passed in 1975), and that he produced a caste certificate issued by the Tahsildar at Saunsar (Chhindwara) establishing Halba tribe membership in Madhya Pradesh.
  2. Nature of the administrative action: The petitioner had been appointed Junior Engineer (C) on 26-3-1981, confirmed after probation, promoted to Assistant Engineer (Civil) on 23-9-1987 (a post reserved against B.C. quota in Maharashtra), and subsequently reverted by respondent No. 2 on 5-5-1989 when it was discovered the promotion was wrongful.
  3. Legal principle from apex authority: The Court relied principally on Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao and the later five-Judge decision in the Action Committee case establishing that the specification of a caste or tribe as Scheduled in relation to one State does not automatically entitle a migrant belonging to that caste/tribe to claim the rights, privileges and benefits of the Scheduled category in another State. The Court emphasized the construction of Articles 341 and 342 and authorities explaining that Scheduled status is, in effect, State-specific for constitutional purposes.
  4. Application to the facts: Applying those authorities, the Court concluded that the petitioner, being originally from Madhya Pradesh and having the Halba tribe certificate from Madhya Pradesh, could not claim the benefits of Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra merely because a tribe of the same nomenclature is scheduled in Maharashtra. The petitioner therefore could not legitimately occupy a post reserved for backward class quota in Maharashtra on the basis of Scheduled Tribe status derived from his State of origin.
  5. Validity of State circular: The Court noted the Government of Maharashtra circular dated 10-5-1990 which excluded migrants from entitlement to SC/ST facilities in Maharashtra; the petitioner had not challenged the circular's legality. The Court found the circular to be consistent with the law laid down by the Apex Court and therefore applicable.
  6. Consideration of authorities relied upon by petitioner: The Court considered Kumari Madhuri Patil (guidelines on social status certificates) and found that it did not assist the petitioner on the migration point; it considered Dudh Nath Prasad (on domicile/residence/ordinarily reside) and found limited relevance; it found the Needish Ashwin Division Bench order inapposite because that matter involved different facts and had been remanded to the Scrutiny Committee.
  7. Conclusion on remedial action: Given that the petitioner was not entitled to claim ST benefits in Maharashtra as a migrant, the Court found no infirmity in respondent No. 2's action to rectify the erroneous promotion by reverting the petitioner to his original post.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that the office order dated 5-5-1989 issued by respondent No. 2 reverting the petitioner from the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) to Junior Engineer (Civil) did not suffer from any infirmity.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The reversion order (5-5-1989) stands; the petitioner may not claim Scheduled Tribe benefits in the State of Maharashtra on the basis of a Scheduled Tribe status acquired in the State of Madhya Pradesh when he migrated for employment. The writ petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.
  • Interim measure: The Court ordered that, upon an oral prayer by the petitioner's counsel, an interim order previously in place shall remain operative for one month.
  • Broader legal impact: The Court applied and followed existing Apex Court authorities (notably Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao and the Action Committee decision) in concluding that migration does not automatically transfer State-specific Scheduled Tribe entitlement; the opinion did not announce a new legal principle beyond the application of those precedents.

Writ petition dismissed.

    Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare v. State Of Maharashtra And Others

    R.M Lodha, J.:— By the order dated 5-5-1989 the respondent No. 2 ordered reversion of the petitioner to the post of Junior Engineer (C) since it was found that the petitioner was wrongfully promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer (C) against the quota reserved for B.C Communities vide order dated 23-9-1987. This office order dated 5-5-1989 is impugned by the petitioner in the present writ petition.

    2. Mr. Mendadkar learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the petitioner was born in Maharashtra and the question whether he is migrant from Madhya Pradesh was not open to be decided by the employer, but could only have been determined by the Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims (For short “the Scrutiny Committee”) and unless that claim was determined holding that the petitioner was not Scheduled Tribe (S.T) the order of reversion could not have been passed. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development, (1994) 6 SCC 241, another judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, 2000 (1) Supreme 38 and the Order of Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1562/2000, Shri Needish Ashwin v. State of Maharashtra decided on October 19, 2000.

    3. Per contra Ms. Baxi learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that the petitioner is migrant to the State or Maharashtra and therefore not entitled to get the benefit of the S.C and S.T in the State of Maharashtra vide circular issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 10-5-1990. According to the learned counsel, the said circular dated 10-5-1990 issued by the Government of Maharashtra is based upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S Medical College, (1990) 3 SCC 130. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 244 and submitted that the order of reversion dated 5-5-1989 is legal and proper.

    4. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner orally submitted that the petitioner was born in Maharashtra, we find that there is no such statement of fact made by the petitioner in the writ petition. Rather, in paragraph 2 of the petition, the petitioner has stated that he was originally resident of village: Sawargaon, post Pandhurna, District Chhindwara in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Meaning thereby the petitioner was born in the State of Madhya Pradesh and is originally resident of the said State. It is further averred by the petitioner in the petition that he got his primary school education till higher secondary examination in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner passed his higher secondary examination in the year 1975 from Pandhurna in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner after having completed his education applied for employment to the respondent No. 2 and by the order dated 26-3-1981 was appointed as Junior Engineer (C) and was posted at Chandrapur. The petitioner claims to have been appointed against the vacant post of Junior Engineer (C) in Workcharged establishment. He has averred that he was confirmed in the employment as Junior Engineer (C) on completion of probation period. The petitioners name was recommended for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) and accordingly vide order dated 23-9-1987 he was promoted on the post of Assistant Engineer and started Working as such. As already indicated above, on 5-5-1989 respondent No. 2 issued the order reverting the petitioner from the post of Assistant. Engineer (Civil II) to the original post of Junior Engineer (Civil) on the ground that the said post was reserved for backward class communities to which the petitioner did not belong and wrongfully promoted.

    5. The nub of the case set up by the petitioner in the writ petition is that he belongs to Halba Tribe which is scheduled Tribe in the State of Maharashtra as well as in the State of Madhya Pradesh and accordingly belongs to Scheduled Tribe in the State of Maharashtra. The petitioner has produced certificate of caste (Exh. C) issued by Tahslidar, Saunsar certifying that the petitioner is resident of Sawargaon, tahsil Saunsar, District: Chhindwara and belongs to Halba Caste and this caste is included in the Scheduled tribes. These facts leave no manner of doubt that the petitioner was born in Madhya Pradesh, got his education in Madhya Pradesh and also obtained his caste certificate belonging to Halba Tribe from the concerned officer in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The question that falls for our consideration is whether the petitioner being of Halba Tribe and original resident of Madhya Pradesh as migrant to the State of Maharashtra can get the benefit of scheduled tribe Halba in the State of Maharashtra.

    6. In Merri Chandra Shekhara Rao (supra), the Apex Court, on construction of Articles 341 and 342 held in paragraphs 10, 12, 20 and 22 of the report thus:

    “10. It has, however, to be borne in mind that a man does not cease to belong to his caste by migration to a better or more socially free and liberal atmosphere. But if sufficiently long time is spent in socially advanced area then the inhibitions and handicaps suffered by belonging to a socially disadvantageous community do not continue and the natural talent of a man or a woman or a boy or girl gets lull scope to flourish. These, however, are problems of social adjustment i.e how far protection has to be given to a certain segment of socially disadvantaged community and for how long to become equal with others is a matter of delicate social adjustment. These must be so balanced in the mosaic of the country's integrity that no section or community should cause detriment or discontentment to other community or part of community or section. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes belonging to a particular area of the country must be given protection so long as and to the extent they are entitled in order to become equal with others. But equally those who go to other areas should also ensure that they make way for the disadvantaged and disabled of that part of the community who suffer from disabilities in those areas. In other words, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of Andhra Pradesh do require necessary protection as balanced between other communities. But equally the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes say of Maharashtra in the instant case, do require protection in the State of Maharashtra, which will have to be in balance to other communities. This must be the basic approach to the problem. If one bears this basic approach in mind, then the determination of the controversy in the instant case does not become difficult. For the purpose of understanding the problem, it may be worthwhile to refer to the Report of the Joint Committee of the Parliament on the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Amendment) Order Bill, 1967. It may also be worthwhile to refer to the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly on September 17, 1949 dealing with draft Articles 303 and 304, which later on became Articles 341 and 342 respectively. Dr. B.R Ambedkar moving the Resolution observed as follows:

    “That after Article 300, the following articles be inserted:

    300-A. (1) The President may, after consultation with the Governor or Ruler of a State, by public notification specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes races or tribes which shall for purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to the State.

    (2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued by the President under clause (1) of this article any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

    300-B. (1) The President may after consultation with the Governor or Ruler of a State, by public notification specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State.

    (2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification issued by the President under clause (1) of this article any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.”

    The object of these two articles, as I stated, was to eliminate the necessity of burdening the Constitution with lone list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It is now proposed that the President, in consultation with the Governor or Ruler of a State should have the power to issue a general notification in the gazette specifying all the castes and tribes or groups thereof deemed to be Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of the privileges which have been defined for them in the Constitution. The only limitation that has been imposed is this: that once a notification has been issued by the President, which, undoubtedly, he will be issuing in consultation with and on the advice of the government of each State, thereafter, if any elimination was to be made from the list so notified or any addition was to be made, that must be made by Parliament and not by the President. The object, is to eliminate any kind of political factors having a play in the matter of the disturbance in the Schedule so published by the President.

    12. It is, however, necessary to give proper meaning to the expressions for the purposes of this Constitution and in relation to that State appearing in Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. The High Court of Gujarat has taken the view in two decisions, namely, Kum Manju Singh v. Dean, B.J Medical College and Ghanshyam Kisan Borikar v. L.D Engineering College to which our attention was drawn, that the phrase for the purposes of this Constitution cannot be and should not be made subservient to the phrase in relation to that State and therefore, it was held in those two decisions that in consequence the classification made by one State placing a particular caste or tribe in the category of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes would entitle a member of that caste or tribe to all the benefits, privileges and protections under the Constitution of India. A similar view has been taken by the Karnataka High Court in the case of P.M Muni Reddy v. Karnataka Public Service Commission. On the other hand, the Orissa High Court in the case of K. Appa Rao v. Director of Posts & Telegraphs, Orissa and the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in M.S Malathi v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division have taken the view that in view of the expression in relation to that State occurring in articles 341 and 342, the benefit of the status of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes would be available only in the State in respect of which the caste or tribe is so specified. A similar view has been taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of V.B Singh v. State of Punjab.

    7. Having regard, however, to the purpose and the scheme of the Constitution which would be just and fair to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, not only of one State of origin but other States also where the Scheduled Castes or Tribes migrate in consonance with the rights of other castes, or community, rights should be harmoniously prospects of weaker sections of society, but while doing so care should be taken not to exclude the legitimate expectations of the other segments of the community.

    22. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to be admitted to the medical college on the basis of Scheduled Tribe certificate in Maharashtra. In the view we have taken, the question of petitioners right to be admitted as being domicile does not fall for consideration.

    8. The view taken in Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao's case has been affirmed and followed by the five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Action Committee on issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra (supra). The question before the Full Bench of the Apex Court was whether a person belonging to a caste or tribe specified for the purposes of the Constitution to be a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in relation to State A migrates to State B., whether caste or tribe in the same nomenclature is specified for the purposes of the Constitution to be the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in relation to that State B, will that person be entitled to claim the privileges and benefits admissible to persons belonging to S.C and/or S.T in the State B?. The Apex Court on consideration of the relevant provisions held in paragraph 16 of the report thus:—

    “16. We may add that considerations for specifying a particular caste or tribe or class for inclusion in the list of Scheduled Castes/Schedule Tribes or backward classes in a given State would depend on the nature and extent of disadvantages and social hardships suffered by that caste, tribe or class in that State which may be totally non est in another State to which persons belonging thereto may migrate. Coincidentally it may be that a caste or tribe bearing the same nomenclature is specified in two States but the considerations on the basis of which they have been specified may be totally different. So also the degree of disadvantages of various elements which constitute the input for specification may also be totally different. Therefore, merely because a given caste is specified in State A as a scheduled Caste does not necessarily mean that if there be another caste bearing the same nomenclature in another State the person belonging to the former would be entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits admissible to a member of the Scheduled Caste of the latter State “for the purposes of this Constitution”. This is an aspect which has to be kept in mind and which was very much in the minds of the Constitution-makers as is evident from the choice of language of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. That is why in answer to a question by Mr. Jaipal Sintih, Dr. Ambedkar answered as under:

    “He asked me another question and it was this. Supposing a member of a Scheduled Tribe living in a tribal area migrates to another part of the territory of India, which is outside both the scheduled area and the tribal area, will he be able to claim from the, local Government, within whose jurisdiction he may; be residing the same privileges which he would be entitled to when he is residing within the scheduled area or within the tribal area? It is a difficult question for me to answer. If that matter is agitated in quarters where a decision; on a matter like this would lie, we would certainly be able to give some answer to the question; in the form of some clause in this Constitution. But so far as the present Constitution stands, a member of a Scheduled Tribe going outside, the scheduled area or tribal area would certainly not be entitled to carry with him the privileges that he is entitled to when he is residing in a scheduled area or a tribal area. So far as I can see, it will be practicably impossible to enforce the provisions that apply to tribal areas or scheduled areas, in areas other than those which are covered by them……”

    9. Relying on this statement of the Constitution Bench ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to admission to the medical college on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin.

    10. Thus the legal position appears to be settled that merely because a given caste or tribe is specified in a particular State as a scheduled caste or tribe does not necessarily mean that if there be caste or tribe bearing the same nomenclature in another State, the person belonging to the former would be entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits admissible to a member of scheduled caste or tribe of the later State. The petitioner, accordingly, being of Halba Tribe and belonging to the State of Madhya Pradesh where said Tribe is a scheduled tribe cannot take the advantages of the Halba Tribe merely because Halba Tribe of the same nomenclature is a scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra. The privileges, rights and benefits admissible to the petitioner being a member of scheduled tribe in the State of Madhya Pradesh cannot be necessarily enjoyed by him in the State of Maharashtra simply because the Tribe bearing the same nomenclature is scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra.

    11. We find that the State of Maharashtra relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Merri Chandra Shekhara Rao (supra) issued a circular on 10-5-1990 that migrants from other States are not entitled to get facilities of scheduled caste/scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra. We may note here that the petitioner has not challenged the legality of the said circular dated 10-5-1990. We even otherwise find that the said circular is in conformity and accord with the law laid down by the Apex Court as aforestated and in view thereof, the petitioner being migrant to the State of Maharashtra from the State of Madhya Pradesh is not entitled to get facilities, benefits and privileges of scheduled caste/scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra. There is no dispute before us that the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) on which the petitioner was promoted was against the quota reserved for B.C class communities. Apparently since the petitioner cannot claim the benefit of scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra being migrant from the State of Madhya Pradesh was not entitled to be promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) against the quota reserved for B.C communities and, therefore, as soon as this error came to the notice of respondent No. 2, the said error is sought to be rectified by reverting the petitioner to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil).

    12. Before we part with the case, we may refer to judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Insofar as Kumari Madhuri Patil's case is concerned, we find that the said judgment does not help the petitioner at all since in that case the Apex Court has issued guidelines to be followed for the purposes of issuance of social status certificate, their scrutiny and their approval as stated in paragraph 13 of the report. In the present case, the question is whether the petitioner as being migrant from the State of Madhya Pradesh to the State of Maharashtra can get benefits to the facilities of scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra on the face of Government Circular dated 10-5-1990. The case in hand is squarely covered by the aforesaid two judgments of the Apex Court in Merri Chandra Shekhara Rao and the Action Committee on issue of caste certificate to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the State of Maharashtra.

    13. Another judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel also does not help. What has been held by the Apex Court in Dudh Nath Prasad's case is with reference to para 5 of the ‘Instructions to the candidates’ contained in the pamphlet issued for Indian Administrative Service etc. Examination 1966 published under the authority of the Government of India and proforma of the form on which the Scheduled Caste Certificate is to be issued as per para 5. The Apex Court in that context held that the concept of domicile and residence are relative concepts and have to be understood in the context in which they are used having regard to the nature and purposes of the Statute in which these words are used. The Apex Court observed that since they were principally concerned with the expression “ordinarily reside”, the same meaning should be given as has been given to the expression “ordinarily resident” used in Section 20 of Representation of People Act, 1950. We find hardly relevance of the judgment of the Apex Court in Dudh Nath Prasads case in the case on hand where we are concerned with the question whether the petitioner is entitled to get the benefits, rights and privileges of scheduled tribe in the State of Maharashtra when he is original resident of Madhya Pradesh and he started residing in Maharashtra only after he got employment in service of respondent No. 2 - Maharashtra State Electricity Board. We are of the considered view that the controversy is concluded rather by the Apex Court judgments in Merri Chandra Shekhar Rao and Action Committee referred to hereinabove.

    14. The reliance placed upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the order, of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1562/2000, Shri Needish Ashwin v. State of Maharashtra decided on October 19, 2000 is also misplaced since we find that the Division Bench of this Court was concerned with the question whether the Caste Scrutiny Committee was justified hr rejecting the claim of the petitioner therein for grant of caste certificate merely on the ground that he is migrated from Gujarat though the petitioner claimed to belong to caste “Hindu Mahyavanshi” which is a scheduled caste in the State of Gujarat as well as in the State of Maharashtra and the matter was remanded to Scrutiny Committee.

    15. For the reasons already indicated above, we have no hesitation in holding that the office order issued by respondent No. 2 on 5-5-1989 does not suffer from any infirmity.

    16. Writ petition accordingly has no merit and is dismissed with no order as to costs.

    17. For a period of one month, upon oral prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the interim order passed by this Court shall remain operative.

    Writ petition dismissed.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sudhakar Vithal Kumbhare v. State Of Maharashtra And Others
    (Mar 23, 2001)