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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a film actress, filed a suit against four defendants associated with the publication of the film journal "Stardust." The defendants include the Publishing House, its Director, the Editor of the journal, and a contributor/reporter. The suit challenges three articles published in the November 2000, December 2000, and January 2001 issues of the journal, alleging that these articles are per se defamatory, false, and malicious, damaging the plaintiff's reputation. The plaintiff seeks damages of Rs. 20 Crores and an injunction restraining the defendants from publishing further defamatory material against her.

The articles in question refer to the plaintiff's personal relationships, particularly alleging clandestine affairs and an adulterous relationship, which the plaintiff claims have harmed her character and reputation. The plaintiff had previously given an interview in the October 2000 issue of the same journal, discussing her break-up with actor Akshay Kumar, which led to subsequent articles reacting to her statements.

The present motion concerns the grant of an injunction against the defendants to prevent further publication of such defamatory content pending the final disposal of the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the three articles published by the defendants are per se defamatory and malicious towards the plaintiff.
  2. Whether the defendants are entitled to publish further articles concerning the plaintiff’s private life and alleged relationships.
  3. Whether an injunction restraining the defendants from republishing the disputed articles or publishing similar defamatory content should be granted pending the final hearing of the suit.
  4. The extent and scope of the injunction that can be granted without being overly vague or wide.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The three articles are defamatory, false, and malicious, severely damaging the plaintiff's reputation and personal life.
  • These articles allege improper relationships and label the plaintiff with derogatory terms, which are scandalous and unwarranted.
  • Reliance on three unreported judgments where injunctions were granted against similar defamatory publications in the film industry.
  • The injunction sought should restrain defendants not only from republishing the disputed articles but also from publishing any similar defamatory material, citing a precedent where a wider injunction was granted.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The defendants justify the publication of the three articles and deny the defamatory nature without filing a formal affidavit in reply.
  • The plaintiff herself initiated publicity by giving an interview about her personal life, thus inviting public commentary and cannot complain about unfavorable publicity.
  • Reliance on the Court of Appeal judgment in Woodward v. Hutchins, which holds that those who seek publicity for favorable light cannot object to unfavorable publicity.
  • Reference to Supreme Court and High Court judgments emphasizing that public figures must endure some criticism and that reputation is based on public opinion rather than self-assessment.
  • Pointed out that the plaintiff continued to give interviews after the disputed articles, which undermines her claim for relief.
  • Submission that the injunction sought is too wide and vague and should be curtailed accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Miss Neelam S. Kothari v. Mr. Ashwin Varde (Unreported, 1995) Grant of injunction restraining republishing defamatory articles in film journalism. Used to support the grant of injunction against republishing defamatory articles by the defendants.
Sharad G. Pawar v. Vinod Mehta (Unreported, 1996) Injunction restraining republishing defamatory material concerning public figures. Supported the argument for injunction restraining republishing or distributing defamatory articles.
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd. v. Magna Publishing Co. Ltd. (Unreported, 1995) Grant of wide injunction restraining publishing defamatory articles and allegations. Used to argue for a broader injunction restraining publication of defamatory material beyond just republishing.
Woodward v. Hutchins, (1977) 1 WLR 760 Public figures who seek publicity in favorable light cannot complain of unfavorable publicity. Defendants relied on this to argue that plaintiff, having opened her personal life to publicity, cannot prevent unfavorable comments.
Kartar Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 541 Public figures must tolerate undeserved criticism and misunderstandings as part of their public role. Supported the defendants' submission that plaintiff must bear adverse public opinion.
Narrotamdas L. Shah v. Patel Maganbhai Revabhai, 1984 Cri LJ 1790 Distinction between character (actual) and reputation (public opinion); relevance of public estimation. Used to emphasize that reputation depends on public opinion, which the plaintiff subjected herself to by media engagement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged that the plaintiff initially gave an interview about her personal life, which justified a limited reaction from the concerned actor involved. However, the court drew a clear distinction between such justified responses and the subsequent publication of articles by third parties that delved deeper into the plaintiff's private life, alleging relationships with other actors and a married man.

The court found that the three articles under challenge were not related to the plaintiff's professional performance but rather targeted her personal life in a manner that was scandalous and defamatory. The court rejected the defendants' reliance on Woodward v. Hutchins, noting that the cited case involved a different factual matrix concerning a public relations officer and confidential information, which did not apply here.

The court emphasized that the public interest did not justify publication of such intrusive and defamatory content about the plaintiff's private life. It held that the articles were per se defamatory and that the defendants could not be permitted to continue publishing similar material pending the final hearing of the suit.

Regarding the scope of the injunction, the court accepted the defendants' submission that the prayer was wide but balanced this by modifying the injunction to restrain republishing the three articles and publishing any defamatory article similar in nature, specifically alleging the plaintiff’s relationships as described. The injunction was made interim and would operate until the suit’s disposal, allowing the defendants to justify the articles at trial.

Holding and Implications

The court granted a modified injunction restraining the defendants from republishing the three disputed articles and from publishing any defamatory articles similar in nature alleging the plaintiff’s relationships with other actors or a married man, effective until the final disposal of the suit.

The defendants’ request for a stay of this order for four weeks was rejected. The direct effect of this decision is to protect the plaintiff’s reputation by preventing further publication of the defamatory material during the pendency of the suit. The court did not set a new precedent but relied on existing principles and prior judgments to balance freedom of expression with protection of reputation in the context of film journalism.

    Shilpa S. Shetty v. Magna Publications Co. Ltd.

    1. Plaintiff is a film actress of some standing. Defendant No. 1 is a Publishing House. Defendant No. 2 is its Director and 3rd defendant is the Editor of a film Journal brought out by the 1st defendant under the name of “Stardust” and defendant No. 4 is one of the contributors and reporters of that Journal. The present suit makes a grievance, that three articles published in November and December 2000 and January 2001 Issues of this Journal, which are annexed at Exhibits A, B and C to the Plaint, are per-se defamatory, false and malicious to the plaintiff's character, Hence, this suit is filed to seek damages of Rs. 20 Crores. The plaintiff has also taken out a Notice of Motion seeking to restrain the defendants from in any way or manner carrying out defamatory allegations and imputations in future against the defendants.

    2. Mr. Maneshinde has appeared for the plaintiff and has drawn my attention to the statements made in the three articles. These statements are quoted in paragraph 4 of the plaint. They are extracts from the three articles which are annexed as Exhibits A, B and C to the plaint. Prior thereto it is stated in paras 3 and 4 of the plaint that during her career since 1992 the plaintiff acted in a number of films as a lead heroin opposite one Akshay Kumar and fell in love with him. However, the relationship ended abruptly. Her interview appeared in the October, 2000 Issue of Stardust which explained her version of this break-up. In the same issue, the interview of this Akshay Kumar was also published giving his version. Thereafter these extracts from Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘C’ are quoted. Amongst others it is stated that as per Exhibit ‘A’ after the break-up with Akshay Kumar, the plaintiff developed a clandestine affair with another actor so much so that she attempted to break-up his relationship with another actress. This trend continues in Exhibit 8. The articles which appeared in the December Issue, is at Exhibit ‘B’ and is written by defendant No. 4. After referring to the alleged relationship with the two actors in bold letters printed on page 37, a question is asked “After all, only men qualify as womanisers. Nobody refers to a woman who changes companions as a ‘maniser’, right?” Then there is the reference to the third article (Exhibit ‘C’) under the caption ‘Scoop the mouth Shilpa's involvement with a married man’. It gives an impression that she is carrying on an adulterous relationship with a married man as stated in para 7 of the plaint.

    3. Mr. Maneshinde submits that these articles bring down the reputation of the plaintiff and since these three articles have appeared one after another, it is time that an injunction ought to be granted against the defendants restraining them through the prayer which is made in the Notice of Motion. Mr. Maheshinde has relied upon three unreported judgments in support. Firstly, he relied upon a judgment in Notice of Motion No. 1847 of 1995 in Suit No. 2691 of 1995 (Miss Neelam S. Kothari v. Mr. Ashwin Varde) which was also filed by a film actress and in that suit also the present defendant Nos. 1 and 3 were joined as defendant Nos. 4 and 1 respectively. In that matter also similar article was printed amongst others in the May 1995 Issue of the same Journal under the caption “Neelam's Steamy Liaison with her Co-star”. An injunction was sought amongst others restraining the defendants from republishing those articles or any defamatory statement about the plaintiff. On behalf of the defendants, a passage from “Gatley on Libel and Slander” (eighth edition para 1574) was relied upon as also “Press Rule” amongst others. The learned Judge (N.D Vyas, J. as he then was) after hearing both the counsel recorded that in his opinion these three articles which had been printed by the defendants gave a distinct impression that the plaintiff was a promiscuous woman. The learned Judge, therefore, granted an injunction in terms of prayer Clause (a) as prayed excluding the bracketed portion. Mr. Virag Tulzapurkar, learned counsel appearing for the defendants, points out that bracketed portion was “or any other defamatory statement about the plaintiff”. Mr. Tulzapurkar therefore submits that an injunction was granted against republishing those very articles but not a general injunction against any defamatory statement in future. In his submission such an injunction would be a vague and wide one.

    4. Mr. Maneshinde, then relied upon another order passed by Vyas, J. on Notice of Motion No. 505 of 1996 in Suit No. 686 of 1996 (Sharad G. Pawar v. Vinod Mehta) filed by Shri Sharad Pawar against Shri Vinod Mehta, Editor of a Journal “Outlook”. In that matter, it was alleged that the plaintiff was having close relations with an undesirable anti social criminal. The learned Judge, after hearing both the parties, granted an injunction restraining the defendants from republishing the article or any part thereof and from printing/distributing any republished article or any part thereof. The third order relied upon by Mr. Maneshinde is passed by my brother A.P Shah, J. on 21st July, 1995 on Notice of Motion No. of 1995 in Suit No. 2525 of 1995 (Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd. v. Magna Publishing Co. Ltd.) taken out by Indian Express Newspapers. That was regarding the publication in the May, 1995 Issue of a magazine called “Island” which is also published by the 1st defendant Publishing House. The article alleged that the 2nd plaintiff-Shri Vivek Goenka had entered into a secret deal with one Rupert Murdoch, an international Press Baron and that the paper was taken over by the concerned Press Baron and that it was a benami transaction with a view to defeat the Government policy. In that matter also an injunction was sought and was granted in terms of prayer (a)(i) of that Motion. That prayer amongst others injuncted the defendants “from in any manner writing, publishing or republishing any article alleging that the plaintiffs are selling and/or transferring ownership and control of Indian Express and the other publication to the said Rupert Murdoch including the Article Exhibit ‘A’ to the plaint”. Mr. Maneshinde, therefore, submits that the injunction granted in the Indian Express case was not confined to republishing the disputed article but was against printing and publishing any article making such allegation and in that sense it was a wider one. In his submission in the present case also a similar order is required to be passed. The articles published by the defendants in their Issues of November, December and January annexed at Exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ to the plaint, are per se defamatory, scandalous and bringing down the reputation of the plaintiff and, therefore, the defendants ought to be restrained from printing these articles or any similar material.

    5. Mr. Virag Tulzapurkar, learned counsel appearing for the defendants states on instructions that they are justifying what is published in the three articles and are proceeding with the final hearing of this Motion on the basic of denial of the statements in the supporting affidaving though without filing any affidavit in reply. He submits that the situation was brought about by the plaintiff herself and she cannot make grievance about it. Mr. Tulzapurkar, learned counsel appearing for the defendants, has relied upon judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Woodward v. Hutchins, reported in the (1977) 1 WLR 760. That was a matter wherein one Hutchins, who was appointed as a Public Relations Officer by a Pop Group, on termination of his service, had gone to the Press and printed articles which showed the Pop Group in less favourable light and hence an action in libel amongst others was taken. The judgment laid down that those who seek and welcome publicity of every kind bearing upon their private lives so long as it shows them in a favourable light, are in no position to complain of an invasion of their privacy by publicity which shows them in an unfavourable light. Mr. Tulzapurkar pointed out that admittedly in the October Issue of Stardust the plaintiff had given interview against Akshay Kumar. That was prior to the disputed articles from November onwards. In that interview she had stated that he was a lier and that he needed a treatment from a psychiatric. It is, in this context, that the reaction of Akshay Kumar was printed in October Issue of “Stardust” and then the disputed articles followed. The submission of Mr. Tulzapurkar is that once the plaintiff opened her personal life for comments, she could not prevent any comments being made by the defendants or others at large and one must take the rough with the smooth.

    6. Mr. Tulzapurkar then relied upon a few passages from two other judgments. Firstly, he relied upon a judgment of the apex Court in the case of Kartar Singh v. The State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1956 SC 541, wherein at the behest of a Minister, the appellant was prosecuted under Section 499 of the Penal Code and in that the apex Court has quoted the observations of Cockburn, C.J in the case of Seymour v. Butterworth, (1862) 3 F & F 372 with approval viz. “Those who fill a public position must not be too thin skinned in reference to comments made upon them. It would often happen that observations would be made upon public men which they know from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and injust; yet they must bear with them and submit to be misunderstood for a time”. The third judgment relied upon by Mr. Tulzapurkar was a judgment of a single Judge of Gujarat High Court (per Ravanji, J. as he then was) in the case of Narrotamdas L. Shah v. Patel Maganbhai Revabhai, reported in 1984 Cri LJ 1790. In that matter, in the context of a strike by the lawyers an article appeared in a newspaper wherein the lawyers, as a class, were described as “Kajia Dalai” and hence, the editor was sought to be prosecuted under Section 499 of Penal Code. In a proceeding to quash the institution of that complaint, the learned Judge has observed in paragraph 21 that ‘character is what a person “actually is”, while reputation is what neighbours and others say “what he is”……It is the estimation in which a person is held by others and not the opinion which he himself may have about himself.’ Mr. Tulzapurkar, therefore, submsits that it is the opinion of others about the plaintiff which is relevant and she having herself permitted to write about her personal life, now she cannot make a grievance of anything being printed against her. Mr. Tulzapurkar points out that the plaintiff had given interviews in other journals which are published even after the articles disputed in the present Suit. His submission, therefore, is that this conduct should dis-entitle the plaintiff from claiming the relief which she has claimed.

    7. I have heard both the learned counsel at length and considered the submissions canvassed by them. No doubt, it is true that the plaintiff did write her article or gave interview first against another actor and, therefore, the journal cannot be criticized for printing the reaction of the concerned actor to her interview. The question is whether the defendants were entitled to write anything thereafter particularly about her personal life as to whether she was having a relationship with a third actor or whether she was having a relationship with a married man and then to call her a ‘maniser’ in the manner in which men are called ‘womanisers’. The answer will have to be in the negative. The articles are not on plaintiff's performance as an artist and cannot be defended as a part of film journalism on that count also. The articles bring down the reputation of the plaintiff and have the impact on her personal life and show her in an undesirable manner to the world at large. The authority relied upon by Mr. Tulzapurkar in the case of Woodward v. Hutchins (supra) is in a situation where a Pop Group itself had appointed a Public Relation Officer and that officer has subsequently gone to the Press and printed the articles. It is in that context that the House of Lord has observed that “In these cases of confidential information it is a question of balancing the public interest in maintaining the confidence against the public interest in knowing the truth’ and then it is observed that. “The reason is because the interest of the public in knowing the truth outweights the interest of a plaintiff in maintaining his reputation” and further that “These Courts rarely, if ever, grant an injunction when a defendant says he is going to justify.” In the present case, the plaintiff having given an interview herself, she exposed herself to reaction by the concerned actor. To that limited extent the submission of Mr. Tulzapurkar is right and the plaintiff cannot make a grievance on that. Question is whether some others like the defendants, who are third parties, have a right to write further articles and dwell upon the private life of the plaintiff and as to whether she has relationship with some others including another married man. Here again, what one has to sec is whether it is in public interest in the sense that whether it is the interest of society that such articles ought to be printed about the private life. The answer will have to be in the negative. The three articles are per-se defamatory as claimed by the plaintiff and the defendants cannot be permitted to go ahead to print any further articles of the like nature.

    8. Mr. Tulzapurkar submitted that the prayer made in the present Motion is a wide one and it will have to be curtailed. The submission of Mr. Tulzapurkar in this behalf is well taken, but at the same time, the tenor of the articles has to be seen, what is indicated in those articles has to be noted and it cannot be ignored that the prayer has been sought in that context. The injunction sought by the plaintiff will therefore be granted in a modified form. Therefore as directed in the case of Indian Express Newspapers (supra), a modified injunction is hereby granted restraining the defendants from republishing the three articles and/or from writing and publishing any defamatory article in the nature of the three articles (which are disputed in the present Suit) alleging that the plaintiff is having relationship with other actors or a married man, which will operate till the disposal of the suit. It is for the defendants to justify these articles when the suit is heard and decided but in the meanwhile, the above-referred injunction will continue to operate.

    9. The Motion is made absolute in terms of the above order.

    10. Mr. Tulzapurkar for the defendants requests for stay of this order for a period of four weeks. Request is rejected.

    Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Shilpa S. Shetty v. Magna Publications Co. Ltd.
    (Jan 12, 2001)